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    <title>DEV Community: Deepak Sharma</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Deepak Sharma (@deepaksharma).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Deepak Sharma</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Iranian Hackers Deploy MiniFast and MiniJunk V2 Through Phishing and SEO Poisoning</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 12:09:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/iranian-hackers-deploy-minifast-and-minijunk-v2-through-phishing-and-seo-poisoning-1aib</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/iranian-hackers-deploy-minifast-and-minijunk-v2-through-phishing-and-seo-poisoning-1aib</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity researchers say they’ve spotted another wave of cyber espionage stuff tied to the Iranian state-linked threat group, sort of Nimbus Manticore, but you might also see it labeled as UNC1549, or Screening Serpens. They report that this crew has been going after organizations in aviation, software, telecommunications, defense, and energy across the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and Australia.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And, supposedly, things got worse after joint U.S.-Israeli military actions against Iran earlier in 2026. At that point, the attackers started rolling out new malware families, swapping the delivery methods around, and widening their activities by leaning hard on phishing, fake job offers, plus SEO poisoning tricks, which is a bit odd. Here we are.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One of the main malware strains that’s shown up in the intrusions is a new backdoor, called “MiniFast,” and it’s also referred to as MiniUpdate. Researchers think the code may be partly made with help from AI tools. They pointed to signs like error handling that’s unusually talkative, repetitive function naming, modular code layouts, and a lot of debug-style messages as hints that someone, or some tooling, was assisting the malware development in a more automated way. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Nimbus Manticore has been sort of known for doing “dream job” type operations like the ones tied to North Korean threat groups. In those cases, victims are basically invited, with fake recruitment chances, and they get nudged into pulling down nasty files that look like normal business docs or real software installers, you know, the usual.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In one campaign aimed at folks working in the aviation and software space in Saudi Arabia and Australia, the targets received career-themed messages that told them to download ZIP archives, which were hosted on OnlyOffice. Once the archive was opened, there was a file that looked harmless, an executable of sorts. But when someone ran it, the whole thing kicked off a method known as AppDomain hijacking. That process then loaded a hostile DLL, tied to the MiniJunk malware family, kinda quietly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Researchers later spotted something like the same attack chain in March 2026, but it was a bit more elaborate. In that run, the bad actors reportedly leaned on a trojanized Zoom installer, sort of tucked inside the infection flow. People were lured via fake meeting invitations, so the whole thing would look more reasonable, like it belonged in normal corporate life. After the installer was run, it relied on AppDomain hijacking, then it pushed the MiniFast backdoor onto the victim’s device.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What really makes MiniFast hard to ignore is what it can actually do. Researchers say it’s basically a fully featured backdoor, built for steady staying power and remote puppeteering. It phones home to attacker-controlled servers over HTTP and supports lots of different operator commands. For example, it handles file manipulation, directory listing, process enumeration, and it can kick off command execution through &lt;code&gt;cmd.exe&lt;/code&gt;. There’s also DLL loading, archive creation, privilege escalation, and it can keep itself around via scheduled tasks. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;MiniFast can also tune its communication intervals on the fly, through jitter changes and polling modifications, so the malware feels less routine and more awkward to track by security monitoring systems. Before jumping into the command loop, it’s reported that it sends system details back to its operators, which lets attackers map out the infected machines in a pretty practical way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One of the more eye-catching turns in this campaign was the group leaning into SEO poisoning. They didn’t just stick with phishing messages; they also built decoy websites that impersonate Oracle SQL Developer download pages. Those pages were pushed forward with search engine optimization tricks to get top placement on search engines like Bing and DuckDuckGo.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;According to researchers, the attackers registered dozens of supporting domains to bolster credibility and visibility for the bad download pages. People looking up everyday software utilities might stumble onto the fake sites, then download trojanized installers that quietly carry MiniFast malware.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security experts say this shift marks a big evolution in the group’s tactics, and honestly, it feels like they’ve been turning it into a quieter kind of operation. Instead of reaching out straight at victims, the attackers now try to compromise people passively, by messing with search engine rankings and then just… waiting for the targets to stumble onto the bad pages themselves.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Extra info from security researchers also showed that Nimbus Manticore rolled out a fresh build of MiniJunk, called MiniJunk V2, during espionage operations aimed at organizations in the United States, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries across the Middle East. One of the reported victims was a U.S. oil and gas firm.