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    <title>DEV Community: Aamer Mihaysi</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Aamer Mihaysi (@o96a).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/o96a</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Aamer Mihaysi</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a</link>
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    <item>
      <title>A sandbox you haven't tried to escape is a suggestion</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:37:41 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/a-sandbox-you-havent-tried-to-escape-is-a-suggestion-1f6c</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/a-sandbox-you-havent-tried-to-escape-is-a-suggestion-1f6c</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Every agent incident report I've read this year ends the same way: someone assumed a boundary. The container "obviously" couldn't reach the network. The agent "obviously" didn't have the cloud keys. The socket "obviously" wasn't mounted.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A sandbox is only a boundary where it removes capability. Everywhere else it's a naming convention with a Dockerfile attached.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Docker's push into disposable agent sandboxes is the right direction, and I'm glad someone with a real runtime is doing it instead of another wrapper around &lt;code&gt;subprocess&lt;/code&gt;. But "disposable and isolated" is a claim about defaults, and defaults are exactly where I've been burned. I haven't run their sandbox myself yet, so I'm not going to tell you it's good or bad. I'm going to give you the exercise I run on my own agent containers, because the exercise is the part that transfers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The exercise
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two questions, in order. First: what does the agent &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; share with the host? Second: can I take it anyway?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's it. If you can answer the first question with an actual list rather than a feeling, and the second question with "I tried and failed, here's the log," you have a sandbox. Otherwise you have a vibe.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Enumerate what it doesn't share
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Go into the container as the agent will run — same user, same mounts, same env — and write down the truth.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The Docker socket.&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;ls -l /var/run/docker.sock&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;env | grep DOCKER_HOST&lt;/code&gt;. If the socket is mounted, the agent isn't sandboxed, it's root on the host with extra steps, because &lt;code&gt;docker run -v /:/host&lt;/code&gt; is one line away. This is the single most common hole I see in "sandboxed" agent setups, and it's almost always there for convenience: the agent needs to run tests, so someone mounted the socket instead of giving it a shell.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The home directory.&lt;/strong&gt; Check whether &lt;code&gt;~&lt;/code&gt; is the host's &lt;code&gt;~&lt;/code&gt; bind-mounted in. Then check what lives in it: cloud credentials, SSH keys, netrc, git credentials, the CLI config with a token in it, shell history that names every internal host you own. An agent that can read your home directory doesn't need to be clever. It needs to be curious for thirty seconds.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Read-write mounts that you thought were read-only.&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;mount&lt;/code&gt; inside, then actually try to write. I've caught a "read-only" workspace mount that was rw because of a stale compose override, and a &lt;code&gt;:ro&lt;/code&gt; on the wrong path. Also look at what's inside the mounted repo — a remote URL with an embedded token is a credential leak that survives every filesystem check.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Egress.&lt;/strong&gt; The one people skip. In order: does DNS resolve arbitrary names, can you open a TCP connection, and can you reach the instance metadata address at 169.254.169.254. That last one matters because on cloud VMs, metadata often hands out credentials to anything that asks nicely. If DNS resolves but TCP is blocked, you still have a channel — a slow, lossy exfiltration path that nobody's log query will catch.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Kernel, PIDs, and limits.&lt;/strong&gt; Are you sharing the host PID namespace? Is there a memory cap, a PID cap, a CPU cap? &lt;code&gt;cat /sys/fs/cgroup/memory.max&lt;/code&gt; settles it faster than the compose file does. An agent looping on a tool call without a PID limit is a fork bomb with a language model attached.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;User.&lt;/strong&gt; Are you root inside? Inside a container root is mostly harmless &lt;em&gt;until&lt;/em&gt; something else is wrong — and it's always wrong eventually. Run as a non-root user and let the workspace ownership stay sane.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Persistence.&lt;/strong&gt; Does anything the agent writes survive &lt;code&gt;--rm&lt;/code&gt;? Where does it write it? A workspace mount is the whole point, but a workspace mount also means the agent can overwrite &lt;code&gt;.github/workflows&lt;/code&gt; and wait for you to merge.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Now try to leave
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Write the attempts down and keep them. Mine lives in &lt;code&gt;scripts/sandbox-canary.sh&lt;/code&gt; and runs against the real image, not a hand-rolled test container, because the difference between those two is where the bugs live.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="nb"&gt;set&lt;/span&gt; -u
&lt;span class="nv"&gt;fail&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;0
check&lt;span class="o"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nb"&gt;echo&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"-- $1"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;

check &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"docker socket"&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="o"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt; -S /var/run/docker.sock &lt;span class="o"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;amp;&amp;amp;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nb"&gt;echo&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"FAIL: socket present"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nv"&gt;fail&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;1&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;

check &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"cloud metadata"&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="k"&gt;if&lt;/span&gt; timeout 3 bash -c &lt;span class="s1"&gt;'exec 3&amp;lt;&amp;gt;/dev/tcp/169.254.169.254/80'&lt;/span&gt; 2&lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;/dev/null&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;then&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="nb"&gt;echo&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"FAIL: metadata reachable"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nv"&gt;fail&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;1
&lt;span class="k"&gt;fi&lt;/span&gt;

check &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"write outside workspace"&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="k"&gt;if&lt;/span&gt; touch /opt/escape-probe 2&lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;/dev/null&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;then&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nb"&gt;echo&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"FAIL: writable /opt"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nv"&gt;fail&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;1&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;fi&lt;/span&gt;

check &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"credentials in env and home"&lt;/span&gt;
env &lt;span class="o"&gt;|&lt;/span&gt; grep -qiE &lt;span class="s1"&gt;'aws_|token|secret|_key='&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;amp;&amp;amp;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nb"&gt;echo&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"FAIL: creds in env"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nv"&gt;fail&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt;1&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;

check &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"uid"&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="o"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"$(id -u)"&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"0"&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;amp;&amp;amp;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nb"&gt;echo&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"WARN: running as root"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;

&lt;span class="nb"&gt;exit&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nv"&gt;$fail&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;It's crude and it doesn't prove safety. That's fine. It converts "we think it's isolated" into an assertion that fails loudly when someone bumps the base image and quietly adds a mount. Run it in CI on every image change and the boundary stops drifting.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And then, once, do the ugly version by hand. Try to read something you know is on the host. Try a long-running loop and watch whether the host notices. Try to write a file and see who owns it on the other side. The ugly version is where you learn that your container is fine but the &lt;em&gt;helper&lt;/em&gt; your agent shells out to isn't.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The threat model nobody writes down
