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    <title>DEV Community: Passwork Team</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Passwork Team (@passwork_team_fd7bbec6480).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480</link>
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    <item>
      <title>How to limit the blast radius of third-party access</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 11:39:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/how-to-limit-the-blast-radius-of-third-party-access-3ljd</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/how-to-limit-the-blast-radius-of-third-party-access-3ljd</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A contractor needs access to your staging environment and an API credential to build an integration.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You grant access. The integration ships, the project ends, and you disable the contractor's account.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But what about the API key they copied three weeks ago?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is where contractor offboarding often breaks down: removing someone's access to a system doesn't necessarily invalidate the credentials they already obtained.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We recently explored this problem in our &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/third-party-access-risk/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Passwork blog post on third-party access risk&lt;/a&gt;, following a major data breach in Denmark. Here, we'll focus on the engineering side: how to scope contractor access, detect suspicious activity, and verify that access is actually gone when the work ends.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  A two-person vendor, 8.8 million exposed records
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In September 2026, an attacker reportedly exploited legitimate access held by a small Danish IT company, Pays ApS, to query Denmark's Central Person Register (CPR).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Approximately 8.8 million records were affected.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;According to &lt;a href="https://cybernews.com/security/denmark-cpr-data-breach-weak-password/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Cybernews&lt;/a&gt;, administrators at the vendor reportedly used the password &lt;code&gt;123456&lt;/code&gt;. The attacker also claimed to have obtained a former employee's leaked password. These details remain reported accounts rather than fully established findings.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The important lesson is what the compromised accounts could do.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The blast radius of a compromised account depends on four things:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Reach:&lt;/strong&gt; Which systems, records, and credentials can it access?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Operations:&lt;/strong&gt; Can it read, modify, delete, or export data?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Rate:&lt;/strong&gt; How many requests or records can it process?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Accounts:&lt;/strong&gt; How many active identities provide similar access?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A contractor with read access to one repository presents a different risk from one who can export an entire customer database.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Let's apply that distinction to a typical development workflow.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. Map access before granting it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Imagine an external developer working on a payment integration.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;They need one repository, a staging environment, and a test API. They don't need production database access or organization-wide administrator permissions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start with a simple access record answering three important questions: who owns this access, what can the contractor do, and where must permissions be revoked?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Keep human accounts, machine tokens, and shared credentials separate. They have different revocation mechanisms.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. Apply six controls to every contractor account
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Control 1: Enforce least privilege
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Grant permissions for the task, not the contractor's job title.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In GitHub, restrict repository access. In your cloud IAM, scope permissions to the required resources. For APIs, use narrowly scoped tokens.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Verify:&lt;/strong&gt; Attempt an operation outside the approved scope using a dedicated test identity. It should fail.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Control 2: Make access temporary
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Set an expiration date when granting access.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Use native expiration or just-in-time access where supported. Otherwise, create a tracked revocation task with an accountable owner.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Verify:&lt;/strong&gt; Check that expired access is actually rejected, not merely marked as expired in a spreadsheet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Control 3: Use individual identities and credentials
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Avoid shared contractor logins.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Give each person an attributable account. Generate strong, unique passwords and use separate API credentials for separate integrations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Verify:&lt;/strong&gt; Every active identity maps to a person or documented workload. No two contractors depend on the same personal login.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Control 4: Enforce MFA at your boundary
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A contractor's internal security policies may be outside your control. Your own systems shouldn't be.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Require MFA for contractor access to your identity provider, VPN, gateway, or credential vault.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Verify:&lt;/strong&gt; A password alone cannot authenticate to the protected entry point.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Control 5: Monitor what contractors actually do
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Authentication logs tell you who signed in. They don't necessarily tell you what data was accessed afterward.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Collect activity logs from the systems that matter: GitHub, cloud infrastructure, applications, and APIs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Verify:&lt;/strong&gt; You can identify the account responsible for sensitive operations and detect unusual activity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Control 6: Treat offboarding as a security operation
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Disabling an account is only the beginning.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Revoke active sessions and tokens, remove permissions, and rotate credentials the contractor could access.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Verify:&lt;/strong&gt; Previously issued credentials no longer work, and the contractor cannot authenticate through another remaining integration.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. Test whether your monitoring catches enumeration
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The reported unauthorized access in Denmark lasted 21 days and 17 hours before the register's administrators became aware of the breach.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Would your monitoring detect a contractor account systematically querying records?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Look for these signals:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Signal&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What to investigate&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Request volume&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sudden increase in API calls or database reads&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Enumeration&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sequential identifiers or repeated unsuccessful lookups&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Unusual access&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;New locations or activity outside expected working hours&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Data extraction&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Bulk exports or unusually large responses&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You don't need to simulate an actual attack.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In a controlled staging environment, generate a small, authorized sequence of test requests with a dedicated contractor identity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then check:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Are the requests visible in your application or API logs?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Can you attribute them to the correct identity?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Does your detection rule fire?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How long does it take for the alert to reach someone responsible?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Tune thresholds against normal application behavior. A fixed request count that works for one API may produce constant false positives for another.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. Revocation and rotation are different operations
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Suppose the contractor accessed a shared database password through a credential vault.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You remove their vault permissions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;They can no longer retrieve the password from the vault, but a previously copied value may still authenticate directly to the database.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The same applies to API keys, SSH keys, and other reusable credentials.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A complete offboarding process must address both identity access and credential validity.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is where credential management tools help. At Passwork, we provide vault- and folder-level permissions, role-based access controls, MFA, and activity logs to help teams manage who can access stored credentials.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But a credential vault has a clear boundary: revoking vault access doesn't automatically revoke external application accounts or invalidate previously copied secrets. Those actions must happen in the target systems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Run this offboarding checklist
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Pick one contractor whose project has recently ended.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;[ ] Identify the internal owner of the contractor's access.&lt;br&gt;
[ ] List all accounts, permissions, tokens, and accessible secrets.&lt;br&gt;
[ ] Disable or remove the contractor's accounts.&lt;br&gt;
[ ] Revoke active sessions, personal access tokens, and SSH keys.&lt;br&gt;
[ ] Rotate shared credentials and API keys they could retrieve.&lt;br&gt;
[ ] Review relevant application and infrastructure logs.&lt;br&gt;
[ ] Test that old credentials and permissions no longer work.&lt;br&gt;