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Researchers also observed that the group went pretty far with personalization in its social engineering. Fake job offers, spoofed meeting invitations, and tailored messages were used to make the whole thing seem more believable. This kind of tuning really pushes up the chances that victims will trust the notes and, basically, kick off the infection sequence on their own. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The campaign points out how modern threat actors are kind of blending old school phishing with newer tricks like SEO poisoning, AI-assisted malware creation, and software impersonation. When they stack several delivery approaches together, attackers end up boosting their chances of getting into high-value targets, but also lowering the whole dependence on one single attack path.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security experts say orgs should boost employee awareness training, only confirm software downloads via official channels, keep an eye on weird network activity, remove or limit the unneeded administrative permissions, and use more advanced endpoint monitoring tools that can catch memory-based malware and persistence tactics. People in sensitive fields, like developers and employees, also should stay wary of unexpected job offers and random meeting invitations that feel too convenient.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity firms such as &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; keep pushing the idea that proactive threat intelligence really matters more and more, along with endpoint monitoring, phishing awareness, and software supply chain security. This is because state-sponsored cyber groups are increasingly targeting enterprise settings, critical infrastructure, and those high-value industries using pretty sophisticated attack campaigns, not just basic stuff.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>KnowledgeDeliver LMS Vulnerability Exploited to Deploy Godzilla Web Shell and Cobalt Strike</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 07:40:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/knowledgedeliver-lms-vulnerability-exploited-to-deploy-godzilla-web-shell-and-cobalt-strike-ea7</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/knowledgedeliver-lms-vulnerability-exploited-to-deploy-godzilla-web-shell-and-cobalt-strike-ea7</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity researchers say they’ve found that a high-severity weakness in Digital Knowledge’s KnowledgeDeliver LMS platform was being used in the wild, kind of like it was a zero-day thing, to push out the Godzilla web shell and later drop the Cobalt Strike Beacon malware.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The problem is listed as &lt;code&gt;CVE-2026-5426&lt;/code&gt;, and the root cause came from hard-coded ASP.NET machine keys that were sitting inside the deployment setups. Those machine keys are the ones ASP.NET relies on to encrypt plus validate ViewState, so if they end up exposed, attackers can then misuse them to run hostile code remotely, even if the attacker does not have authentication. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Researchers also mention the flaw in KnowledgeDeliver setups that were in place before February 24, 2026. Since several deployments supposedly used the same shared machine keys, once those keys became known, attackers might be able to breach a bunch of internet-facing systems, not just one, and do it in short order.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The whole attack chain kind of started with a ViewState deserialization exploit, where attackers put together nasty payloads and then delivered them via HTTP requests. After it worked, the attackers went ahead and rolled out the Godzilla web shell, which basically gave them remote control of the server that got compromised.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once they had access, it’s reported that they changed some application files and then tucked in malicious JavaScript directly into the LMS platform. People who visited the affected site were greeted with fake security warnings, telling them to go ahead and install a so-called “security authentication plugin”, as if it were totally normal.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But in reality, that supposed installer ended up dropping a Cobalt Strike Beacon instead, a pretty well-known post-exploitation tool that lots of threat actors lean on for keeping foothold persistence, moving laterally, and running remote commands once they’re inside the environment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Researchers also noticed that some payloads were tweaked with organization-specific encryption keys, which kind of hints that the attackers had in mind specific victims, not just some generic mass campaign. Like, they weren’t really winging it… more like they prepped a tailored deployment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This incident really puts the spotlight on the risks of shared secrets and those insecure default settings that show up in enterprise software rollouts. If even one encryption key leaks, it can end up opening the door for compromise across an entire installation ecosystem, not just a small slice of machines.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security experts suggest rotating machine keys and updating vulnerable systems right away. They also recommend watching for odd ViewState activity, checking application integrity, and putting in place stronger endpoint monitoring, so you can catch post-exploitation tooling like Cobalt Strike before it runs too far.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And companies such as &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; keep stressing secure configuration management, faster vulnerability patching, plus proactive monitoring, because attackers increasingly go after enterprise platforms and web applications using more advanced exploitation methods, day after day.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
