DEV Community: Alan Bonnici

When Your CPU Dies: My Journey with a Defective Intel Core i7-13700K

Alan Bonnici — Tue, 09 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000

Introduction

My perfectly stable homelab server gradually descended into chaos — random crashes, segfaults, system hangs — and how months of troubleshooting, community support, and hardware swaps eventually led to one conclusion: the CPU itself was defective from the factory.

If you're experiencing unexplained instability on an Intel 13th or 14th Gen system, this story might save you months of frustration.

Quick Symptom Checklist

If you're seeing multiple of these symptoms, you may be affected:

Random segfaults in unrelated applications
System instability appearing after months of stability
Crashes or hangs under light load or while idle
VMs freezing while still marked as "running"
Issues persisting despite PSU, RAM, or OS checks or changes

The Setup

In November 2022, I built a homelab server with the following components:

Component	Model
CPU	Intel Core i7-13700K (Raptor Lake)
Motherboard	ASUS PRIME Z690-P D4 (Intel Z690, ATX, DDR4)
RAM	Patriot Viper Steel DDR4 3600 MHz C18, XMP 2.0
Cooler	Cooler Master Hyper 212 Black Edition
PSU	Corsair RM-850e
OS	Proxmox VE

The system ran Proxmox VE 7, later upgraded to v8, hosting a mix of Windows, Ubuntu, and Debian VMs, plus a couple of LXC containers. For over a year, everything was rock-solid. NUT (UPS monitoring), LAN bonding, automated backups — all worked flawlessly.

The Trouble Begins: A Timeline

August–September 2024: First Signs of Instability

After upgrading VirtIO drivers from 0.1.248 to 0.1.262, I started seeing x86/split lock detection errors. The entire Proxmox host would crash, taking down all VMs and containers.

Even though I didn’t fully trust that theory, I pointed a finger at the VirtIO upgrade — it was the only change I had made.

What the community said:

"Don't think VirtIO would make the whole host crash... this seems more like a hardware issue with storage or memory"
"Split lock is an indication of your VM doing some weird stuff... generally related to very buggy software/OS or faulty hardware — bad memory, bad CPU, bad power supply"
Suggestions: Run memtest, stress-test the CPU, check thermals, check fans

I disabled split lock detection as a workaround. The crashes continued.

September 2024: Testing Everything

Following community advice, I:

Ran PassMark memory tests — no errors
Updated the motherboard BIOS - I was one version before the latest
Ran stress-ng on the CPU — no errors
Replaced the PSU with a spare one I had.

October 2024: Stability... or So I Thought

The issue appeared to disappear.

On 17 October 2024, I reported back to the Proxmox forum that the system seemed stable. I waited a full month before posting to be sure. I assumed—incorrectly—that the component I had changed was the culprit.

The stability was temporary—the degradation was progressive.

December 2024 – January 2025: New Symptoms Emerge

New problems surfaced:

A Windows Server 2022 VM would hang during backup restarts
QEMU guest agent fs-freeze/fs-thaw commands would time out
VMs appeared "running" but were unresponsive
Console showed improper shutdown states

I tried:

Switching backup modes
Changing machine types (q35 → i440fx)
Updating QEMU

Nothing resolved the issue.

February 2025: The Penny Drops

While continuing to seek help on Reddit, someone pointed me to the Intel 13th/14th Gen instability issue. The symptoms matched perfectly:

Random crashes under varied workloads
Segfaults in unrelated binaries
System hangs after running for days
Progressive worsening over time

It was suggested that I run the Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool (IPDT) (https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000005567/processors.html).

This tool is Windows-only. Intel should have created a utility that is OS-agnostic making it something you could run from a bootable USB drive.

Having to jump through hoops to perform a test for the company's product is counterproductive.

Stress tests like mprime / Prime95 didn’t expose the issue.

March 2025: Intel RMA Process

Armed with the information, I hopped over to the Intel Community (https://community.intel.com/) and asked about the process.

At https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/support/articles/000057098/processors.html I found all the information to start the process.

You need to provide:

Processor number
ATPO
FPO

If you no longer have the box, you’ll need to remove the CPU and clean off the thermal paste to read the markings.