[ ] Record completion and obtain the owner's sign-off.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One access record, six controls, and a verified offboarding procedure are enough to expose the most obvious gaps.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The question is whether you can identify and invalidate everything contractor's account could access.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What is harder in your stack: revoking contractor accounts or finding every credential they could access?&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>news</category>
      <category>devops</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Agentic shadow AI doesn't care what you call super intelligence</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:11:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/agentic-shadow-ai-doesnt-care-what-you-call-super-intelligence-3ncm</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/agentic-shadow-ai-doesnt-care-what-you-call-super-intelligence-3ncm</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fz9c2q3nxwqm6t2bibiri.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fz9c2q3nxwqm6t2bibiri.png" alt="Agentic Shadow AI Doesn't Care What You Call Super Intelligence" width="800" height="414"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On September 29, 2026, the White House signed &lt;a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/inaugurating-the-era-of-super-intelligence/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Executive Order 14434&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;"Inaugurating the Era of Super Intelligence."&lt;/strong&gt; The order tells federal agencies to use "Super Intelligence," or "SI," in official communications instead of "AI." It tries to change a term. It defines no new technology and creates no new risk category, so there is no &lt;strong&gt;Shadow Super Intelligence&lt;/strong&gt; to plan for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The risk we already have is agentic shadow AI: autonomous agents running without sanction or supervision. AI systems that operate inside your organization without a human approving each action, holding their own credentials instead of borrowing a person's login. That kind of agent doesn't care what the federal government calls it. The agent still has the OAuth token, and the token still works whether the paperwork says AI or Super Intelligence.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Key takeaways: your agents never got the memo that it's SI now
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Executive Order 14434 (September 29, 2026) tells US federal agencies to write "Super Intelligence" instead of "AI" in official documents. It defines no new technology, sets no penalty, and places no obligations on private companies.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The risk to plan for is agentic shadow AI: autonomous agents that nobody inventoried, running on their own API keys, OAuth tokens, or service accounts.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An agent acts without a human login event. Its traffic looks like routine automation, so detection rules built for stolen user passwords miss it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;JumpCloud found that 83% of organizations manage more non-human identities than human users, while only 21% govern access for those identities.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Agents reach production through seven routes that bypass approval: developer tooling, pilots that never end, orphaned agents, vendor feature flags, low-code builders, personal agents, and third-party teams.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A forgotten credential causes the damage. Klue's token, issued in 2022 for a limited pilot, was still valid when attackers used it in June 2026.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The 5-step agent credential checklist starts with an inventory of which agents hold which credentials. You cannot scope, rotate, or revoke a credential you have not found.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What the "Super Intelligence" order actually changes (it doesn't)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Executive Order 14434 is a &lt;strong&gt;terminology directive&lt;/strong&gt; for the US executive branch. agencies to write "Super Intelligence" ("SI") instead of "AI" in official non-statutory documents. It places no obligations on private companies and carries no penalty. It also starts a 60-day process that could end in a new statutory definition.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;President Trump signed the &lt;a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/09/inaugurating-the-era-of-super-intelligence/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;order&lt;/a&gt; on September 29, 2026. It was published in the &lt;a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/10/02/2026-20321/inaugurating-the-era-of-super-intelligence?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Federal Register&lt;/a&gt; on October 2 (91 Fed. Reg. 63129). The operative provisions:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 1 sets the policy: to the maximum extent permitted by law, the executive branch uses "SI" in place of "AI" and "will not acknowledge" the old terms in any applicable setting.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 2(a) applies the rule to official correspondence, public communications, websites, reports, policy documents, and other non-statutory documents.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 2(b) states that nothing in that section requires altering existing regulations, Presidential actions, contracts, grants, or other historical documents.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 3(a) defines "SI" by reference to the existing statutory definition of AI in 15 U.S.C. § 9401(3). The definition holds until superseded by Presidential action or an Act of Congress.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 3(b) gives the White House science advisor 60 days to propose new legislative language, which would need separate congressional action to take effect.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Section 4(c) states that the order creates no enforceable rights.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Strict wording, little legal effect&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The order's language is stricter than its effect. Section 1 says the executive branch &lt;strong&gt;"will not acknowledge"&lt;/strong&gt; the term AI in any applicable setting, yet the order itself uses "artificial intelligence" and anchors its definition of SI to 15 U.S.C. § 9401(3). Every obligation applies only &lt;strong&gt;"to the maximum extent permitted by law"&lt;/strong&gt; and only to non-statutory documents, so statutes, regulations, contracts, and grants keep saying AI.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fq5rk2bahzdwhh2bcaj18.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fq5rk2bahzdwhh2bcaj18.png" alt="Screenshot of a post by Donald J. Trump saying the White House considers anyone who uses “Artificial Intelligence” instead of “Super Intelligence” the enemy." width="800" height="420"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;
&lt;em&gt;The White House’s position on what to call AI, as posted by Donald J. Trump&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Section 3(a) makes SI mean exactly what AI means today, and section 4(c) creates no enforceable rights. Lawyers at &lt;a href="https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/blogs/enforcement-edge/2026/10/whats-in-a-name?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Arnold &amp;amp; Porter&lt;/a&gt; note that the order has &lt;strong&gt;no penalty or enforcement provision&lt;/strong&gt;. The President's October 8 post calling anyone who says "Artificial Intelligence" &lt;strong&gt;"THE ENEMY"&lt;/strong&gt; went further than the order, and the order names no consequences for it. Agencies change their vocabulary. The technology and its regulation stay as they were.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That is the entire scope of the order: a communications exercise and vocabulary rule for one government's own paperwork. The agents already connected to production systems, holding the credentials they already hold, do not care which word appears in that paperwork.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What agentic shadow AI actually is&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Agentic shadow AI&lt;/strong&gt; is the unsanctioned or unsupervised use of autonomous agents inside an organization. These agents plan and chain actions on their own, hold their own credentials, and run without a human approving each step. Unlike &lt;a href="https://blog.passwork.club/shadow-it-vs-shadow-ai/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;shadow IT or general shadow AI&lt;/a&gt;, they need nobody at a keyboard to act.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Traditional &lt;strong&gt;shadow IT&lt;/strong&gt; is an employee adopting a tool, such as a file-sync app or a project tracker, without going through procurement. &lt;strong&gt;General shadow AI&lt;/strong&gt; , the kind most governance posts cover, is an employee pasting data into a public chatbot. Both involve a person making a choice in the moment, and both eventually surface somewhere: an expense report, a SaaS usage log, a browser history entry.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Agentic shadow AI works differently.&lt;/strong&gt; An agent leaves a trace only once. Someone connects a Slack bot, a sales-tooling integration, or a script that watches a code repository, and from then on the agent acts on its own schedule. It authenticates with its own API key, OAuth token, or service account. A token issued once keeps working until someone revokes it, so no later human decision exists for anyone to notice or flag.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Criterion&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Shadow IT&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Shadow AI&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Agentic shadow AI&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Who acts&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;An employee, without IT approval&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;An employee, in a single session&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;An autonomous agent, often set up once and then forgotten&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;What it can do&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Run one unsanctioned tool&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Process or expose one prompt's worth of data&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Chain actions across systems with no approval per step&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Credential it uses&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;A personal or shared login&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;The employee's own session&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Its own API key, OAuth token, or service account&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Why it's hard to see&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Shows up in expense reports or logs eventually&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Shows up in browser or SaaS usage logs&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Leaves no human login event; the traffic looks like routine automation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Why MCP widens the problem&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agents built on the &lt;strong&gt;Model Context Protocol (MCP)&lt;/strong&gt; reach tools and data sources through whatever credential the integration was configured with. They inherit that credential's full access. The access is frequently broader than the one task the agent was built for, and nobody revisits the scope once the integration works.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Some vendors call these systems "shadow agents." This article uses "agentic shadow AI" throughout. Both labels describe the same problem: autonomous agents that nobody inventoried, holding credentials that nobody is watching.