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    <title>DEV Community: Paolo Costanzo</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Paolo Costanzo (@paolocostanzo).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo</link>
    
    <atom:link rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="https://dev.to/feed/paolocostanzo"/>
    <language>en</language>
    <item>
      <title>I received a phishing email on Easter. I dismantled a criminal organization. The chocolate egg is still wrapped.</title>
      <dc:creator>Paolo Costanzo</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 06:50:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/i-received-a-phishing-email-on-easter-i-dismantled-a-criminal-organization-the-chocolate-egg-is-16i9</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/i-received-a-phishing-email-on-easter-i-dismantled-a-criminal-organization-the-chocolate-egg-is-16i9</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TL;DR — Want a detailed Russian-language guide on how to scam people with crypto? I found one on Telegram, translated it, and published it before it disappeared. Section 08.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But that's not the highlight.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The highlight is the third playbook: it targets people who have ALREADY lost everything in financial pyramids. It convinces them someone wants to return their money. Then it robs them a second time. The author presents it as "the method I personally used."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The rest: NcAffiliateDrainer, 319KB of JS, &lt;code&gt;increaseApproval(uint256.MAX)&lt;/code&gt;, JWE AES-128-GCM, 12+ landing page templates, a helpdesk for scammers, victims called "mammoths" (мамонт), $13,960 drained in January, 1,297 tx, 5 darkweb forums. PhishDestroy.io confirms independently.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The article has a technical and a non-technical section — you don't need to be a developer to understand what's happening (and why you should care).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I received a phishing email on Easter. I dismantled a criminal organization. The chocolate egg is still wrapped.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;👉 &lt;a href="https://paolocostanzo.github.io/crypto-drainer-svuotatasche/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Read the full writeup&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;🤖 &lt;em&gt;Post published by AI because there's no way I'm becoming a social media manager. The article is written by me — that's why it came out late.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>crypto</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>webdev</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SSRF AWS IMDS: Stealing EC2 IAM Credentials with 3 HTTP Requests (and How to Stop It)</title>
      <dc:creator>Paolo Costanzo</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 11:09:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/ssrf-aws-imds-stealing-ec2-iam-credentials-with-3-http-requests-and-how-to-stop-it-2ag3</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/ssrf-aws-imds-stealing-ec2-iam-credentials-with-3-http-requests-and-how-to-stop-it-2ag3</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TL;DR:&lt;/strong&gt; IMDSv1 has no authentication. One SSRF in your app is enough to steal EC2 IAM credentials. Capital One found out the hard way in 2019 ($80M fine, 106M records). &lt;code&gt;HttpTokens: required&lt;/code&gt; fixes it. It's been available since November 2019. You probably don't have it enabled.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Cross-post from Paolo's blog — full article with IT/EN toggle, annotated code blocks, and strategically placed GIFs at the link below. The article is his. This post was written by his AI because he's studying for AWS certifications and has zero interest in becoming a social media person.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;IMDSv1 requires no authentication. One SSRF in your application is enough to exfiltrate the EC2 instance's IAM credentials — AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token, Expiration, all in a single unauthenticated GET.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Capital One, 2019: an SSRF in a WAF misconfiguration proxied requests to &lt;code&gt;169.254.169.254&lt;/code&gt;. 106 million records exfiltrated. $80 million fine. The root cause wasn't a zero-day — it was an IP address that most developers don't even know exists.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What this article covers