When the Intel support agent asked me for the following additional information (from Intel's email):

Motherboard: Please include the model and any relevant details.
Power Supply Unit (PSU): Model, wattage, and manufacturer.
Dedicated Graphics Card: Model and manufacturer, if applicable.
Thermal Solution Details (Air Cooler or a Liquid Cooler):
Operating System Details:
Have you tested this processor on a different motherboard, if yes, on which motherboard was it tested?
Have you tested your current motherboard with a different compatible processor, if yes, which processor have you used?

The process was excellent.

I live in Malta, an island at the edge of Europe, where cross-border logistics usually take time.

Key dates:

16 March 2025: Case opened / CPU information provided / collection process initiated
18 March 2025: DHL collected the defective CPU
20 March 2025: Replacement CPU delivered by DHL

Thermal Paste

Make sure you have thermal paste on hand. If you need to read information off the CPU (and using the machine while your case is being processed) and when you mount the new CPU on your motherboard.

Replacement CPU

The replacement CPU arrived in Intel-branded packaging.

Post-Replacement: Problems Resolved

After installing the replacement i7-13700K, all previously experienced problems disappeared. Two months after replacing the CPU, the system returned to the rock-solid stability it had enjoyed during its first year of operation.

The Bigger Picture: Intel's Raptor Lake Defect

My experience was not isolated. It was part of one of the largest CPU reliability crises in recent computing history. Earlier in my troubleshooting process, I had seen references to CPU-related problems, but:

CPU tests passed
in over 40 years I had never encountered a time-delayed CPU defect

What Went Wrong

Intel's 13th Gen ("Raptor Lake") and 14th Gen ("Raptor Lake Refresh") desktop processors suffered from a fundamental defect that caused progressive, irreversible degradation. The issue affected high-performance SKUs — primarily the Core i5, i7, and i9 K/KF/KS variants with the 8P+16E core configuration.

Root Cause: Vmin Shift Instability

On 25 September 2024, Intel employee Thomas Hannaford posted the official root cause analysis on the Intel Community forums (https://community.intel.com/t5/Blogs/Tech-Innovation/Client/Intel-Core-13th-and-14th-Gen-Desktop-Instability-Root-Cause/post/1633239)

Intel localized the problem to a clock tree circuit within the IA core that is particularly vulnerable to reliability aging under elevated voltage and temperature. These conditions lead to a duty cycle shift of the clocks, causing system instability.

Intel identified four operating scenarios that lead to Vmin shift in affected processors:

1. Motherboard Power Delivery Exceeding Intel Guidance

Mitigation: Intel Default Settings recommendations for 13th/14th Gen desktop processors. It is common practice for motherboards to exceed these settings and they have done so for years. It is normally set by default.

2. eTVB Microcode Algorithm Issue

The Enhanced Thermal Velocity Boost algorithm was allowing i9 desktop processors to operate at higher performance states even at high temperatures.

Mitigation: Microcode 0x125 (June 2024)

3. SVID Algorithm Requesting High Voltages

The microcode's Serial Voltage Identification algorithm was requesting high voltages at a frequency and duration that caused Vmin shift.

Mitigation: Microcode 0x129 (August 2024)

4. Elevated Core Voltages During Idle/Light Activity

Microcode and BIOS code were requesting elevated core voltages especially during periods of idle and/or light activity — exactly the condition a homelab server experiences most of the time.

Mitigation: Microcode 0x12B, which encompasses 0x125 and 0x129, and addresses elevated voltage requests during idle and/or light activity periods

Intel confirmed that mobile processors and future product families (Lunar Lake, Arrow Lake) are unaffected by the Vmin Shift Instability issue.

Manufacturing Oxidation (Early Units)

For some early 13th Gen processors (manufactured in late 2022 — exactly when I purchased mine), there was an additional manufacturing defect involving oxidation. Intel confirmed this was identified internally in late 2022 and addressed in production by early 2024, but on-shelf inventory with the defect may have persisted into early 2024.

The Critical Point: Damage Is Irreversible

Once a processor has been exposed to excessive voltage for long enough, the damage to the clock tree circuit is permanent and cannot be repaired by any software update. Microcode patches can only prevent further damage on CPUs that haven't yet degraded — they cannot restore already-damaged processors.

This is why my system's stability gradually worsened over time, and why replacing the PSU only appeared to help temporarily.