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Why agentic shadow AI is worse than shadow IT&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agentic shadow AI is harder to contain than shadow IT because agents get connected to real systems faster than organizations assign owners, scope credentials, or inventory them. Shadow IT needs a person to keep using the tool. An AI agent keeps working after its creator moves on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The gap shows up in three published figures.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://jumpcloud.com/blog/it-security-agentic-shadow-ai?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;JumpCloud&lt;/a&gt; found that &lt;strong&gt;83% of organizations&lt;/strong&gt; manage more non-human identities (NHIs), meaning service accounts, API keys, and agent credentials, than human users. Only 21% have access governance for those identities.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://www.cyberhaven.com/blog/fastest-growing-ai-categories-risks?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Cyberhaven Labs&lt;/a&gt; recorded a &lt;strong&gt;509% year-over-year increase&lt;/strong&gt; in enterprise use of endpoint-based AI agents between February 2025 and February 2026. Coding assistants alone grew 357%.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2025-08-26-gartner-predicts-40-percent-of-enterprise-apps-will-feature-task-specific-ai-agents-by-2026-up-from-less-than-5-percent-in-2025?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Gartner&lt;/a&gt; predicted in August 2025 that &lt;strong&gt;40% of enterprise applications&lt;/strong&gt; would include task-specific AI agents by the end of 2026, up from less than 5% in 2025.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Adoption is accelerating, and governance covers a small share of the identities involved. Most teams cannot answer "what can this credential access?" on demand. Without that answer, nobody can scope, rotate, or revoke the credential.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What a gap costs&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The cost of a breach gives the problem a dollar value. &lt;a href="https://www.ibm.com/reports/data-breach?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IBM&lt;/a&gt;'s Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026 puts the global average breach cost at &lt;strong&gt;$4.99 million&lt;/strong&gt; , a record and a 12% increase over the prior year. IBM does not attribute that figure to agents, so read it as the price of the failure mode, not as the price of agentic shadow AI.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An unowned credential is the same failure whether a person or an agent holds it. The difference is detection. A person who misuses access leaves a login event. An agent with a valid token produces traffic that looks like routine automation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Put plainly: organizations are building up non-human identities (NHIs) and connecting agents to production systems well ahead of building the ownership records, scoping discipline, and monitoring.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;How AI agent sprawl happens in organizations&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Seven routes lead to agent sprawl in governed organizations: developer tooling, pilots that never end, orphaned agents, vendor feature flags, low-code builders, personal agents, and third-party teams. Each one ends with an agent holding a credential that no central owner has recorded.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Developer tooling.&lt;/strong&gt; Coding assistants and locally run MCP servers work with the repository tokens and cloud keys already sitting on a developer's machine. They run on the endpoint, so no SaaS admin console lists them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;A pilot that never ended.&lt;/strong&gt; A team wires up an agent to fix one irritating task. It saves hours, colleagues come to depend on it, and nobody schedules the decision to approve it or shut it down. The key it was created with keeps its original scope.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Orphaned agents.&lt;/strong&gt; The person who built an agent changes roles or leaves, and the agent carries on. Disabling their directory account does not necessarily revoke the OAuth grants and API keys they created. Check how each of your systems behaves.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;A feature flag in a trusted tool.&lt;/strong&gt; A vendor ships an agent in a routine update and turns it on for every tenant. The agent reaches data through connections the product already holds. The security review on file describes the product as it was a year ago.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Low-code agent builders.&lt;/strong&gt; Business users assemble agents in workflow platforms the company already licenses. Every connection the agent makes is created under the builder's identity, so the platform's admin sees apps, not the credentials behind them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;A personal agent.&lt;/strong&gt; An employee links an assistant to their inbox, calendar, or code repository and lets it act with their own permissions. Those permissions were granted for the person's whole job, so the agent has far more reach than its one task requires.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Third-party and acquired teams.&lt;/strong&gt; An agency, a consultant, or a newly acquired company brings agents that already run on their own credentials. Those credentials never pass through your onboarding.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Two credential breaches, ten months apart&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two named incidents, a year apart, show what an ungoverned machine credential actually costs. In both cases, a forgotten OAuth token or access key sat connected to an AI-adjacent integration with nobody watching it, until an attacker found it first.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Salesloft Drift, August 2025&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The threat actor UNC6395, tracked by Google's &lt;a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/data-theft-salesforce-instances-via-salesloft-drift?locale=en&amp;amp;ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Threat Intelligence Group&lt;/a&gt;, exploited Salesloft's Drift AI chatbot integration with Salesforce to harvest OAuth access and refresh tokens. Drift connects to a customer's Salesforce instance to automate sales conversations, and that connection runs on a standing OAuth grant rather than a one-time login.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once UNC6395 had working tokens, the attack moved at machine speed: the group used them to query Salesforce objects directly and pull whatever credentials and case data those tokens could reach.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;From there, the attacker pulled AWS access keys, Snowflake tokens, stored passwords, and support-case data out of connected environments. The goal throughout was data exfiltration through a trusted, already-authorized channel rather than a break-in through the front door. A Google threat analyst told &lt;a href="https://www.cybersecuritydive.com/news/hackers-steal-data-salesforce-instances/758676/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Cybersecurity Dive&lt;/a&gt; that over 700 organizations could potentially have been affected. Cloudflare, Zscaler, and Palo Alto Networks confirmed they were among them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Klue, June 2026&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On June 11, 2026, an attacker used a GitHub personal access token to push unauthorized code into Klue's integration service. The code collected the OAuth access and refresh tokens that customers had granted to the Klue Battlecards app. With those tokens, the attacker queried customers' Salesforce tenants and exported contacts, opportunities, quotes, and sales notes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;According to Klue's CrowdStrike investigation summary, as quoted by the &lt;a href="https://nhimg.org/klue-oauth-supply-chain-breach-hits-700-organisations?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NHI Management Group&lt;/a&gt;, the token had been "previously compromised." &lt;a href="https://www.huntress.com/blog/klue-breach-investigation?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Huntress&lt;/a&gt; describes it as long-disused but still active. Klue told TechCrunch it was issued to a third party in 2022 for a limited pilot. Salesforce alerted Klue on June 12, and Klue revoked the tokens and rotated credentials that morning. The extortion group Icarus claimed the attack.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Klue has not published a victim count. At least eleven companies had confirmed impact by June 25, among them Huntress, Recorded Future, Tanium, Jamf, Gong, HackerOne, Snyk, OneTrust, Insurity, and Sprout Social. A second extortion group claimed 195 customers, and that claim is unverified.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What the two incidents share&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The entry points differ. At Klue it was a stale source-control token. The Drift sources describe the use of stolen OAuth tokens, not how they were obtained. The shared exposure is a non-human credential with standing access to customer data, held by a vendor and usable without a login event. Traffic from a valid token looks like the integration itself.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Klue's token stayed valid for about four years after a pilot ended. Drift's tokens stayed valid until someone revoked them.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Risks of agentic shadow AI&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agentic shadow AI create five risks: exposed long-lived credentials, activity that looks like normal traffic, excessive agency, credential chaining between agents, and compliance gaps. They share one cause. The agent acts on its own with a credential that nobody inventoried, scoped, or reviewed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Long-lived credentials that outlive their purpose&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An agent keeps working as long as its key or token is valid, and nothing in the agent forces a review. Pilot credentials are rarely rotated and often keep the broad scope they had during testing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Klue is the clearest case. According to the company's own account, a token issued in 2022 for a limited pilot was still valid when attackers used it in June 2026. Nobody had decided to keep it. Nobody had decided to retire it either.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Activity that looks like normal traffic&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An agent authenticates with its own API key or OAuth token, so no human login event exists to flag. Its requests come from a known integration, at regular intervals, through approved APIs. Detection rules built for stolen user passwords have nothing to match.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Data loss through an agent therefore tends to surface late. The first signal is often a vendor notice or an unusual invoice, not an alert in your SIEM.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Excessive agency&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agents that reach tools and data through MCP inherit the permissions of the service account behind them. Those permissions are usually granted for a broad range of tasks, not for the one the agent performs. The gap is the attack surface.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;OWASP lists this pattern as &lt;a href="https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Excessive Agency&lt;/a&gt; (LLM06:2025) in its Top 10 for LLM applications. An agent that reads untrusted content, such as an email or a web page, can be steered into using access it should never have held. Narrow scopes limit what a successful injection can reach.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Credential chaining between agents&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When one agent calls another, the downstream agent often receives the upstream credential or a token derived from it. A compromise in the weakest agent then opens everything the strongest one can touch. Unregistered agents make this worse, because nobody has mapped which agent trusts which.