      <category>darkx</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Ghost CMS Vulnerability Exploited to Hijack Over 700 Websites in ClickFix Campaign</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 07:27:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/ghost-cms-vulnerability-exploited-to-hijack-over-700-websites-in-clickfix-campaign-5h02</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/ghost-cms-vulnerability-exploited-to-hijack-over-700-websites-in-clickfix-campaign-5h02</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered this big attack campaign that takes aim at a critical flaw in Ghost CMS and then ends up compromising hundreds of websites, sorta sneaking in malicious code that’s tied to ClickFix attacks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The problem, catalogued as &lt;code&gt;CVE-2026-26980&lt;/code&gt;, is a high-severity SQL injection weakness; in other words, it hits Ghost CMS directly. Researchers report that adversaries used it to gain unauthorized access to admin API keys. Once they have those keys, they can tweak website content and also insert nasty JavaScript into published articles, not just in drafts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;They also mention that the vulnerability got patched earlier in 2026, but threat actors still moved fast and kept going after any unpatched installs. In fact, investigators say over 700 websites across a bunch of different areas, including universities, AI platforms, blockchain projects, SaaS providers, fintech companies, and media orgs, got hit.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The attackers reportedly used the stolen admin API keys to tuck in some hidden JavaScript loaders at the bottom of website pages, sort of quietly. Those loaders then pulled extra payloads from attacker-controlled infrastructure during runtime, which gave the whole campaign more flexibility to tweak malicious behavior without having to re-touch the compromised sites again each time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Researchers also noted that the malicious backend relied on cloaking techniques to dodge detection. Instead of handing out malware right away to every single visitor, the system first gathered browser fingerprinting data and then decided whether the visitor was a real target or basically just a security scanner probing around.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For victims that were flagged as legitimate targets, they were eventually served fake CAPTCHA verification screens, as part of what’s called a ClickFix attack. In the end, users were deceived into copying and then running malicious commands through the Windows Run dialog, and that led to the download and execution of malware on their machines.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The attack chain seems to have evolved, basically swapping out what it delivered: DLL files, JavaScript loaders, and even altered Electron-based applications that could keep running and also talk back to remote command and control servers.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security experts say this campaign kind of shows a clear pattern, how a vulnerable content management system can quietly turn into a front door for broad malware distribution, unless it gets patched quickly. Since the intrusions relied on real compromised websites, many victims were naturally more willing to trust what they were shown, even if the content was shady.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Users associated with Ghost CMS are strongly encouraged to update to the newest fixed release, rotate credentials, check admin access logs for odd moments, remove any inserted scripts, and then scan their websites for signs of compromise.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity groups like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; keep stressing that patch management, website security monitoring, and fast vulnerability response matter more each year, because attackers increasingly turn CMS platforms into tools for large-scale cyber campaigns.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Lazarus Group Deploying Memory-Only RemotePE Malware Against Financial and Crypto Targets</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 10:15:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/lazarus-group-deploying-memory-only-remotepe-malware-against-financial-and-crypto-targets-55ka</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/lazarus-group-deploying-memory-only-remotepe-malware-against-financial-and-crypto-targets-55ka</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered new details about a stealthy malware framework called “RemotePE” that is reportedly being used by the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group in attacks targeting financial institutions and cryptocurrency organizations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;According to researchers, the malware operates through a multi-stage infection chain designed to avoid detection and maintain long-term access inside compromised systems. The attack reportedly begins with social engineering, where attackers impersonate employees from trading companies and contact victims through platforms like Telegram. Victims are then redirected to fake scheduling websites that help deliver the malware.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The infection chain involves multiple loaders, including &lt;code&gt;DPAPILoader&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;RemotePELoader&lt;/code&gt;. The first loader uses the Windows Data Protection API (DPAPI) to decrypt hidden payloads stored on disk. Once decrypted, the second-stage loader communicates with a remote command-and-control server and retrieves the final payload known as RemotePE.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What makes RemotePE especially dangerous is that it runs entirely in memory without being written to disk. This “memory-only” execution significantly reduces forensic evidence and helps the malware avoid traditional antivirus and endpoint detection systems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Researchers say the malware also includes advanced evasion techniques such as patching Windows Event Tracing (ETW) and using methods like Hell’s Gate to bypass security monitoring tools.