<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel>
    <title>DEV Community: Minute Notary</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Minute Notary (@minutenotary).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/minutenotary</link>
    
    <atom:link rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="https://dev.to/feed/minutenotary"/>
    <language>en</language>
    <item>
      <title>Verifying a sealed PDF in the browser: SHA-256, ECDSA P-256, RFC 3161 and a hash chain</title>
      <dc:creator>Minute Notary</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 18:09:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/minutenotary/verifying-a-sealed-pdf-in-the-browser-sha-256-ecdsa-p-256-rfc-3161-and-a-hash-chain-6pe</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/minutenotary/verifying-a-sealed-pdf-in-the-browser-sha-256-ecdsa-p-256-rfc-3161-and-a-hash-chain-6pe</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A PDF arrives with a seal on it. How does the person holding it check that seal without trusting the sender, and without uploading the document anywhere?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We needed an answer for the PDFs our office seals, so we wrote one down as a spec and built an open-source verifier around it: &lt;a href="https://github.com/minutenotary/sealed-pdf-verify" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;sealed-pdf-verify&lt;/a&gt;. It runs as a library (Node 20+ and browsers), a CLI, and a single HTML file that works from &lt;code&gt;file://&lt;/code&gt; with no network requests. This post walks through the five checks it makes, the one place WebCrypto was not enough, and what a "genuine" result does &lt;strong&gt;not&lt;/strong&gt; prove.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  What the holder receives
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two files: the PDF, and a small proof JSON next to it. Trimmed:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight json"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"schemaVersion"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="mi"&gt;1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"sealId"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"…"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"documentHash"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&amp;lt;64 hex: SHA-256 of the exact PDF bytes&amp;gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"algorithm"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"OCI_ECDSA_P256_SHA256"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"signature"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&amp;lt;base64 DER ECDSA signature&amp;gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"publicKeyPem"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----…"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"tsaToken"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&amp;lt;base64 DER RFC 3161 TimeStampToken, or null&amp;gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"ledger"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"seq"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="mi"&gt;123&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"previousEntryHash"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&amp;lt;64 hex&amp;gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"entryHash"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&amp;lt;64 hex&amp;gt;"&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nl"&gt;"sealedAt"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"2026-11-04T15:04:05.000Z"&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Everything the verifier needs is in those two files. The full format is in the &lt;a href="https://sealed-pdf-verify.readthedocs.io/en/latest/specification/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;specification&lt;/a&gt;, written so anyone can build their own checker without reading our code.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Check 1: the bytes
&lt;/h3&gt;



&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight typescript"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="kd"&gt;const&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;digest&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;new&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nc"&gt;Uint8Array&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="k"&gt;await&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;crypto&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;subtle&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;digest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s1"&gt;'SHA-256'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;pdfBytes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The digest must equal &lt;code&gt;documentHash&lt;/code&gt;, compared in constant time. This is a seal on &lt;strong&gt;bytes&lt;/strong&gt;, not on how the page looks: open the PDF in an editor, save it, and the check fails, even if you changed nothing visible. That is the point.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Check 2: the signature, and why WebCrypto wasn't enough
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The issuer signs the 32-byte digest with ECDSA P-256 in a cloud KMS. The digest &lt;em&gt;is&lt;/em&gt; the ECDSA message; it is not hashed a second time.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;crypto.subtle.verify&lt;/code&gt; can't express that. It always hashes whatever you pass in, and it only accepts the raw 64-byte &lt;code&gt;r || s&lt;/code&gt; encoding, while the KMS returns DER. If you have the PDF, passing the whole file to WebCrypto works out to the same math. But the verifier also has a proof-only mode where it holds the digest and not the file, and there WebCrypto would hash the digest again.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So the signature goes through &lt;code&gt;@noble/curves&lt;/code&gt; in prehashed mode:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight typescript"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="k"&gt;import&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;p256&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;from&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s1"&gt;'@noble/curves/nist.js'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;