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Compliance and audit gaps&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An uninventoried agent processes data outside your records and controls. GDPR Article 32 requires "appropriate technical and organisational measures" to secure personal data, and a credential nobody owns is hard to defend as one. &lt;a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIS2 Article 21&lt;/a&gt;(2)(i) lists access control policies and asset management among the required risk measures.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Governing agentic shadow AI: the 5-step agent credential checklist&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The 5-step agent credential checklist governs agentic shadow AI through the credentials agents run on. Find every agent and its secrets, issue each one a separate scoped identity, name a business and a technical owner, set runtime limits, then log, test, and revoke on a schedule.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Step 1. Discover agents through the credentials they hold&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agents are easy to miss, but their credentials leave records in the systems they touch. Search these places first:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;OAuth grants and connected apps in each SaaS admin console&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;service accounts and service principals in your identity provider and cloud accounts&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;secret stores, repository variables, and CI/CD settings&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;API gateway consumer lists&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;endpoints: installed assistants, browser extensions, and Model Context Protocol (MCP) configuration files&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For each agent, record what it can reach, which tools or APIs it calls, what data it reads or writes, and who switched it on. The first pass will be incomplete. Repeat it on a schedule, because new agents appear faster than quarterly reviews.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Step 2. Issue each agent its own identity and scope it&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An agent should never run behind a shared account or an employee's personal login. Create one identity per agent, tied to its workload. Then remove the broad permissions the agent picked up during testing, so that access matches the one job it does in production.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The same rule covers agents that call other agents. Each agent authenticates on its own, and one agent's credential is never passed on to another.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Passwork&lt;/a&gt;, a service account is a non-interactive account built for automation. One service account can hold several scoped API tokens, so each agent or pipeline gets its own. &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/passworks-vault-policies/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Vault policies&lt;/a&gt; set who administers each vault type, so a vault for agent credentials has corporate administrators from creation. Rotating a credential does not break the pipelines that depend on the account.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Step 3. Name a business owner and a technical owner&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Each credential needs two people. The business owner accepts responsibility for what the agent is for and what risk is tolerable. The technical owner handles runtime access, logging, and maintenance. Without both, nobody can say whether a credential should still exist.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Klue shows the cost of an empty owner field. According to the company's own account, a token issued in 2022 for a limited pilot was still valid when attackers used it in June 2026. Store the owners, the purpose, and a review date next to the credential. When an owner changes role or leaves, reassign the credential in the same ticket.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Step 4. Set runtime limits before the agent goes live&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Write down what the agent may do and what it may never do, and match the depth of review to its autonomy. An agent that only reads a calendar needs a short checklist. An agent that moves money or writes to external systems needs a formal risk review and a sign-off.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once the agent runs, enforce limits outside its own reasoning layer:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;restrict which tools it can call, and validate what goes in and out of each call&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;block secrets and personal data from leaving through uploads or the clipboard&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;require human approval for payments, permission changes, and writes to external APIs&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Banning every unapproved tool pushes the work out of sight. Offer a sanctioned route that is quicker than the workaround, such as an internal agent platform with these limits already built in.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Step 5. Log, test, and retire&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Send agent activity to your SIEM. In &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Passwork&lt;/a&gt;, the Activity log records who read or changed a credential and exports to Syslog or a SIEM. Alert on a token used from a new source or at an unusual volume.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two drills show whether the controls work:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Trace test: pick one automated action and follow it back to the human who authorized it and the data it used.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Revocation drill: measure how long it takes to cut one agent's access across every system it touches.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Review each agent on its review date. Look for permissions that grew since launch, rotate its credentials, and decommission agents that no longer have a purpose. Google's &lt;a href="https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/data-theft-salesforce-instances-via-salesloft-drift?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Threat Intelligence Group&lt;/a&gt; gave customers the same advice after the Drift breach: review connected integrations, then revoke and rotate their credentials.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The label changed on September 29, 2026. The underlying risk did not. Agentic shadow AI, an autonomous agent holding a live, unrotated credential that nobody owns, was exactly as dangerous the day before Executive Order 14434 as the day after. Salesloft Drift and Klue, a year apart, already proved that twice over.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start this week with the first step on the checklist above: a full inventory of which agents hold which credentials. Nothing else on the list works until that inventory exists, because you cannot scope or rotate what you have not found. It is also the one step every security team can start today, without waiting on budget, a new platform, or a policy rewrite triggered by a federal order that has nothing to do with the credentials sitting in your environment right now.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>aiagents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>September 2026 cybersecurity news: Forged tokens and leaked keys</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 09:35:28 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/september-2026-cybersecurity-news-forged-tokens-and-leaked-keys-3199</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/september-2026-cybersecurity-news-forged-tokens-and-leaked-keys-3199</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F1ak7e6y91u3hfho2kn9z.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F1ak7e6y91u3hfho2kn9z.png" alt="Blue graphic featuring a dark blue speech bubble with white text reading “Monthly cybersecurity news” and a “September 2026” label. A yellow lightning bolt overlaps the bubble’s upper-right corner." width="799" height="413"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;September 2026 cybersecurity news was dominated by forged tokens, replayed sessions, and leaked API keys that kept working after the password was changed or never needed. Two vulnerabilities are already on CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list, and one leaked vendor key put 100,000+ sites at risk.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Cisco ISE:&lt;/strong&gt; CVE-2026-76460, an authentication bypass with confirmed active exploitation (&lt;a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Cisco&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;EvilTokens:&lt;/strong&gt; Microsoft disrupted a device-code phishing service linked to more than 12,000 compromised inboxes across over 10,000 organizations (&lt;a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/22/unmasking-eviltokens-getting-to-the-root-of-device-code-phishing/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Microsoft&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Brevo and Cloudflare:&lt;/strong&gt; a compromised API key put more than 100,000 sites at potential risk (&lt;a href="https://sansec.io/research/brevo-supply-chain-attack?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Sansec&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;JFrog Artifactory:&lt;/strong&gt; a flaw exploited in honeypots to mint administrator tokens (&lt;a href="https://www.securityweek.com/critical-jfrog-artifactory-vulnerability-reportedly-exploited-in-the-wild/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;SecurityWeek&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Cleo Harmony:&lt;/strong&gt; a public exploit for a JWT refresh-token flaw (&lt;a href="https://www.securityweek.com/exploit-published-for-fresh-cleo-harmony-vulnerability/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;SecurityWeek&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;CyberArk:&lt;/strong&gt; 10 security bulletins on four dates, including one Critical (&lt;a href="https://community.cyberark.com/s/topic/0TO2J000000IyAYWA0/security-bulletin?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;CyberArk&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;GitHub App keys:&lt;/strong&gt; GitGuardian found 474 of 4,802 leaked private keys still valid, authenticating as 440 apps (&lt;a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/github-app-private-keys-leaked/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;GitGuardian&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;NIST IR 8587:&lt;/strong&gt; final guidance on protecting tokens and assertions, published September 15 (&lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8587/final?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Each case below shows a different way a credential keeps working after it should have stopped: forged, replayed, leaked, or minted on demand. Details, affected versions, and fixes follow, with a short list of team-level actions at the end.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Active exploitation of an authentication bypass in Cisco Identity Services Engine (CVE-2026-76460)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Cisco published an advisory on September 16, 2026 for CVE-2026-76460, a critical, unauthenticated authentication-bypass vulnerability in an Identity Services Engine (ISE) API. Cisco rates it CVSS 3.1 Base 10.0 (Critical) and confirmed active exploitation. CISA added the CVE to its &lt;a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog&lt;/a&gt; the same day.