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    <title>DEV Community: David D. Geer</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by David D. Geer (@geercom).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/geercom</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: David D. Geer</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/geercom</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Can static JSON schemas secure non-deterministic AI agent reasoning?</title>
      <dc:creator>David D. Geer</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 10 Aug 2026 20:13:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/geercom/can-static-json-schemas-secure-non-deterministic-ai-agent-reasoning-36pl</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/geercom/can-static-json-schemas-secure-non-deterministic-ai-agent-reasoning-36pl</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I would love feedback from the technical community on scope enforcement and impact boundaries when building production agent workflows.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  Decoupling LLM Reasoning from Tool Execution to Block Indirect Prompt Injection
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Indirect prompt injection allows attackers to context-hijack autonomous AI agents. Because hijacked tool calls look completely legitimate at the API and firewall level, non-deterministic evaluation (using an LLM to monitor another LLM) fails to enforce strict security boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To address this vulnerability, I published a paper modeling a deterministic &lt;strong&gt;Intent Architecture&lt;/strong&gt;. By placing a static JSON policy schema layer between agent reasoning and tool execution, proposed actions are validated against explicit policy boundaries &lt;em&gt;before&lt;/em&gt; execution can occur.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Live Sandbox &amp;amp; Code Repository
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Interactive Colab Sandbox:&lt;/strong&gt; Open in Google Colab&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;GitHub Repository:&lt;/strong&gt; ai-agent-intent-architecture on GitHub&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Full Research Paper:&lt;/strong&gt; Read the full paper on HackerNoon&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Core Implementation Overview
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The architecture intercepts proposed agent actions and validates them against a static &lt;code&gt;policy_schema.json&lt;/code&gt; file prior to execution:&lt;/p&gt;



&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;
python
import json
import jsonschema

# Load static policy schema
with open("policy_schema.json", "r") as f:
    policy_schema = json.load(f)

def validate_agent_intent(intent_payload):
    """Intercepts a proposed agent action and validates it against static policy schema rules."""
    try:
        jsonschema.validate(instance=intent_payload, schema=policy_schema)
        return True, "ACTION ALLOWED: Intent satisfies static policy schema."
    except jsonschema.exceptions.ValidationError as err:
        return False, f"ACTION BLOCKED: Policy violation -&amp;gt; {err.message}"
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;

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      <category>ai</category>
      <category>secdevops</category>
      <category>architecture</category>
      <category>llm</category>
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