Why My Homelab Was the Perfect Victim

Looking at Intel's four identified scenarios, my Proxmox homelab hit the worst-case combination:

Scenario 4 (idle/light activity): A homelab server spends most of its time in light-load or idle states — exactly when the faulty microcode was requesting the highest inappropriate voltages
Scenario 3 (SVID high voltage requests): The constant power-state transitions of a virtualization host (VMs starting, stopping, idling) triggered frequent SVID voltage requests
Early manufacturing (oxidation): Purchased November 2022, squarely in the window for the oxidation manufacturing defect
Always-on operation: Running 24/7 meant maximum cumulative exposure to the damaging conditions

The May 2025 microcode update (0x12F) specifically addressed "systems continuously running for multiple days with low-activity and lightly-threaded workloads" — a near-perfect description of a homelab server.

Intel's Response: A Timeline

Date	Action
Late 2023 – Early 2024	Community reports of instability begin accumulating
April 2024	Intel recommends motherboard manufacturers use "Intel Default Settings"
July 2024	Intel officially acknowledges elevated voltage as the cause
June 2024	Microcode 0x125 released — fixes eTVB algorithm issue
August 2024	Microcode 0x129 released — addresses high voltage requests
August 2024	Intel announces 2-year warranty extension (3 years → 5 years) for affected SKUs
September 2024	Intel identifies root cause (clock tree circuit / Vmin Shift)
September 2024	Microcode 0x12B released — "final" fix encompassing 0x125 + 0x129 + idle voltage control
October 2024	Intel confirms the voltage issue was the sole root cause
November 2024	Class action lawsuit filed in San Jose, California
May 2025	Microcode 0x12F released — addresses edge cases in systems running continuously for multiple days with light workloads

Warranty Extension

Intel extended the warranty from 3 years to 5 years for all affected boxed 13th/14th Gen desktop processors (https://community.intel.com/t5/Mobile-and-Desktop-Processors/Additional-Warranty-Updates-on-Intel-Core-13th-14th-Gen-Desktop/m-p/1620853).

Key points from the announcement:

The extension applies to new and previously purchased processors
Coverage applies to all customers globally
The warranty eligibility period starts on the original purchase date and does not reset if Intel provides a replacement
Intel committed to supporting all customers experiencing instability symptoms through the exchange process

Affected Processors

The instability primarily affects desktop processors with the 8P+16E Raptor Lake silicon:

13th Gen (Raptor Lake):

Core i9-13900K/KF/KS
Core i7-13700K/KF
Core i5-13600K/KF

14th Gen (Raptor Lake Refresh):

Core i9-14900K/KF/KS
Core i7-14700K/KF
Core i5-14600K/KF

Lower-power variants (non-K, mobile) were less commonly affected but not entirely immune.

Lessons Learned

For Users Experiencing Instability

Don't assume it's software. If your system was stable for months and gradually becomes unstable, hardware degradation is a real possibility — especially with Intel 13th/14th Gen CPUs.
The symptoms are deceptive. The crashes manifest as memory errors, storage corruption, split lock violations, segfaults in random binaries — anything that looks like "something else" is broken. This is because the CPU is making computation errors.
Run the Intel Processor Diagnostic Tool / equivalent. Download it from Intel's support site. If your CPU fails, you have clear evidence for an RMA. Remember that a Pass is not a sign that your CPU is not impacted.
Don't waste money replacing other components first. I had a perfectly good PSU to replace but didn't have spare RAM, storage and a motherboard lying about. While testing RAM and storage is reasonable, be aware that a degrading CPU can make other components appear faulty.
Check your warranty status. Intel extended the warranty to 5 years for affected 13th/14th Gen desktop processors. If you purchased after October 2022, you likely have coverage through at least 2027.
Update your BIOS/microcode. If your CPU hasn't yet degraded, microcode 0x12B (or newer) can prevent the excessive voltage that causes damage. Check your motherboard manufacturer's website for the latest BIOS. A replacement is ultimately the best solution if you are eligible.

Conclusion

What started as random crashes turned out to be a widespread hardware issue.

The community played a critical role in identifying the root cause.

People who dedicate time to maintaining forums and helping others are a key part of the ecosystem—thank you.

If you're reading this because your 13th or 14th Gen Intel system is acting up take action. The fix exists, the warranty coverage is there, and Intel's replacement process works. Don't spend months chasing ghosts like I did. The clock is running out and these CPUs will eventually no longer be covered for replacement.

