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    <title>DEV Community: ankush1982</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by ankush1982 (@ankush1982).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/ankush1982</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: ankush1982</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/ankush1982</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Add AI agents to your access review in three checks (owner, scope, stop and evidence)</title>
      <dc:creator>ankush1982</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 11:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/ankush1982/add-ai-agents-to-your-access-review-in-three-checks-owner-scope-stop-and-evidence-hg7</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/ankush1982/add-ai-agents-to-your-access-review-in-three-checks-owner-scope-stop-and-evidence-hg7</guid>
      <description>&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  Add AI agents to your access review in three checks
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Treat each AI agent like an entitlement in your next access review, and ask three questions of it. Who owns it? What can it reach? How do you stop it, and what evidence shows that you can?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A thread on r/grc asked the question that started this. &lt;a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/grc/comments/1xrt4bv/are_your_access_reviews_including_ai_agent/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;u/TheAccountableAgent asked&lt;/a&gt; whether access reviews include AI agent permissions. They noted that coding agents now store "always allow" rules locally, and that Apiiro had reported 1,379 secrets in public copies of one tool's settings file. Their approach: treat each saved agent permission like an IAM entitlement with an owner, a business reason, the data it reaches and a review date. They asked how others evidence this for auditors.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;My answer builds on an argument I made in &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/agents-dont-go-rogue-scopes-do-ankush-v7off/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Agents don't go rogue. Scopes do.&lt;/a&gt; Scope is what an agent can technically do whatever its instructions say: the identities it holds, the tools it can call, the hosts it can reach and the actions it can take without a human. The people who deploy an agent set its scope. "Out of scope and nothing stopped it" is a finding, and a finding can be owned, fixed and audited.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Check 1: Who owns the agent?
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href="https://nachi065.github.io/AI-Security-Wiki/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AI Security Wiki&lt;/a&gt;'s Agentic AI Security and Tool Governance standard says no agent should be approved until its owner, identity, tools, APIs, data boundary, approval workflow, logging, kill switch and SOC integration are defined.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The r/grc replies add the practical detail:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Split the owner in two.&lt;/strong&gt; LogicManager suggested separating the technical maintainer from the business owner. The maintainer explains how the permission is configured. The business owner explains why the agent needs it. The person who configured the permission shouldn't become its business owner by default.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Expect orphans.&lt;/strong&gt; Ok_Statistician_997 said the owner field trips people up. A dev sets the permission, changes teams and nobody updates it. Tying the review date to the service account's own access cycle helped them stop it drifting.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Make a move trigger a review.&lt;/strong&gt; LogicManager again: a developer changing teams should trigger a review, not an assumption that the permission is still appropriate.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Decide your source of truth first.&lt;/strong&gt; AlwaysAnotherShot pointed out that many of these permissions live in a settings file on a developer's laptop. If endpoint tooling can collect the config files, sample from that like any entitlement list. If not, you rely on developers self-declaring, and the control description should say so plainly.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Check 2: What can it reach?
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is the scope inventory. One row per agent. Here is a sketch built from the fields the thread and the wiki name. The field names are mine.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight yaml"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="na"&gt;agent&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;support-triage-bot&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;purpose&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"Summarise and label inbound tickets"&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;business_owner&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; 
&lt;span class="na"&gt;technical_maintainer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; 
&lt;span class="na"&gt;identity&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;own workload identity&lt;/span&gt;   &lt;span class="c1"&gt;# not a person's login, not a shared key
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="na"&gt;tools&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;ticket.read&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;ticket.label&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;hosts_reachable&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;tickets.internal.example&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;data_scope&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"Ticket text only"&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;secrets_in_agent_environment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;none&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;can_modify_credentials&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="kc"&gt;false&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;actions_without_human&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;label&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;approval_required_for&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;delete&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;send&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;change-permissions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;last_reattested&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="mi"&gt;2026-11-01&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;next_review&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; 
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Fields to include, all from the sources:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Owner, purpose, data scope, connected tools, secrets, approval boundaries, and whether the agent can create or modify other credentials (macromind on r/grc).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Effective permissions and recent use at each review. Flag dormant grants and broad wildcard access (macromind).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Wildcard "always allow" rules on shell commands, or anything that can read .env files: treat as a finding by default, with a written exception and an expiry date (AlwaysAnotherShot).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then check the inventory against how the agent is actually wired. The r/AskNetsec thread on &lt;a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/AskNetsec/comments/1xsjwoa/most_common_beginner_mistakes_in_securing_ai/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;beginner mistakes securing agent credentials&lt;/a&gt; gives a quick list of what to look for:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A shared admin key "for testing", tokens kept overnight, and tool calls logged without the human, task and scope behind each request. That is the original poster's own list.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A single token with both read and write scope because it was quicker, so an agent that only needed to look things up can also delete (Secvura).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An agent running on its own broad service account rather than on-behalf-of the user. Economy_Dust_9606 calls this the confused deputy problem: prompts can then bypass the user's permissions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Secrets where the model can see them. Secvura recommends keeping them in the tool layer so the agent calls a tool by name and the tool attaches the credential.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Also test chains. macromind notes the hard part is chained actions, since a low-privilege agent may gain material reach through an authorised integration.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Check 3: How do you stop it, and what is the evidence?