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; A crafted request to the affected API endpoint lets an attacker bypass ISE's web-based management interface and gain unauthorized access to an affected ISE or ISE-PIC device, without valid credentials. Cisco's PSIRT confirmed it was aware of in-the-wild attacks. The exact date exploitation began has not been disclosed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; ISE is a network-access policy platform. Unauthorized access could create serious deployment-specific risk to administration and policy operations, but the available sources don't establish that every customer's downstream RBAC or MFA decisions were altered. Impact depends on how a given organization has ISE deployed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Cisco says no workaround addresses the flaw. Upgrading to a fixed release is the complete remediation. As a temporary mitigation, Cisco recommends infrastructure ACLs (iACLs) that allow only required management- and control-plane traffic to the affected device. Review each node's access.log for suspicious usernames and cross-check network and firewall logs outside the appliance itself. These are detection and response steps, not a substitute for patching.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-ISE-ABP-VNSW7Tn5?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Cisco&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;CISA KEV&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Microsoft disrupts EvilTokens, an OAuth device-code phishing service&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On September 22, 2026, Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit, working with partners, disrupted infrastructure behind EvilTokens, a phishing-as-a-service platform linked to more than 12,000 compromised inboxes across over 10,000 organizations worldwide.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; EvilTokens abused OAuth 2.0 device-authorization flows, the mechanism designed for devices without a browser, such as smart TVs or CLI tools, to trick users into approving a sign-in on the attacker's behalf. Microsoft separately disclosed passkey-themed social-engineering activity observed since May 2026. In one investigated sequence, a passkey lure led to device-code phishing. In other investigated patterns, attackers used help-desk pretexts or registered attacker-controlled authentication methods. Microsoft's reporting doesn't establish that every sequence combined all of these steps into one attack chain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Device-code phishing sidesteps the parts of authentication that get the most defensive attention. There's no fake login page to spot and no password typed into an attacker's site. The victim approves the sign-in through Microsoft's own legitimate page, believing it's routine. That said, a victim without an active Microsoft session can still be prompted for a real password and MFA challenge, so this technique doesn't universally erase every authentication step.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Disable device-code authentication flows for users who don't operationally need them, and monitor for abnormal device-code sign-in volume as a detection signal. Where the flow is genuinely required, gate it behind conditional-access policy.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/22/unmasking-eviltokens-getting-to-the-root-of-device-code-phishing/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Microsoft&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/09/09/passkey-themed-social-engineering-leads-identity-cloud-compromise/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Microsoft (passkey-themed activity)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;A single overprivileged Cloudflare API key put 100,000+ sites at risk&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On September 14, 2026, attackers used a compromised, broadly privileged Cloudflare API key belonging to email and marketing platform Brevo to deploy a malicious Cloudflare Worker that altered Brevo-embedded assets on customer sites.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Sansec's telemetry recorded the malicious Worker serving content from 16:05 to 20:13 UTC on September 14, roughly four hours. &lt;a href="https://status.brevo.com/incidents/01M2QBC4EZ24ZACW6SWQYVW8N3/write-up?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;u&gt;Brevo's incident&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/a&gt; write-up describes the Worker as active for about five and a half hours, a longer window than Sansec directly observed. Sansec estimated that more than 100,000 sites using affected Brevo components may have been exposed to malicious content during that period.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; One long-lived, full-permission Cloudflare API key, tied to a marketing-automation vendor, became a distribution channel for malicious code across a large number of third-party sites. Cloud API keys with broad scopes and no expiration are exactly the credential type that traditional password policy doesn't cover.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Scope API keys to the minimum permission set an integration actually needs, set expirations even on service-level keys, and run continuous secret scanning across repositories and deployment pipelines, not just employee password vaults. Monitoring for unexpected Worker deployments or routing changes would likely have caught this faster than a manual audit.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://sansec.io/research/brevo-supply-chain-attack?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sansec&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://status.brevo.com/incidents/01M2QBC4EZ24ZACW6SWQYVW8N3/write-up?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Brevo&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Long-lived, overprivileged API keys are exactly the kind of credential a dedicated secrets manager should control: centralized storage, role- and vault-based access, and a full activity log instead of a key sitting untracked in a config file for years. Try Passwork free at &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;passwork.pro&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;JFrog Artifactory flaw used to mint admin tokens (CVE-2026-82329)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;JFrog published a fix for CVE-2026-82329 on August 28, 2026. On September 1, WatchTowr reported honeypot activity consistent with attackers exploiting the flaw to generate administrator tokens.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; WatchTowr's honeypots captured exploitation attempts against a small number of source IPs, some of which appeared to be verification-only activity rather than follow-through attacks. That's evidence the vulnerability is exploitable and being probed. It doesn't establish broad scanning across the internet or confirmed mass exploitation of customer instances.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Artifact repositories sit near the center of the software supply chain. They hold federation trust relationships with other repositories and often carry embedded credentials for downstream systems. An attacker who can generate an admin token doesn't need to steal one, they create valid access on demand.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; For self-hosted Artifactory, upgrade to the fixed release for your branch: &lt;strong&gt;7.111.21, 7.117.28, 7.125.20, 7.133.29, 7.146.38, or 7.161.20&lt;/strong&gt;. JFrog says affected cloud environments were already fortified. If logs show exploitation or suspicious token issuance, revoke and reissue potentially exposed admin tokens and audit federation configurations. The available reporting supports honeypot-observed exploitation, not confirmed compromise of customer instances.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://docs.jfrog.com/releases/docs/jfrog-security-advisories?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;JFrog&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.securityweek.com/critical-jfrog-artifactory-vulnerability-reportedly-exploited-in-the-wild/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;SecurityWeek&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Public exploit for a JWT refresh-token flaw in Cleo Harmony (CVE-2026-84115)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A public exploit for CVE-2026-84115 was reported on September 2, 2026, shortly after the CVE record was published on September 1.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The flaw affects Cleo Harmony versions through 5.8.1.10 and is fixed in Harmony 5.8.1.11. The CVE record describes a remotely exploitable issue in the /api/connections JWT Refresh Token Handler: manipulating the Bearer argument results in improper privilege management. SecurityWeek describes the same issue as allowing authentication bypass and privilege elevation. The available reporting establishes public exploitability and researcher reproduction. It doesn't establish confirmed exploitation of customer systems, nor that a manipulated token persists beyond the original session's expiry.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Refresh tokens are meant to extend a session quietly, without forcing a fresh login. A flaw in how one is validated turns that convenience feature into a potential persistence risk, which is reason enough to patch even without confirmed exploitation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Upgrade to Harmony 5.8.1.11 promptly. If exposure is suspected, follow Cleo's current guidance, review authentication and privilege changes from the relevant window, and revoke outstanding refresh tokens where the deployment supports that control. A public exploit's existence doesn't by itself confirm compromise or persistent access.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-84115&amp;amp;ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;NVD&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.securityweek.com/exploit-published-for-fresh-cleo-harmony-vulnerability/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;SecurityWeek&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;CyberArk ships ten security bulletins across its PAM product line&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;CyberArk released 10 security bulletins in September 2026, in four dated batches.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; CyberArk released 10 security bulletins in four batches during September 2026, addressing High-severity issues across endpoint privilege management agents, self-hosted gateway and vault components, privileged-access analytics, and database credential management, as well as a Critical issue—CA26-44—affecting certain self-hosted Password Vault Web Access (PVWA) versions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; PAM systems often manage or provide access to privileged credentials and sensitive infrastructure. A concentrated set of security updates is a reminder that these environments require continuous patch management, clear access governance, and reliable auditability. The advisories do not, by themselves, indicate active exploitation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Organizations using affected products should review the advisories and prioritize remediation according to severity, exposure, and the potential impact on credential-related systems. More broadly, security teams should maintain visibility into who can access sensitive credentials and be able to review that access when needed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://community.cyberark.com/s/topic/0TO2J000000IyAYWA0/security-bulletin?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;u&gt;CyberArk&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://cyberiam.com/bulletin-board/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;CyberIAM bulletin board&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Passwork gives administrators exactly that visibility: vault- and role-based access controls paired with a full audit trail of who accessed which credential and when. Start a free trial at &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;passwork.pro&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Leaked GitHub App private keys keep working long after exposure&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;GitGuardian tested 4,802 leaked GitHub App private keys found in public sources and found 474 still authenticating as 440 distinct live apps.