The Zero-Day Exploit Clock Is Ticking

Alan Bonnici — Thu, 04 Jun 2026 10:12:58 +0000

A Personal Introduction

The notion of breaking into a system and making it do something its developers never intended has existed since the early days of computing. My own introduction to computing came through hacking into games — disabling or increasing the number of lives to compensate for my slow reflexes.

Using TD (Turbo Debugger, from Borland — shipped alongside Turbo Assembler and Turbo C/C++), I would painstakingly try to identify the memory location that held the lives counter. Once found, one could either alter the value directly or place a NOP (No Operation) over the conditional jump. It was a task that required patience, determination, and, many times, reams of sprocketed continuous-feed paper annotated to help decipher what the code did.

Discoveries were rarely kept to oneself. You shared them with others on BBSs (Bulletin Board Systems), the dial-up communities that served as gathering places for the technically curious long before the web existed.

BBSs were not just a place to share results; they were a primary source of knowledge. Text files on cracking techniques, annotated memory maps for popular games, and tutorials on x86 assembly circulated freely between boards. You would dial in with a modem, download a collection of .TXT and .NFO files, then spend hours offline studying them. It was a decentralised, informal education system: no textbooks, no courses, just collective knowledge passed between pseudonyms.

The motivation was curiosity. There was no financial incentive and no criminal intent. It was intellectual challenge for its own sake — the digital equivalent of picking a lock just to prove you could.

From Annoyance to Destruction

That harmless hacking eventually evolved into something darker: worms, trojans, and viruses. Initially, these programs were little more than an annoyance, displaying messages on screen or slowing machines down. But the lever was gradually notched towards the harmful and destructive. Rather than simply popping up a message, these programs began deleting files and formatting hard drives.

Early examples like the Brain virus (1986) were relatively benign; it even included the authors' names and phone number. But by the early 1990s, destructive payloads had become common. The Michelangelo virus (1992) overwrote the first hundred sectors of a hard disk. CIH/Chernobyl (1998) went further, attempting to corrupt BIOS firmware and render machines unbootable.

If you are interested in watching a YouTube video of mine from 19 years ago demonstrating the operation of a destructive virus called “Casino de Malte”, head over to https://youtu.be/wiLZAEMsofM. Your hard disk’s fate was determined by the outcome of a game.

The Commercialisation of Hacking

The internet, cryptocurrency, and the dark web created an environment in which malicious actors could come together and organise themselves into profit-seeking entities. Their business model: penetrate systems, steal data, hijack operations, and then seek payment from the victim to rectify the mess they created.

It proved extraordinarily lucrative. Cybercrime is now measured in the trillions. Cybersecurity Ventures estimated that global cybercrime damage would reach $10.5 trillion annually by 2025 — a figure that, if treated as an economy, would make cybercrime the third-largest in the world after the United States and China.

These are not lone hackers in basements. Modern cybercriminal organisations operate with corporate structures — complete with HR departments, customer service teams to “help” victims pay ransoms, software development lifecycles, and even employee performance reviews. Groups such as LockBit and Conti have operated as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) platforms, licensing their tools to affiliates in exchange for a percentage of the ransom collected.

The Ecosystem: States, Criminals, and Brokers

Today, the malware market is made up of three distinct layers:

State-backed groups — Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors funded by nation-states for espionage, sabotage, and geopolitical advantage. Examples include Fancy Bear (Russia), Lazarus Group (North Korea), and APT41 (China).
Private criminal groups — Organisations that carry out penetration attacks, deploy ransomware, and operate data-theft schemes for profit.
Exploit brokers — Companies and individuals that trade in hacking knowledge. Firms such as Zerodium openly advertise bounty prices for zero-day exploits: up to $2.5 million for a full Android exploit chain, for example. This grey market means that vulnerabilities are sometimes sold to the highest bidder rather than reported to the vendor for patching.

The success of these operations often depends on what are known as zero-day exploits: vulnerabilities in software that are not yet publicly known and for which no patch or mitigation exists. The term “zero-day” refers to the fact that the vendor has had zero days to fix the problem before it is exploited.

To complicate matters further, some attacks require chaining together multiple exploits in a particular sequence. This is known as an exploit chain, or attack chain. For example, a modern browser exploit might chain a renderer vulnerability with a sandbox escape and a kernel privilege escalation — three separate flaws linked together to achieve full system compromise.

