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    <title>DEV Community: Fabio Marano</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Fabio Marano (@fabiomarano).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/fabiomarano</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Fabio Marano</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/fabiomarano</link>
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      <title>Offline vs Cloud: the Real Threat Model in Password Managers</title>
      <dc:creator>Fabio Marano</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 05:18:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/fabiomarano/offline-vs-cloud-il-vero-modello-di-minaccia-nei-password-manager-1b4e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/fabiomarano/offline-vs-cloud-il-vero-modello-di-minaccia-nei-password-manager-1b4e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When talking about password managers, the discussion often focuses on encryption algorithms, key length, or “zero-knowledge.”&lt;br&gt;
Much less often, a more important question is asked:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Who am I trying to protect myself from?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Without a clear threat model, comparing different solutions becomes meaningless.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What is a threat model&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A threat model is not a list of features.&lt;br&gt;
It is an explicit description of:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;which attacks are meant to be prevented&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;which ones are accepted as out of scope&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;which assumptions are made about the environment&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every password manager, consciously or not, makes these choices.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The cloud-first model&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cloud-based password managers introduce a model built around:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;remote synchronization&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;an always-on backend&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;user accounts&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;centralized infrastructure&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This approach protects well against:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;device loss&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;multi-device access requirements&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;user mistakes (automatic backups)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But it also introduces new attack surfaces:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;provider compromise&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;backend bugs&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;server misconfiguration&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;third-party dependencies&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;metadata exposure&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Even with strong encryption, the risk model changes the moment data exists online.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The offline-first model&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An offline password manager completely eliminates:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;remote servers&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;automatic synchronization&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;recovery accounts&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;backend APIs&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The result is a simpler model:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;the vault exists only locally&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;security depends on the device&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;the master password is the only critical secret&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This approach protects very well against:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;remote attacks&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;provider breaches&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;third-party compromises&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;online metadata exposure&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But it requires the user to take on:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;greater responsibility&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;conscious backup management&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;operating system protection&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;No model is “better” in absolute terms&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cloud ≠ insecure&lt;br&gt;
Offline ≠ invulnerable&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;They are different models, suited to different threats.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Problems arise when:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;total security is promised&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;assumptions are hidden&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;convenience is confused with protection&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The OneCritto choice&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://onecritto.com/IT/index.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;OneCritto deliberately adopts an offline and zero-knowledge model.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This means:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;no servers&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;no accounts&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;no forced synchronization&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;no remote recovery&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security is not delegated to a provider, but remains under the direct control of the user.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It is a choice that reduces the attack surface, but requires awareness.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security as responsibility, not as a service&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A system that promises to “always save the user” inevitably introduces bypass mechanisms.&lt;br&gt;
A system that removes those bypasses demands more attention, but offers a more predictable model.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;OneCritto does not try to cover every possible scenario.&lt;br&gt;
It aims to be clear about what it protects—and what it does not.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Conclusion&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The right question is not:&lt;br&gt;
“Which password manager is the most secure?”&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But:&lt;br&gt;
“Which threat model is consistent with my real risk?”&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security is not a checklist.&lt;br&gt;
It is an architectural choice.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Originally published on &lt;a href="https://onecritto.ghost.io/offline-vs-cloud-il-vero-modello-di-minaccia-nei-password-manager/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;onecritto.ghost.io&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>architecture</category>
      <category>cloud</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>security</category>
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