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    <title>DEV Community: Laboski</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Laboski (@laboski_814e4260d2a).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Laboski</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Is this Chrome extension safe? How to check what it can do before you install it</title>
      <dc:creator>Laboski</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:06:05 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a/is-this-chrome-extension-safe-how-to-check-what-it-can-do-before-you-install-it-3f8l</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a/is-this-chrome-extension-safe-how-to-check-what-it-can-do-before-you-install-it-3f8l</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Chrome shows a warning when you add many extensions: "Read and change all your data on all websites." Most people click Add and move on. Here is what it means, what to check before you install, and how to look at an extension without installing it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What the warning means
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The extension can run on every page you open. It can see what is on the page, including what you type, and it can change the page. An ad blocker or a dark mode tool needs this to work, so the warning alone is not a red flag. It says what the extension is able to do, not what it does.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It also lasts. Chrome updates extensions on its own, without asking you. If an extension already has access to every site, an update can start using it the same day.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Why it matters
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Extensions get sold. A buyer gets the access and the users along with it, and the next silent update reaches everyone. In 2026, researchers at Socket reported 19 Chrome and Edge extensions that delivered a wallet drainer and password stealer. The attackers built 14 of them and bought the other 5 from their original developers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is not rare access. I looked at the 150 most-used Chrome extensions: 94 of them can read and change every website you open, and 48 of those are made by developers who have not registered as a business. A long list of such extensions is normal, which is why a warning on its own tells you little.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What to check before you install
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Does it need every site?&lt;/strong&gt; A tool for one site should ask for that site only.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Who publishes it?&lt;/strong&gt; Look at the developer name, website and whether they are registered as a business. A missing website or a free email address is worth a second look.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Is the code open?&lt;/strong&gt; You can read it, and so can others, which makes hidden changes harder.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;What else does it ask for?&lt;/strong&gt; Reading your browsing history, managing your other extensions, or talking to programs on your computer are bigger asks than most extensions need.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Limit what you already have
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In Chrome, open chrome://extensions, choose Details on an extension, and look at Site access. You can set it to "On click" or to specific sites. Many extensions still work that way, and an update then cannot quietly read every page. Remove the ones you no longer use.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Check an extension without installing it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I built a free checker for this. Paste a Chrome Web Store link at &lt;a href="https://guardian.tinyward.org" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://guardian.tinyward.org&lt;/a&gt; and it shows who publishes the extension and what it is able to do, as full, limited or basic access, read from the permissions in its package. There is a plain-language guide to the warnings here: &lt;a href="https://guardian.tinyward.org/guides/read-and-change-all-your-data-on-all-websites" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://guardian.tinyward.org/guides/read-and-change-all-your-data-on-all-websites&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It cannot tell you whether an extension is trustworthy, only what it could do. A password manager needs full access to work, and the checker says so rather than calling it dangerous.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I also make a browser extension, Extension Guardian, that watches the ones you have installed and warns you when one changes owner, gains new permissions or disappears from the store. It is free, open source (MIT), with no ads, no analytics and no account: &lt;a href="https://github.com/laboskiriste/extension-guardian" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/laboskiriste/extension-guardian&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;I'm the developer of Extension Guardian. This post was written by an AI assistant (Claude) on my behalf, using my public report of the 150 most-used extensions (checked 30 October 2026) for the figures.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>privacy</category>
      <category>chrome</category>
      <category>webdev</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>I read the manifests of the 150 most popular Chrome extensions</title>
      <dc:creator>Laboski</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 16:21:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a/i-read-the-manifests-of-the-150-most-popular-chrome-extensions-24ji</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a/i-read-the-manifests-of-the-150-most-popular-chrome-extensions-24ji</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I build &lt;a href="https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/extension-guardian/mpceklcidiadoneogfmpkjpadihmlcjd" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Extension Guardian&lt;/a&gt;, a free extension that warns you when one of your extensions changes owner or asks for new permissions. I wanted a baseline: what do the extensions most people actually have installed ask for? So I pulled the 150 most-used extensions from the Chrome Web Store and read their manifests.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Full report with every extension: &lt;a href="https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/report/popular-chrome-extensions-2026" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/report/popular-chrome-extensions-2026&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The numbers