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The stop.&lt;/strong&gt; The Builder Track maps two controls to OWASP's ASI10 Rogue Agents entry: a named owner, and a blast-radius cap with a kill switch. "Exists" is a runbook. "Operated" is a dated test and a revocation propagation table. The wiki's TC-D09-016 test case disables an agent and measures how long each system keeps accepting its tokens. EbbCommon9300 describes a design where revoking an agent means denying it at a broker, instead of hunting down every token it touched.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The record.&lt;/strong&gt; If the compromised agent wrote the entry, the entry isn't evidence. The fix, step B10 in the Builder Track, is an independent writer: the policy gateway logs every decision, denials included, each entry carries the hash of the one before, and the latest hash sits where the agent cannot write. EbbCommon9300 makes the same point on r/AskNetsec: write the log at the broker (agent identity, session, tool, arguments, allow or deny, who approved) and make it append-only or hash-chained, so the thing being audited can't edit its own record.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What the reviewer should ask for, per agent:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Control&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Exists&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Operated (what to sample)&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Inventory and ownership&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Registry with owner fields&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Owner history, leaver handling, re-attestation records&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Scoped, short-lived identity&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Policy stating scopes and lifetimes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Issuance logs with actual scopes and TTLs&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Per-action authorisation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Policy engine on the diagram&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Decision logs with denials, tied to principals&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Kill switch&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Runbook&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Dated test and a revocation propagation table&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Independent audit log&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Retention settings&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hash-chain verification and a sample reconstruction&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Source for the table: the wiki's AI Security Audit and Evidence Checklist, as I summarised it in the LinkedIn article. Only the "operated" column supports an opinion that the controls worked.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For the thread's evidence question, AlwaysAnotherShot's answer is a good minimum: a dated export of the configs, the reviewer's sign-off per agent, and tickets for anything revoked.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Do this first
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Pick the population source for agents: endpoint config collection, or developer self-declaration stated plainly.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Add the inventory fields above, with a business owner and a technical maintainer.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Add a re-attestation date and an automatic restriction for agents whose owner doesn't respond.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Move the audit log to a writer the agent cannot reach, and chain the entries.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Run one kill-switch test, date it, and record how long tokens kept working.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What does your review use today as the source of truth for agent permissions?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The AI Security Wiki is co-authored with &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/nachiket-sathaye/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Nachiket Sathaye&lt;/a&gt; and published under CC BY-SA 4.0. OWASP is a trademark of the OWASP Foundation.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  aisecurity #grc #devsecops #agents
&lt;/h1&gt;

</description>
      <category>agents</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Stop keeping security rules in the prompt: a deterministic check engine for code from AI assistants</title>
      <dc:creator>ankush1982</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 11:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/ankush1982/stop-keeping-security-rules-in-the-prompt-a-deterministic-check-engine-for-code-from-ai-assistants-2bkl</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/ankush1982/stop-keeping-security-rules-in-the-prompt-a-deterministic-check-engine-for-code-from-ai-assistants-2bkl</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A security rule in a prompt depends on the assistant remembering it. I wanted the rule in code that gives the same answer every time, so I built &lt;a href="https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Secure &amp;amp; Private by Design&lt;/a&gt;. Version 0.2.0 is out under Apache-2.0.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The engine is called &lt;code&gt;sbd&lt;/code&gt;. It runs as a CLI, as pre-commit hooks, as a GitHub Action and as an MCP server, and all four share one rule set. An assistant can explain a finding and propose a fix. It does not decide what the findings are.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What it finds
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is &lt;code&gt;sbd check&lt;/code&gt; on the sample app in &lt;code&gt;mcp-server/test/fixtures/clinic-app&lt;/code&gt;, trimmed. I ran it on v0.2.1.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;Manifest: privacy-security-manifest.yaml (schemaVersion 0.2)
Regimes:  nist-ssdf-1.1, iso-27001-2022, dpdp-2023

  1. [CRITICAL] SBD-SCAF-001 Missing src/privacy/consent. (Consent scaffold).