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; A GitHub App private key has no automatic expiry and can remain usable until it's manually revoked or deleted. Among the 474 still-valid keys GitGuardian tested, 207 carried repository content-write permission, 40 could administer self-hosted runners, 98 could control workflows, and 44 held organization-administration privileges. A key committed years ago may still authenticate if it hasn't been revoked or deleted.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A related pattern surfaced in a WSO2 API-management flaw, CVE-2026-5430. The advisory dates to May 2026 and the CVE was published in August. The September news was exploitation reporting, not a new disclosure. An attacker can craft a JWT with an unsupported signing algorithm and exploit WSO2's faulty validation to bypass authentication. The service doesn't need to mint a token itself. WatchTowr's honeypot captured administrator-privilege forged JWTs against it on September 13, and CISA added the CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on September 24. Backend credentials, consumer keys, or secrets were reported as potentially reachable, not confirmed stolen.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; A public leak creates potentially persistent access until the key is revoked or deleted. It doesn't by itself prove the key was used or that data was accessed. The WSO2 case shows a related pattern one layer down the stack: an attacker doesn't need a leaked key at all if the validation logic itself can be tricked into accepting a forged one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Maintain an owner and a documented rotation/revocation process for every GitHub App key. If exposure is suspected or confirmed, generate a replacement and revoke or delete the old key promptly; periodic rotation reduces exposure time, though GitHub doesn't prescribe a universal schedule. For WSO2 deployments, apply the vendor's fix, review logs for the September exploitation window, and rotate credentials the API-management layer had access to.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/github-app-private-keys-leaked/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;GitGuardian&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://docs.github.com/en/apps/creating-github-apps/authenticating-with-a-github-app/managing-private-keys-for-github-apps?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;GitHub docs&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://security.docs.wso2.com/en/latest/security-announcements/security-advisories/2026/WSO2-2026-5328/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;WSO2 advisory&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/active-exploitation-attempts-target.html?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Hacker News&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;NIST and CISA finalize guidance on protecting identity and access tokens&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;NIST and CISA finalized IR 8587 on September 15, 2026, after an initial public draft dated December 22, 2025.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The implementation guidance is written primarily for federal agencies and the cloud service providers they use, covering identity tokens, access tokens, and assertions in SSO, federation, and API-access scenarios. Its recommendations summarize key-management, token-verification, lifecycle (including lifetime and revocation), and continuous-monitoring practices, with responsibilities divided between providers, consuming agencies, and cloud consumers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Several of the failures described above, forged JWTs, admin tokens generated through validation flaws, non-expiring API keys, fall inside the categories this report addresses: verification gaps, missing lifecycle controls, and unclear provider-versus-customer responsibility for revocation. That overlap is useful even for organizations outside the federal space.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Use NIST IR 8587 as a working checklist against current practices: confirm token lifetimes are bounded, revocation paths are tested rather than just documented, and session logging captures enough detail to reconstruct a token-based incident after the fact.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8587/final?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;NIST&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-and-nist-release-guidelines-protect-federal-cloud-identity-systems-token-theft-forgery-and?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;CISA&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  CloudSEK details BigBear 2.0, an adversary-in-the-middle service that replays Microsoft 365 sessions after MFA
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;CloudSEK published its BigBear 2.0 research on September 7, 2026. Its TRIAD team discovered the operation in June, which doesn't establish when all campaign activity began.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The Evilginx2-based adversary-in-the-middle service relayed Microsoft 365 sign-ins. It captured credentials and the Microsoft-issued session cookie after victims completed MFA, then let attackers replay the authenticated sessions. CloudSEK's panel contained 4,148 session-cookie records and 474 completed MFA-bypassed authentications. BleepingComputer reported that 258 distinct organizations had at least one such completed compromise, while 461 organizations appeared in the broader targeting dataset. The 4,148 figure is a cookie-record count, not a confirmed count of unique victims. (CloudSEK; BleepingComputer)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; MFA that the victim completes on a proxied page protects nothing once the session cookie is stolen. The attacker inherits an already authenticated session. Codes and push approvals don't stop this pattern.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Prioritize phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys and FIDO2 security keys for administrators and high-risk users. Review conditional access policies that bind sessions to compliant devices. Alert on sign-ins where the session's IP address or device changes soon after MFA.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Sources:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/tracking-bigbear-2-0-evilginx2-phishing-campaign?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;CloudSEK&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt;;&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/bigbear-microsoft-365-phishing-service-bypassed-mfa-at-258-organizations/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BleepingComputer&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Okta analyzes infostealer dump with 44,791 unique JWTs, 1,843 tokens still valid at release
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Okta published research on September 9, 2026 on a 7 GB infostealer dump posted to Telegram on August 2.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The dump held data from 5,871 infected machines. Okta identified 44,791 unique JWTs, including 555 likely related to AI-service authentication, plus 2,937 authentication-related JWEs. As of the dump's release, 1,843 JWTs and JWEs hadn't expired. Okta said unexpired session secrets could potentially be replayed to bypass credential-based authentication. The research didn't report a successful replay or a confirmed account takeover. Whether replay works depends on the service and on controls such as token binding or IP allowlisting. (Okta)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Infostealers take whatever sits on the endpoint, and tokens are part of that haul. Token lifetime sets how long a stolen secret stays useful. The AI-service tokens in the set show that the exposure now reaches newer tools that teams often adopt outside central identity management.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Shorten token lifetimes where the service allows it, and bind tokens to a device or network where supported. After an infostealer infection, revoke sessions and rotate secrets, not just reset the password. Include AI-service accounts in your inventory of tokens and API keys.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.okta.com/blog/threat-intelligence/signing_in_without_actually_signing_in/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Okta&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  JeetBot Twitch extension forwarded OAuth tokens through operator-controlled proxies
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The malicious Twitch browser extension JeetBot had roughly 30,500 store installations across Chrome and Firefox (an installation estimate, not a confirmed compromise count).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Socket found it captured account-scoped Twitch OAuth tokens and forwarded them in an &lt;code&gt;&amp;amp;auth=&lt;/code&gt; query parameter through operator-controlled proxies. The reporting doesn't establish that the tokens were used for unauthorized activity. Firefox version 85.8.7 (September 16) and Chrome version 85.8.9 (reported September 25) stopped the forwarding. The operator disputed calling the extension malicious but acknowledged security and disclosure problems. (Socket)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Audit installed browser extensions, and treat any token that appeared in a URL as exposed. Users of JeetBot should revoke the app's access to their Twitch account.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://socket.dev/blog/malicious-twitch-browser-extension?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Socket&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Microsoft Entra begins auto-enabling passkeys ahead of SMS and voice MFA retirement
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Microsoft Entra began auto-enabling passkeys on September 1, 2026 for public-cloud users already enabled for SMS or voice MFA in the Entra Authentication Methods Policy or legacy settings.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; When these users next sign in and complete MFA, they are nudged to register a passkey. The nudge can typically be snoozed, and a temporary tenant opt-out is available through February 1, 2027. Microsoft-provided SMS and voice delivery retires on February 1, 2027 for most users, and on July 1, 2027 for Global Administrators and external users. Organizations with a legitimate need can continue SMS or voice through a supported telephony provider. That configuration option is scheduled for October 30, 2026.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; The change moves the default away from phone-based factors, the type the BigBear 2.0 campaign above shows can be relayed. Tenants that do nothing will see registration prompts now and lose Microsoft-provided SMS and voice delivery in 2027.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Inventory which users and service processes still rely on SMS or voice. Start passkey registration with administrators and external users, whose deadline is earliest. Decide before February 1, 2027 whether you need a telephony provider or can retire these methods entirely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/concept-sms-voice-retirement?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Microsoft Learn&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What this means for your team&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most of this month's cases come down to credentials that kept working after they should have stopped. Six steps your team can take to avoid similar problems:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Inventory non-human credentials.&lt;/strong&gt; List API keys, service-account tokens, GitHub App private keys, and CI/CD secrets the way you list user accounts. Give each a named owner and a documented expiration or rotation plan. The Brevo and GitHub App cases both involved keys that nobody was tracking.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Scope and expire.&lt;/strong&gt; Grant each key only the permissions the integration needs, and set an expiration wherever the provider supports one. Where it doesn't, schedule manual rotation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Test revocation before you need it.&lt;/strong&gt; For each provider, confirm what revoking a session, JWT, OAuth grant, or refresh token actually does. After an incident, run the revocation path end to end instead of relying on the documentation. Revoke sessions and rotate secrets, not just reset the password.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Close the OAuth and session gaps.&lt;/strong&gt; Disable device-code flows for users who don't need them, and move administrators to passkeys or FIDO2 keys ahead of Microsoft's 2027 SMS and voice retirement. Where supported, bind sessions to devices.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Patch exposed identity infrastructure first.&lt;/strong&gt; Cisco ISE, JFrog Artifactory, Cleo Harmony, and WSO2 issue or validate access for everything behind them. Treat their updates as a priority over routine patching.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Log enough to reconstruct an incident.&lt;/strong&gt; Keep session and token logs detailed enough to show who authenticated, from where, and with which token. NIST IR 8587 is a usable checklist for this and the points above.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

