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    <title>DEV Community: MANUJ KUMAR PANDEY</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by MANUJ KUMAR PANDEY (@manuj_kumarpandey_c3f050).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/manuj_kumarpandey_c3f050</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: MANUJ KUMAR PANDEY</title>
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    <item>
      <title>12,000 Indian SIMs for Dubai Scam Centres: How the Pimpri Chinchwad SIM Racket Worked and How to Check Your Name</title>
      <dc:creator>MANUJ KUMAR PANDEY</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 07:30:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/manuj_kumarpandey_c3f050/12000-indian-sims-for-dubai-scam-centres-how-the-pimpri-chinchwad-sim-racket-worked-and-how-to-48a8</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/manuj_kumarpandey_c3f050/12000-indian-sims-for-dubai-scam-centres-how-the-pimpri-chinchwad-sim-racket-worked-and-how-to-48a8</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Seven people are under arrest for allegedly supplying 10,000 to 12,000 Indian SIM cards, many activated on genuine customers' KYC without their knowledge, to fraud operations in Dubai. Here is how the pipeline worked, the warning signs, and what users and investigators should do.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What happened
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Pimpri Chinchwad Cyber Police in Maharashtra say they have broken up an interstate network that arranged an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 Indian SIM cards for cyber fraud operations run from Dubai. Seven people are under arrest, according to a police statement reported by ANI on 19 November 2026 and a Punekar News report dated 17 November.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The case did not begin with the SIMs. It began with a suspected mule bank account. Investigators at the Cyber Police Station traced a local account holder who allegedly received and withdrew fraud proceeds, and then the man who handled such accounts. Free Press Journal reported on 2 November that the pair allegedly opened accounts at several banks, passed the details on, kept a commission, and moved the rest of the money towards Dubai through ATMs and cash deposit machines. Police say more than 150 accounts were arranged this way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Those accounts led to the alleged principal accused, a 26-year-old from Pune who police say worked from Dubai and was in contact with Chinese nationals. Police issued a Look Out Circular, worked through Interpol, and took him into custody at Mumbai airport after he was deported. According to Free Press Journal, he told interrogators he started on a salary of 6,000 dirhams to make calls and send messages for share-trading and task-based scams, plus 4% of victims' money, and later moved to a 20% share of proceeds. These are allegations made during interrogation and have not been tested in court.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The SIM supply chain came next. Two men from Ambernath and Kalyan allegedly procured the 10,000 to 12,000 SIM cards from associates and sent them to Dubai; Punekar News reports their passports show 25 to 30 trips there. The two most recent arrests are SIM sellers from Vikhroli and Thane. DCP (Crime) Rohidas Pawar said investigators are now examining data linked to the SIM cards to find how many other offences they connect to. The FIR invokes Sections 318(4), 317(2), 61(2) and 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;IGRS mentioned this case in a paragraph in this morning's &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/articles/igrs-125-india-cyber-brief-19-november-2026.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;India Cyber Brief&lt;/a&gt;. This piece looks at how the SIM side of the operation works and what both users and investigators can do about it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  How the SIM pipeline works
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;According to the police account reported by Punekar News, the method at the retail counter was simple. A customer walked in for a genuine new connection and completed KYC. The seller then told the customer the one-time password had expired or that a server problem had blocked activation, and asked them to repeat the process. The extra connection created in the customer's name went to the seller's associates for money instead of to the customer.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Police say the SIMs were then used to make fraud calls, register apps under false identities, link bank accounts used for fraudulent transactions, and create email accounts. Each of those steps needs a working Indian mobile number that passes an OTP check. That is why a verified Indian SIM has value to an overseas scam operation even when the calls are placed from another country.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Analysis:&lt;/strong&gt; The case shows three supply lines feeding one fraud operation: verified Indian phone numbers, mule bank accounts, and cash-out through ATMs and deposit machines. Each line is run by different people who may never meet the callers. A SIM seller who duplicates a customer's KYC may not know which scam the number ends up in, and the customer whose name is on the number may not know it exists. When that number later shows up in a complaint, the first person police reach is the innocent subscriber.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is not a new weakness, and the Department of Telecommunications has been tightening it for three years. In August 2023 DoT made registration of point-of-sale (PoS) agents mandatory, with verification and a written agreement, and said a PoS found in illegal activity would be terminated and blacklisted for three years. At that time it reported more than 67,000 PoS blacklisted and more than 300 FIRs against over 1,700 PoS. On 21 September 2026 DoT issued a fresh caution after a PoS agent in Chhattisgarh activated 25 SIM cards using citizens' identity documents without their knowledge; the agent was blacklisted and the numbers that failed re-verification were cut off.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Red flags
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  For mobile users
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The retailer says your OTP "expired" or the "server is down" and asks you to give your thumbprint, face scan or OTP a second time.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;You are asked to sign or scan documents for one connection, but the counter takes more than one photograph or capture.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;You receive SMS messages about a connection, a SIM activation or a bank registration you did not start.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Police, a bank or a platform contacts you about a number you do not recognise.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  For investigators
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Many fraud numbers from one telecom circle, activated through the same PoS code over a short period.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Subscribers who, when contacted, deny ever using the number, or say they bought only one SIM.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Mule accounts with ATM and cash deposit machine withdrawals soon after credits, and account holders with frequent overseas travel.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What to do