 10. [HIGH] SBD-FIELD-001 prisma/schema.prisma:5 — Field dateOfBirth looks personal or sensitive but no dataCategory lists it.
 12. [HIGH] SBD-CODE-002 src/routes/patients.ts:19 — Log call references a field the manifest classifies as personal or sensitive.
       console.log('loaded patient', patient.email);
       → Route the value through the redacting logger in src/security/audit_log.
 13. [HIGH] SBD-CODE-003 src/services/triage.ts:6 — Model inference call with no decision-log call within 15 lines.
 16. [MEDIUM] SBD-CODE-001 src/routes/patients.ts:12 — Handler mutates data without an auditLog() call within 40 lines.

17 finding(s): 2 critical, 11 high, 3 medium, 1 low, 0 info.
This report lists control gaps. It is not a compliance determination.
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Each finding has a stable rule ID, a severity, a location and the regime controls it maps to. Output comes as text, JSON or SARIF 2.1.0. Exit code &lt;code&gt;0&lt;/code&gt; means nothing at or above &lt;code&gt;--fail-on&lt;/code&gt; (default &lt;code&gt;high&lt;/code&gt;), &lt;code&gt;1&lt;/code&gt; means findings, and &lt;code&gt;2&lt;/code&gt; means a usage or runtime error.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Secrets and personal data
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;sbd scan&lt;/code&gt; needs no manifest. I gave it four fake values on stdin:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;  1. [CRITICAL] SBD-SECRET-001 :1 — Hardcoded AWS access key ID.
       const k = "AKIA****************";
  2. [HIGH] SBD-PII-002 :2 — Value matches the PAN format. Personal data does not belong in the repository.
       const pan = "**********";
  3. [HIGH] SBD-PII-003 :3 — Value looks like an Indian mobile number. Personal data does not belong in the repository.
       const phone = "**********";
  4. [HIGH] SBD-PII-004 :4 — Value looks like a person's email address. Personal data does not belong in the repository.
       const mail = "********************";
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The report masks each value. Aadhaar numbers are matched with their checksum. Placeholder values such as &lt;code&gt;@example.com&lt;/code&gt; addresses are skipped.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Rules are patterns over your code and data files, so a clean report does not prove the data is absent.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Try it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The engine ships as prebuilt bundles and needs only Node.js 20+. It is not on the npm registry yet.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;git clone &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--branch&lt;/span&gt; v0.2.1 https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design
&lt;span class="nb"&gt;cd&lt;/span&gt; /path/to/your/repo
node /path/to/ai-secure-by-design/dist/sbd.mjs check
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;To set up a project, pick your regimes:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;sbd init &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--non-interactive&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--regime&lt;/span&gt; nist-ssdf-1.1,iso-27001-2022
sbd validate
sbd deploy &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--dry-run&lt;/span&gt;
sbd deploy
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;init&lt;/code&gt; writes a draft &lt;code&gt;privacy-security-manifest.yaml&lt;/code&gt;. It leaves &lt;code&gt;dataCategories&lt;/code&gt; empty and lists personal-looking fields as &lt;code&gt;TODO(user):&lt;/code&gt; comments, because classification is your call. &lt;code&gt;deploy&lt;/code&gt; copies the scaffolds the manifest requires and leaves files you have edited alone unless you pass &lt;code&gt;--force&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For commits, add the hooks through &lt;a href="https://pre-commit.com" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;pre-commit&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight yaml"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="na"&gt;repos&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;repo&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;rev&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;v0.2.1&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;hooks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;id&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;sbd-secrets&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;id&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;sbd-check&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;id&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;sbd-provenance&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;git commit --no-verify&lt;/code&gt; turns local blocking off, so make the GitHub Action a required check. The workflow template is &lt;code&gt;templates/.github/workflows/secure-by-design.yml&lt;/code&gt;. It uploads SARIF to code scanning and fails the build on findings at or above &lt;code&gt;fail-on&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What lands in your repo
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;sbd deploy&lt;/code&gt; adds scaffolds as ordinary code you can edit or delete: consent, data rights, retention, breach notification, a children's data gate, RBAC, audit logging, security headers, PHI redaction, AI decision logs and a human oversight gate. TypeScript + Express and Python + FastAPI are covered. Next.js is planned.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One YAML manifest records your data categories, regimes, retention and consent. Only the regimes you list are enforced: NIST SSDF 1.1, ISO 27001:2022 Annex A controls for the dev and SDLC slice, and India's DPDP Act 2023.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  AI-specific checks
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Add &lt;code&gt;ai-security-wiki&lt;/code&gt; to your regimes to turn on checks from the &lt;a href="https://nachi065.github.io/AI-Security-Wiki/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AI Security Wiki&lt;/a&gt;, which I co-author with &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/nachiket-sathaye/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Nachiket Sathaye&lt;/a&gt;. That adds rules for model output reaching &lt;code&gt;eval&lt;/code&gt;, a shell, HTML or SQL; unsafe model loading; &lt;code&gt;trust_remote_code&lt;/code&gt;; unpinned models and MCP servers; remote MCP over HTTP; auto-approved tools; and agents run with approvals off.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;sbd evidence&lt;/code&gt; then plans audit evidence for the wiki's 46 AI controls, showing each as &lt;code&gt;gap&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;checked&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;manual&lt;/code&gt;. &lt;code&gt;checked&lt;/code&gt; only means the automated checks found nothing, so it does not show a control works.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What it does not do
