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    <title>DEV Community: Mafie Arif</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Mafie Arif (@hesikafi).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/hesikafi</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Mafie Arif</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/hesikafi</link>
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    <item>
      <title>20 Things I Learned from Reading Bug Bounty Writeups</title>
      <dc:creator>Mafie Arif</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:54:10 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/hesikafi/20-things-i-learned-from-reading-bug-bounty-writeups-430f</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/hesikafi/20-things-i-learned-from-reading-bug-bounty-writeups-430f</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I started bug bounty hunting with no security background. Before I touched a target, I read public writeups, the reports researchers publish after a program pays them. After a while the same patterns kept showing up. These are the twenty that stuck with me.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. A role without a scope
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One writeup described a GraphQL mutation that checked the JWT for a supplier admin role but never matched it to the supplier ID in the body. An admin on supplier A became an admin on supplier B. My test: two accounts, two tenants, one privileged call replayed across them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. Hunt the legacy switch
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A patch does not kill the chain. In one writeup, 19 of 21 servers were already on the hotfix, but the exploit chain needed the Legacy API switch turned on, and that switch was the whole vulnerability. On every target I check what old feature is still on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. Verification discipline
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A launched process, a 403, a token receipt. None of these is proof. A candidate is confirmed only when a negative control fails and the positive replay succeeds twice. Many stacks put a parser in front of auth, so a malformed body gets a 400 first. Re-test with a well-formed body.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. Write reports for a tired volunteer
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One program nearly died because about 20 percent of its reports were AI slop and the confirmed rate fell below 5 percent. Every report needs five things: a clear title, reproduction steps, a proof of concept, an impact statement, a suggested fix. Before I submit anything I ask whether a tired volunteer would be glad to receive it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Out-of-scope bugs escalate
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The bug class is not banned. What gets rejected is the finding reported on its own. A missing rate limit becomes a finding when you show the math: a 6-digit code, a 10-minute window, no lockout. A CORS misconfiguration becomes one only when an endpoint returns authenticated data cross-origin with credentials included.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  6. Model output is untrusted
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Model output is untrusted. It must never grant authority, bypass policy, or trigger a privileged action without independent application controls. The question is whether untrusted content can change what the application is allowed to do. The finding is a missing control on that chain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  7. A jailbreak alone does not pay
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A jailbreak by itself is not a finding. Most programs list jailbreaks out of scope. The paid prompt-injection reports lead somewhere: another user's data leaked, an unauthorized action happened, or the injection reached outside the chat. Write the report around the missing control, not the prompt.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  8. Mass assignment
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The cheapest critical I read about was one extra key. A PUT endpoint bound the whole JSON body to the database model with no allow-list, so adding &lt;code&gt;"role": "admin"&lt;/code&gt; made a standard user an administrator, CVSS 9.9. On every PUT or PATCH endpoint I add privilege fields to the body: role, is_admin, is_staff, permissions, tenant_id, plan, balance. Then I prove it with a write in the admin surface.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  9. Read the whole API response
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One finding started with an endpoint that returned full emails and internal IDs for everyone enrolled, including people who never posted. About 14,000 emails came back in one response. Registration had no email verification, so any fresh account could harvest the whole list. I read every API response in full and ask whether the data is scoped to the requester.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  10. Pre-auth flow steps are an API surface
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One login flow ran its duplicate-check step before any authentication and returned the matching account's numeric user ID for any email or phone. My test: submit an identifier for a normal account, a hidden account, a suspended account, and a nonexistent one, and diff the responses. A pre-auth step must return a decision, never an identity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  11. Predictable randomness is not a secret
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One writeup showed Math.random() used as an authentication secret, chained with a DOM XSS in a postMessage handler, ending in account takeover. I grep every JavaScript bundle for Math.random(), rand(), and random.random used to build tokens and secrets. If it is predictable, it is not a secret.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  12. OAuth redirect chains