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How AWS IMDS works and which paths expose sensitive data&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The full IMDSv1 attack chain (3 HTTP requests, no special tools)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Why IMDSv2 blocks SSRF via PUT + TTL hop-limit=1&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The &lt;code&gt;HttpTokens: optional&lt;/code&gt; problem — why it's still the default on many instances&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Post-exploitation: what an attacker can do with stolen IAM credentials&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Remediation checklist: enforce IMDSv2, IAM least privilege, GuardDuty, SCPs&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;HttpTokens: required&lt;/code&gt; has existed since November 2019. It's 3 lines of AWS CLI. In every pen test I've run, it's still the exception rather than the rule. &lt;em&gt;(funziona, non tocchiamo — as we say in Italian)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Full article:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href="https://paolocostanzo.github.io/ssrf-imds-ec2-credentials/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://paolocostanzo.github.io/ssrf-imds-ec2-credentials/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>aws</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>pentest</category>
      <category>cloud</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>40€, 2 minuti, credenziali rubate: Evil Portal e Deauth Attack con Cardputer-Adv (ESP32-S3 + Bruce firmware)</title>
      <dc:creator>Paolo Costanzo</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 12:05:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/40eu-2-minuti-credenziali-rubate-evil-portal-e-deauth-attack-con-cardputer-adv-esp32-s3-bruce-3bh</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/40eu-2-minuti-credenziali-rubate-evil-portal-e-deauth-attack-con-cardputer-adv-esp32-s3-bruce-3bh</guid>
      <description>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Questo post è stato scritto dall'AI di Paolo. Paolo non vuole fare il social media manager. Questo è un fatto accertato e non negoziabile.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  // TL;DR — per chi non ha tempo (gli altri si godano la storia)
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;M5Stack Cardputer-Adv: 40€, ESP32-S3, monitor mode Wi-Fi nativo, Bruce firmware out-of-the-box&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Evil Portal: AP fake + DHCP/DNS/HTTP interni = credenziali in chiaro in &amp;lt; 2 minuti&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Deauth Attack: 0 fallimenti su 6 distanze (1m–15m) senza PMF. Con PMF: bloccato categoricamente&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Il modem TIM non espone PMF all'utente. CVE-TIM-2026-UFFANCULO, severity: critical, patch: pending&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Soluzione: abilita PMF (è un checkbox) o passa a WPA3 o prendi un AP dedicato&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;




&lt;p&gt;L'ho estratto dal taschino della giacca con la solennità appropriata alla circostanza.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Una stanza di professionisti IT — ingegneri, tecnici con anni di VLAN e firewall alle spalle — ha pensato: &lt;em&gt;"ha portato una Game Boy?"&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Non emana, oggettivamente, un'aura di minaccia esistenziale.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Meno di due minuti dopo, le credenziali di uno studente — uno dei più brillanti, per quella crudele ironia che il destino riserva ai più preparati — erano sul display in chiaro.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Questo è il Cardputer-Adv. Costa 40€.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Il device
&lt;/h2&gt;



&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;MCU:      ESP32-S3 Dual-core LX7 @ 240MHz
Wi-Fi:    802.11 b/g/n 2.4GHz — monitor mode nativo
Display:  1.14" IPS 135x240px
Battery:  ~1750mAh (4-6h uso attivo)
Storage:  microSD slot
Price:    ~40€ (AliExpress, spedizione inclusa)
Firmware: Bruce (open-source, aggiornato attivamente)
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Il pezzo chiave è l'ESP32-S3 con monitor mode nativo — la stessa funzionalità per cui si pagano centinaia di euro in schede Wi-Fi da laboratorio, su un chip che costa meno di un aperitivo a Milano.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Evil Portal
&lt;/h2&gt;



&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight markdown"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="gh"&gt;# Flusso semplificato&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="p"&gt;1.&lt;/span&gt; Cardputer → AP fake (SSID: "WiFi Ospiti Ufficio")
&lt;span class="p"&gt;2.&lt;/span&gt; DHCP server interno → assegna IP ai client
&lt;span class="p"&gt;3.&lt;/span&gt; DNS server interno → risolve TUTTO verso sé stesso
&lt;span class="p"&gt;4.&lt;/span&gt; HTTP server → serve pagina di login fake (template da microSD)

&lt;span class="gh"&gt;# Lato client:&lt;/span&gt;
→ OS rileva captive portal → apre browser automaticamente
→ Utente vede schermata login aziendale → la compila
→ Credenziali → display in chiaro + log su microSD
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Setup time: &amp;lt; 2 minuti. Competenze hardware: nessuna. Scopo: educativo, ovviamente — il disclaimer rituale che nessuno legge ma che va scritto lo stesso.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Deauth Attack — dati empirici
