DEV Community: Fundacja Dobre Państwo

Constitutional Agency and the Predator's Hour

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 01:30:00 +0000

The article analyzes the phenomenon of temporal asymmetry, namely the difference between the speed at which powerful actors make decisions and the pace at which they are held accountable by democratic institutions. The author defines the 'predator's hour' as a period of misalignment between legal structures and the dynamics of contemporary technologies and AI. The key problem is not speed itself, but the temporal arbitrage of power, where advantage stems from the ability to operate in a shorter time cycle than oversight bodies. The proposed solution is institutional optimization: eliminating idle friction (bureaucracy) while maintaining productive friction, which serves a protective and epistemic function. The goal is to create a system of reversible agency, in which control mechanisms are designed to match the pace of modern threats.

Man vs. Objective Function: Lessons from Lieusaint

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Fri, 30 Oct 2026 00:29:06 +0000

The article analyzes the case of the French town of Lieusaint, which struggled with an influx of traffic generated by the Waze app. The author uses this story to illustrate the fundamental conflict between techne (the technical proficiency of the algorithm) and phronesis (practical wisdom and the common good). The text argues that the technical correctness of an objective function does not guarantee social optimality, as AI systems often ignore external costs. The key conclusion is the thesis that true human agency in the era of algorithms does not lie in trying to better fit into the system, but in the ability to question and change the rules of the game themselves and the definitions of the problems that systems are meant to solve.

Algorithmic power and the right to challenge the machine

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 23:29:04 +0000

The article analyzes the nature of algorithmic power, rejecting the thesis of AI's inherent authoritarianism in favor of the concept of institutional potential. The author argues that it is not the technology itself, but the socio-technical architecture—comprising data, procedures, and a lack of oversight—that determines the political character of these systems. A key element is the distinction between four types of opacity (technical, organizational, cognitive, and institutional) as well as the distinction between explainability and interpretability. The text emphasizes that the right to challenge a machine's decision does not require a mathematical understanding of the model, but rather transparent decision-making premises and effective appeal processes, which are essential for upholding the principles of the rule of law in the era of automation.

Big Tech as quasi-institutions: Power and AI regulations

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 22:21:19 +0000

The article analyzes the evolution of tech giants from the role of ordinary service providers to the position of quasi-institutions and 'gatekeepers'. The author indicates that traditional monopoly models are insufficient to describe the platform economy, where network effects and high switching costs become key, leading to the lock-in phenomenon. The text emphasizes the transition from product competition to infrastructural power, in which Big Tech companies design the rules of visibility and market participation. In response to these processes, European regulations such as the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and the Digital Services Act (DSA) are cited, aiming to restore market fairness and limit the arbitrary selective power of the largest digital players.

Epistemic Capture: Big Tech Power vs The State

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 21:19:01 +0000

The article analyzes the concept of epistemic capture, distinguishing it from classical corruption. The author argues that modern states are becoming dependent on Big Tech not through secret agreements, but through a structural asymmetry of knowledge and resources. By adopting the language and tools of the technology sector, regulators begin to define problems from the perspective of the entities they are meant to oversee. Using the example of the Narwhal project from Barack Obama's campaign and the role of Eric Schmidt, the text illustrates the process of convergence between politics and Silicon Valley. This phenomenon leads to a situation in which the infrastructural power of corporations shapes the conceptual frameworks of public administration, limiting the state's ability to independently model digital regulations.

The crisis of technocracy and the architecture of perception according to da Empoli

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 20:19:01 +0000

The text analyzes the tension between procedural correctness and governing effectiveness, using Giuliano da Empoli's metaphor of the 'party of lawyers'. The author points to a divergence in three dimensions of legitimacy: input, output, and throughput. The crisis of technocracy results not only from a lack of effects but from citizens' feeling that procedures have become a ritual that does not translate into solving real social problems. Citing OECD data, the article emphasizes that trust in institutions depends on the balance between process reliability and the actual agency of citizens and the delivery of public goods; a lack of synergy here opens space for populist movements.