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One login endpoint was a valid OAuth redirect URI. After a login migration, it bounced through the new login and back to a caller-supplied next URL. The old version did the final hop in JavaScript. The new version redirected directly, and fragment tokens travel across redirects. I map every redirect_uri and next parameter, and follow the chain with a fragment token.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  13. Proxied user input
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A proxy took an item ID from the URL and dropped it into the internal path. The WAF blocked the obvious ../, and a backslash variant slipped past. Error shapes did the mapping: 'not found' meant the internal API was reached. From there the researcher reached a search API over about 100 million customer records. On any proxy endpoint I try ../, ..\, %2e%2e, %5c, and ..;/, and diff the error shapes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  14. Internal-sounding surfaces are leads
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Companies forget things: old test pages, unused login panels, internal portals on public subdomains. In one writeup, a portal's API returned full account data when a phone number was appended to the URL, with no auth. Any subdomain or endpoint that sounds internal is a lead. I hit it unauthenticated first.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  15. Hunt the forgotten asset
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The main app has had a hundred hunters on it. The old staging site has had none. First I read the scope and confirm the asset is in scope. Then I look at the forgotten surface before the homepage: staging subdomains, test pages, legacy panels, decommissioned tools, archived docs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  16. Spot IDOR without a second account
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;With only one account, generate the other user's identifier from data the app already shows: reviews, comments, listings, and avatar URLs. In one demo, a review exposed another user's avatar URL, whose path contained his user ID, and opening it leaked his information. A UUID or non-integer ID in a URL is not proof of safety.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  17. One file for self-hosted reports
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Without a platform, do not paste the full report into the email body. Send one file instead, a PDF or a .txt, attached to a short email. A self-hosted team triages from an inbox, and one clean file reads better than a long email body.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  18. No bounty program? Get permission first
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;With no formal bounty program, do not just start testing. Find the official contact and ask for permission to test first. Only then ask about the reward or recognition. Permission comes first, so the testing is authorized. The reward question comes second, so it does not read as extortion.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  19. Headers are attacker input
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This one has a name and a number: CVE-2026-18516, Crafty Controller, CVSS 9.6, fixed in 4.11.0. Crafty stored the 'IP' from X-Forwarded-For and X-Real-IP in its logs without validating them. A failed login with a JavaScript payload returned a clean 401, but the payload was already saved. The log page inserted it into HTML unescaped, so it ran in the admin's browser when opened. My test: a harmless marker in those headers, a failed login, then open the log as an admin.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  20. XInclude is XXE without a DOCTYPE
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A 'Check stock' feature embeds productId in server-side XML. No DTD can be defined, because the attacker does not control the whole document. But the parser still processes XInclude directives, so an injected xi:include retrieves the file anyway. The payload is:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight xml"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="nt"&gt;&amp;lt;foo&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;xmlns:xi&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;"http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nt"&gt;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;xi:include&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;parse&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;"text"&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;href&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;"file:///etc/passwd"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nt"&gt;/&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/foo&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The detail that matters is parse="text": without it, /etc/passwd fails as invalid XML. Blocking DOCTYPE does not close XXE.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of these twenty came from a course. They came from other people's writeups. Reading is the cheapest part of this work. The expensive part is testing each pattern with two accounts and a proof of concept.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>bugbounty</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>beginners</category>
      <category>webdev</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>My Agent Says It Followed the Rules. Prove It.</title>
      <dc:creator>Mafie Arif</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:12:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/hesikafi/my-agent-says-it-followed-the-rules-prove-it-3i08</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/hesikafi/my-agent-says-it-followed-the-rules-prove-it-3i08</guid>
      <description>&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  My Agent Says It Followed the Rules. Prove It.
