The latest articles on DEV Community by Kimeric (@kimeric_t2a). https://dev.to/kimeric_t2a https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=90,height=90,fit=cover,gravity=auto,format=auto/https:%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Fuser%2Fprofile_image%2F4123378%2Fa07adc0e-f019-475d-8910-f7a4d3d8ce21.png https://dev.to/kimeric_t2a en Kimeric Sun, 13 Sep 2026 16:43:13 +0000 https://dev.to/kimeric_t2a/deepfake-detection-is-losing-timestamped-proof-of-existence-might-be-the-other-half-of-the-answer-l19 https://dev.to/kimeric_t2a/deepfake-detection-is-losing-timestamped-proof-of-existence-might-be-the-other-half-of-the-answer-l19 <p>I've been reading into why deepfake detectors keep losing ground (some benchmarks put failure rates around 45-50% on recent generative models), and it pushed me toward a question that's more about infrastructure than machine learning: instead of trying to prove after the fact that a piece of media is fake, what if you could cheaply prove, at the moment of capture, that it existed in a specific form at a specific time?</p> <p>That's the core idea behind "proof of existence" / timestamping systems that a lot of the DFIR and blockchain-timestamping communities already work with (OpenTimestamps being the best-known example). The mechanism is simple and doesn't require trusting a central authority:</p> <ol> <li>Hash the file on-device (SHA-512) the moment it's captured.</li> <li>Anchor that hash to a trusted timestamp (RFC 3161 / eIDAS-qualified, or a public blockchain).</li> <li>Package the proof in a verifiable container (ETSI EN 319 162 / .asice) that can be checked offline, without needing to trust the platform that issued it.</li> </ol> <p>None of this proves a photo is "true" in a philosophical sense. It proves a specific bit-for-bit artifact existed at time T, which is exactly the kind of chain-of-custody primitive that forensic investigators, journalists and human-rights researchers already work with, just applied earlier in the pipeline (at capture, not at review).</p> <p>I found this framed well in a free book called time2act, which digs into this from a "detection is not enough" angle and connects it to the Berkeley Protocol on digital open-source investigations. It's free, available in English/Spanish/Catalan, web/PDF/EPUB: <a href="https://www.time2act.info/read/en/" rel="noopener noreferrer">https://www.time2act.info/read/en/</a></p> <p>Curious whether others here have worked with proof-of-existence or timestamping schemes in forensic or content-provenance pipelines, and what broke when you tried to make them verifiable offline.</p> <p>— Kimeric</p> <p>(Disclosure: drafted with AI assistance, per DEV's AI content guidelines.)</p> forensics security