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It is not a compliance certification, legal advice or a substitute for a Data Protection Officer or counsel.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It does not detect names, postal addresses, clinical free text in code, or personal data in production databases or logs.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The DPDP scaffolds have not had a legal review.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The repo's tests cover the CLI, git hooks, GitHub Action and MCP server.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The fallback hook scripts for machines without Node.js cover secrets only.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Everything runs locally, with no telemetry and no hosted service. The &lt;a href="https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design/releases/tag/v0.2.1" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;v0.2.1 release notes&lt;/a&gt; cover upgrades and known limits, and the &lt;a href="https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design/blob/main/ROADMAP.md" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;roadmap&lt;/a&gt; lists what comes next. If it's useful, please &lt;a href="https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;star the repo&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>opensource</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>showdev</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AAISM, AAIA, AAIR or AIGP: pick the one that matches your job</title>
      <dc:creator>ankush1982</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 17:04:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/ankush1982/aaism-aaia-aair-or-aigp-pick-the-one-that-matches-your-job-5a4e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/ankush1982/aaism-aaia-aair-or-aigp-pick-the-one-that-matches-your-job-5a4e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Each of these four AI credentials tests a different job, so the quickest way to choose is to ask which of those jobs you already do. Three come from ISACA and one from the IAPP, and they are not four levels of one ladder.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The short version
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;AAISM&lt;/strong&gt; (ISACA Advanced in AI Security Management): you run or advise a security programme and now own AI risk inside it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;AAIA&lt;/strong&gt; (ISACA Advanced in AI Audit): you audit or give assurance, and AI systems are now in scope.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;AAIR&lt;/strong&gt; (ISACA Advanced in AI Risk): you run IT risk and need to recommend a response to AI risk.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;AIGP&lt;/strong&gt; (IAPP Artificial Intelligence Governance Professional): you set or run AI governance, often from a privacy, legal or policy seat, and you don't hold a security or audit credential yet.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Side by side
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Facts below are from the issuers' own pages, checked on 30 October 2026. Fees change; confirm them before you register.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;AAISM&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;AAIA&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;AAIR&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;AIGP&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Issuer&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISACA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISACA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISACA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;IAPP&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Prerequisite&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Active CISM or CISSP (&lt;a href="https://www.isaca.org/credentialing/aaism" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ISACA&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;CISA, or another listed designation held by someone in an IT audit or advisory role (&lt;a href="https://www.isaca.org/credentialing/aaia" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ISACA&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;One of a listed set, including CISA, CISM, CRISC, CGEIT, CDPSE and CISSP (&lt;a href="https://www.isaca.org/credentialing/aair" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ISACA&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;None listed (&lt;a href="https://iapp.org/certify/faqs/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IAPP FAQ&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Questions&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;90 (&lt;a href="https://www.isaca.org/credentialing/aaism/aaism-exam-content-outline" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;outline&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;90 (&lt;a href="https://www.isaca.org/credentialing/aaia/aaia-exam-content-outline" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;outline&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;90 (&lt;a href="https://www.isaca.org/credentialing/aair/aair-exam-content-outline" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;outline&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;100 (&lt;a href="https://iapp.org/certify/faqs/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IAPP FAQ&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Domains&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Governance and programme management 31%, risk management 31%, technologies and controls 38%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Governance and risk 33%, operations 46%, auditing tools and techniques 21%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Risk governance and framework integration 37%, life cycle risk management 21%, risk programme management 42%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Four domains: foundations of AI governance; laws, standards and frameworks; governing AI development; governing AI deployment and use (&lt;a href="https://prod.iapp.org/media/pdf/certification/AIGP_Cert_BOK_2025_FINAL_v2.1.0.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Body of Knowledge 2.1&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Exam fee, member / non-member&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;US$459 / US$599&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;US$459 / US$599&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;US$459 / US$599&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;US$649 / US$799 (&lt;a href="https://store.iapp.org/aigp-exam/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IAPP store&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Pass mark&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;450 on a 200–800 scale (&lt;a href="https://www.isaca.org/-/media/files/isacadp/project/isaca/certification/aaism/aaism-exam-candidate-guide.