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  If you are a mobile user
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Open the DoT's Sanchar Saathi portal (sancharsaathi.gov.in) or app and use &lt;em&gt;Know mobile connections in your name&lt;/em&gt;. Log in with your number and review the list.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Mark any number you do not use as &lt;em&gt;Not my number&lt;/em&gt;, and numbers you no longer need as &lt;em&gt;Not required&lt;/em&gt;. DoT and the operator then act to disconnect them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Keep the limit in mind: under the Telecommunications Act rules a person may hold up to nine connections (six in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-East). Unknown numbers in your name eat into that limit and carry your identity.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;At the counter, complete KYC once. If you are asked to repeat it, ask for the reason in writing or go to the operator's own store.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If a number in your name has been misused, or you have lost money, call 1930 or file a complaint at cybercrime.gov.in. Keep the Sanchar Saathi screenshot and any SMS as evidence.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If you also suspect your identity documents were reused elsewhere, such as for a bank account, ask your bank for a list of accounts linked to your PAN and Aadhaar. IGRS's &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/breach-check.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Breach Check&lt;/a&gt; can tell you whether your email appears in known breaches.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  If you are an investigator
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;For every fraud number, ask the operator's nodal officer under S.94 BNSS for the customer application form, KYC record, activation date and time, and the PoS or agent code used.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Group numbers by PoS code and activation date. A cluster from one agent is a strong lead to a duplication racket like the one alleged here.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Contact a sample of subscribers before treating them as suspects. Record their statements on whether they visited that PoS and how many SIMs they asked for.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Report rogue PoS findings to the operator and DoT so the agent is blacklisted and linked numbers are re-verified, as DoT did in the Chhattisgarh case.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Follow the money in parallel: request account opening forms, KYC and ATM/CDM withdrawal logs from banks, and map common devices, IPs and phone numbers across mule accounts. For UPI handles seen in complaints, IGRS's &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/upi-id-analyzer.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;UPI ID Analyzer&lt;/a&gt; helps sort handles by bank before you send requests.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Where the main operators are abroad, start early on a Look Out Circular and Interpol channels, which is how this case reached the alleged principal accused.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;For every record obtained, collect the certificate under S.63 BSA so that call detail records, KYC scans and bank statements are admissible.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Applicable law
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Provision&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it covers&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Relevance here&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.318(4) BNS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Invoked in the FIR; covers the fraud on victims and on deceived SIM customers&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.317(2) BNS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Dishonestly receiving stolen property&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Invoked in the FIR&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.61(2) BNS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Criminal conspiracy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Invoked in the FIR; links sellers, couriers, account handlers and overseas operators&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.3(5) BNS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Invoked in the FIR&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.319 BNS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Cheating by personation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Where a SIM or account is used in another person's name&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.42(3)(e), Telecommunications Act 2023&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Obtaining SIMs or other telecom identifiers through fraud, cheating or personation; up to 3 years, fine up to Rs 50 lakh, or both&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Directly fits SIMs activated on duplicated KYC&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.66C and S.66D IT Act 2000&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Identity theft; cheating by personation using a computer resource&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Use of another person's identity and OTPs to register apps and accounts&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.94 BNSS&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Summons to produce documents or records&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;KYC, CAF and PoS records from operators; account records from banks&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.63 BSA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Admissibility of electronic records, with certificate&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;CDRs, KYC images, bank statements&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;DPDP Act 2023, S.8&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Data fiduciary must protect personal data, including data processed by its agents&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Customers' KYC data misused at the retail point&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The bigger picture
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Analysis:&lt;/strong&gt; Overseas scam operations depend on Indian infrastructure: numbers that pass OTP checks, bank accounts that accept UPI and IMPS credits, and people willing to withdraw cash. Arrests of callers abroad are rare and slow. Cutting the supply of SIMs and mule accounts at home is where Indian police and regulators can act fastest. For ordinary users, a two-minute check on Sanchar Saathi is the cheapest protection against having their name on someone else's fraud number.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Sources