</description>
      <category>news</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Post-quantum password security: What changes and what to do</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 13:14:16 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/post-quantum-password-security-what-changes-and-what-to-do-lan</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/post-quantum-password-security-what-changes-and-what-to-do-lan</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fl4tuy0cormywgjscsdm1.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fl4tuy0cormywgjscsdm1.png" alt="Post-quantum password security: What CISOs must do now" width="800" height="414"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Quantum computers will not brute-force a properly hashed 16-character password anytime soon.&lt;/strong&gt; Grover's algorithm only halves the exponent of a hash search, not the whole problem. What a large enough quantum computer does break is the RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange that carries that password to your server, and NIST has already put a 2030 deadline on replacing it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two separate problems get collapsed into one headline: "quantum computers will break your passwords." This guide keeps them apart, then hands IT and security teams a workflow for checking which one actually applies to their own password estate, and which parts of that estate can wait.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Key takeaways
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Shor's algorithm&lt;/strong&gt; breaks RSA and elliptic-curve key exchange. &lt;strong&gt;Grover's algorithm&lt;/strong&gt; only halves the effective strength of a password hash, from roughly 128-bit to 64-bit.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;NIST finalized FIPS 203, 204, and 205 in August 2024 and set a 2030 deprecation, 2035 disallowance timeline for RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA in NIST IR 8547.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Harvest-now-decrypt-later&lt;/strong&gt; is already active. 61% of security professionals name it their top quantum concern, according to &lt;a href="https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/quantum-ai-data-threat-report?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Thales&lt;/a&gt;'s 2026 report.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;3-Layer Quantum Exposure Audit&lt;/strong&gt; sorts a password estate into hashes, key exchange, and long-lived encrypted data. Each layer gets its own verdict.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;AES-256&lt;/strong&gt; stays quantum-resistant at current key sizes. &lt;strong&gt;RSA-2048&lt;/strong&gt; is the component every vendor, including password managers, needs a migration plan for.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;The two quantum algorithms that matter (Shor vs Grover)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two quantum algorithms matter for password security, and they do different jobs. &lt;strong&gt;Shor's algorithm&lt;/strong&gt; delivers an exponential speedup against the math behind RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, which breaks key exchange once a large enough quantum computer exists. &lt;strong&gt;Grover's algorithm&lt;/strong&gt; delivers only a quadratic speedup against symmetric search, cutting effective strength in half rather than to zero.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Algorithm&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Speedup&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Target&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Practical effect&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Shor's algorithm&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Exponential&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;RSA, elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), Diffie-Hellman&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Breaks key exchange and digital signatures once a large error-corrected quantum computer exists&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Grover's algorithm&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Quadratic (square root)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Symmetric search: password hashes, AES keys&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Halves effective bit strength (128-bit becomes roughly 64-bit); the algorithm itself stays intact&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The gap between exponential and quadratic is the whole story. A quadratic speedup against a 128-bit hash still leaves roughly 2⁶⁴ operations to try, which is computationally enormous today, and a memory-hard function like Argon2id multiplies that cost further. An exponential speedup against RSA-2048 doesn't leave a comparable margin.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For the deeper mechanics of lattice-based and other post-quantum schemes, see our explainer on &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/what-is-quantum-cryptography/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;what is quantum cryptography&lt;/a&gt;; this guide stays focused on what changes for password infrastructure specifically.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  What is Shor's Algorithm?
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;  &amp;lt;path d="M12 5V19M5 12H19" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/path&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;/svg&amp;gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Shor's Algorithm&lt;/strong&gt; — a quantum algorithm developed by Peter Shor in 1994 that efficiently factors large integers into their prime factors in polynomial time. On a quantum computer, it can factor an n-bit number in approximately O(n³) operations, compared to the best known classical algorithms which require exponential time. This algorithm is significant because it can break RSA encryption, which relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. For example, while a classical computer might take thousands of years to factor a 2048-bit number, Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could do it in hours.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  What is Grover's Algorithm?
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;  &amp;lt;path d="M12 5V19M5 12H19" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/path&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;/svg&amp;gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Grover's Algorithm&lt;/strong&gt; — a quantum algorithm developed by Lov Grover in 1996 that searches an unsorted database of N items in O(√N) time, providing a quadratic speedup over classical search which requires O(N) time. The algorithm uses quantum superposition and amplitude amplification to identify a marked element among many unmarked ones. For example, to find a specific item among 1 million items, Grover's algorithm would need approximately 1,000 queries instead of 500,000 on average. While less dramatic than Shor's algorithm, Grover's speedup applies to a broader range of problems including database searching, optimization, and cryptanalysis.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Why your password hash is not the real target&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A properly hashed password stays expensive to crack even under Grover's algorithm, because the hashing function's cost applies to every single guess a quantum computer makes. Argon2id and bcrypt are memory-hard by design, so halving the exponent still leaves an attacker paying a steep price per attempt.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Take a 16-character random password drawn from the full 95-character printable set: roughly 105 bits of entropy before hashing touches it. Grover's quadratic speedup roughly halves that exponent, landing an attacker around 2⁵² effective operations. That number stays out of reach for any quantum computer under serious discussion today, and Argon2id's memory-hard cost multiplies the price of each guess on top of it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Not every hashing function offers that protection equally. PBKDF2 is CPU-bound and cheaper to parallelize on custom hardware. Argon2id and bcrypt force an attacker to pay in memory as well as time, which matters more as GPU and ASIC cracking improves, quantum or not. Salting stays mandatory regardless of algorithm: it stops precomputed rainbow-table attacks and forces every guess to run individually against a single hash.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Our guide to &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/hash-and-salt/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;password hashing and salting&lt;/a&gt; covers the mechanics of each function in more depth, including why a 16-character minimum has become the practical floor.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  What is Argon2id?
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;  &amp;lt;path d="M12 5V19M5 12H19" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/path&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;/svg&amp;gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Argon2id&lt;/strong&gt; — a modern password hashing algorithm that won the Password Hashing Competition in 2015. It is designed to be resistant to both GPU and ASIC attacks by requiring significant amounts of memory and computational time. Argon2id combines two variants: Argon2i (resistant to side-channel attacks) and Argon2d (faster but potentially vulnerable to side-channels). It uses configurable parameters for time cost, memory cost, and parallelism, making it highly resistant to brute-force attacks. For example, with recommended settings, hashing a password might take 1-2 seconds and require 64MB of memory, making it impractical for attackers to crack passwords at scale.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  What is PBKDF2?
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;  &amp;lt;path d="M12 5V19M5 12H19" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/path&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;/svg&amp;gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key Derivation Function 2)&lt;/strong&gt; — a key derivation function standardized by NIST that applies a pseudorandom function (like HMAC-SHA256) repeatedly to a password and salt to produce a derived key. It is designed to slow down password hashing by using a configurable iteration count, making brute-force attacks more computationally expensive. PBKDF2 has been widely adopted for password hashing and key derivation in various applications. However, it has limitations compared to modern algorithms like Argon2id because it does not require significant memory, making it vulnerable to GPU and ASIC-based attacks. For example, PBKDF2 with 100,000 iterations is still considered acceptable but less secure than memory-hard alternatives.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  What is bcrypt?