Disruption Policy and the Architecture of Power | Analysis

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 19:10:58 +0000

The text analyzes Donald Trump's governing style through the lens of disruption politics and the theory of the administrative presidency. The author focuses on the systemic conflict between the administration's responsiveness to a democratically elected leader and the concept of neutral competence within the professional state apparatus. A key example of this struggle for control over the bureaucracy is the introduction and modification of Schedule F, which aims to limit the autonomy of civil servants and increase the steerability of the state. The analysis frames these phenomena within organizational economics, highlighting the principal-agent problem and the risk of agent drift, where the bureaucracy's information advantage clashes with the president's political goals, leading to attempts at a radical restructuring of the executive power architecture.

Manual override and G. da Empoli's politics of exception

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 18:08:59 +0000

The text analyzes the concept of 'manual override' as a strategy for bypassing institutional procedures to achieve rapid results, which is characteristic of the modern governance model described by Giuliano da Empoli. The author contrasts this approach with Max Weber's theory of rational-legal domination and Carl Schmitt's concept of sovereignty, who defines the sovereign as the person who decides on the state of exception. The core issue is the moment when extraordinary instruments for protecting order become an alternative method of ordinary governance. The article points to the conflict between bureaucratic predictability and the pursuit of immediate effectiveness, emphasizing the attempt to regulate the exception itself within modern constitutionalism to prevent discretion from turning into pure arbitrariness.

Diplomacy and the economics of violence in the hour of the predator

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 17:09:45 +0000

The text analyzes the evolution of diplomacy, which has ceased to be a tool for preventing violence and has become an instrument for legitimizing faits accomplis. The author introduces the concept of 'kinetic diplomacy,' where military and cyber power becomes the first step in the sequence of action, and negotiations follow only after the factual state has been changed. In the era of the 'hour of the predator,' traditional bargaining gives way to coercion in the gray zone, resulting from dynamic changes in the balance of power and technological development. Drawing on the theories of Thomas Schelling and James Fearon, the article presents violence as a form of strategic communication, in which modern states employ multiple channels of coercion to alter an opponent's calculus and force favorable political conditions.

5. The Predator's Hour: The Conflict Between Agency and Power

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 16:09:38 +0000

The text analyzes the phenomenon of the 'predator's hour,' understood as a crisis of agency within traditional institutions in the face of the acceleration of events. The author points to the emergence of temporal arbitrage—a situation where actors operating with the logic of shock and speed (e.g., tech corporations, authoritarian leaders) gain an advantage over democratic and diplomatic systems. While law, courts, and international organizations rely on time-consuming procedures and consensus, contemporary threats, such as cyberattacks or disinformation operations, act almost instantaneously. This leads to a state where formal power structures still exist but become merely a ritual backdrop for real decisions made outside their control and reaction speed.

Power Mechanisms and Institutions: An Analysis of Retribution

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 14:58:56 +0000

The text analyzes contemporary political mobilization as a struggle for the limited resource of attention, where controversy becomes an effective communication tool. The author invokes theories of agenda-setting and flaming to explain how language shapes citizens' perception of reality. A key element is the analysis of social identity as well as mechanisms of affective polarization and cognitive dissonance, which cause political beliefs to become part of an individual's 'self'. The article also draws attention to the ritualistic nature of political rallies (collective effervescence) and the performative aspect of populist leadership. Overall, it shows how cognitive psychology and crowd sociology are utilized to build lasting group bonds and resistance to facts in a polarized political environment.

Trump and State Theory: An Institutional Analysis

Fundacja Dobre Państwo — Thu, 29 Oct 2026 13:53:37 +0000

The article analyzes Donald Trump's presidency through the prism of state theory and Max Weber's sociology, moving away from evaluating the leader's personal traits toward examining institutional mechanisms. The author posits a thesis regarding the attempt to convert charismatic leadership into lasting administrative agency. A key issue is the process of the routinization of charisma—the transformation of personal political energy into procedures, personnel, and organizational structures. The text highlights the tension between a personalistic style of governance and legal-rational bureaucracy, while analyzing limitations resulting from constitutional frameworks (the 22nd Amendment). The goal is to understand whether Trumpism can create a reproducible political repertoire that survives its founder's biography and permanently transforms the state's institutional regime.