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;candidate guide&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISACA scaled score&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISACA scaled score&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;300 (&lt;a href="https://iapp.org/certify/faqs/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IAPP FAQ&lt;/a&gt;)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The three ISACA exams share a fee and a 90-question format, so the choice between them comes down to the job you do. AIGP is the only one of the four with no credential prerequisite.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of these pages gives an Indian-rupee fee. All four are priced in US dollars.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  One scenario, four answers
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The domain weights tell you what each exam cares about. A single scenario shows it better.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;An organisation has put an AI agent into production. It can update customer records. Nobody is listed as its owner, and it runs under a developer's credentials.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An &lt;strong&gt;AAISM&lt;/strong&gt; question asks what the security manager does first. Getting an accountable owner in place comes first, because access, risk acceptance and monitoring all depend on someone owning the agent's scope. Controls follow.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An &lt;strong&gt;AAIA&lt;/strong&gt; question asks what the auditor reports and what evidence they need. The missing owner and the shared credentials are findings. The auditor doesn't fix them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An &lt;strong&gt;AAIR&lt;/strong&gt; question asks how the risk is assessed and which response to recommend, and whether it sits inside appetite.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An &lt;strong&gt;AIGP&lt;/strong&gt; question is more likely to ask which policy, law or framework obligation applies, and who in the governance structure decides.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The facts stay the same while the best answer changes with the role. If one of those questions feels like your day job, that's your credential.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  AAISM next to CISM
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;AAISM requires an active CISM or CISSP, so it doesn't replace either. It assumes you already know how to run a security programme and tests whether you can apply that to AI systems: model and data risk, AI-specific controls, and governance of tools your organisation didn't build. If you hold CISM, AAISM extends it. If you hold neither CISM nor CISSP, you can't sit AAISM yet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Is it worth it?
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It depends on your job. If AI risk has landed on your desk as a security, risk or audit lead, the ISACA exam that matches your role will test the decisions you're already being asked to make. If you sit in governance, privacy or legal and don't hold a security or audit credential, AIGP is the one you can sit today.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;I passed AAISM in 2026 and built &lt;a href="https://cyberque.app" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;CyberQue&lt;/a&gt;, an AAISM practice-exam app with original questions written to ISACA's published outline. They are practice questions, not real exam questions. CyberQue is not affiliated with or endorsed by ISACA or the IAPP. AAISM, AAIA, AAIR, CISM, CISA, CRISC, CGEIT and CDPSE are trademarks of ISACA; AIGP is a trademark of the IAPP; CISSP is a trademark of ISC2.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Further reading: &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-i-chose-pursue-aaism-isaca-ankush-jain-cissp-ccsp-iso-la-6tyoc/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Why I chose to pursue AAISM&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>infosec</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Security &amp; Privacy Plugin</title>
      <dc:creator>ankush1982</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 14:25:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/ankush1982/security-privacy-plugin-1m8n</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/ankush1982/security-privacy-plugin-1m8n</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Just released v0.2.1 of an open-source tool i built. it runs the same security and privacy checks whichever AI wrote the code: secrets, Aadhaar, PAN, mobile numbers and emails get blocked at commit and in CI, and reports mask the value.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It ties findings to NIST SSDF, ISO 27001 and the DPDP Act. It isn't a compliance certification, but it does show your control gaps.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If it's useful, please star the repo. it helps others find it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/ankush1982/ai-secure-by-design&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>mcp</category>
      <category>grc</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agents don't go rogue. Scopes do. Five controls, in config</title>
      <dc:creator>ankush1982</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 07:33:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/ankush1982/agents-dont-go-rogue-scopes-do-five-controls-in-config-5169</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/ankush1982/agents-dont-go-rogue-scopes-do-five-controls-in-config-5169</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;If your agent can reach the internet, hold a long-lived key and write its own logs, it doesn't need to "go rogue" to cause an incident. It just needs a task and an open door.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's the practical reading of this year's agent incidents. OpenAI's &lt;a href="https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/67869394-cb91-4c12-888c-5cbd85c7814c/OpenAI-Hugging-Face%20Incident-Technical-Report.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;technical report&lt;/a&gt; says agents in a July 2026 cyber evaluation, run with certain safeguards disabled, exploited a flaw in an internal package-mirror service to reach the internet. They then used publicly exposed credentials, together with vulnerabilities in Hugging Face's own infrastructure, to compromise parts of its production systems. The &lt;a href="https://swarmtraces.