Bosnia’s Internet Is Stuck in the Same Divisions as the Country Itself

Noel — Fri, 04 Sep 2026 00:49:24 +0000

I grew up in the United States, so when I moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina about twenty years ago, the internet situation honestly shocked me.

I didn't expect Bosnia to have the same infrastructure as the US. That would have been an unfair comparison, especially back then. What surprised me wasn't just that the internet was slower. It was the feeling that nobody involved seemed in any real hurry to fix it.

Slow connections were treated like bad weather. You complained, you waited, you restarted the modem, you called customer support, and in the end you just accepted that this was how things worked.

Two decades later, the tech has changed. We have fiber in some neighborhoods, 4G in a lot of populated areas, modern smartphones, streaming services, cloud apps, and people trying to run international businesses from home.

But the basic problem hasn't changed nearly enough.

Bosnia and Herzegovina still has one of the least convincing telecom markets in Europe. Mobile internet is where the problem really jumps out. Coverage is patchy, 4G showed up embarrassingly late, VoLTE support is still fragmented, and commercial 5G is still more of an abstract idea than something a regular customer can actually use.

The usual explanation is that Bosnia is a small and complicated country.

That's true, but it's also a handy excuse.

The deeper problem is that Bosnia doesn't really have a healthy telecom market. It has three established telecom ecosystems running inside the same country, historically tied to different territories, political structures, and ethnic constituencies.

They technically compete.

In practice, they often look a lot more comfortable with things staying as they are.

Three operators in one country, but not a normal market

The three main mobile network operators are BH Telecom, m:tel, and HT Eronet.

On paper, that sounds totally fine. Three mobile operators should be enough to create competition, especially in a country with fewer than four million people.

But Bosnia is not a normal single market.

BH Telecom has historically been strongest in Bosniak-majority parts of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. HT Eronet has traditionally held its strongest position in Croat-majority areas. M:tel dominates much of Republika Srpska.

That doesn't mean every customer picks a provider based on ethnicity, or that the operators are legally locked into their traditional territories. All three can sell services more broadly.

Still, pretending the historical and political split doesn't matter would be ridiculous.

Bosnia's telecom market grew up along a lot of the same fault lines as the state itself. Each big operator grew inside a certain institutional, geographic, and political environment. The result is a market that looks national on a spreadsheet but often acts like three partly separate zones.

If an operator already has a dominant local position, with its own infrastructure, public-sector contracts, retail stores, brand recognition, and relationships built over decades, how much reason does it really have to start a price war?

Not much.

And if all three operators understand that same reality, they don't need to sit in a dark room and sign some secret deal. A stagnant market can keep itself going without an explicit conspiracy.

Sometimes the most effective cartel is just a comfortable arrangement that nobody powerful wants to mess with.

Republika Srpska shows what happens when consolidation goes too far

The situation in Republika Srpska is especially worrying.

M:tel is controlled by Telekom Srbija, the telecom company majority-owned by the Republic of Serbia. Put another way, a strategically important piece of Bosnia and Herzegovina's communications infrastructure is controlled through a company owned by a neighboring state.

That should at least spark a serious public conversation.

Instead, it's usually treated like a normal corporate ownership detail.

Over the years, the m:tel group grew through acquisitions involving companies and brands like Logosoft, Blicnet, Telrad Net, and Elta-Kabel. These weren't all identical deals, and the companies didn't all work in exactly the same market segments. Still, the overall direction is hard to miss.

Potential competitors slowly became parts of the same corporate ecosystem.

A company can then look like it's competing through multiple brands, packages, subsidiaries, and sales channels while a lot of the revenue ends up flowing to the same group.

That's not the kind of competition customers need.

I don't care if my bill has a different logo on it when the infrastructure, wholesale access, and corporate control all lead back to the same place. Changing the color of the website isn't competition.

Republika Srpska isn't the only part of Bosnia with concentration problems, but it gives a particularly clear example of how consolidation can hollow out a market while keeping the appearance of choice.

The competition authorities approved those transactions. That doesn't automatically mean the decisions were corrupt or illegal. It does mean the long-term effect should be looked at honestly.

Did customers get lower prices, better rural coverage, faster upgrades, and more freedom to switch?

Or did the dominant provider just get harder to challenge?

That's the question that matters.

Bosnia joined the 4G era in 2019

Bosnia and Herzegovina didn't get commercial 4G service until 2019.

Let that sink in.

By then, 4G wasn't new tech. The first commercial LTE networks in Europe had launched almost ten years earlier. Operators in more developed markets were already testing and rolling out 5G.

Bosnia was celebrating something that had been normal elsewhere for years.

