<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel>
    <title>DEV Community: Bogumił Jankiewicz</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Bogumił Jankiewicz (@bogumi_jankiewicz_fcfce0).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/bogumi_jankiewicz_fcfce0</link>
    
    <atom:link rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="https://dev.to/feed/bogumi_jankiewicz_fcfce0"/>
    <language>en</language>
    <item>
      <title>gate.cat: a deterministic, fail-closed veto that stops AI coding agents before rm -rf</title>
      <dc:creator>Bogumił Jankiewicz</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 20:42:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/bogumi_jankiewicz_fcfce0/gatecat-a-deterministic-fail-closed-veto-that-stops-ai-coding-agents-before-rm-rf-577e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/bogumi_jankiewicz_fcfce0/gatecat-a-deterministic-fail-closed-veto-that-stops-ai-coding-agents-before-rm-rf-577e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;AI coding agents now run real shell commands. Most "guardrails" log the damage after the fact. &lt;strong&gt;gate.cat&lt;/strong&gt; vetoes the execution itself — before the shell sees it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What it does
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It blocks irreversible shell commands (&lt;code&gt;rm -rf&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;DROP TABLE&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;terraform destroy&lt;/code&gt;, secret exfiltration via &lt;code&gt;scp&lt;/code&gt;/&lt;code&gt;curl&lt;/code&gt;) &lt;em&gt;before&lt;/em&gt; they execute. The check is deterministic string + path analysis plus an independent exec analyzer — &lt;strong&gt;no model call in the veto path&lt;/strong&gt;, so a prompt injection can't talk the gate into allowing something. Fail-closed: anything it can't parse becomes a block, never a silent allow.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Three ways to use it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Claude Code hook&lt;/strong&gt; (the strongest — enforcement runs in the harness, outside the model's control flow): &lt;code&gt;pip install gate.cat&lt;/code&gt;, then add &lt;code&gt;gatecat-hook&lt;/code&gt; to &lt;code&gt;.claude/settings.json&lt;/code&gt; with matcher &lt;code&gt;Bash|Write|Edit&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Gated shell&lt;/strong&gt; for any CLI agent (Codex, aider — anything honoring &lt;code&gt;$SHELL&lt;/code&gt;): use &lt;code&gt;gatecat-shell&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Local proxy&lt;/strong&gt; for anything speaking the OpenAI API (Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio, OpenRouter): your agent changes one &lt;code&gt;base_url&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Measured, not claimed
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every number below has a row in &lt;code&gt;FACTS.md&lt;/code&gt; in the repo, pinned to a reproducible artifact:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;1,085,159&lt;/strong&gt; unique real agent commands (5 public datasets) replayed through the full 6-stage gate: &lt;strong&gt;0 real misses&lt;/strong&gt; after adjudication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the reproducible bypass suite catches &lt;strong&gt;178/178&lt;/strong&gt; danger shapes it claims — and prints its own known gap (runtime assembly) plus &lt;strong&gt;1 benign false-block in 129&lt;/strong&gt; cases. We publish the misses instead of hiding them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;71&lt;/strong&gt; default policy walls (73 presets incl. opt-in), &lt;strong&gt;~0.6%&lt;/strong&gt; intervention rate on real commands.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Honest limit
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The gate is certain only about what it &lt;strong&gt;blocks&lt;/strong&gt;. An unmatched action is unchecked, not safe. It's a wall in front of known-dangerous shapes, not a proof of safety — use it &lt;em&gt;with&lt;/em&gt; your sandbox, not instead of one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Free forever, Apache-2.0, zero-dependency core.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Install: &lt;code&gt;pip install gate.cat&lt;/code&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Repo: &lt;a href="https://github.com/BGMLAI/gate.cat" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/BGMLAI/gate.cat&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Site: &lt;a href="https://gate.cat" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://gate.cat&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What I'd genuinely like feedback on: does publishing our own bypass map and a documented false-block build more trust than a clean number would? That was the hardest design call.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>agents</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>gate.cat: a deterministic, fail-closed veto that stops AI coding agents before rm -rf</title>
      <dc:creator>Bogumił Jankiewicz</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 15:44:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/bogumi_jankiewicz_fcfce0/gatecat-a-deterministic-fail-closed-veto-that-stops-ai-coding-agents-before-rm-rf-3e6e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/bogumi_jankiewicz_fcfce0/gatecat-a-deterministic-fail-closed-veto-that-stops-ai-coding-agents-before-rm-rf-3e6e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;AI coding agents now run real shell commands. Most "guardrails" log the damage after the fact. &lt;strong&gt;gate.cat&lt;/strong&gt; vetoes the execution itself — before the shell sees it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What it does
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It blocks irreversible shell commands (&lt;code&gt;rm -rf&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;DROP TABLE&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;terraform destroy&lt;/code&gt;, secret exfiltration via &lt;code&gt;scp&lt;/code&gt;/&lt;code&gt;curl&lt;/code&gt;) &lt;em&gt;before&lt;/em&gt; they execute. The check is deterministic string + path analysis plus an independent exec analyzer — &lt;strong&gt;no model call in the veto path&lt;/strong&gt;, so a prompt injection can't talk the gate into allowing something. Fail-closed: anything it can't parse becomes a block, never a silent allow.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Three ways to use it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Claude Code hook&lt;/strong&gt; (the strongest — enforcement runs in the harness, outside the model's control flow): &lt;code&gt;pip install gate.cat&lt;/code&gt;, then add &lt;code&gt;gatecat-hook&lt;/code&gt; to &lt;code&gt;.claude/settings.json&lt;/code&gt; with matcher &lt;code&gt;Bash|Write|Edit&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Gated shell&lt;/strong&gt; for any CLI agent (Codex, aider — anything honoring &lt;code&gt;$SHELL&lt;/code&gt;): use &lt;code&gt;gatecat-shell&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Local proxy&lt;/strong&gt; for anything speaking the OpenAI API (Ollama, vLLM, LM Studio, OpenRouter): your agent changes one &lt;code&gt;base_url&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Measured, not claimed
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every number below has a row in &lt;code&gt;FACTS.md&lt;/code&gt; in the repo, pinned to a reproducible artifact:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;1,085,159&lt;/strong&gt; unique real agent commands (5 public datasets) replayed through the full 6-stage gate: &lt;strong&gt;0 real misses&lt;/strong&gt; after adjudication.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;the reproducible bypass suite catches &lt;strong&gt;178/178&lt;/strong&gt; danger shapes it claims — and prints its own known gap (runtime assembly) plus &lt;strong&gt;1 benign false-block in 129&lt;/strong&gt; cases. We publish the misses instead of hiding them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;71&lt;/strong&gt; default policy walls (73 presets incl. opt-in), &lt;strong&gt;~0.6%&lt;/strong&gt; intervention rate on real commands.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Honest limit
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The gate is certain only about what it &lt;strong&gt;blocks&lt;/strong&gt;. An unmatched action is unchecked, not safe. It's a wall in front of known-dangerous shapes, not a proof of safety — use it &lt;em&gt;with&lt;/em&gt; your sandbox, not instead of one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Free forever, Apache-2.0, zero-dependency core.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Install: &lt;code&gt;pip install gate.cat&lt;/code&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Repo: &lt;a href="https://github.com/BGMLAI/gate.cat" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/BGMLAI/gate.cat&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Site: &lt;a href="https://gate.cat" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://gate.cat&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What I'd genuinely like feedback on: does publishing our own bypass map and a documented false-block build more trust than a clean number would? That was the hardest design call.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>agents</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>security</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