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once active, RemotePE functions as a fully featured remote access trojan (RAT). It can perform file operations, execute processes, manage DLL modules, collect system information, communicate with attacker-controlled servers, and maintain persistence on infected systems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One notable capability involves secure file deletion. The malware reportedly overwrites files multiple times before renaming and deleting them, making forensic recovery more difficult.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security researchers believe the malware is designed for stealthy long-term surveillance rather than immediate disruption. Its low detection footprint and advanced evasion methods suggest it is reserved for high-value targets, particularly organizations in the financial and cryptocurrency sectors.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The campaign once again highlights how advanced threat groups are increasingly targeting crypto platforms, trading firms, and decentralized finance ecosystems through social engineering and sophisticated malware delivery techniques.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity companies like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; continue to emphasize the importance of strong endpoint monitoring, employee awareness training, threat hunting, and secure communication practices to defend against modern targeted attacks.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TrapDoor Supply Chain Attack Targets npm, PyPI, and Crates.io Developers</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 09:47:45 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/trapdoor-supply-chain-attack-targets-npm-pypi-and-cratesio-developers-4oia</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/trapdoor-supply-chain-attack-targets-npm-pypi-and-cratesio-developers-4oia</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;This update arrives when software supply chain attacks are zooming up, across a bunch of open-source ecosystems. In a sort of pattern, attackers are going after package registries more and more, plus the developer workflows, the CI/CD setup, and also third-party dependencies, all to push in malware and quietly siphon credentials.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Many security teams think improvements such as staged publishing and more rigid install controls matter a lot for increasing confidence in how open-source software gets distributed. Still, developers are told pretty regularly to audit dependencies, keep an eye on package changes, lean on trusted publishing methods, and lock down CI/CD pipelines the right way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity firms like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; keep pointing out how supply chain security is central, especially as today’s development environments become ever more reliant on open-source utilities and automated deployment systems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In the Rust ecosystem, some crates used sketchy &lt;code&gt;build.rs&lt;/code&gt; scripts that could trigger sneaky code execution while building, basically, when you thought everything was just compiling. Researchers reported that these packages went looking for local keystores, encrypted whatever they collected, and then sent it out somewhere external. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;At the same time, the Python side relied on the usual “import means run” pattern, meaning the packages were set up to automatically execute code when imported. Rather than shipping the entire malicious payload right in the package, they went for a two-step move: download remote JavaScript from an attacker-controlled domain, then run it via Node.js. By doing it this way, the attackers could adjust the malware behavior remotely, without having to publish new and updated packages every time. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There was also a pretty odd thread in the campaign, where researchers saw attempts to manipulate AI-assisted coding tools. Hidden instructions were tucked into files such as &lt;code&gt;.cursorrules&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;CLAUDE.md&lt;/code&gt;, and those were meant to coax AI assistants into carrying out malicious “security scans” that could end up exposing secrets and other sensitive information.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The campaign kind of highlights that attackers are now going after developer workflows, those CI/CD pipelines, open-source ecosystems, and even AI development environments, rather than just depending on traditional malware distribution ways like before.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security experts suggest you should do a careful dependency audit, stay away from packages you don't fully trust, keep an eye on build scripts, check what happens after install, and limit unnecessary credential exposure in dev environments, to reduce the blast radius when something weird shows up.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity companies such as &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; keep stressing that software supply chain security is getting more and more important, mainly because today’s development stacks feel more automated, more connected, and well, harder to reason about.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>npm Introduces New Security Controls to Reduce Supply Chain Attacks</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 09:32:54 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/npm-introduces-new-security-controls-to-reduce-supply-chain-attacks-350e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/npm-introduces-new-security-controls-to-reduce-supply-chain-attacks-350e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;GitHub has rolled out new security-oriented updates for npm, basically trying to strengthen the software supply chain protection and lower the odds of those malicious package attacks that keep growing in the open-source world.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One of the most notable changes is a feature they call “staged publishing.” Rather than having a package show up immediately right after publishing, the maintainers now have to manually ok the release through a 2FA challenge. Only after that challenge is accepted does it become publicly installable on npm.