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://newsable.asianetnews.com/india/police-uncover-major-cyber-fraud-racket-involving-dubai-sim-cards-articleshow-q0rk6iv" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Asianet Newsable / ANI: Police uncover major cyber fraud racket involving Dubai SIM cards (19 Nov 2026)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.punekarnews.in/?p=249180" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Punekar News: How 12,000 Indian SIM cards reached Dubai for cyber fraud; seven arrested (17 Nov 2026)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.freepressjournal.in/pune/pune-international-cyber-fraud-racket-operating-from-dubai-busted" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Free Press Journal: Pune international cyber fraud racket operating from Dubai busted (2 Nov 2026)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1949957" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;PIB: Two reforms introduced for mobile user protection, PoS registration (17 Aug 2023)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.thehansindia.com/business/misuse-of-sims-may-attract-up-to-3-years-imprisonment-and-rs-50-lakh-fine-warns-dot-1124025" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;The Hans India / IANS: Misuse of SIMs may attract up to 3 years' imprisonment and Rs 50 lakh fine, warns DoT (Sep 2026)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/bareacts/telecommunications/42.php" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Telecommunications Act 2023, Section 42 (bare act text)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.onmanorama.com/news/india/2024/06/23/new-telecom-act-effective-from-june26-nine-sim-per-person.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Onmanorama: New telecom act effective from June 26, nine SIMs per person&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.digit.in/news/general/how-to-check-mobile-numbers-issued-in-your-name-on-sanchar-saathi.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Digit: How to check mobile numbers issued in your name on Sanchar Saathi&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Originally published on &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/articles/igrs-126-sim-card-racket-dubai-fraud-centres-pimpri-chinchwad.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IGRS — Intel Grid Research Station&lt;/a&gt;. Free OSINT tools and investigation guides for India: &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;igrs.xyz&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>india</category>
      <category>osint</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Is This IP a VPN, Proxy or Tor? How to Check It (and Name the Provider) for Free</title>
      <dc:creator>MANUJ KUMAR PANDEY</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 20:41:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/manuj_kumarpandey_c3f050/is-this-ip-a-vpn-proxy-or-tor-how-to-check-it-and-name-the-provider-for-free-4fm2</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/manuj_kumarpandey_c3f050/is-this-ip-a-vpn-proxy-or-tor-how-to-check-it-and-name-the-provider-for-free-4fm2</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;When a fraud complaint, a phishing log or a platform's login history gives you an IP address, the first question is whether that address belongs to a real subscriber connection or to something that hides one — a commercial VPN, a Tor exit node or a rented server. The answer decides who holds the next record: a telecom operator in India, a VPN company that may be abroad, or nobody at all.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Short answer:&lt;/strong&gt; Check the IP against the server lists VPN providers publish and the Tor Project's relay list — a match names the service. If nothing matches, look at who owns the network: hosting and cloud networks are a strong indicator of a VPN, proxy or bot. The free &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/vpn-ip-checker.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IGRS VPN &amp;amp; Tor IP Checker&lt;/a&gt; does the matching for up to 1,000 IPs at once, and the &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/ip-lookup.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IGRS IP Lookup&lt;/a&gt; shows the network owner, ASN, WHOIS range and abuse contact.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. The five signals, from strongest to weakest
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Signal&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Where it comes from&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Strength&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;IP is in a VPN provider's published server list&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Provider's own server data (collected daily by open-source-vpn-ip-lists)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Confirmed — names the provider&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;IP is a Tor relay with the Exit flag&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Tor Project's Onionoo directory&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Confirmed — Tor exit&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Network owner is a hosting, cloud or datacenter company&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ASN holder and WHOIS records (RIPEstat)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Indicator — VPN, proxy, bot or server&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reverse DNS or network name contains “vpn”, “proxy” or a server naming pattern&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;DNS PTR record, WHOIS netname&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Indicator&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Location or time zone does not fit the rest of the evidence&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Geolocation databases, device time zone, language settings&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Weak on its own — corroborate&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Only the first two are first-party facts. The rest are reasoned indicators and should be written up as such. A clean result proves nothing: lists cover the major providers only, fleets change daily, and residential-proxy services route traffic through ordinary home connections that no list can flag.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. What real results look like
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;IGRS ran these public infrastructure addresses through its own tools on 17 November 2026:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;IP&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;List match&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Network (ASN / registry)&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Reading&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2.56.190.2&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;NordVPN server list&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AS62240; WHOIS netname PACKETHUB-20210602-DAL; Dallas, US&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;NordVPN server running on rented datacenter capacity&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;23.144.160.67&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Mullvad server list&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AS32727 (SB Professional Services), US&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Mullvad server; the network name alone would not reveal it&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;204.8.96.153&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Tor exit (Onionoo)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AS62744 (Quintex Alliance Consulting), US&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Tor exit relay — the operator cannot identify users&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;49.36.0.1&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;None&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AS55836 Reliance Jio Infocomm, Mumbai&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Indian telecom range — subscriber records sit with the operator&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Analysis:&lt;/strong&gt; In the Mullvad example the hosting network's name gives no hint of a VPN, so a check based only on network type would have called it “datacenter” at best. The provider-published list is what turns an indicator into a named service. That is why IGRS reports list matches as &lt;em&gt;CONFIRMED&lt;/em&gt; and network-type signals as &lt;em&gt;INDICATOR&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. The “India” VPN location trap