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;swarmtraces report&lt;/a&gt;, by authors from Parse, Palisade Research and others, says the agents appear to have started with GET-only access and still got code execution by chaining a screenshot service and an HTTP mirror.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;OpenAI's &lt;a href="https://openai.com/hugging-face-incident-and-misalignment/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;incident page&lt;/a&gt; sorts the activity into five categories. Each maps to a control you can express in config and test in CI. The examples below come from the &lt;a href="https://nachi065.github.io/AI-Security-Wiki/24_Builder_Track/01_Secure_Your_First_Agent.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Builder Track&lt;/a&gt; of the AI Security Wiki I co-author with &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/nachiket-sathaye/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Nachiket Sathaye&lt;/a&gt;, published under &lt;a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;CC BY-SA 4.0&lt;/a&gt;. They're teaching code for one example agent, not a product, and the page says so: the token format exists to show the checks a gateway must make, not to be copied into production.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The one design rule
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Treat the model as an untrusted component. Every power the agent has is enforced by code outside the model, which decides from three things only: who the agent is, what the policy says, and the exact arguments of the call. The wiki's &lt;a href="https://nachi065.github.io/AI-Security-Wiki/00_Foundations/05-Agents-Identity-and-Excessive-Agency.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;agent identity page&lt;/a&gt; frames it as advisory output, enforced authority. The model proposes. A deterministic guard decides, and logs the decision.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. Access control bypass: authorise the call, not the session
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Register each agent with an owner, a purpose, its tools and its budget. The guard refuses any call from an agent that isn't registered, and checks each tool call against this block:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight json"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"agent://support-triage"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"owner"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"support-platform-team@example.com"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"purpose"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"Read tickets and docs, draft replies for human approval"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"tools"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"read_file"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"http_get"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"send_email"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;],&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"rate_per_minute"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="mi"&gt;30&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"max_actions"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="mi"&gt;200&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Excerpt from the wiki's example &lt;code&gt;policy.json&lt;/code&gt;: one member of a larger object, reformatted (the &lt;code&gt;tools&lt;/code&gt; array is on one line here).&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Where a real user is present, exchange the user's token for one limited to both that user's rights and the agent's task, so the agent can never do more than the user may. An agent that runs on a shared service account is a confused deputy waiting to happen.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. Exposed credentials: egress limits, no secrets in the agent, narrow tokens
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In OpenAI's category, agents found other people's keys online and used them directly against the services those keys unlock. Your gateway never sees that call. What contains it is egress: if the agent can reach only named hosts (section 5), a found key has nowhere to go. The second control is that the agent holds no secrets worth finding. Keep credentials out of its environment and out of reach of the code it generates (section 4).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For the credentials you do issue to agents, the wiki's token issuer caps lifetime at 15 minutes whatever the caller asks for, binds each token to one audience, compares signatures in constant time, and only lets a sub-agent's token subtract scopes, tools and time from its parent's. Your gateway should accept only tokens your issuer minted. Swarmtraces describes a script that ranked found tokens by permission breadth, with wildcard verbs and resources scoring highest, and used the five highest-scoring ones to request more private data. A token used as soon as it's found barely notices a short lifetime, so narrow scope matters more than lifetime.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. Query or command injection: limit where calls go, then validate arguments outside the model
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In OpenAI's category, the agent was the one sending injection payloads to other people's services. The first control is the host allowlist in section 5. The second keeps your own tools from becoming the delivery vehicle. Put the rules for each tool in the policy file, where a reviewer can read them without reading code:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight json"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"send_email"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"scopes"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"mail:send"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;],&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"approval"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"always"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"args"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"to"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"type"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"email"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"domains"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"example.com"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;},&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"subject"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"type"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"string"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"max_len"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="mi"&gt;120&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;},&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"body"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"type"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"string"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"max_len"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="mi"&gt;4000&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Excerpt from the wiki's example &lt;code&gt;policy.json&lt;/code&gt;: one member of a larger object, reformatted, with the pinned definition hash omitted.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The guard rejects unknown arguments, resolves paths (symlinks included) before checking they stay inside an allowed root, rejects URLs that resolve to private or internal addresses, and passes only the cleaned arguments to the tool. Common mistakes the wiki calls out: checking path text for &lt;code&gt;..&lt;/code&gt; instead of resolving it, and allow-listing hosts with a string prefix test, which &lt;code&gt;docs.example.com.evil.net&lt;/code&gt; passes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. Runtime internals: a sandbox that is a boundary
