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    <title>DEV Community: infracore</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by infracore (@infracore).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/infracore</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: infracore</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/infracore</link>
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      <title>A memory server may need two write paths, not one</title>
      <dc:creator>infracore</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 08 Sep 2026 23:20:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/infracore/a-memory-server-may-need-two-write-paths-not-one-2p2</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/infracore/a-memory-server-may-need-two-write-paths-not-one-2p2</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;For anything an agent can persist, split the &lt;em&gt;proposal&lt;/em&gt; path from the &lt;em&gt;commit&lt;/em&gt; path and put a real trust boundary between them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If a model can save durable facts, untrusted text from one session could influence later sessions. A practical DIY baseline:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Store proposed items as append-only JSONL in Git.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Record the source, session ID, and originating commit.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Treat agent-authored items as candidates.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Promote items into the trusted briefing only through a human-controlled credential or out-of-band approval.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Git provides diff, blame, and rollback. Provenance makes the trust decision inspectable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;code&gt;--by human&lt;/code&gt; argument is not an authority check when the agent can invoke the same command. The promotion signal must be inaccessible to the agent, not merely labeled as human.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One unresolved issue is expiry: provenance identifies where a rule came from, but not whether it still describes the codebase.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What non-forgeable signal do you use before an agent-proposed memory becomes trusted state?&lt;/p&gt;

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      <category>ai</category>
      <category>mcp</category>
      <category>coding</category>
      <category>devops</category>
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