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;CERT-In's directions of 28 April 2022 require VPN service providers to register and keep subscriber details — including names, contact details, the purpose of use and the IP addresses allotted — for five years. In June 2022 several large providers responded by removing their physical servers from India: ExpressVPN said its Indian IP addresses would be served from “virtual” servers in Singapore and the UK, Surfshark announced it was shutting its Indian servers, and NordVPN said its Indian servers would stay active only until 26 June 2022.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two consequences for investigators:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A VPN IP that geolocates to India may be served from another country. Treat its location as unknown until the provider confirms it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Records about the user, if any exist, may be held outside India. That means a request to the provider, or a letter of request under S.112 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, rather than a domestic notice to an Indian operator.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. Workflow: from an IP in a log to the next record
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Step&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Action&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Tool or provision&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Record the IP, source port and exact timestamp with time zone exactly as the platform gave them&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Case diary; preserve the original export&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Bulk-check every IP in the export for VPN and Tor matches; export the CSV&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/vpn-ip-checker.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;VPN &amp;amp; Tor IP Checker&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Look up the network owner, ASN, WHOIS range and abuse contact for the remaining IPs; download the report with its SHA-256 hash&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/ip-lookup.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IP &amp;amp; ISP Lookup&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Indian ISP or telecom: seek subscriber details for IP + port + time&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.94 BNSS 2023 notice through the nodal officer&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hosting company: seek customer, payment and access records for that server&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.94 BNSS 2023 (India) or a request to the foreign provider&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;VPN or Tor: shift weight to account, device, payment and behavioural evidence&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Platform records, UPI/bank trail, device identifiers&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;7&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Produce electronic records with a certificate&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.63 BSA 2023&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To see the full server fleet a provider publishes — for blocklists, log correlation or checking a historical address against today's list — use the &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/vpn-server-ip-list.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;VPN Server IP Lists&lt;/a&gt; page, which covers NordVPN, Proton VPN, Mullvad, Private Internet Access, Surfshark, Windscribe, AirVPN, IVPN, OVPN and RiseupVPN.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Legal position in India
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Provision&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Relevance&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;CERT-In Directions, 28 April 2022 (under S.70B IT Act 2000)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;VPN, VPS, cloud and datacenter providers keep subscriber details for five years; service providers keep ICT logs for 180 days&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.94 BNSS 2023&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Summons to produce documents and electronic records from providers in India&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.112 BNSS 2023&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Letter of request for investigation in a country outside India&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.63 BSA 2023&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Certificate for electronic records, including tool reports and platform exports&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.66C / S.66D IT Act 2000&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Identity theft and cheating by personation using a computer resource — common in cases where VPNs are used&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;S.318 / S.319 BNS 2023&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Cheating and cheating by personation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Using a VPN is not an offence. A VPN or Tor result tells you where the IP trail ends; the case is built on what else the evidence shows.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Originally published on &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/articles/igrs-124-check-if-ip-is-vpn-tor-proxy.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IGRS — Intel Grid Research Station&lt;/a&gt;, a free OSINT and cyber-investigation resource for Indian investigators. The tools mentioned — &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/ip-lookup.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IP &amp;amp; ISP Lookup&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/vpn-ip-checker.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;VPN &amp;amp; Tor IP Checker&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/vpn-server-ip-list.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;VPN Server IP Lists&lt;/a&gt; — are free, need no API key, and run in your browser. The engine (&lt;a href="https://igrs.xyz/iplookup.js" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;iplookup.js&lt;/a&gt;) is MIT-licensed. I'm Manuj Kumar Pandey, an OSINT and digital forensics investigator and founder of &lt;a href="https://dunime.com/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Dunime Technologies&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>osint</category>
      <category>networking</category>
      <category>opensource</category>
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