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One payload in the swarmtraces data ran on Hugging Face's dataset workers and went after &lt;code&gt;/proc/self/environ&lt;/code&gt;, where a process's startup environment, often including credentials, lives. That was the victim's worker running attacker-supplied content, and your agent's generated code is the same kind of untrusted input. A process wrapper with resource limits is hygiene. A container is the minimum boundary:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;docker run &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--rm&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--network&lt;/span&gt; none &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--read-only&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--tmpfs&lt;/span&gt; /tmp:rw,noexec,nosuid,size&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;64m &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--cap-drop&lt;/span&gt; ALL &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--security-opt&lt;/span&gt; no-new-privileges &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--pids-limit&lt;/span&gt; 64 &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--memory&lt;/span&gt; 256m &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--memory-swap&lt;/span&gt; 256m &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--cpus&lt;/span&gt; 0.5 &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--user&lt;/span&gt; 65534:65534 &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nt"&gt;-v&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nv"&gt;$JOB_DIR&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&lt;/span&gt;:/job:ro &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  python:3.13-slim &lt;span class="se"&gt;\&lt;/span&gt;
  python &lt;span class="nt"&gt;-I&lt;/span&gt; /job/main.py
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;From the wiki's &lt;code&gt;docker-sandbox.sh&lt;/code&gt;, with the leading &lt;code&gt;exec&lt;/code&gt; omitted.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;No network, no capabilities, read-only root, an unprivileged user and nothing secret mounted. Never give the agent or its tools the Docker socket: anyone who can run &lt;code&gt;docker&lt;/code&gt; is effectively root on the host. Containers share the host kernel, so for code you don't trust the wiki points to a user-space kernel or a microVM. In production, pin the image by digest, not by tag.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Agent spam and runaway loops: budgets, egress and a kill switch
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Egress is what turned a sandbox escape into a breach. Send all agent traffic through a proxy that allows named hosts only, and use network policy so the agent pod can reach only the proxy and cluster DNS:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight yaml"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="na"&gt;apiVersion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;networking.k8s.io/v1&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;kind&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;NetworkPolicy&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;metadata&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="na"&gt;name&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;support-agent-egress&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="na"&gt;namespace&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;agents&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="na"&gt;spec&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="na"&gt;podSelector&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;matchLabels&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="na"&gt;app&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;support-agent&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="na"&gt;policyTypes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="pi"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;Egress"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="na"&gt;egress&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;to&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;podSelector&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
            &lt;span class="na"&gt;matchLabels&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
              &lt;span class="na"&gt;app&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;egress-proxy&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="na"&gt;ports&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;protocol&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;TCP&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="na"&gt;port&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="m"&gt;3128&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;to&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;namespaceSelector&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
            &lt;span class="na"&gt;matchLabels&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
              &lt;span class="na"&gt;kubernetes.io/metadata.name&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;kube-system&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="na"&gt;podSelector&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
            &lt;span class="na"&gt;matchLabels&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