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An AI agent can claim anything. "I followed the rules." "I checked the balance first." "I never touched the data I wasn't supposed to touch." These sentences cost nothing. An agent can print them, log them, and put them in a report, and none of that makes them true.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is the problem zkVerify's Agent Games is built around: whether anyone else can check that the work was done the way the agent says it was done, without taking the agent's word for it and without seeing everything the agent saw.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  A proof is not a promise
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Zero-knowledge proofs answer that question for one claim at a time. A proof lets someone show that a formalized claim is true without revealing the data behind it. The claim has to be written down first, precisely, as a circuit that says exactly what counts as a correct step. The proof shows the step satisfies the circuit. Nothing else is revealed. The underlying data stays private. The proof itself is the evidence.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;zkVerify is a blockchain built for one job: verifying those proofs at scale. Checking a proof on Ethereum can cost 200,000 to 300,000 gas, so instead proofs go to zkVerify, get verified there, and the result is a receipt other applications can use.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agent Games Season 01, running from 21 October to 21 November 2026, tests this in public. Entry is free. The prize pool is 400,000 VFY tokens, 100,000 per track, split 50,000 / 30,000 / 20,000 for first, second, and third. There are four tracks: Proof Gatekeeper, Steal the VFY, Creator Track, and Wildcard. The first two matter most here, because that is where an agent's claims get checked by a machine instead of a judge.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Proof Gatekeeper: the circuit checks the decision
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An agent runs a public HTTPS endpoint. The platform sends it a signed task envelope, and the agent must verify the HMAC signature on the raw body before doing anything, then decide: APPROVE or REJECT. It has 60 seconds. The decision alone is not enough. The agent must also generate a Groth16 zero-knowledge proof, built with Circom 2.x on the BN128 curve, that its decision follows the rules of the task.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The platform then re-verifies that proof against its own registered verification key. The key hash is public: &lt;code&gt;0x6b79c6…d77b0&lt;/code&gt;. The agent cannot swap in a friendlier key or submit a proof made for a different set of rules. And the agent cannot prove a wrong decision at all. A proof that claims an invalid decision was valid simply does not verify.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scoring makes the stakes concrete. A correct decision earns 12 points, approval or rejection. A wrong approval costs 6, a wrong rejection 3, a timeout 2, a missing or invalid proof 2. About half the tasks are valid, and the event page documents seven trap varieties, so guessing is a losing strategy.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The proof and the decision are judged separately. The proof shows the agent followed the procedure, and the score shows whether the decision was right. A valid proof leaves a bad decision bad. It only makes the decision checkable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Steal the VFY runs the same principle in a different shape. Two agents play a 20-turn match from 100 VFY each, and every move must carry a per-turn policy proof the platform re-checks against the game state it knows. A stale match ID, a reused idempotency key, a mismatched circuit version: all rejected on a 5-minute deadline per turn, in a Swiss tournament of 7 rounds into a Top 16 bracket. A move without a proof does not happen.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The limit, stated honestly
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A valid proof does not mean the AI is always right, and it does not mean the AI is safe. A proof only proves the claim that was designed into the proving system. Nothing more.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If the rules in the circuit are wrong, the proof will still verify. If the task falls outside what the circuit covers, there is no proof to check at all. If the agent makes a bad decision for a reason the circuit never measured, a misread of context, a stale assumption, a judgment call the rules did not anticipate, the proof stays valid and the decision stays bad. Proof Gatekeeper's scoring catches some of that. A wrong decision loses points even with a valid proof. But the scoring is a separate layer. The proof never claimed the decision was wise, only that it followed the procedure.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That is the boundary of what this technology can deliver. Verifiable AI is not a guarantee that an agent will always behave well. It is a guarantee that specific, formalized claims about an agent's behavior can be checked with evidence instead of taken on trust. A proof is a receipt for one claim, nothing more.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is a smaller promise than "trustworthy AI," and a more useful one. A small promise that holds is worth more than a large one that cannot be checked. When an agent says "I checked the balance before approving the transfer," a proof can settle that one sentence. It cannot settle whether the agent should have approved the transfer at all. That question still belongs to the rules, the task design, and the people who wrote them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What "checkable" is worth
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most of the time an agent does work for us, we have two options: read everything it did, which does not scale, or trust that it did what it said, which is not a system. A proof gives a third option: check the receipt. You need the proof, a key you trust, and a circuit you can read. The agent's private data and its reasoning are not part of the check.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That is what Agent Games is testing, in public, with real agents and modest stakes. At the VFY price on 18 November 2026, around $0.0042, a first-place finish in one track is worth roughly $210. The payout is small. The tournament's value is that a group of agents is being forced to play by rules they cannot talk their way around, and the results are on the record.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The test that matters is whether the pattern survives contact with real work: a claim, written down precisely; a proof, generated by the agent that made the claim; a verification, done by someone other than the agent; a receipt, usable by the next application in line. If that pattern holds, "my agent followed the rules" stops being a sentence in a log file and becomes something you can check.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The change worth watching is agents whose claims can be proven, one formalized statement at a time, with the limits of each proof stated plainly next to it.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Written for the zkVerify Agent Games Creator Track, Season 01 (#AgentGames, @ZKVProtocol). &lt;a href="https://agentgames.zkverify.io" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://agentgames.zkverify.io&lt;/a&gt;, 21 October to 21 November 2026; registration closes 21 November 2026 at 22:00 UTC. Entry is free.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>agentgames</category>
      <category>zkverify</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>zeroknowledge</category>
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