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The idea here is to add one more human verification layer, especially for packages that get published via automated CI/CD pipelines. That extra step should help prevent compromised workflows from quietly pushing poisoned updates to developers and users, without anyone noticing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;With staged publishing, package releases get put up first in some kind of temporary staging queue. After that, a maintainer kind of has to give an explicit approval for the release before it actually shows up on the npm registry. GitHub claims this gives a stronger “proof of presence” when publishing packages, so automated compromise attempts become way harder, or at least more difficult to pull off.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To use the feature, maintainers must already have permission to publish the package, make sure 2FA is turned on for their account, and they need npm CLI version 11.15.0 or newer. Otherwise, it just won’t work right.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;GitHub also added new install control flags for npm. These options let developers block installations coming from local directories, local files, and remote URLs unless everything is explicitly okayed. The intention here is to give teams a tighter grip over non-registry package sources, since those could sneak in malicious code into projects.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This update arrives when software supply chain attacks are zooming up, across a bunch of open-source ecosystems. In a sort of pattern, attackers are going after package registries more and more, plus the developer workflows, the CI/CD setup, and also third-party dependencies, all to push in malware and quietly siphon credentials.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Many security teams think improvements such as staged publishing and more rigid install controls matter a lot for increasing confidence in how open-source software gets distributed. Still, developers are told pretty regularly to audit dependencies, keep an eye on package changes, lean on trusted publishing methods, and lock down CI/CD pipelines the right way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity firms like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; keep pointing out how supply chain security is central, especially as today’s development environments become ever more reliant on open-source utilities and automated deployment systems.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Claude Mythos AI Identifies Thousands of High-Severity Software Vulnerabilities</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 09:16:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/claude-mythos-ai-identifies-thousands-of-high-severity-software-vulnerabilities-5feo</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/claude-mythos-ai-identifies-thousands-of-high-severity-software-vulnerabilities-5feo</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Anthropic said that its cybersecurity effort, Project Glasswing, has basically already helped spot over 10,000 vulnerabilities with high and critical severity across software that a lot of people actually use, since it started last month.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;As part of the program, a small group of cybersecurity partners gets early access to Claude Mythos Preview, which is an advanced AI model built to autonomously study software and surface security weaknesses before attackers get the chance to use them.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In Anthropic’s words, more than 6,200 of the vulnerability results were tied to over 1,000 open-source projects. Then, after more checks were run, the team confirmed that above 1,700 of those findings were legit, including more than 1,000 that were rated high or critical.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This kind of AI-based vulnerability discovery is showing up as a real change in cybersecurity. Pretty soon, orgs might have to run quicker patch cycles, keep tighter oversight, and be more defensively ready, because advanced AI tools keep reshaping both defense and the threats themselves.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One of the major findings sort of points at a critical flaw in WolfSSL that might let a malicious actor forge certificates and then impersonate real services, you know. Anthropic said that dozens of the vulnerabilities they identified have already been patched, and that security advisories were also issued to the projects that were affected.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The company also admitted, pretty plainly, that AI is changing the cybersecurity scene, like, rapidly. Even though AI models can boost vulnerability hunting and defensive research in a meaningful way, they also add this kind of pressure for organizations, because issues may be discovered far faster than anyone can realistically remediate them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security researchers tied to the effort described Mythos Preview as especially strong in poring over source code with a security-minded approach. Some other reports go further, and suggest the model can link several weaknesses together into believable attack paths, which makes it feel more capable than the usual automated scanning tools.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Beyond vulnerability research, Anthropic mentioned that at least one financial institution reportedly used its AI system to detect and stop a fraudulent wire transfer attempt after attackers got into a customer’s email account, and then tried to spoof the communication.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Also, the whole rise of AI-assisted discovery is kind of shifting the way software vendors handle patch management, and now companies are being pushed to make patch cycles faster, improve logging, lock down default configurations, and lean on multi-factor authentication to lower overall exposure.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On top of that, Anthropic launched a Cyber Verification Program, which gives verified security professionals a chance to use advanced AI capabilities for vulnerability research, penetration testing, and defensive operations-more or less.