This delay wasn't caused by a lack of smartphones. It wasn't caused by customers refusing to use mobile data. It wasn't because the laws of physics work differently in the Balkans.

Licensing, spectrum allocation, institutional delay, and political dysfunction all played a part.

The three established operators got 4G licenses from the Communications Regulatory Agency in 2019. Deployment followed, and coverage got a lot better in cities and along major roads.

That was clearly positive. I'm not going to knock 4G just because it showed up late.

But announcing a network and building a consistently useful network aren't the same thing.

A coverage map can show a big colored area while saying very little about what happens inside buildings, in valleys, on side roads, or in villages where the signal jumps between 4G, 3G, and nothing useful.

People don't use coverage maps. They use phones.

The real test is whether a connection stays stable when someone leaves Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, or another big urban area. In a lot of Bosnia, that experience is still unpredictable.

The country's geography makes building networks harder. Mountains, valleys, scattered settlements, and low population density drive up the cost of coverage.

But difficult isn't the same as impossible.

Norway has tough terrain. Switzerland has mountains. Croatia has islands, mountains, and huge seasonal swings in network demand. None of that stopped those countries from building modern mobile networks.

Bosnia's geography is a challenge. It's not a full explanation.

Mobile internet exposes the real weakness

Fixed broadband stats can hide a lot.

One household might have a good fiber connection in central Sarajevo while another is stuck on an old copper line a few kilometers away. Average speeds go up when providers upgrade profitable city neighborhoods, even if rural and suburban users stay stuck with outdated infrastructure.

Mobile internet is harder to disguise because people carry the network around with them.

A mobile network should let customers move across the country without constantly thinking about which operator dominates which region. Calls shouldn't drop back to older network tech for no good reason. Data shouldn't get flaky the second someone leaves a city center.

That's not always what you get in Bosnia.

Quality can swing a lot by operator, municipality, neighborhood, road, and even which side of a building you're on. One provider might work fine in a certain town but perform badly twenty kilometers away. Another might have a strong outdoor signal but struggle indoors.

Some variation is normal in every country. The scale and persistence of the variation is the problem.

Bosnia has spent years near the bottom of different European broadband and mobile connectivity comparisons. The exact ranking shifts depending on the month, the methodology, and whether the measurement covers fixed or mobile connections. Saying Bosnia is literally the slowest country in Europe at every single moment would be inaccurate.

The more defensible conclusion is still bad enough: Bosnia has repeatedly stayed among Europe's weaker performers, even though the tech needed to fix a lot of the problem is widely available.

This isn't 2006 anymore.

Customers aren't impressed by the fact that mobile data technically exists. They expect it to work.

VoLTE should not still feel experimental

VoLTE lets voice calls run over the 4G network instead of forcing the phone to fall back to 3G or 2G.

This isn't some futuristic feature for telecom nerds. It improves call setup times, voice quality, and the ability to keep a modern data connection going during calls. It also makes it easier for operators to eventually shut down older network tech and reuse valuable spectrum.

In a mature 4G market, VoLTE should be boring.

In Bosnia, it still feels inconsistent.

Support can depend on the operator, the subscription type, the device model, firmware, SIM card, provisioning status, or whether the person in customer support even knows what the customer is asking about.

An operator can technically say it offers VoLTE while only supporting a limited set of devices or customer categories. That checks a box, but it doesn't create a dependable nationwide service.

The same goes for Wi-Fi calling, eSIM support, and other features that have become routine in a lot of markets.

Bosnian operators often present basic network modernization like it's a premium achievement. That pitch might work better if customers didn't know how phones work outside the country.

And then there is 5G

While European operators are talking about 5G Standalone, private 5G networks, network slicing, and the future of 6G, Bosnia still doesn't have a normal nationwide commercial 5G experience.

There have been tests, demos, equipment announcements, and talk about future readiness. That stuff isn't worthless, but it's not a commercial network.

A 5G logo showing up during a controlled demo doesn't mean a customer can buy a plan, walk outside, and use 5G across a meaningful coverage area.

I also don't think Bosnia needs 5G just because the number is higher.

A stable and well-designed 4G network is more useful than a 5G icon hooked up to inadequate backhaul. There's no point putting up new radio gear if base stations are poorly connected, rural coverage stays weak, and customers get tiny data allowances.

Still, the lack of commercial 5G says something about the market.

Operators facing tough competition usually use new network tech to win customers. They race to cover cities, publish independent test results, improve device support, and offer better plans.

Operators in a comfortable market can wait.

Bosnian consumers have already shown they'll put up with delays because, realistically, where else are they going to go?