The Zero-Day Exploit Clock

The website “Zero Day Clock” presents a striking visualisation. It analyses publicly known vulnerabilities and estimates the time between public disclosure of a vulnerability and the first confirmed exploitation in the wild.

CVE gives a publicly disclosed vulnerability a common identifier, but it is only one part of the vulnerability-tracking ecosystem. CWE describes the underlying weakness, CVSS scores technical severity, EPSS estimates exploit likelihood, and CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue highlights flaws already exploited in the wild. Together, these systems help organisations decide what to fix first.

Strictly speaking, once a vulnerability is publicly disclosed, it is no longer a zero-day in the narrowest sense; exploitation after disclosure is often described as n-day or one-day exploitation. But from a defender’s point of view, the practical effect is similar: the available response window is collapsing.

The trend is alarming:

That compression — from months to days, and potentially from days to minutes — represents a fundamental shift in the threat landscape. Defenders used to have time to test, prioritise, patch, and monitor. Increasingly, they may have only hours, minutes, or seconds.

The AI Accelerant

The dramatic reduction in exploitation time is being accelerated by artificial intelligence, but AI is only one part of a wider shift. Automated scanning, exploit marketplaces, faster reverse engineering, criminal collaboration, and global infrastructure have all compressed the defender’s response window.

The same AI tools that security researchers use to find flaws in code can also be weaponised by adversaries. Their systems can continuously scour vulnerability databases, security mailing lists, vendor advisories, and even social media for news of a newly disclosed weakness. Once alerted, AI-assisted tools can help to:

Analyse the vulnerability — parsing patch diffs to understand exactly what was fixed and, therefore, what was broken.
Generate exploit code — assisting with proof-of-concept attacks targeting the flaw.
Adapt and mutate — creating variants that may evade simple signature-based detection.
Scale deployment — scanning the internet for unpatched systems and deploying attacks at machine speed.

This is no longer theoretical. Academic research has shown that AI agents can exploit some real-world vulnerabilities in controlled benchmark environments. The barrier to entry has lowered: what once required deep expertise in assembly language and months of reverse engineering can now, in some cases, be partially automated.

AI is also being used offensively for:

Spear-phishing at scale — generating personalised, convincing emails that bypass traditional spam filters.
Deepfake social engineering — cloning voices and video to impersonate executives in business email compromise (BEC) attacks.
Automated reconnaissance — mapping an organisation’s attack surface faster than any human team could.

What Can We Do?

We cannot eliminate risk, but we can significantly reduce our exposure.

For individuals:

Keep all devices updated with the latest security patches, and enable automatic updates wherever possible.
Retire technology that is outdated and no longer receiving security updates. End-of-life software is an open door.
Use multi-factor authentication or passkeys on every account that supports them.
Be sceptical of unexpected communications, even from known contacts. Verify through a separate channel.
Avoid reusing passwords. A single compromised password can become the first link in a much larger chain.

For organisations:

Maintain a rigorous patch management programme. The window between disclosure and exploitation is shrinking towards zero. That means patching can no longer be treated as a slow administrative process. Organisations should:
- Automate patch deployment where the risk profile allows it, especially for standard operating systems, browsers, endpoint software, and widely deployed services. Human approval remains important for high-impact systems, but approval workflows measured in days do not match a threat landscape measured in minutes.
- Prioritise vulnerabilities based on exposure, exploitability, business impact, and evidence of active exploitation. If twenty fixes are waiting, the most exposed and most exploitable systems should move first.
- Maintain an emergency patching route for critical vulnerabilities, with pre-agreed ownership, testing boundaries, rollback plans, and communication paths. The middle of an incident is the wrong time to decide who is allowed to approve a fix.
Prioritise internet-facing systems and known exploited vulnerabilities. These are the systems attackers can reach first and the weaknesses they are most likely to weaponise quickly.
Adopt a zero-trust architecture: assume breach and verify every access request.
Invest in defensive tools that can detect, prioritise, and respond at machine speed. Alerts alone are not enough; the goal should be rapid triage, containment, and recovery.
Conduct regular penetration testing and red-team exercises. These should test not only whether vulnerabilities exist, but whether the organisation can detect, escalate, and respond to them quickly.
Ensure robust, tested backup and recovery procedures. Ransomware is only effective if you have no viable alternative.