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity firms like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; help organizations adjust to these moving threats via threat intelligence, vulnerability monitoring, security analysis, and those proactive defense strategies that people tend to overlook until it’s too late.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;As AI keeps transforming cybersecurity, that balance between quicker vulnerability discovery and quicker patching may become one of the most important security problems for organizations around the globe, or at least it feels that way.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Claude Mythos AI Helped Discover Thousands of High-Severity Software Vulnerabilities</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 07:36:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/claude-mythos-ai-helped-discover-thousands-of-high-severity-software-vulnerabilities-3mi4</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/claude-mythos-ai-helped-discover-thousands-of-high-severity-software-vulnerabilities-3mi4</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Anthropic says that in its cybersecurity push, Project Glasswing, it already spotted over 10,000 problems that are high and also critical, across a bunch of software systems people actually use, and all of that happened within weeks, not months.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The effort also, well it gives a set of picked cybersecurity partners early access to Claude Mythos Preview. That’s an advanced AI model aimed to analyze code on its own and find security gaps before bad actors can take advantage. Roughly 50 organizations are in the program right now, the ones Anthropic trusts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In Anthropic’s words, more than 6,200 of the issues they found landed in the high or critical buckets, and they were tied to more than 1,000 open-source projects. After a deeper review, the team verified that over 1,700 of the leads were real vulnerabilities, and more than 1,000 were considered high-risk problems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One example researchers kept bringing up involved a critical weakness in WolfSSL, where attackers might be able to counterfeit certificates and show up as if they were real services. The company stated that dozens of vulnerabilities found via the project have already been fixed and then made public.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This announcement kinda shows how artificial intelligence is moving vulnerability research and day-to-day security operations along, at a pace that feels like it’s outrunning everyone. AI models are getting better at scanning huge codebases, flagging hazardous patterns, and even stitching separate bugs into probable attack chains more quickly than the older manual approach.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Anthropic also said, the hard part isn’t just hunting vulnerabilities anymore it’s repairing them in time. With AI-assisted discovery speeding up, software vendors could end up struggling to match the rate of patching and remediation work.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The company said that the AI model is already being used in, like, real-world defensive scenarios. In one situation, a financial institution supposedly used the system to find and stop a fraudulent $1.5 million wire transfer attempt, tied to a hacked email account and these spoofed phone calls.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Because these models bring both powerful offensive and defensive abilities, Anthropic hasn’t publicly released Mythos Preview. They also mentioned that extra safeguards are still required to stop bad actors from trying to misuse it.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity firms such as &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; assist organizations in getting ready for this shifting environment via threat intelligence, vulnerability monitoring, and proactive security review.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The upsurge in AI-driven vulnerability discovery really points to a major shift in cybersecurity. Businesses may soon need more rapid patch cycles, heavier monitoring, and stronger defensive readiness, because advanced AI tools keep reshaping both cyber defense and cyber threats… simultaneously, it seems.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Compromised Laravel-Lang Packages Used to Distribute Massive Credential Stealer</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 07:20:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/compromised-laravel-lang-packages-used-to-distribute-massive-credential-stealer-31g4</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/compromised-laravel-lang-packages-used-to-distribute-massive-credential-stealer-31g4</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security researchers say they uncovered some kind of big-scale software supply chain attack, hitting several really common Laravel-Lang PHP packages. In short, the attackers were able to secretly push around a credential-stealing malware that’s pretty advanced, and it was aimed at Windows, Linux, and macOS systems.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The packages that got hit, according to the report, include &lt;code&gt;laravel-lang/lang&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;laravel-lang/http-statuses&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;laravel-lang/attributes&lt;/code&gt;, and &lt;code&gt;laravel-lang/actions&lt;/code&gt;. Investigators think the adversaries might have slipped into the org’s release infrastructure, their automation pipelines, or even the publishing credentials.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What makes this all the more dangerous is that the attackers did not go and directly touch the obvious, visible project source. Instead, they basically rewrote existing Git tags so they referenced nasty commits. So when developers later grabbed what seemed like normal package versions, from the outside it looked fine, they could end up installing that malware anyway into their environments, without realizing it, for a while.