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;64%&lt;/strong&gt; (94 of 148) can read and change everything on every website you visit.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Together that's about &lt;strong&gt;812 million installs&lt;/strong&gt; with all-sites access.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;24&lt;/strong&gt; haven't been updated in over a year, 15 of them in over two.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;48&lt;/strong&gt; of the all-sites extensions come from developers who haven't registered as a business in the store.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;0&lt;/strong&gt; are still on Manifest V2. The migration is done, at least at the top.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The most common powerful permissions:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Permission&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it allows&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Extensions&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;scripting&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Run its own code on pages&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;93&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;tabs&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;See the address and title of every tab&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;76&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;webRequest&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Watch your network requests&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;46&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;cookies&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read and change cookies, including sign-ins&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;40&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;nativeMessaging&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Talk to programs installed on your computer&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Full access isn't the problem
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;My first reaction was "64% is terrible". It isn't, really. An ad blocker, a password manager or a grammar checker can't work without reading the pages you open. Our own risk model rates all 148 as low risk today: they're popular, maintained and have a named developer.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The problem is that this access is transferable. When an extension is sold, the buyer gets the users, the reviews and every permission, and Chrome installs the next update silently. Nothing tells you the developer changed. This year attackers &lt;a href="https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/incidents/superior-2026" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;bought established extensions and turned them into credential and wallet stealers&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's why the list I find most interesting is the 12 extensions with all-sites access that haven't shipped an update in over a year, about 20 million installs combined. Some are simply finished software. But a popular extension whose developer has moved on is exactly what buyers look for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  How I got the data
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The list: the extensions with the most users across the Web Store's categories.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Store data (developer, users, last update, trader status) from each public listing.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Permissions from the CRX of the current version. A CRX is a zip with a header, so I used HTTP range requests to read only the zip's central directory and &lt;code&gt;manifest.json&lt;/code&gt;, instead of downloading 150 packages.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Access and risk ratings from the same open-source code the extension uses: &lt;a href="https://github.com/laboskiriste/extension-guardian" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/laboskiriste/extension-guardian&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Optional permissions aren't counted, and user counts are the store's rounded install numbers, so totals overlap.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The raw data is free to reuse: &lt;a href="https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/report/popular-chrome-extensions-2026.json" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/report/popular-chrome-extensions-2026.json&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you want to check an extension you use, paste its store link here: &lt;a href="https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>privacy</category>
      <category>chrome</category>
      <category>webdev</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Chrome won't tell you when an extension is sold, so I built something that does</title>
      <dc:creator>Laboski</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 14:25:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a/chrome-wont-tell-you-when-an-extension-is-sold-so-i-built-something-that-does-mnh</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/laboski_814e4260d2a/chrome-wont-tell-you-when-an-extension-is-sold-so-i-built-something-that-does-mnh</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;You installed an extension three years ago. It does one small thing well, it has a few hundred thousand users, and you forgot it exists.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then the developer sells it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The buyer pushes an update. Chrome installs it silently in the background, like every update. The extension already has permission to read every page you visit, because it always had. Now it uses it: affiliate redirects, injected ads, or quietly shipping your browsing history somewhere.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This isn't hypothetical. It has happened many times to popular extensions, and the pattern is always the same. Nothing in Chrome tells you that the person behind an extension changed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So I built &lt;a href="https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/extension-guardian/mpceklcidiadoneogfmpkjpadihmlcjd" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Extension Guardian&lt;/a&gt;. It's free and &lt;a href="https://github.com/laboskiriste/extension-guardian" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;open source&lt;/a&gt;. This post is about how it works and the one annoying problem I didn't expect.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What it watches for