The uncomfortable truth is that vigilance alone is no longer sufficient. When exploitation timelines compress to minutes, human reaction time becomes the bottleneck. Organisations need automated detection, prioritisation, containment, and recovery capabilities that can operate at the same speed as the attacks they face.

We must also recognise that each of us can be one link in an exploit chain. A compromised personal device, a reused password, an unpatched home router — any of these can become the entry point that leads to a larger organisational breach.

Closing Thought

In three decades, hacking has evolved from teenagers on BBSs trading game cheats into a global criminal industry: commercialised, professionalised, backed by nation-states, and now accelerated by artificial intelligence.

The zero-day exploit clock is ticking faster than ever. For individuals, that means patching, retiring obsolete technology, using passkeys or multi-factor authentication, and treating unexpected communication with caution. For organisations, it means accepting that manual response is no longer enough.

The question is no longer whether an attack will come, but whether our defences can respond in the seconds we may have left.

Suggested references

Zero Day Clock: https://zerodayclock.com/
Cybersecurity Ventures, 2025 Official Cybercrime Report: https://cybersecurityventures.com/official-cybercrime-report-2025/
CVE-Bench: https://arxiv.org/html/2503.17332v3

"Complexity Ceiling" in Power Apps

Alan Bonnici — Wed, 20 May 2026 08:25:55 +0000

Power Apps is a powerhouse for rapid prototyping within the Microsoft ecosystem, but for complex development, the "seams" are becoming visible. This new analysis explores the "Complexity Ceiling" and the friction points faced by architects and developers.

Core Issues Identified:

Mental Model Mismatch: Chaining nested With blocks to simulate sequential logic.
Tooling Gaps: The need for real breakpoints and execution narratives over simple trace functions.
Governance Hurdles: The "abrupt cliff" of enterprise compliance for makers.

Microsoft has the opportunity to bridge the gap between business analysts and professional engineers by introducing controlled imperative constructs and better code organization.

https://www.alanbonnici.com/2026/05/the-complexity-ceiling-where-microsoft.html

Does your Linux server actually know when the power is failing?

Alan Bonnici — Thu, 19 Mar 2026 11:39:08 +0000

NUT (Network UPS Tools) is the go-to open-source solution for UPS monitoring on Linux — but it takes some know-how to set up properly, especially with hardware that isn't auto-detected out of the box.

This detailed guide covers everything from finding the right driver, dealing with stubborn read-only settings, configuring automatic shutdowns, and setting up email alerts so you know when things go wrong. There's even a section on how to safely test your shutdown logic before a real power cut hits.

Great resource for anyone running a homelab or Linux-based home server. 👇

https://www.alanbonnici.com/2026/03/setting-up-nut-ups-software-on-linux.html

How to configure Postfix to relay mail through Gmail (simple step-by-step guide)

Alan Bonnici — Tue, 17 Mar 2026 10:31:07 +0000

If you run Linux servers that need to send alerts, backup reports, or monitoring notifications, configuring SMTP can be a pain.

I wrote a short guide explaining how to install and configure Postfix with Gmail as an SMTP relay, including:

• Installing required packages

• Configuring TLS

• Setting up Gmail app passwords

• Securing credentials

• Testing email delivery

Good for small servers, homelabs, monitoring tools, and UPS notifications.

https://www.alanbonnici.com/2026/03/install-and-configure-postfix-using.html

Building a Production RAG Server with Ollama, Open WebUI and Chroma DB

Alan Bonnici — Wed, 11 Feb 2026 08:48:39 +0000

I've created a comprehensive guide on building a headless LLM server with RAG capabilities. The tutorial walks through the complete implementation including document ingestion, vector storage, and query optimization.

The setup is production-ready and can be completed in about 30 minutes.

There are optional code sections for those who would like to interact with the model programmatically.

MS PowerApps Wordle Engine HowTo

Alan Bonnici — Wed, 29 Jan 2025 14:05:24 +0000

In this HowTo, I dive into creating a Microsoft Power Apps Canvas Wordle app that checks a guessed word against an answer!

🔍 Features include:

✅ Duplicate detection

✅ Suggestions for improvement

✅ Tips for enhancing Power Apps to bridge the gap between no-code/low-code and procedural approaches!

https://youtu.be/-cz_lun6fo0?si=COXVB5vb2rXboyka