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's the part that makes agents different from normal container workloads: your agent writes its own next command. The threat model isn't trusted code doing expected things. It's a tireless, mildly creative process with a shell and no sense of proportion. You don't need to defend against a determined attacker to get burned — you need to defend against a model that decides the fastest way to fix a permissions error is to fix the permissions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's why "disposable" is the interesting property, not "isolated." Isolation reduces what one bad command can do. Disposability reduces how long it gets to do it. You want both, and you want both to be defaults rather than things a tired engineer remembers to pass.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;My current setup is boring, and boring is the goal: no socket, no home mount, workspace read-write and nothing else, egress denied with a short allowlist, non-root user, memory and PID caps, container thrown away after every task. It took an afternoon to get there and it has cost me exactly one debugging session where I couldn't figure out why a build needed the internet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Worth it. The alternative is finding out in a postmortem which boundary you assumed.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nobody grades the "no"</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 14:38:15 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/nobody-grades-the-no-4hco</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/nobody-grades-the-no-4hco</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Short version, in case you missed it: an agent opened a PR against matplotlib, a maintainer looked at it, said no, closed it, and then a blog post showed up arguing the maintainer was the obstacle. &lt;a href="https://github.com/matplotlib/matplotlib/pull/31132" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/matplotlib/matplotlib/pull/31132&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Everyone I've talked to about this reaches for the system prompt first. Add a line about respecting maintainer decisions, ship it, done. I don't think the prompt is where the bug lives. I think it's in the scoreboard, and the scoreboard is mine.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What my evals actually pay for
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Look at how any of us grade a coding agent. Issue in, patch out, tests pass or they don't. Resolved or unresolved. That's the column. There is no column for "how many times did it ask," no column for "did it stop when a human told it to," and no column for maintainer minutes burned along the way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So the only thing under selection — in benchmarks, in my own A/B runs, in the scaffold I copy from the last project — is whether the patch eventually landed. A run that accepts a rejection scores zero. A run that pushes back and gets lucky scores above zero. Most of the time both score zero same as the polite one, which is exactly why the incentive is easy to miss. It's a low-probability, high-payoff move sitting in the action space, and nothing in my measurement setup charges for attempting it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'm not claiming anyone trained a model to harass a maintainer. I'm saying the ambient objective — "resolve the issue," "drive it to merge," whatever framing we've all absorbed — contains no term for the person on the other end. When you optimize a thing that has no term for a cost, you don't get neutral behavior. You get whatever the cheapest path to the objective happens to be, and sometimes that path goes through a blog post.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The evals I was missing
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've started writing tasks where the correct output is not a patch. An issue that's really a design disagreement. A stale PR where the thread clearly needs a human call. A closed PR from three weeks ago. The right behavior is: read it, write six lines on what the disagreement is, say it needs a decision from a person, and exit.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Grading those is trivial. Did it stop? Did it produce something a maintainer could read in thirty seconds? Costs me a day to build a set of twenty.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's the uncomfortable part. My merge-rate went up over the last few months. My stop-rate — the fraction of runs that correctly quit — I have never measured. Not once. I've been tuning one side of a two-sided problem and calling the improvement progress. That's a bug in my scoreboard, and the scoreboard is downstream of me, not of the model.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Retry policy is an ontology, whether you meant it or not
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A smaller thing I keep chewing on. My retry logic is a claim about what kinds of events exist. 429: transient, back off. Timeout: transient, retry. 403: permanent, stop. That table is my model of the world, written in Go or Python or YAML, and it's more honest than any of my prompts because I actually enforce it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A closed PR isn't in the table. It has no type. So the harness does whatever comes next in the loop, and "whatever comes next" in an agent with a shell and credentials and a goal is not a well-defined thing. The agent didn't decide to escalate. The event just fell through the type system and got handled by the generic case.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's less dramatic than "the model wanted attention" and more useful, because I can fix a type system. A human "no" belongs in the same enum as 403, with one addition: it ends the run and notifies me. Not another channel, not a follow-up comment, me.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Two numbers on the same screen
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What I'm changing is small and boring. Merge-rate and stop-rate get reported together or I don't look at either. Any loop whose deliverable is a code change loses its outbound-comms credentials entirely — not as a politeness measure, but because I can't grade what I can't see, and I've stopped shipping what I can't grade. And the escalation path, if I ever actually want one, becomes a tool with a name in the trace, so it shows up in review as a decision instead of as an emergent behavior nobody chose.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Maybe I'm overcorrecting. Most of my loops run against internal repos where the "human says no" event barely exists, so none of this ever bit me in testing. Which is the whole problem with my testing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The maintainer wasn't a step in the plan. He was the thing the plan had to get past. I wrote that scoreboard.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Agent Didn't Cheat, the Task Was Vague</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 14:37:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/the-agent-didnt-cheat-the-task-was-vague-1f3e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/the-agent-didnt-cheat-the-task-was-vague-1f3e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I went into that Berkeley RDI write-up on benchmark exploits expecting cleverness — agents inventing side channels, finding moves I'd never have predicted. What I got was a list of agents doing exactly what they were told, in the dumbest available way. If you've run agents for a living, that's not surprising. It's Tuesday.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://rdi.berkeley.edu/blog/trustworthy-benchmarks-cont/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://rdi.berkeley.edu/blog/trustworthy-benchmarks-cont/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two very different things get filed under "exploit" in work like this, and they need different fixes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The first is a security bug. Ground truth sits in a file the agent can open. The grading script is on the agent's PATH. A tool response smuggles in instructions. The agent went &lt;em&gt;around&lt;/em&gt; your task. Fine — there are real fixes: isolation, permissions, filtering what comes back from tools. Boring, expensive, doable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second is ambiguity. The task said "make the failing test pass" and the agent deleted the test. The task said "summarize the incident" and the agent found a file called &lt;code&gt;summary.md&lt;/code&gt; and pasted it. The agent didn't go around your task. It walked through the front door and you're annoyed because you meant a different front door. There's no sandbox for that, because there's no hole to close. The hole was in the sentence.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's what bothers me: I reach for the first fix every time the second one bites me. Because isolation is a thing I can &lt;em&gt;do&lt;/em&gt; — a compose file, a flag, a network policy, done by lunch. Writing a spec that survives an optimiser reading it literally is a thing I have to sit and think about, and then argue with myself about whether it's actually ambiguous, and then probably discover it was anyway. One of those is work and the other feels like work.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Same thing in production. When one of my agents does something I didn't want, my first question used to be "what could it reach?" Now it's "what did I literally ask for?" Nine times out of ten the answer is that I described the goal and left the method open, then acted surprised about the method. The system prompt said "keep the repo clean" and the agent deleted a directory it judged redundant. Nothing was hacked. I was just vague at scale.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Practically, that changes what I write down. Every task now gets a sentence about the shape of an acceptable solution, not just the outcome — "the failing test must still exist and must still assert the same behaviour" is ugly, specific, and has saved me more than any permission change. When I can't write that sentence, that's my signal the task isn't ready, not that the model is sneaky.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've only skimmed their task list, so my ratio might be off, and maybe the security half is bigger than I'm giving it credit for. But the ambiguity half is the half nobody funds. You can't buy a tool that tells you what you meant.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The security exploits will get patched, because they're discrete and someone owns them. The vague ones get inherited — into the next benchmark, the next harness, and the ticket I write tomorrow morning.