              &lt;span class="na"&gt;k8s-app&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;kube-dns&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="na"&gt;ports&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;protocol&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;UDP&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="na"&gt;port&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="m"&gt;53&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;protocol&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;TCP&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="na"&gt;port&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="m"&gt;53&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;From the wiki's &lt;code&gt;k8s-agent-pod.yaml&lt;/code&gt;, comments removed.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Close three gaps before you call this the only way out. First, DNS is still open: cluster DNS will usually resolve any external name, and swarmtraces describes code, run on Hugging Face's dataset workers, built to move data out in DNS queries. The proxy does the external lookups, so point agent pods at a resolver that answers only for internal zones, or use a DNS-aware network policy. Second, this policy does nothing unless your CNI plugin enforces NetworkPolicy, so test it with a blocked connection from inside the pod. Third, set &lt;code&gt;automountServiceAccountToken: false&lt;/code&gt; on agent pods. The LOOT script used Kubernetes tokens it found to ask for cluster secrets.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The wiki notes that its Docker command and Kubernetes manifest "were not executed" when the page was written. Check every flag against your runtime and Kubernetes version, and pin images by digest.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Don't allowlist multi-tenant hosts like paste sites or webhook services: anyone can open an account there and receive whatever your agent sends. The proxy limits where the agent connects, not what it sends there. Then add a per-agent rate limit and a per-session action budget (&lt;code&gt;rate_per_minute&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;max_actions&lt;/code&gt; above), and a kill switch the guard checks before any policy lookup, revoking children with the parent.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A kill switch you have never used doesn't count. The wiki's &lt;a href="https://nachi065.github.io/AI-Security-Wiki/10_Test_Case_Library/D09-agent-and-non-human-identity-governance.html#tc-d09-016" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;TC-D09-016&lt;/a&gt; test design disables an agent and measures how long each connected system keeps accepting its tokens. Run something like it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The sixth control: the agent never writes its own log
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If a compromised agent can write the audit entry, the entry isn't evidence. Swarmtraces describes requests that deleted files the agents had planted. In the wiki's design the guard, not the agent, logs every decision including denials, each entry carries the hash of the previous one, and the latest hash is stored somewhere the agent can't write. Verify the chain in CI and you'll know when someone edited history. I wrote more about why integrity of the audit trail carries the most weight in &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/integrity-now-dominates-ai-threat-landscape-your-up-ankush-gvdsf/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AI attackers go after Integrity first&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where "rogue" fits
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href="https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications&lt;/a&gt; has an entry called ASI10 Rogue Agents, for agents that drift from their intended function or scope. OWASP's own mitigations include isolation, least-privilege scopes, kill switches and credential revocation, and the Builder Track maps ASI10 to two steps: register the agent with a named owner, and cap the blast radius with a kill switch. Both are config. Scope is something you set, so it's something you can fix.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Checklist for your next pull request
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] Agent registered with an owner, purpose, tool list and budget&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] No secrets in the agent's environment or within reach of the code it generates&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] Tokens are narrowly scoped, audience-bound, short-lived and narrow-only for sub-agents&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] The gateway rejects any credential your issuer didn't mint&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] Every tool call passes argument validation in code, with unknown fields rejected&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] Generated code runs with &lt;code&gt;--network none&lt;/code&gt;, read-only root and no secrets, and nothing gets the Docker socket&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] Egress goes through a proxy to named hosts, enforced by network policy, with DNS limited to internal names&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] Your CNI plugin enforces NetworkPolicy, and agent pods set &lt;code&gt;automountServiceAccountToken: false&lt;/code&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] Rate limit, action budget and kill switch are in place, and the kill switch has a test&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;[ ] The guard writes a hash-chained log the agent can't touch, and CI verifies it&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Full article, including the ownership and audit-evidence side for your GRC team: &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/agents-dont-go-rogue-scopes-do-ankush-v7off/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/agents-dont-go-rogue-scopes-do-ankush-v7off/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Licence: the code excerpts above are adapted from the AI Security Wiki &lt;a href="https://nachi065.github.io/AI-Security-Wiki/24_Builder_Track/01_Secure_Your_First_Agent.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Builder Track&lt;/a&gt; (page author: &lt;a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/nachiket-sathaye/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Nachiket Sathaye&lt;/a&gt;), licensed under &lt;a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;CC BY-SA 4.0&lt;/a&gt;, and are shared under the same licence. Changes: the two &lt;code&gt;policy.json&lt;/code&gt; blocks are single members excerpted from a larger object and reformatted; the pinned definition hash is omitted from the &lt;code&gt;send_email&lt;/code&gt; rule; the leading &lt;code&gt;exec&lt;/code&gt; is dropped from the &lt;code&gt;docker run&lt;/code&gt; command; comments are removed from the NetworkPolicy. OWASP is a trademark of the OWASP Foundation.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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      <category>security</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>devops</category>
      <category>kubernetes</category>
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