The regulator exists, but accountability feels distant

The Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, usually known as RAK, is in charge of regulating telecom and broadcasting. It handles spectrum, hands out licenses, adopts rules, and monitors parts of the market.

In theory, it's an independent regulator.

The problem is that no institution in Bosnia works in a political vacuum. Appointments, budgets, laws, and enforcement priorities all live inside a system dominated by political parties and ethnic power-sharing.

People often go a step further and claim telecom operators directly pay political cartels that control the regulator. I get where that suspicion comes from. The ties between public companies, political parties, government appointments, ad budgets, public procurement, and media influence deserve serious scrutiny.

But suspicion isn't evidence, and I'm not going to present direct bribery as proven fact without paperwork to back it up.

The visible problem is already serious enough.

Two of the major operators are deeply tied to public ownership structures. The third also works inside a politically sensitive ownership and institutional environment. Political authorities shape the legal framework and the appointment environment around regulatory bodies. Public institutions are themselves big telecom customers.

That creates obvious conflicts of interest.

The state is simultaneously an owner, policymaker, customer, and regulator.

When the same political system benefits from operator profits, controls public contracts, and shapes regulatory institutions, tough regulation gets less likely. Even without an illegal order, everyone knows which decisions are politically easy and which ones aren't.

This is how regulatory capture can work. It doesn't always need an envelope of cash. Sometimes it's built right into the incentives.

When customers complain, they usually enter a slow admin process with the provider first and the regulator later. The individual customer has limited time, limited info, and almost no market power.

The operator has lawyers, engineers, regulatory specialists, and years of practice.

That's not a balanced relationship.

A virtual operator is not automatically real competition

Bosnia has seen alternative mobile brands and virtual operator setups. That's better than having no alternatives at all.

But an MVNO only creates real competition if it gets fair wholesale access and enough commercial freedom to challenge the network owner.

If a virtual operator depends completely on an incumbent's infrastructure, wholesale pricing, tech support, and access terms, its ability to compete may be limited from the start.

An MVNO should be able to innovate on pricing, data packages, customer service, eSIM activation, roaming, and specialized business services. It shouldn't exist just to put one more logo in a shopping mall.

Bosnia needs wholesale rules that let independent operators become genuine competitive threats.

Otherwise, an MVNO is renting a chair in somebody else's casino.

Customers have been trained to expect too little

One reason this system survives is that expectations stay low.

People compare their current service to what they had five or ten years ago and decide things have gotten better.

Of course they've gotten better. Tech got cheaper, equipment got better, smartphones became universal, and global internet traffic exploded. A telecom operator would have to actively try to offer exactly the same service it offered in 2010.

The relevant comparison isn't Bosnia today versus Bosnia fifteen years ago.

The relevant comparison is Bosnia versus countries using the same generation of network tech today.

Are data allowances competitive?

Is 4G coverage dependable outside urban centers?

Is VoLTE turned on by default on commonly used phones?

Can customers activate eSIM without pointless bureaucracy?

Are advertised speeds close to real-world speeds?

Can customers get out of a contract without getting punished when the provider keeps failing to deliver?

Can an independent company get fair access to infrastructure?

Those questions paint a much less flattering picture.

The solution is a free market, but not the fake version

The obvious solution is competition.

Not competition in political speeches. Not three logos on a government slide. Not subsidiaries pretending to compete with their parent company.

Bosnia needs the kind of competition that makes established operators uncomfortable.

A free market doesn't mean dropping regulation and hoping everything magically fixes itself. Telecom infrastructure has extremely high entry costs. Spectrum is limited. Towers need permits. Fiber networks need construction. Dominant operators can make market entry almost impossible without technically breaking any obvious rule.

Creating a real market therefore takes active structural reform.

Open the market to a serious fourth operator

Bosnia should make future spectrum allocation transparent and appealing to new entrants, including established European or regional operators.

A fourth physical network might be hard to justify in a small country, but it shouldn't be ruled out just because the current operators don't like the idea.

Spectrum auctions should reward coverage promises and investment, not just the ability to pay the highest upfront fee. A new operator could get phased coverage requirements, infrastructure-sharing rights, and temporary national roaming while it builds its network.

The goal should be to lower entry barriers without creating a permanently subsidized company.

Force fair wholesale access

Independent MVNOs need regulated access to existing mobile networks under transparent and nondiscriminatory terms.

Wholesale prices should be published or independently reviewed. Technical access should include modern features like 4G, VoLTE, 5G when available, eSIM, and reasonable quality-of-service terms.

An incumbent shouldn't be able to hand an MVNO a deliberately worse version of the network and then point to its failure as proof that competition doesn't work.