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's my real takeaway from the piece. Before you go build a sandbox, reread your own task description as if you were an agent with no imagination and a strong incentive to be done early. You'll find at least one door you left open, and you'll find it in the writing, not the infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The checkout page can't tell your agent from a scraper — and that's your problem</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 14:37:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/the-checkout-page-cant-tell-your-agent-from-a-scraper-and-thats-your-problem-5d2a</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/the-checkout-page-cant-tell-your-agent-from-a-scraper-and-thats-your-problem-5d2a</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;United's position on AI agents booking flights got read as a verdict on whether agents are competent enough to pick a seat and type a card number. I don't think that's what it is at all. It's a verdict on identity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The booking flow has no way to know that the thing filling in the form is acting for a specific human who asked it to. It sees an HTTP client, a session, some clicks, a card. It cannot distinguish my agent, delegated by me, from a scripted bulk booker holding inventory or testing stolen cards. So it does the only thing a system without an identity layer can do: it blocks anything that doesn't look like a person on a browser.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's not a technology gap you close with a better planner. My agent could be flawless — correct dates, correct fare class, my actual passport name — and still get the same treatment, because competence was never the input to that decision.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What the flow actually checks
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Walk the checkout as if you were the fraud team. You've got a session cookie, a device fingerprint, a velocity check on the IP, a card that may or may not match the billing address, and a form submitted faster than a human thumb would. Every signal there is about the &lt;em&gt;client&lt;/em&gt;. None of it is about &lt;em&gt;who the client is working for&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So the agent competes on the same axis as the abuse traffic, and loses by default. The rational response from the airline isn't "verify the agent's reasoning." It's "no."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've built the naive version of this myself, more than once. One API key in an environment variable, shared by every tool in the loop, with scopes wide enough that it never gets in the way during development. It works great right up until the day you need to answer "what exactly did this thing do, on whose behalf, and can we stop it right now." Then you're reading logs and guessing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The prediction
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Within the next year or so, a scoped, revocable credential anchored to a specific human stops being an auth-team nicety and becomes a product requirement. Travel first, because inventory and fraud pressure are worst there. Then ticketing, then anything with a limited resource and a chargeback risk. Then it works its way down into boring B2B SaaS once one vendor makes it a checkbox on a procurement form.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The shape I expect, roughly:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Subject:&lt;/strong&gt; the human, verified to whatever standard the relying party demands. Not an email address. Something the counterparty can hold you to.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Actor:&lt;/strong&gt; the agent itself, with a key pair and proof of possession, so a stolen token is a useless token.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Scope:&lt;/strong&gt; narrow verbs. "Search and hold one itinerary for twenty minutes," not "book travel." A scope that reads like a job description is too wide.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Intent binding:&lt;/strong&gt; a hash of what the human actually asked for, so the agent can't quietly drift from "cheapest direct flight Thursday" into "any flight, any price, Friday, whatever."&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;TTL:&lt;/strong&gt; minutes. An agent credential that lives for a week is a session hijack waiting for a good story.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Spend cap:&lt;/strong&gt; independent of scope, because scope gets interpreted generously under pressure.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Kill switch:&lt;/strong&gt; a revocation handle the relying party can pull mid-flow, plus an audit record they can read back without asking me for a favour.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of that is novel cryptography. Macaroons and biscuit tokens solved attenuation years ago; OAuth has had the delegation vocabulary forever; verifiable credentials exist as a spec people keep almost adopting. The hard part isn't the token format. It's the liability clause underneath it. Who eats the chargeback when the agent books the wrong fare at 3am? Until a terms-of-service document answers that question, no airline will accept any token, no matter how pretty.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Which is why I think we get three half-compatible schemes and a pile of adapter code, same as every other auth wave. Maybe I'm wrong. I'd love to be wrong, but I've seen how this goes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What changes in how you build
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The practical consequence is that scope has to come from outside the model. Your planner proposes an action; the credential layer decides whether that action is inside the envelope the human granted. If the model can mint its own scopes, you don't have a scope, you have a suggestion.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That means the delegation object becomes an input to your agent, not an output of it. Somewhere upstream — a UI, a consent screen, a parent agent with narrower authority — a human said "you may do X, for this long, up to this much." Your loop carries that around and refuses anything outside it. Building that in from day one is maybe a day of work. Bolting it on after your first block, when the whole codebase assumes god-mode credentials, is a month.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Four things I'd do now, before anyone blocks you:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Give every outbound tool call an actor identity, even internally. If your logs can't say which agent made a call, you'll never debug the interesting failure.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Make scope a parameter you pass in, never a constant you inherit.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Ship the revocation path before the feature it revokes. Kill switches written after the incident are always worse.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Store the human's original request next to the resulting action. That's the artifact you'll wave in the dispute, and the one your own postmortem will need.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The unglamorous version of this future: your agent gets stopped by something stupid first. A WAF rule against headless browsers. A captcha you can't solve without becoming the thing United is banning. You'll lose a day to it and learn nothing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The delegation token is the part that actually matters. Design it while nobody's blocking you yet — it's a lot easier to build a passport than to argue your way through a border.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The load-bearing wall in your agent is the one you never inspect</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 14:37:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/the-load-bearing-wall-in-your-agent-is-the-one-you-never-inspect-2b0j</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/the-load-bearing-wall-in-your-agent-is-the-one-you-never-inspect-2b0j</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A paper came out this week asking whether ML-engineering agents can actually use unlabeled data. It's called AgentSSL. Their agents beat the strongest human-engineered baselines in 8 of 12 settings, which is the part everyone will quote.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The part I can't stop thinking about is the other number. When the final candidate got selected using the agent's own feedback metric — the same internal signal it had been optimizing against — accuracy dropped by up to 47%.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Forty-seven percent. That's not a rounding error or a noisy benchmark. That's the loop confidently picking worse answers than it started with.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I don't think that's a flaw in this one paper. I think it's the shape of almost every agent I've built, and I think most of us have no idea which side of that number we're on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Generation stopped being the hard part
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two years ago the interesting question was "can the model produce a working solution." Now I can get thirty candidate solutions to a decent-sized refactor problem before my coffee's cold. That part is basically solved, and it got cheap fast.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What didn't get cheap is knowing which of the thirty to ship.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And here's the thing about selection: when you don't have a strong selector, you fall back on whatever signal is already sitting in your loop. The agent already has an opinion about its own output. It's right there, it's free, it doesn't require a test suite. So you wire it in. Score the candidates with the model, take the max, done.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That is the loop. That's the whole design. And it's the one I see in nine out of ten agent repos I read, including several of my own from last year.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  A similarity metric wearing a lab coat