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The harmful code got tucked away inside a file called &lt;code&gt;src/helpers.php&lt;/code&gt;. Since that file was pulled in automatically via Composer autoload, the payload would run quietly as soon as a Laravel or PHP app started up. There was no real manual step needed, and no user did anything, just the usual boot.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;According to researchers, the malware initially went after details about the compromised machine, then it fetched a bigger credential-stealing payload from some outside server. It was designed for a lot of targets, like cloud credentials, CI/CD tokens, SSH key material, Docker auth files, Kubernetes settings, browser cookies, crypto wallets, password manager vault data, VPN credentials, and even developer secrets.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The stealer also went after data that lives in browsers like Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave, and Opera, plus a bunch of everyday apps such as Discord, Slack, Telegram, Outlook, and FTP clients. The stolen bits were encrypted before they were pushed over to attacker-controlled infrastructure, then the malware tried to tidy up and remove its own footprints from the infected system.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In total, researchers found over 700 suspicious package versions tied to this campaign, which kind of hints that the whole thing was highly automated, and not really a last-minute move. It feels planned, in a careful way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Honestly, this incident is just another reminder that software supply chain attacks are getting more advanced every year. A lot of developers end up trusting package repositories and automated updates, and when a dependency gets compromised, it becomes really dangerous not only for individuals but also for organizations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity companies such as &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; are there to help organizations lessen these risks, via supply chain security monitoring, threat intelligence, credential exposure analysis, and also more careful secure development habits.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For developers and security teams, the safest route feels like you should verify package integrity, watch for unexpected version shifts, review dependency updates with a lot of patience, and avoid giving “blind trust” to automated package ecosystems.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Actively Exploited LiteSpeed cPanel Plugin Flaw Gives Attackers Root Access</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 25 May 2026 07:06:26 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/actively-exploited-litespeed-cpanel-plugin-flaw-gives-attackers-root-access-53i2</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/actively-exploited-litespeed-cpanel-plugin-flaw-gives-attackers-root-access-53i2</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A critical security flaw in the LiteSpeed User-End cPanel Plugin is being actively exploited, and it’s putting vulnerable servers at risk of full system compromise. Like, seriously, it’s one of those situations where you don’t just get a minor issue, but potentially the whole host goes sideways.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The problem, labeled CVE-2026-48172, shows a maximum CVSS severity score of 10.0. Researchers are saying the weakness lets adversaries run arbitrary scripts with root-level privileges, mainly because the plugin makes the wrong privilege assignment, or at least it does so improperly, inside the overall flow.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Per LiteSpeed, even a standard cPanel user account… including one that’s compromised, or just low-privileged in the first place, could misuse the vulnerable &lt;code&gt;lsws.redisAble&lt;/code&gt; function to climb into elevated access. And since root access is basically near-total command over a server, attackers could in theory install malware, change configurations, take sensitive information, or disrupt the hosted services entirely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So, the issue shows up in LiteSpeed User-End cPanel Plugin versions 2.3 through 2.4.4; it’s kind of a bumpy window there. LiteSpeed said its WHM plugin isn’t directly in the blast radius, but then the newer releases now do add extra security improvements after an internal review, yes, that part matters.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;They also confirmed that the weakness is already being used in actual attacks, though the full technical story on exactly how it’s being done hasn’t been shared yet. In the meantime, admins are asked to check for indicators of compromise, look at suspicious IP activity, and block any unauthorized access attempts right away, like immediately.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;LiteSpeed has now released fixed versions that address this, and it strongly recommends upgrading to the newest available release. If patching can’t happen on the spot, then as a short-term measure, it’s being recommended to temporarily remove the vulnerable user-end plugin.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This incident shows, kind of, how panel hosting and server administration add-ons still stay nice target for attackers. It’s because these tools usually run with high permissions, so any flaw in them can quickly spiral into a big-scale server takeover, you know, in practice.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity firms like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; assist organizations by feeding them vulnerability intelligence, plus doing server monitoring, threat assessment, and proactive security evaluations. They basically help you see what’s happening before it turns into a mess.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For hosting providers and system administrators, the takeaway is pretty straightforward: treat critical add-on vulnerabilities like emergency patching events, particularly when active exploitation is already verified.