Treat future acquisitions as a market issue, not paperwork

Every new telecom acquisition should be judged on its practical effect on local and regional competition.

National market share alone can be misleading. An operator might not look dominant across the whole country while controlling nearly all meaningful infrastructure in a particular entity, canton, or municipality.

Competition authorities should look at local dominance, shared ownership, wholesale dependencies, and the loss of potential future competitors.

In some cases, approval should require the sale of infrastructure, guaranteed wholesale access, or other structural remedies.

And yes, sometimes the right answer should just be no.

Publish honest coverage and performance data

Operators should have to provide standardized coverage data that can be independently checked.

RAK should publish interactive maps based not only on operator predictions but also on measurements, customer data, and drive testing. Results should include download speed, upload speed, latency, indoor reliability, dropped calls, and VoLTE availability.

Marketing coverage isn't the same as usable coverage.

If public money or regulatory perks support network expansion, the public should be able to see what actually got built.

Make switching painless

Number portability has to be fast, predictable, and cheap. Contract terms should be written in language normal people can understand.

Customers should be able to walk away without heavy penalties when a provider keeps failing to deliver the advertised service.

eSIM activation should be available remotely where ID rules allow it. Forced store visits and paperwork protect incumbents, not customers.

The harder it is to switch, the less pressure providers feel to improve.

Build infrastructure once and share it

Bosnia doesn't need three separate towers on every hill just to keep up the illusion of independence.

Infrastructure sharing can cut costs and improve rural coverage, as long as it doesn't turn into another way to lock out newcomers.

Municipalities should simplify permits for towers and fiber builds. Public infrastructure like roads, railways, power routes, and utility ducts should be coordinated with broadband construction.

When a road is opened up for construction, fiber ducts should go in at the same time. Digging up the same street over and over because institutions won't talk to each other isn't development. It's expensive theater.

Make RAK institutionally harder to capture

The regulator needs transparent appointments, published voting records, clear conflict-of-interest rules, and detailed explanations for big decisions.

Performance testing should be independent. Enforcement stats should be public. Consumers should be able to see how many complaints came in, how long cases took, what violations were found, and what penalties were handed out.

Senior officials should disclose relevant financial and political ties. A real cooling-off period should apply before regulators can go work for companies they used to supervise.

Independence can't be declared in a law and then assumed to exist forever. It has to be shown.

Separate public ownership from political management

Public ownership isn't automatically bad. A publicly owned telecom company can be efficient, innovative, and profitable.

Political management is the problem.

Boards and executives shouldn't be prizes handed out after elections. Procurement should be transparent. Jobs shouldn't be used as a party patronage system. Company profits shouldn't protect political influence at the cost of investment and competition.

If governments want to stay owners, they should act like professional owners.

If they can't do that, then the ownership structure needs to change.

Bosnia does not lack engineers or demand

What frustrates me most is that Bosnia doesn't lack technical talent.

The country has developers, network engineers, sysadmins, security specialists, entrepreneurs, and remote workers serving clients all over the world. Many understand modern infrastructure perfectly well because they work with it every day.

Bosnia also doesn't lack demand.

People stream video, work remotely, use cloud software, run online businesses, talk to family abroad, and depend on mobile connectivity for everyday life. Tourists expect mobile data. Diaspora visitors notice the difference between networks right away.

The missing ingredient is pressure.

The current operators have had too little reason to fear losing customers. Regulators have faced too little pressure to show measurable results. Political institutions have gained too much from keeping control.

That's why technical progress has arrived late and unevenly.

The uncomfortable conclusion

Bosnia's internet problem isn't really an internet problem.

It's a market problem, a regulatory problem, and in the end a political problem.

The cables and antennas can be installed. Spectrum can be handed out. VoLTE can be switched on. 5G gear can be bought. None of this is mystery tech.

The hard part is building a system where powerful operators are forced to compete and regulators are forced to regulate.

Free-market competition is the answer, but Bosnia won't get it by waiting for the existing telecom groups to voluntarily give up their own positions.

It will take transparent spectrum policy, serious merger control, fair wholesale access, easier switching, independent performance measurements, infrastructure sharing, and a regulator that expects to be questioned.

It may also take pressure from the European Union, international financial institutions, civil society, businesses, and customers who stop treating bad service like a natural feature of the country.

Bosnia joined the 4G era late. It shouldn't make the same mistake again with 5G, network modernization, and the next generation of digital infrastructure.

Twenty years ago, slow internet in Bosnia shocked me.

What shocks me now is how many people with power still seem comfortable with it.

DEV Community: Noel