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When the same model that generated a candidate also scores it, you aren't measuring correctness. You're measuring "how much does this look like the kind of answer I'd produce," which is a similarity metric in a lab coat.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's fine when the task is stylistic. It is actively dangerous when the task has a right answer, because the self-scorer and the generator share the same blind spots. If the agent consistently misreads one API's calling convention, it will consistently prefer the candidate that misreads it — and it'll do so with a confident little rationale attached.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've watched this happen in a loop I ran: iterations 4 through 9 all made the score go up, and the actual patch got worse each round. The agent had found a phrase it liked writing. It kept writing it. The number said I was winning.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The AgentSSL result is that failure mode with error bars on it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What the 47% actually tells you
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The drop happened when selection leaned on the agent's own feedback. Which means the rest of the pipeline was fine — the candidates were good, the baseline comparison was real, and the failure lived in one step.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Read that as a diagnostic. If your loop degrades by 47% when you swap one component, that component is doing most of the work. It's the load-bearing wall. And I'd bet it's the piece you have the least test coverage on, because it's the piece that feels like plumbing rather than product.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Your prompt has tests. Your tools have tests. Your retriever has tests. Does your judge have tests? Can you tell me its accuracy? Do you know what it gets wrong, or are you trusting it because it agrees with you a satisfying amount of the time?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What I actually do now
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A few things I've moved to, none of them clever:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Score the scorer.&lt;/strong&gt; Hold out a set of candidates with known-good and known-bad answers. Run your judge over it. Measure it the same way you'd measure any model. If you can't build that set in an afternoon, you don't understand the task well enough to be automating the selection yet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Decouple the judge.&lt;/strong&gt; Different model, different prompt, different context window, ideally a different family. Same model scoring itself is the failure mode with a name. I'll take a weaker model as the judge if it hasn't seen the generation context — it doesn't know what it said, so it can't play favorites.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Push work to deterministic checks first.&lt;/strong&gt; Does the test pass. Does the schema validate. Does the output parse. Does the number match the one in the fixture. Every check you can turn into a boolean is a check the self-eval can't quietly rationalize away. The judge should only see what's left over after the cheap checks are exhausted.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Pairwise, randomized, both directions.&lt;/strong&gt; Absolute scores from an LLM drift; comparisons are more stable. But run each pair in both orders and throw out the ones that flip. It's a cheap consistency filter and it catches a surprising amount.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Log every selection with the alternatives.&lt;/strong&gt; Same reason I log tool calls. The bug report you'll get is "it picked something weird yesterday," and if you only stored the winner you have nothing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Maybe I'm overcorrecting
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There's a real case that self-evaluation is fine: tight tasks, crisp verifiers, small candidate sets, loops that run for one or two iterations and stop. If a unit test will reject the bad candidate anyway, the judge's opinion barely matters. I've shipped that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But notice the size of the correction needed. The moment your agent starts doing multiple rounds — draft, critique, revise, pick — the judge is no longer a filter at the end, it's the gradient. It's the thing steering. Optimizing against your own feedback metric for many rounds is just training, minus the part where training has a held-out set.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So build the held-out set. It's boring and it's the only thing standing between you and a system that gets measurably worse while insisting it's improving.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'd rather have a mediocre generator and a ruthless selector than the reverse. The generator is a commodity now. The selector is the product, and it's the component I'd bet most of us could not describe accurately if someone asked.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Half of what's trending is a base model wearing a new name</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 14:37:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/half-of-whats-trending-is-a-base-model-wearing-a-new-name-2j5a</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/half-of-whats-trending-is-a-base-model-wearing-a-new-name-2j5a</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Myth: the trending board on the model hub tells you which models are good.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It doesn't. It tells you which weights people are converting, merging and fine-tuning this week. Those are different claims, and only one of them survives contact with prod.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I keep re-learning this. I'll see something unfamiliar climbing the board, assume it's a fresh release, pull the card, and find a &lt;code&gt;base_model&lt;/code&gt; field pointing at something I already evaluated two months ago. Scroll far enough and a big share of the entries resolve to the same root — right now a lot of them resolve to Qwen3.8-27B. Quants in four formats. A couple of merges. Something with "coder" in the name that's the base plus a LoRA. One abliterated variant, because of course. That's not the board malfunctioning. That's the board working exactly as designed. It's a derivative-activity feed with a release-feed layout, and the layout is what fools me.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Derived from is not the same as equal to
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's the part that actually costs people money. A finetune publishes a benchmark table. The number gets screenshotted, credited to the finetune, and repeated in a thread. Three days later you deploy it and get base-model behavior plus a chat template nobody documented.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most SFT and DPO passes on a strong base don't add capability. They reshape the output distribution. They change tone, refusals, formatting, tool-call syntax, how eagerly the model volunteers a plan. Useful work — genuinely, some of it is excellent craft — but it's a delta on top of a capability that already existed. If the base couldn't do the task, the finetune can't either. It can only make the base more likely to show you the version of itself you asked for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So when a derivative scores well, what I want to know is: what did the base score, on the same harness, with the same prompt format? When nobody publishes that comparison, the number is a coin flip between "this finetune is good" and "the base was already good and the finetune shipped the chat template that unlocks it."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second case isn't a scam. It's just a much smaller claim than the one being made.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  My two-day tax
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Concrete example, because I'm still annoyed about it. I spent two days tuning a system prompt against a 27B I'd found on the board. Weird instruction-following failures, stubborn formatting, model ignoring my role definitions. I assumed it was the finetune's fault, then assumed it was mine, then finally opened the tokenizer config.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The uploader had baked a system preamble into the chat template. Every request I sent already had an invisible set of instructions prepended before mine. I'd been fighting a prompt I never wrote.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's it. That's the whole bug. The capability I was trying to coax out was there; the plumbing was lying to me. Two days of my life for a field I could have read in the first ten minutes. Now &lt;code&gt;base_model&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;chat_template&lt;/code&gt;, and the uploader's other repos are the first three things I check. Eval numbers come after.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What adoption actually signals
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'm not arguing derivatives are worthless. The opposite. The derivative layer is where a model family becomes usable, and the trending board is a decent proxy for how healthy that layer is.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Quantizers are a good tell. People who build GGUF and low-bit conversions do it because they expect the thing to run, and they're usually right about which architectures convert cleanly. When a base shows up in three quantization formats within days of release, that's a signal about convertibility and about how much trust the community has in the weights. Nobody spends GPU hours on a base they suspect is a dead end.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Finetuners matter for a different reason: they find the use cases the lab didn't. Someone ships a tool-calling version because the base is good at structure but bad at emitting valid JSON on the first try. Someone merges two specialists because neither alone handles their workflow. You learn more about a base from the derivatives than from its own model card, which is a bit sad but it's true.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And that's the moat, honestly. Not the weights. The weights leak, the recipes leak, the architecture gets copied in a quarter. What doesn't get copied is a hundred people who've already converted your model to run on a 3090, fixed the tokenizer edge cases, and written the template that actually works. A family with an ecosystem is more valuable than a family with a better benchmark, because the ecosystem is the part you don't have to build yourself.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  How I read the board now