&lt;span class="c1"&gt;// `compact` is r || s, converted from DER after a strict parse&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="c1"&gt;// (minimal lengths and integers, no trailing bytes).&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="kd"&gt;const&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;ok&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;p256&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;verify&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;compact&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;digest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;publicKeyPoint&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="n"&gt;prehash&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="kc"&gt;false&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="c1"&gt;// the digest is the message&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="n"&gt;lowS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="kc"&gt;false&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;    &lt;span class="c1"&gt;// high-S is valid ECDSA: accept it on purpose&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="n"&gt;format&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s1"&gt;'compact'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Two details that were easy to get wrong:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Do &lt;strong&gt;not&lt;/strong&gt; enforce low-S. Low-S is a malleability rule some blockchains add on top of ECDSA, not part of ECDSA verification, and a signer that does not normalise S produces perfectly valid high-S signatures.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Reject &lt;code&gt;r&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;s&lt;/code&gt; outside &lt;code&gt;[1, n-1]&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Check 3: is it the issuer's key?
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A valid signature only proves that &lt;em&gt;someone&lt;/em&gt; holding &lt;em&gt;some&lt;/em&gt; private key signed these bytes. Anyone can generate a key pair and write a proof that passes the math. So the verifier computes a fingerprint, the SHA-256 of the key's SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;openssl ec -pubin -in key.pem -outform DER &lt;span class="o"&gt;|&lt;/span&gt; openssl dgst -sha256
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;It then compares that fingerprint with a trust list you fill in yourself. The result has three states:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;code&gt;pinned&lt;/code&gt;: the key is on your list.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;code&gt;rejected&lt;/code&gt;: the key is not on your list, and the whole verdict becomes "altered".&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;code&gt;unpinned&lt;/code&gt;: you gave no list. The verifier says so plainly, instead of pretending the math settles it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The issuer's fingerprint is published in two places, so you can compare one against the other: &lt;code&gt;trust/issuers.json&lt;/code&gt; in the repo, and the issuer's own check page at &lt;a href="https://minutenotary.ca/verify" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://minutenotary.ca/verify&lt;/a&gt; (we are Minute Notary, an Ontario notary office; the PDFs we seal are the ones this tool was built for).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Check 4: the RFC 3161 timestamp
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The issuer's own clock proves nothing about time. A timestamp authority (TSA) does: it signs a token over the same digest. The verifier checks the token in two layers:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Imprint (required).&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;TSTInfo.messageImprint&lt;/code&gt; must be SHA-256 and must equal the document digest. That binds the token to &lt;em&gt;this&lt;/em&gt; document. &lt;code&gt;genTime&lt;/code&gt; becomes the trusted time.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Trust (on by default).&lt;/strong&gt; Exactly one &lt;code&gt;SignerInfo&lt;/code&gt;. SHA-2 digest only (SHA-1 is refused before anything else is looked at). RSA or ECDSA signature over the signed attributes. A signer certificate whose extended key usage is critical and contains only &lt;code&gt;id-kp-timeStamping&lt;/code&gt;. Validity at &lt;code&gt;genTime&lt;/code&gt;. A chain to a root the verifier trusts. Two roots are bundled (DigiCert Trusted Root G4 and FreeTSA), and callers can add their own.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;ASN.1 and CMS parsing goes through PKI.js and the &lt;code&gt;@peculiar/asn1-*&lt;/code&gt; packages. The tests include a real FreeTSA token plus a synthetic TSA generated in the suite, so chain validation is exercised fully offline.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One honest limit: offline means no CRL and no OCSP. A TSA certificate revoked after the fact still verifies as &lt;code&gt;trusted&lt;/code&gt;. The docs say so, and the &lt;a href="https://sealed-pdf-verify.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat-model/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;threat model&lt;/a&gt; lists it next to the other things a "genuine" result does not cover.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Check 5: the ledger entry
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every seal also gets an entry in an append-only hash chain:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight typescript"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="kd"&gt;const&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;line&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="sb"&gt;`${seq}\n${documentHash}\n${previousEntryHash}\n${sealedAt}`&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="kd"&gt;const&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;entryHash&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nf"&gt;hex&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="k"&gt;await&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;crypto&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;subtle&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;digest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s1"&gt;'SHA-256'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;new&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nc"&gt;TextEncoder&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;encode&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;line&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The verifier recomputes that hash and compares it with the proof. A single entry only proves local consistency; it cannot show that the issuer never forked the chain. Two things go further:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An evidence ZIP carries a segment of the chain, and the verifier walks it link by link.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The issuer's online check compares against the published chain.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  The verdict
&lt;/h3&gt;



&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;overall: genuine | altered | incomplete
checks:  hash · signature · key · timestamp · ledger
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;genuine:&lt;/strong&gt; every check passes. The key check counts as passing unless it is &lt;code&gt;rejected&lt;/code&gt;: an &lt;code&gt;unpinned&lt;/code&gt; key still allows "genuine", and the output says only the math was checked.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;altered:&lt;/strong&gt; any check fails.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;incomplete:&lt;/strong&gt; a file is missing or unreadable.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The CLI exits with &lt;code&gt;0&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;1&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;2&lt;/code&gt; to match, so it drops into a script:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;npx sealed-pdf-verify document.pdf --proof document.proof.json --trust issuers.json
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;From code:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight typescript"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="k"&gt;import&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;verifySealedPdf&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;from&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s1"&gt;'sealed-pdf-verify'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;

&lt;span class="kd"&gt;const&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;verdict&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;await&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nf"&gt;verifySealedPdf&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="n"&gt;pdf&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;   &lt;span class="c1"&gt;// Uint8Array; omit it for proof-only mode&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="n"&gt;proof&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="c1"&gt;// object, JSON text or JSON bytes&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="n"&gt;options&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;trustedKeyFingerprints&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s1"&gt;'3796446c…'&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="nb"&gt;console&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;log&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;verdict&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;overall&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;verdict&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;checks&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;In a browser, the &lt;a href="https://minutenotary.github.io/sealed-pdf-verify/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;verifier page&lt;/a&gt; is one HTML file. Drop in the PDF and the proof, or an evidence ZIP, and it runs locally. Open DevTools → Network if you want to watch it make no requests.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  What "genuine" does not prove
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This part matters more than the cryptography:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It does not prove who signed the &lt;em&gt;content&lt;/em&gt; of the document, that they were who they said, or that they had authority. The seal is the issuer's statement about bytes and time, not about the people in the document.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It says nothing about the document's legal effect anywhere.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It cannot rule out a stolen issuer key. That is what key rotation and published fingerprints are for.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Where we'd like a second pair of eyes
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Strict DER parsing of ECDSA signatures: are we rejecting anything that real HSMs or KMSs emit?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Is "no revocation checks, stated loudly" the right trade-off for an offline tool, or should an online mode fetch OCSP when it can?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Anything in the spec that a second, independent implementation would trip over.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Links:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Code: &lt;a href="https://github.com/minutenotary/sealed-pdf-verify" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/minutenotary/sealed-pdf-verify&lt;/a&gt; (MIT)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Docs and spec: &lt;a href="https://sealed-pdf-verify.readthedocs.io/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://sealed-pdf-verify.readthedocs.io/&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Browser verifier: &lt;a href="https://minutenotary.github.io/sealed-pdf-verify/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://minutenotary.github.io/sealed-pdf-verify/&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;npm: &lt;a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/sealed-pdf-verify" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://www.npmjs.com/package/sealed-pdf-verify&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>cryptography</category>
      <category>javascript</category>
      <category>opensource</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