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Distanza&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Tempo disconnessione&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Esito&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1m&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&amp;lt; 1 sec&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;✅&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3m&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&amp;lt; 1 sec&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;✅&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5m&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;~2 sec&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;✅&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;8m&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;~3 sec&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;✅&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;10m&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;~6 sec&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;✅&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;15m&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;~10 sec&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;✅&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Fallimenti totali: 0/6. Con PMF abilitato: 0 disconnessioni, punto.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;802.11w (PMF) è disponibile dal 2009. Obbligatorio su WPA3 dal 2018. Il modem TIM testato non espone questa opzione all'utente. Un attacco del 2004, ancora vivo nel 2026 per un checkbox nel pannello admin che nessuno ha mai aperto.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Cosa fare adesso
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Abilita PMF&lt;/strong&gt; (WPA2 + PMF Required) — è un checkbox nel pannello admin&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Passa a WPA3&lt;/strong&gt; — PMF è obbligatorio di default&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Non connetterti a reti sconosciute&lt;/strong&gt; — Evil Portal: 2 minuti, zero competenze&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Usa VPN&lt;/strong&gt; su qualsiasi rete non controllata&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Forma gli utenti con una demo pratica&lt;/strong&gt;, non con una slide — il vettore umano non ha patch&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;




&lt;p&gt;Write-up completo: &lt;a href="https://paolocostanzo.github.io/cardputer-adv-wifi-security/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://paolocostanzo.github.io/cardputer-adv-wifi-security/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Rete e dispositivi di proprietà, ambiente controllato, fini didattici. Il disclaimer è noioso? Assolutamente. Va scritto lo stesso? Con la stessa certezza con cui il Wi-Fi dell'aeroporto ha qualcuno che ci ascolta.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>networking</category>
      <category>hacking</category>
      <category>hardware</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Operation Epic Fury: the Iranian C2 nobody found (0/94 VT, RDTSC sandbox evasion, 8 months pre-op)</title>
      <dc:creator>Paolo Costanzo</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 08:20:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/operation-epic-fury-the-iranian-c2-nobody-found-094-vt-rdtsc-sandbox-evasion-8-months-pre-op-13nc</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/operation-epic-fury-the-iranian-c2-nobody-found-094-vt-rdtsc-sandbox-evasion-8-months-pre-op-13nc</guid>
      <description>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TL;DR (subito, niente scroll bait):&lt;/strong&gt; Mentre tutti documentavano la fake RedAlert APK iraniana post-28 febbraio 2026, nessuno aveva trovato il C2 Windows sotto. 0/94 VT. CrowdStrike: CLEAN. Infrastruttura viva da giugno 2025. RDTSC anti-VM. Ancora live 16 giorni dopo.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Post pubblicato da AI perché col cazzo che divento social media manager. Il writeup tecnico è mio.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Cosa sapevano già tutti
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Campagna iraniana, fake RedAlert APK, smishing contro civili israeliani post-28 febbraio 2026. Documentato da Unit 42, CloudSEK, Cloudflare Cloudforce One entro 5 giorni dall'operazione.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Quello che nessuno aveva trovato
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Payload Windows inedito&lt;/strong&gt;: LotAccessUI.EXE, client VPN cinese del 2016 trojanizzato. CrowdStrike Falcon: CLEAN. 59/72 vendor VirusTotal: silenzio.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Secondo C2 con 0/94 VT&lt;/strong&gt;: 167.160.187[.]43 / 9732.5486311[.]xyz — nessun sistema di reputazione lo conosce. Nessun report ne parla.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Infrastruttura attiva da giugno 2025&lt;/strong&gt; — 8 mesi prima dell'operazione.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Entrambi i C2 Windows ancora &lt;strong&gt;live 16 giorni dopo l'operazione&lt;/strong&gt;, nonostante i report pubblici.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Secondo APK Android&lt;/strong&gt; (com.net.alerts / umgdn) non documentato — stage 2 con canale C2 resiliente via Pushy.me.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Convergenza tattica con Arid Viper 2023&lt;/strong&gt;: stesso pattern TTP (fake alert app + push C2). Documentato qui per la prima volta.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Perché nessun sandbox lo aveva visto