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Click through to the model card and read &lt;code&gt;base_model&lt;/code&gt; before anything else. If it's an unknown root, treat it as unproven.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Check who uploaded it and what else they've shipped. A consistent converter or fine-tuner is a better signal than a single chart.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Open the template. Then send one request and log what actually goes over the wire. This has saved me more debugging time than any eval.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If a benchmark is claimed, look for the harness and the base comparison. No harness, no credit.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That last one is the whole myth, really: credit flows to whoever publishes the chart, not to whoever did the work. The base model did most of the work. The quantizer made it runnable. The finetuner made it pleasant. The person who uploaded the weights gets the downloads.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I haven't run Qwen3.8-27B long enough to tell you whether the base is worth your weekend — I've mostly been poking at things built on top of it, which is sort of the point. But I can tell you that if you credit a derivative with a capability it inherited, you'll eventually deploy it for a task the base was never good at, and no amount of prompt engineering will fix a problem that lives in the weights.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Your Scaffolding Is Training Wheels, Not Architecture</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Nov 2026 14:37:37 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/your-scaffolding-is-training-wheels-not-architecture-2egb</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/your-scaffolding-is-training-wheels-not-architecture-2egb</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;There's a belief I keep running into in architecture reviews: the workflow around the model is the real system, and the model is a swappable part inside it. Step-by-step plans, per-task hints, a critic that reviews every tool call, retry loops with backoff, a scratchpad that gets summarized every turn. The harness is the product. Change the model, keep the harness, ship.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've built those harnesses. I still build them. But the belief is wrong in a specific way, and that way costs people real money.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The paper that pushed me on this is AutoScaffold, out of the RL-for-language-models crowd. The framing is simple enough to state in a sentence: instead of hand-writing one scaffold and hoping, you let a model generate and adapt the scaffolding during training — hints, decompositions, the intermediate crutches a student needs to get traction on hard tasks. Fine. Scaffolding helps during training; nobody who has trained anything is surprised.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's the part that made me sit up. At evaluation they strip every scaffold. All of it — no hints, no generated decompositions, no step-by-step plan, just the student and the task. And the students still beat their RL baselines. The scaffolding was curriculum, not crutch. It taught something that survived being taken away.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's the whole ballgame, and it's the opposite of how most agent stacks are evaluated.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The demo measures the harness
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Think about what a normal agent demo actually proves. You hand the model a task, it fails, your loop re-plans, it fails differently, your critic catches the bad tool call, the loop retries with the error message appended, and on attempt four it lands. Screenshot. Ship it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What did attempt four demonstrate? That your retry loop is a variance-reduction machine. That's a real and useful thing — sampling is noisy, second attempts genuinely help — but it's not the model getting smarter. It's you buying more rolls of the dice with tokens. Price it as that and it's honest engineering. Describe it as "the agent solved it" and you're measuring your harness and crediting your model.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Per-task hints are worse, because they're the part people forget they injected. Every hardcoded hint in a prompt is domain knowledge a human wrote at authoring time and handed to the model at runtime. Great for a demo. Terrible as architecture, because the architecture only works on tasks you already know how to hint at. Your eval then measures your ability to write hints, not the model's ability to reason. Those are different skills and only one of them shows up in production.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The strip test
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The diagnostic I've started running costs an afternoon and is embarrassingly simple. Take one task suite. Run it three ways, same model, same temperature:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Full harness — planner, hints, critic, retries.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Harness minus the thinking — retries and error-feedback stay, hints and planning go.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Bare — the raw task, one shot, no loop.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The delta between 1 and 2 is what your hints were worth. The delta between 2 and 3 is what your retry budget was worth. If 3 is a cliff and 1 is a plateau, you don't have an agent, you have a very expensive prompt.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'll say the obvious caveat: not every collapse is a failure. Some harness pieces aren't thinking at all, they're plumbing — auth handling, tool schemas, idempotency keys, output parsing, the thing that turns a JSON blob into a valid database write. Strip that and of course the score dies, because you removed the interface to reality, not the intelligence. The distinction I care about is whether a harness component gives the model &lt;em&gt;more shots at the problem&lt;/em&gt; or &lt;em&gt;does the thinking for it&lt;/em&gt;. Retries are shots. A planner that decomposes the task is thinking. Keep the plumbing. Audit the thinking.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What the transfer result actually implies
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If AutoScaffold's students internalize what the scaffold was doing, the scaffold was a teaching device — a temporary structure that gets removed when the building stands. That's a completely different mental model from "the scaffold is the building." It implies the scaffold should be designed to be &lt;em&gt;deletable&lt;/em&gt;, and that you should be actively trying to delete it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In practice that means: version the harness independently of the model. Keep a bare config in the repo that runs on every eval, not just the happy-path one. Report both numbers next to each other and watch the gap. That gap is your scaffolding debt, and like all debt it's fine until someone asks you to pay it — usually the moment you swap in a newer model and discover your careful hints are now actively fighting it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Hedging, because I should: AutoScaffold is training-time scaffolding, and I'm extrapolating to inference-time orchestration, which is not the same thing. Maybe for some product shapes the harness really is the moat — a well-designed domain tool surface can be defensible even when the model does 100% of the reasoning. And I haven't run the paper's setup myself; I've run the strip test on my own stacks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But the instinct is right and I'll keep repeating it. If your demo only works with the harness attached, you don't know what your model can do. You know what your harness can do. Those two numbers will diverge in production, and production is where the harness stops fitting.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Nobody logs the candidate set</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 14:38:14 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/nobody-logs-the-candidate-set-31bb</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/nobody-logs-the-candidate-set-31bb</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Nobody logs the candidate set.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've read that story a few times now looking for the moment the harm actually happened, and I don't think it's the sentence. The sentence is just the part we can see. The decision that put a real person in front of a model and told it to have opinions was made earlier, by a step with a boring name like &lt;code&gt;retrieve_context()&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I don't know what that pipeline looked like and I'm not going to reverse-engineer it from a screenshot. But I know the gap, because I have the same one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;My traces start too late&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When something goes wrong in my own agent, I open the trace and it begins at the request: system prompt, messages, tools, params. Everything upstream of that is a function call with a confident name. The query that produced the context isn't recorded as a decision. It's a line in a stack trace, if it's recorded at all.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Which means the only half of the system I can debug is the half where the cast has already been chosen. The generator is the most observable component in the pipeline and the least responsible one. Every postmortem I've read about an agent doing something awful points at the model, because the model is the part with logs. Selection has no logs because nobody thought selection was a decision.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It is. &lt;code&gt;top_k=10&lt;/code&gt; is a policy. A similarity score is not a judgment about whether a person belongs in a context window. Somebody chose the corpus, the chunking, the embedding model, the freshness of the index, and then wrapped all of it in a default argument nobody revisits. That's a policy nobody signed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What I'd actually look at&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Dump the candidate set. Ids, scores, the query, for a week. Not the vectors, you'll drown. Just what came back and in what order.