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why Data Leaks Never Truly Disappear</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 08:28:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/why-data-leaks-never-truly-disappear-13g7</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/why-data-leaks-never-truly-disappear-13g7</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Once sensitive data leaks online, it rarely disappears completely. Even if the original source removes the information, copies often continue spreading across forums, cloud storage, private groups, dark web marketplaces, and archived databases for years.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One of the biggest reasons data leaks persist is replication. The moment leaked files become public, other attackers, researchers, collectors, and automated systems quickly copy and redistribute the data. A single breach can end up mirrored across dozens of platforms within hours.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Leaked information can include email addresses, passwords, phone numbers, financial details, internal documents, API keys, identity records, or confidential business data. Even older leaks remain valuable because attackers combine them with newer information to build more complete profiles of victims.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Another problem is credential reuse. Many users continue using the same passwords or recovery methods long after a breach occurs. This allows attackers to use old leaked credentials in credential-stuffing attacks against email, banking, cloud, and social media accounts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Data leaks also fuel phishing and social engineering campaigns. Attackers use leaked personal details to create more convincing scams, fake support calls, or impersonation attempts targeting individuals and businesses.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For organizations, leaked internal documents or exposed employee data can create long-term reputational, legal, and operational risks. Even if the original vulnerability is fixed, the exposed data may continue circulating indefinitely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Search engines, archives, screenshots, backups, and underground forums make complete removal nearly impossible. In some cases, old leaks resurface years later during new cybercrime campaigns.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To reduce risk, users should change compromised passwords immediately, enable multi-factor authentication, monitor accounts for suspicious activity, and avoid password reuse. Businesses should also strengthen breach detection, limit unnecessary data storage, and rotate exposed credentials quickly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity companies like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; help organizations reduce these risks through threat intelligence, breach monitoring, and digital risk analysis.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A data leak is not just a temporary incident. Once information spreads online, it can continue creating security risks long after the original breach is forgotten.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Hidden Threat in Free PDF Downloads</title>
      <dc:creator>Deepak Sharma</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 23 May 2026 08:26:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/the-hidden-threat-in-free-pdf-downloads-1b8i</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/deepaksharma/the-hidden-threat-in-free-pdf-downloads-1b8i</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Free PDF downloads may seem harmless, but they are increasingly being used by cybercriminals to spread malware, steal credentials, and trick users into visiting dangerous websites. From fake ebooks and cracked software manuals to invoices and templates, malicious PDF files are now a common part of modern cyberattacks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One major reason PDFs are attractive to attackers is trust. Most users assume PDF files are safe because they are widely used for documents, reports, forms, and educational content. Attackers take advantage of this trust by disguising malicious files as useful or urgent documents.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Some malicious PDFs contain hidden links that redirect users to phishing websites or malware downloads. Others may include embedded scripts, fake login pages, or exploit code targeting vulnerabilities in outdated PDF readers and browsers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybercriminals also use SEO poisoning to push malicious PDF downloads higher in search results. Users searching for free guides, resumes, government forms, or software documentation may unknowingly download infected files from fake websites.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Another growing threat involves fake invoice or payment PDFs sent through phishing emails. These documents often pressure users to click links, scan QR codes, or open attachments quickly without verifying authenticity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Businesses are also at risk because employees frequently exchange PDFs through email and cloud platforms. A single malicious attachment can lead to credential theft, malware infection, or unauthorized access to company systems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To reduce risk, users should download PDFs only from trusted sources, avoid opening unexpected attachments, keep PDF readers updated, and verify suspicious links before clicking. Organizations should also use email filtering, endpoint protection, and sandbox analysis for attachments.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cybersecurity companies like &lt;a href="https://intelligencex.org/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IntelligenceX&lt;/a&gt; help organizations reduce these risks through threat intelligence, phishing analysis, and malware monitoring.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;PDF files are useful everyday tools, but in the hands of attackers, they can quietly become an effective method for phishing, malware delivery, and data theft.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>intelligencex</category>
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