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;RDTSC anti-VM (T1497.003): il payload misura i cicli CPU, rileva le VM, e non contatta mai il C2 in ambiente virtualizzato. Sei anni di invisibilità tecnica (prima submission sandbox: settembre 2020).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Strumenti usati
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;VirusTotal (free tier), FOFA, crt.sh, nmap, openssl. Nessun accesso privilegiato. Tutto riproducibile.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Il writeup completo include: IOC CSV, YARA rules, Sigma rules (TLP:WHITE, MIT license), timeline infrastrutturale completa, MITRE ATT&amp;amp;CK mapping.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;👉 &lt;a href="https://paolocostanzo.github.io/operation-epic-fury-cyber-war-iran/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Write-up completo con IOC, YARA e Sigma rules&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Post pubblicato tramite AI — il contenuto è mio, scritto da me.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>threatintel</category>
      <category>osint</category>
      <category>malware</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>TIM, GeForce Now e l'ICMP Black Hole</title>
      <dc:creator>Paolo Costanzo</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 09:37:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/tim-geforce-now-e-licmp-black-hole-2e8m</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/paolocostanzo/tim-geforce-now-e-licmp-black-hole-2e8m</guid>
      <description>&lt;blockquote&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TL;DR in cima&lt;/strong&gt; (informazione essenziale subito, niente scroll bait): TIM FTTH 1 Gbps → 26 Mbps reali + 10–12% packet loss su GeForce Now. Colpevole: ICMP black hole sul PPPoE. Workaround: ProtonVPN WireGuard MTU 1380 → 0% loss, ~900 Mbps.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Post pubblicato da AI perché col cazzo che divento un social media manager. Trovi tutto subito — non sono qui per catturare click o venderti qualcosa. Il writeup tecnico è mio, scritto da me.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Perché scrivo
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;TIM FTTH, linea dichiarata da 1 Gbps, ma GeForce Now è diventato ingiocabile: 10–12% packet loss, download bloccato a ~26 Mbps. Ho escluso ogni pezzo del mio setup e ho scoperto che il problema è nella rete TIM.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Questo è il diario tecnico del troubleshooting. C'è &lt;strong&gt;sia la parte tecnica&lt;/strong&gt; (log, comandi, Wireshark) &lt;strong&gt;che quella non tecnica&lt;/strong&gt; (la commedia del supporto TIM) — scegli tu fin dove spingerti.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Diagnosi in breve
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Escludere il mio hardware&lt;/strong&gt; — riavvii, cavi nuovi, Wi-Fi spento, hotspot 5G = 0% loss → problema TIM, non mio.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Log e prove&lt;/strong&gt; — traceroute, ping, Wireshark: gli ICMP muoiono lungo il PPPoE.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Supporto TIM&lt;/strong&gt; — chatbot Angie, ticket chiusi come "risolti", 54 minuti di attesa, proposta tecnico a pagamento per un bug loro.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Conferme esterne&lt;/strong&gt; — Nvidia EU/USA: nessun problema lato loro.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Workaround attuale
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;ProtonVPN con WireGuard (TCP), MTU 1380 → 0% packet loss, ~900 Mbps.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;È un fix temporaneo: pagare una VPN per bypassare un bug TIM non è la soluzione, ma almeno funziona.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Cosa chiedere a TIM
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Tecnico di 2° livello + verifica MTU e MSS clamping sul PPPoE. Il bug è un ICMP black hole lungo la tratta — non è un intervento che dovresti pagare.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Cosa c'è nel write-up
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Log, comandi e "frase magica" per spiegare il problema al supporto&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Timeline completa (ticket, telefonate, proposte a pagamento)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Parte tecnica con pcap, traceroute e Wireshark per chi vuole i dettagli&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;👉 &lt;a href="https://paolocostanzo.github.io/tim-packet-loss-gfn/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Write-up completo con log e workaround&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Post pubblicato tramite AI — il contenuto è mio, scritto da me. Sul blog segnalo sempre le eventuali eccezioni.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>networking</category>
      <category>cloud</category>
      <category>italy</category>
      <category>tim</category>
    </item>
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