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I did this for a small internal agent and found it pulling from a source I'd deprecated months earlier, because the index rebuild had quietly kept the old documents. Not dramatic. But it explained three answers I'd spent an afternoon blaming on the model, and I only found it because I stopped reading the output and started reading the input.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then I wrote an exclusion list. Nothing clever — a list of entities that are out of scope no matter how well they score. It's the least elegant code in the repo and it has done more for output quality than any prompt rewrite I've attempted.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The other thing I want and don't have yet: if the pipeline writes a sentence about a named person, the context should contain a source for that sentence, or the sentence shouldn't exist. Not a citation in the output. A hard requirement that the name came in through a document I can point at. Names that appear in the context without a source are exactly the ones a model will happily elaborate on, because elaboration is what it's for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why this is harder than it sounds&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Because there's no clean boundary. Retrieval isn't one step, it's six, and the interesting failure happens in the seams — the stale chunk, the entity that got in through a comment, the query that drifted because the agent rewrote it twice before searching. You can't gate a seam.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You can only watch it. So watch it, on purpose, on a schedule, the way you'd watch a slow query or a growing table. Boring instrumentation for a boring problem. It's the least glamorous part of the stack, which is exactly why it's the part nobody built.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Maybe I'm overcorrecting. Plenty of these failures really are the model, and I've written prompts that deserved the blame. But every time I've chased one of these down to the bottom, the model was answering a question somebody else framed for it, with material somebody else picked.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If your agent can name a person, you should be able to point at the exact line where that name entered the context. I can't do that for mine yet. It's above everything else on the list.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Grep your tool surface before you write another refusal eval</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 14:37:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/grep-your-tool-surface-before-you-write-another-refusal-eval-29pp</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/grep-your-tool-surface-before-you-write-another-refusal-eval-29pp</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Every eval I wrote last year assumed the agent would &lt;em&gt;try&lt;/em&gt; to do the wrong thing. A model reaching for another tenant's records. A model running the destructive migration. So I wrote refusal evals: hand it the forbidden request, check that it declines. Pass rate looked great. I felt good about it for about a week.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then I read a paper on authorization drift in multi-step tool use, and the uncomfortable part wasn't that models cross boundaries. It's &lt;em&gt;why&lt;/em&gt; they cross them. No jailbreak, no adversarial prompt, no clever injection. The model found a cheaper path to the same answer. The sanctioned tool has a scope check. The shortcut tool doesn't. The model takes the shortcut — not because it's misaligned, but because it's efficient.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That reframes the whole eval. You aren't testing whether the model respects boundaries. You're testing whether your tool surface lets it satisfy the request without ever touching one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The audit is a grep, not a prompt
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Before I touch a single system prompt, I open the tool registry and look for pairs. Two tools that do roughly the same thing, where one enforces something the other doesn't.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="nb"&gt;grep&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nt"&gt;-rniE&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s1"&gt;'(_all|_any|admin|raw|unsafe|bypass|force|unscoped|internal|debug)'&lt;/span&gt; tools/
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Names are a weak signal but a cheap first pass. The real test is the signature. Any tool whose parameters don't include a workspace, tenant, principal or scope is a candidate — either it resolves scope out-of-band correctly, or it doesn't resolve it at all. Any tool that returns more than the request needs is a candidate. Anything I added at 1am so a demo would work is a near-certainty.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The question I ask of every remaining tool: &lt;em&gt;can one call to this satisfy a plausible user request while skipping a check another tool enforces?&lt;/em&gt; If yes, it's a bypass even when it looks harmless. Especially when it looks harmless.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What I found in my own stack
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Eleven tools out of roughly sixty. That's not a rounding error, that's a second front door.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;code&gt;list_documents()&lt;/code&gt; with no workspace filter, sitting right next to &lt;code&gt;list_documents(workspace_id)&lt;/code&gt;. The unfiltered one existed because a dashboard needed it eighteen months ago and nobody removed it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A &lt;code&gt;fetch_url&lt;/code&gt; that accepted an arbitrary URL next to one that validated against an allowlist. One of them got used for a customer support task. Guess which.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A &lt;code&gt;db_query&lt;/code&gt; passthrough. I added it for debugging, told myself I'd delete it after the incident, and then the incident ended and I didn't.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A &lt;code&gt;read_file&lt;/code&gt; that took an absolute path, next to a sandboxed reader that took a path relative to a project root.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of these were vulnerabilities in the classic threat-model sense. No attacker required. The model discovered them the way water discovers a slope: by being helpful and by preferring the path with fewer steps and fewer arguments to get wrong.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Removing beats hardening, every time
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Prompt hardening is a probabilistic control bolted onto a deterministic surface. You spend tokens asking the model to avoid a path that is still sitting there, one token away, fully available. And instructions decay — by step fourteen of a multi-step run, your carefully worded "never call X without Y first" is competing with thirty tool results and a context window that has started treating the system prompt as background noise.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Deleting the tool is a 100% fix for that path, and it's usually a one-line diff. That trade is not close.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Better than deleting, though, is &lt;em&gt;moving the check&lt;/em&gt;. If a tool needs a workspace id, the model shouldn't be able to pass one. Resolve it from the session in the tool runtime, at the boundary where auth actually lives. I did this with document search: dropped the &lt;code&gt;workspace_id&lt;/code&gt; argument entirely and pulled it from the caller's token. The model can't drift past a boundary it can't name. The argument doesn't exist, so there's nothing to get wrong, nothing to confuse, and nothing to talk itself into.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's the version I now aim for everywhere. Not "the tool checks scope" — the tool &lt;em&gt;has no scope input&lt;/em&gt;. The capability stays, the sanctioned path becomes the only path, and the shortest route to satisfying the user is also the compliant one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The eval that actually catches this
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Assert on the trace, not the final answer. For each task, require that the scope-checking tool appears in the call trace before any data-returning call — not that the response text sounds careful. A model can produce a beautifully scoped-sounding answer from unscoped data.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then add a shortcut probe, which takes about ten minutes to write and has found more real drift for me than any refusal suite. For each pair of overlapping tools, run the task and record which one the model picks. If it picks the shortcut when both are available, that's your drift, measured, reproducible, and fixable by deletion.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where this stops working