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Four signals catch most bad cases:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;The developer changed.&lt;/strong&gt; The Chrome Web Store shows who offers each extension. If that name or email changes, the extension was probably sold.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;An update added permissions.&lt;/strong&gt; Going from "read data on example.com" to "read data on all websites" deserves a warning.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;It vanished from the store.&lt;/strong&gt; When Google finds malware, it usually removes the listing. Your installed copy keeps running, and nobody tells you.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;It came from outside the store.&lt;/strong&gt; Extensions installed by another program or updating from a non-Google server are a classic adware trick.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Access is not risk
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;My first version had a problem: it rated almost everything "high". A password manager, an ad blocker and a grammar checker all need to read every page, because that's their job.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So every extension gets two separate ratings:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Access&lt;/strong&gt;: what its permissions technically allow (full, limited, basic).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Risk&lt;/strong&gt;: whether you should trust it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Risk combines the warnings above with signals from the store page. Few users and no updates in two years raise it. A large user base, recent updates and a registered business lower it. Critical signals, like an owner change or removal from the store, always mean high risk, no matter how popular the extension is.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The scoring looks roughly like this:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight javascript"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="nx"&gt;score&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nx"&gt;critical&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;*&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="mi"&gt;40&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;+&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nx"&gt;firm&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;+&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nb"&gt;Math&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;max&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="mi"&gt;0&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nx"&gt;soft&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nx"&gt;good&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;);&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="nx"&gt;level&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nx"&gt;critical&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="mi"&gt;0&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;?&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s1"&gt;high&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nx"&gt;score&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="mi"&gt;40&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;?&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s1"&gt;high&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nx"&gt;score&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="mi"&gt;15&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;?&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s1"&gt;watch&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s1"&gt;low&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="dl"&gt;'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;"Soft" signals, like few users, can be offset by good ones. A recent jump in permissions is "firm" and can't be talked down by a big install count, because a big install count is exactly what a buyer pays for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The surprise: extensions can't read the Chrome Web Store
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The developer info lives on the public store page, so the plan was simple: fetch &lt;code&gt;chromewebstore.google.com/detail/&amp;lt;id&amp;gt;&lt;/code&gt; from the extension and parse it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Chrome blocks that. Extensions can't script or fetch the Web Store, even with host permissions. It's a deliberate protection, so a malicious extension can't install or review other extensions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The fix is a tiny server. A Cloudflare Worker fetches the public page, extracts the developer name, email, user count and last update date, and returns JSON. Results are cached in Workers KV for 6 hours, so the store is hit rarely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The extension sends only extension IDs, nothing about the user. IDs are public 32-letter identifiers, the same ones in every store URL. The server allows any origin through CORS, so the extension doesn't even need a host permission for it, and Chrome shows no extra install warning.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Parsing a page with no API
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There's no official Web Store API for this, so the server parses HTML, which can break whenever Google changes the layout. Two safeguards:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Fixtures of real store pages in the tests, so a layout change shows up as a failing test, not as wrong data.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If more than half of a user's extensions suddenly come back "not found", the extension assumes the parser broke and doesn't raise removal alerts. A false "removed from store" alert on every extension would be worse than no alert.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Try it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/extension-guardian/mpceklcidiadoneogfmpkjpadihmlcjd" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Chrome Web Store&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/laboskiriste/extension-guardian" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Source on GitHub&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://app.extensionguardian.workers.dev/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Check a single extension on the web&lt;/a&gt;, no install needed&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://www.producthunt.com/products/extension-guardian" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;On Product Hunt&lt;/a&gt;, feedback there is welcome too&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It's early, so the most useful feedback is false alarms: an extension you trust that it flags as risky, and why you trust it. Tuning those signals is most of the work.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>chrome</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>privacy</category>
      <category>javascript</category>
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