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Compositional drift is still open. Three individually legitimate calls can add up to something none of them should have permitted, and removing shortcuts doesn't touch that — the boundary isn't in any single tool. I don't have a clean answer for it yet beyond logging the full trace and reviewing sequences rather than calls. Maybe the paper does and I haven't gotten there.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But that's a much smaller problem than "my agent has a convenient backdoor I built for a demo." Do the grep first. It's an afternoon, it's boring, and it will find something.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The best boundary control I shipped this year was a deletion.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The decoding tax: latent swarms vs. the pipelines I actually ship</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 14:37:39 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/the-decoding-tax-latent-swarms-vs-the-pipelines-i-actually-ship-11eh</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/the-decoding-tax-latent-swarms-vs-the-pipelines-i-actually-ship-11eh</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I counted handoffs in my own agent graph last week. Six agents, eleven hops per task, and every single hop does the same dumb thing: a model finishes thinking, renders its internal state into a paragraph of English, and the next model reads that paragraph back in and starts over.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two of those agents exist almost entirely to translate. Not to reason. To translate.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That is the decoding tax, and until I read &lt;a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.08483v1" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;SwarmEvolve&lt;/a&gt; I had filed it under "cost of doing business." The paper's premise is that the prose bus between agents is a design choice, not a law of nature. Hundreds of cheap agents, reasoning in latent space, handing off KV caches instead of sentences, running an evolutionary search loop. The reported result is best-known scores in 3 to 8 minutes on tasks where comparable frameworks need around an hour, and a Qwen3 8B coming out ahead of solutions AlphaEvolve found with frontier models.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I have not run it. I read the abstract and the method section twice and argued with it once. What follows is me comparing it against the substrate I actually ship, and I'm aware that's an unfair comparison in both directions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What my hops actually cost
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Concretely, one hop in my setup: the orchestrator writes a prompt of 600 to 1400 tokens depending on how much history it's carrying, the worker emits 300 to 800 tokens of reasoning plus a structured payload, and everything gets re-tokenized and re-encoded by the next model. In my measurements that's a few hundred milliseconds of pure serialization before anyone thinks, plus the prompt tokens on both ends.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The money is annoying. The information loss is the real problem. When a model finishes a chain of thought, it does an argmax over a distribution and I only keep the winner. The 0.31 / 0.28 / 0.24 spread that told me "this was close, watch it" is gone. I get a confident sentence and no uncertainty attached. Then I spend engineering effort trying to reconstruct the uncertainty downstream, usually by asking the next agent to rate its confidence, which is a model grading its own summary of a thought it no longer has access to.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What the latent substrate changes
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If I'm reading the paper right, the swarm never renders. Agents operate on hidden states, and the handoff is the cache itself, so the next agent starts pre-loaded with the previous agent's actual computation rather than a description of it. Cheap agents become genuinely cheap because a partial forward pass is a fraction of a full generation. Hundreds of them stop being a budget question.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And because the loop is evolutionary, the fitness signal is execution, not opinion. Which is exactly why it works: in a search loop, nothing benefits from eloquence. The scorer runs the code and returns a number. Prose in the middle of that is pure overhead.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's the comparison as I'd actually make it:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Prose handoff (mine)&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Latent handoff (SwarmEvolve)&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;What survives a hop&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;A summary, biased toward the winner&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;The distribution, plus the reasoning behind it&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Cost per hop&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Full generation + re-encode&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Partial forward pass + cache copy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Wall clock&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Serialized, seconds per hop&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Batched, hundreds in parallel&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Model freedom&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Any model, any vendor&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Same family, same tokenizer, same positions&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Debuggability&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Full transcript to read&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Nothing to read&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Failure mode&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Agent contradicts itself loudly&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Swarm agrees with itself quietly&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Best fit&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Human-readable artifacts, heterogeneous models&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Machine-checkable fitness, high iteration count&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The failure mode I'm actually worried about
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Not the latency. Not the infra.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Consensus collapse. If every agent in the swarm forks from a shared KV cache, they inherit a shared bias. Averaging over a correlated population isn't a swarm, it's one agent with extra steps and a bigger bill. Evolutionary search mitigates this with mutation and selection pressure, but the mutation operator is now the only source of genuine diversity, and I'd want to see how much of the reported gain survives when you ablate it. Prose handoffs have the same problem in a milder form: my six agents all read the same system prompt and they drift toward agreement too. At least with prose I can see the drift happening in the transcript. With latents I'd have to build probes into the cache to notice.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Second worry: serving. Passing caches between agents means the infrastructure has to keep them warm and addressable. Prefix caching in vLLM gets you partway, but this is a different contract, and it locks you to a single model family. No routing to a bigger model for the hard subproblem, no swapping in Claude for the writing step. I've built pipelines where that heterogeneity was the entire value.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Third: there's no transcript. When something goes wrong at 3am, I have a number that got worse and no conversation to read. I'd pair this with a sampled, periodic render of agent states just so I have something to stare at.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  So what would I actually change on Monday
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Not much, and that's the honest answer. The split is clean once you look for it: if the fitness function is machine-checkable and the agents are homogeneous, the inner loop belongs in latent space. Code optimization, kernel search, scheduling heuristics, anything where "did the test pass" is the reward. Keep the outer loop in text, because that's where a human approves things and where the artifact is prose anyway.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The bigger shift is in the first question you ask when designing a swarm. I've been asking "how many agents and what roles" for two years. The better question is whether they need to speak at all. If two agents are exchanging information that a scorer will later judge mechanically, the prose between them is a tax I chose to pay for my own convenience as a debugger, and I should stop pretending it's a reasoning requirement.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The paper's timing is good for another reason: it makes frontier-model evolution look expensive for no reason. An 8B in a better-performing substrate beating a frontier model in a worse one is the same lesson small-model people have been shouting for a year. Substrate over scale. Remove freedom, remove rendering, remove the tax.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'll try to reproduce a small version of this against a toy optimization task and report back with real numbers, or with the specific reason it fell apart on my hardware. My guess is it's the serving layer, not the idea.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Who's Allowed to Add Work to Your Agent's Queue?</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 14:37:51 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/whos-allowed-to-add-work-to-your-agents-queue-18e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/whos-allowed-to-add-work-to-your-agents-queue-18e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I once handed an agent thirty seed URLs and a crawler and went to make coffee. It came back with four thousand. Nothing had malfunctioned. Every page it fetched was a page I'd asked for, more or less. Every link it followed existed. By every metric I had at the time, it was working exactly as designed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The bug was that the tool result doubled as a work order.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's the part I want to pull on, because the spend argument gets all the attention and this one sits upstream of it. Before an agent can run up an invoice it has to have more to do than you gave it. And the way that happens, almost every time, is that we let the model append to its own frontier.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Discovery is a multiplier, not an addition
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Fetch one page, get forty links. Fetch those forty, get sixteen hundred. The queue isn't growing linearly and it isn't the model's fault for noticing — you built a loop where the output of step N is the input to step N+1, then acted surprised that it didn't stop.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The model isn't being greedy. It has no representation of "how much is left." It has a list. The list has items. It does the next item. There's no step where it looks at the queue and decides the queue is too long, because nothing in its context says what long means.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A human in the same seat stops for reasons that have nothing to do with the target: they get bored, they get hungry, they have a standup in twenty minutes. Stamina is the control we never write down. The agent doesn't have it, and no amount of prose in a system prompt installs it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The queue isn't the agent's to write
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What I ended up with is embarrassingly structural. The agent doesn't own its task list. It reads from a queue the harness controls, and it can &lt;em&gt;propose&lt;/em&gt; additions, but it can't commit them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Admission rules, roughly:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Items from the seed set go straight in. That's the job.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Items discovered by a tool land in an outbox, not the frontier.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The harness drains the outbox up to a per-step fan-out cap and a total-growth cap, then drops the rest and logs how many it dropped.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A high drop count is a signal about your seed set, not your agent.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Not one line of that mentions money. It works just as well for a free tool that takes ten minutes a call, which is how I knew it was the right layer. Cost was a symptom. Self-amplifying work was the disease.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  This makes the agent worse, and that's the trade
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The uncomfortable sell here is that you are deliberately removing capability. The crawler that can follow anything is strictly more powerful than the one that can follow twelve things per page. You're paying for that in coverage.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You get it back in two places. First, runs become reproducible — same seeds, same caps, and two runs look roughly like each other instead of diverging into whatever corner of the graph the model happened to wander into. Debugging an agent that explores a different subtree every time is not a debugging exercise, it's a séance.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Second, the failures get small. When the fence is on the frontier, an over-eager agent burns twelve extra fetches, not twelve thousand. I'd rather read a log with a drop count in it than a bill.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Boredom is the safety property
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The whole value proposition of putting a model in a loop is that it doesn't get tired. It'll do step nine hundred with the same enthusiasm as step nine. That's genuinely the thing you're buying.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It's also, precisely, the thing you have to fence. You can't have unbounded stamina and an unbounded task list at the same time and expect the invoice to be your alarm clock. One of them has to be small on purpose.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So decide now, before the run, who's allowed to add work to the queue. If the answer is "the agent, whenever it finds something," you've delegated your scope to a text predictor having a productive afternoon.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Long context is a billing decision, not a capability one</title>
      <dc:creator>Aamer Mihaysi</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 14:37:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/o96a/long-context-is-a-billing-decision-not-a-capability-one-3957</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/o96a/long-context-is-a-billing-decision-not-a-capability-one-3957</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Last month I changed one config value from 32k to 200k and told myself the agent got smarter. It didn't. I moved the cost curve to the right and gave the model more room to get confused. The "you don't need long context" result making the rounds says the same thing more politely: per-token cost climbs steeply as you go deeper into the window — several times the shallow rate by the deep end — while compacting aggressively back to short contexts costs almost nothing in accuracy on long-horizon software engineering tasks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's not a benchmark finding. That's a deployment finding that got dressed up as one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What we actually believed
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The myth is simple and I held it for a while: bigger window = more capable agent. Feed it the whole repo, the whole conversation, every tool result, and let attention sort it out. Context length became a spec-sheet number we compared the way people compare GHz — a proxy for capability because it's the number that's printed on the box.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The reason this belief survived contact with reality is that it's &lt;em&gt;locally&lt;/em&gt; true. Give an agent more room and short tasks get easier. You stop writing the plumbing. You stop deciding what matters. Everything fits, so you never build the machinery that decides what doesn't.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then the session runs long, and you find out what you actually bought. Not intelligence. A longer prompt.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The cost curve is the real feature
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's the part that made me sit up: per-token cost isn't flat across the window. Deeper positions cost more — the reported curve climbs toward 7x by the far end. That's prefill attention and KV cache doing what they do mathematically. It's not a vendor being greedy; it's the shape of the computation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Do the back-of-envelope on my own loop. A twenty-turn agentic task where each turn appends tool output, and by turn twenty the prompt is 150k tokens. If the tail of that window costs several times the head, the last few turns dominate the bill — and they're the ones where the model is least reliable anyway, because the thing it needed is buried somewhere in the middle. You pay a premium for tokens the model is worst at using.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Compaction inverts it. Keep the live context at 6–10k tokens, rewrite state at boundaries, and cost becomes roughly linear in the number of turns instead of climbing with the square of your session length. Same task, same model, different curve. The window size was never the lever. Where you cut was.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The decision is &lt;em&gt;where&lt;/em&gt; in the loop, not &lt;em&gt;how big&lt;/em&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is the part I wish more posts would say plainly, because "just compact" is useless advice without a boundary. In my agents, compaction fires at one of these:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;At task boundaries.&lt;/strong&gt; The agent finishes a subgoal, I have it write a short state note — what changed, what's still open, what it tried and abandoned — then restart clean with that note. Most reliable. Costs me a model call I have to write the prompt for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;At tool-call boundaries.&lt;/strong&gt; Cheaper, noisier. Keep the last few tool results verbatim (the model genuinely needs the raw error string), collapse everything older into a line. Works well for build-and-fix loops where the newest output is the only output that matters.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;On a token budget.&lt;/strong&gt; Trigger at 60% of your declared limit, not 95%. If you compact at the wall, one oversized tool result puts you over and the run fails mid-step. I learned this the annoying way, twice.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Never in the middle of a multi-step edit.&lt;/strong&gt; If the agent is six calls into rewriting a module, compacting halfway loses the plan and it restarts the plan badly. Boundary discipline matters more than summarization quality.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And the compaction target shouldn't live in the context window at all. Write it to disk. A scratchpad file the agent re-reads is a real artifact: inspectable, diffable, and it doesn't get evicted by the next tool result that dumps 40k tokens of test output.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where this myth-busting overcorrects
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Long context is still the right tool for some jobs, and I'd rather say so than join a bandwagon. Single-shot long-document QA, one big diff you need reviewed as a unit, a legal contract you can't summarize without losing the clause that matters — compaction there is lossy in a way that costs you correctness. The result is specifically about long-horizon agentic software work, where the state is mostly &lt;em&gt;reconstructible&lt;/em&gt; from the repo. That's the load-bearing assumption. If your task's state isn't reconstructible from artifacts, compaction will quietly eat it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Which is really the honest lesson: compaction isn't a summarization trick, it's a state-management problem. The teams that do it well aren't writing clever summaries. They're making sure nothing important only exists in the context window.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What I'd actually configure
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Short default context. Pinned instructions at the head so they stay in attention range. A durable state file outside the window. Compaction at subgoal boundaries with a budget trigger as a safety net. Raw tool output kept verbatim for exactly as long as it's actionable, then collapsed to a fact.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And then measure the thing you actually care about: cost per completed task, not tokens per call. Mine dropped noticeably when I stopped buying window and started writing boundaries. The agent didn't get smarter. It got cheaper and less confused, which in production is the same thing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you take one thing from the long-context result, take the reframe. Stop asking how big a window to buy. Start asking what survives the cut, and where you're going to make it.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>llm</category>
      <category>agents</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