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;  &amp;lt;path d="M12 5V19M5 12H19" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round"&amp;gt;&amp;lt;/path&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;/svg&amp;gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;bcrypt&lt;/strong&gt; — a password hashing algorithm based on the Blowfish cipher, designed by Niels Provos and David Mazières in 1999. It incorporates a salt and a configurable cost factor (work factor) to slow down the hashing process, making it resistant to brute-force attacks. The cost factor can be increased over time as computing power grows, allowing bcrypt to remain secure for years. bcrypt automatically generates and stores the salt within the hash output, simplifying implementation. For example, bcrypt with a cost factor of 12 takes approximately 250 milliseconds to hash a password on modern hardware. While bcrypt is still widely used and considered secure, it does not require memory like Argon2id, making it somewhat vulnerable to specialized hardware attacks.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;The layer that actually breaks: Key exchange&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;RSA-2048 and ECDH key exchange are the actual target here. Shor's algorithm makes factoring the math behind RSA and computing the discrete logs behind ECC tractable, which breaks TLS handshakes, SSH sessions, VPN tunnels, and any private-key wrap built on the same primitives.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Public-key cryptography carries that risk into everyday infrastructure in more places than most teams track:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;TLS 1.3 handshakes: RSA or ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA certificates&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;SSH host and user key exchange&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;VPN tunnel negotiation&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Private-key wrapping inside a password manager's key hierarchy&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Code-signing and document-signing certificates&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The math behind that risk isn't hypothetical. &lt;a href="https://blog.google/technology/research/tracking-the-cost-of-quantum-factoring/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Google Quantum AI&lt;/a&gt; published a May 2025 preprint showing that 2048-bit RSA could theoretically be factored by a sufficiently large error-corrected quantum computer. The machine doesn't exist yet. The mathematics that would break it does.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A password manager sits inside this same list. Sharing a vault with a new team member, syncing a record between devices, or unwrapping a private key at login all depend on an asymmetric operation somewhere in the chain. Auditing your password manager's crypto stack belongs in the same inventory as your TLS endpoints and VPN concentrators.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Harvest now, decrypt later: The threat that exists today&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Harvest now, decrypt later describes an attacker recording encrypted traffic today and decrypting it once a capable quantum computer exists. It reframes "quantum is ten years away" into "the collection already started," which matters for any data whose confidentiality needs to survive a decade or more.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://cpl.thalesgroup.com/quantum-ai-data-threat-report?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Thales's&lt;/a&gt; 2026 Quantum &amp;amp; AI Threat Report surveyed 3,120 security and IT professionals across 20 countries and found harvest-now-decrypt-later is their top quantum concern, cited by 61% of respondents, ahead of algorithm deprecation or compliance deadlines. Adversaries with the patience to wait years for a payoff, typically nation-state actors, are the ones running this collection today.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The exposure concentrates in data that needs to stay confidential for years: medical records, legal filings, intellectual property, government communications. A TLS session key discarded the moment a connection closes is a poor target. An RSA-wrapped archive from 2024 still sitting on a backup tape in 2034 is exactly what this threat targets, and so is an encrypted vault export sitting in a decommissioned backup that nobody remembered to purge.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What NIST actually decided, and the deadlines that bind you&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST&lt;/a&gt; finalized its first three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024: &lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/203/final?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;FIPS 203&lt;/a&gt; (ML-KEM) for key exchange, &lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/204/final?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;FIPS 204&lt;/a&gt; (ML-DSA) and &lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/205/final?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;FIPS 205&lt;/a&gt; (SLH-DSA) for digital signatures. NIST IR 8547 then set the compliance clock, deprecating RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA after 2030 and disallowing them after 2035.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Date&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Milestone&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2016&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;NIST opens its post-quantum cryptography standardization process&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;August 2024&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;FIPS 203, 204, and 205 finalized: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;November 2024&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;NIST IR 8547 published, setting the deprecation and disallowance timeline&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;After 2030&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA deprecated&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;After 2035&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA disallowed&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/symmetric-algorithms/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Symmetric cryptography&lt;/a&gt; at 128-bit security or higher is unaffected by any of this. AES-256 needs no algorithm change. The deadlines target the asymmetric layer specifically: RSA, ECDSA, and EdDSA, replaced by ML-KEM and ML-DSA. The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 mirrors this timeline for U.S. national security systems, one signal of how seriously procurement teams are meant to take it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/ir/8547/ipd?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST IR 8547&lt;/a&gt; frames post-quantum migration as a multi-year engineering effort, on the order of a decade to integrate across products and infrastructure, which is the real argument for starting an inventory now rather than waiting until 2029. &lt;a href="https://www.ibm.com/quantum/roadmap?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;IBM's&lt;/a&gt; public quantum roadmap targets a system of 100,000-plus qubits by 2033. That's the vendor's own stated goal, not an independent projection, but it puts a rough date on when "large enough" stops being theoretical.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Building crypto agility into procurement now, meaning the ability to swap an algorithm without rearchitecting a product, is what turns this from a scramble into a scheduled migration.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;The 3-Layer Quantum Exposure Audit&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Running this audit takes an afternoon, not a consulting engagement. Sort your password estate into three layers, and each one gets its own verdict: safe, watch, or act now.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Layer&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it is&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Quantum status&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Verdict&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1. Password hashes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Argon2id, bcrypt, or PBKDF2 protecting stored credentials&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Grover halves effective strength; memory-hard functions stay expensive per guess&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Safe. Recheck the algorithm and iteration count, but this isn't urgent&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2. Key exchange and transport&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;RSA, ECDH, ECDSA in TLS, SSH, VPN, and private-key wraps&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Shor breaks the underlying math once a capable quantum computer exists&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Act now. Inventory it and plan a migration to ML-KEM and ML-DSA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3. Long-lived encrypted data at rest&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Archives, backups, and records whose confidentiality must outlast a decade&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Exposed today via harvest-now-decrypt-later if protected only by an asymmetric key exchange&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Watch. Prioritize by data sensitivity and retention period&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Layer 1&lt;/strong&gt; is the one teams worry about most and need to worry about least. If your login and password-manager master-password hashes already use Argon2id, PBKDF2 or bcrypt with a reasonable work factor, Grover's algorithm doesn't change your risk calculus. The one real gap worth chasing: a legacy system still running MD5 or unsalted SHA-1 was already broken before quantum entered the conversation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Layer 2&lt;/strong&gt; is where an admin usually finds the actual gap: a VPN concentrator still pinned to RSA-2048, an internal PKI issuing ECDSA certificates with no renewal plan, a legacy API that never moved past TLS 1.2. Inventory every place RSA, ECDH, or ECDSA performs a key exchange, and start with whatever protects your longest-lived traffic.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Layer 3&lt;/strong&gt; is about what's already been collected, not what gets encrypted tomorrow. Ask what data your organization protects today that still needs confidentiality in 2035: legal holds, cap tables, source code, anything under a multi-year NDA. Then check whether that confidentiality depends on an asymmetric key exchange performed years ago.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Run the audit once, then fold it into whatever cadence your team already uses for a crypto inventory. Annually is reasonable. Faster if you're issuing new PKI or renegotiating a VPN contract this year.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;How to read a password manager's crypto documentation&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A password manager's crypto documentation should name exactly what protects your vault at each layer. A vague "military-grade encryption" claim doesn't count. Look for named algorithms, stated key sizes, a named key-derivation function, and a public position on post-quantum migration.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What a quantum-aware vendor publishes:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The exact symmetric cipher and key size protecting vault data (AES-128 and AES-256 are not the same margin, so "AES" alone isn't enough)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The exact asymmetric algorithm used for key exchange and private-key wrapping&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The key derivation function and iteration count turning a master password into an encryption key&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Whether encryption happens client-side, the &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/what-is-zero-knowledge-encryption/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;zero-knowledge&lt;/a&gt; model, or only at rest on the server&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Passwork&lt;/a&gt;'s own documentation is a reasonable example of what that transparency looks like in practice. Its client-side encryption applies AES-256 to vault and record data, with a separate AES-256 layer protecting the database at rest. A master password derives a 512-bit master key through PBKDF2 (HMAC-SHA-256), which unwraps an RSA-2048 private key that in turn unwraps per-vault and per-record keys, a hierarchy documented in the &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/tech-guides/cryptography/intro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;cryptography overview&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Run that stack through the 3-Layer Audit and the honest answer is straightforward. The AES-256 data layer stays quantum-resistant at current key sizes; the RSA-2048 key-exchange layer is the component to watch as post-quantum standards mature across the industry. That's the same answer any vendor wrapping keys with RSA should be giving you today: a documented AES-256 layer that doesn't need to change, and an asymmetric layer with an acknowledged migration path, not a claim that everything is already quantum-proof. Our &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/aes-256-encryption-unbreakable-2026/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AES-256 explainer&lt;/a&gt; covers why the key size margin matters on its own.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What to do today (and what can wait)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start with what protects TLS, SSH, and VPN key exchange today, since that's the layer with an actual 2030 deadline. Passkey rollout, hybrid key exchange testing, and a documented crypto inventory can run in parallel. Re-keying AES-256 deployments or worrying about password hash strength can wait.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Do now:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Inventory every place RSA, ECDH, or ECDSA performs key exchange: TLS endpoints, SSH hosts, VPN concentrators, internal PKI.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Confirm your password manager and identity provider publish their actual crypto stack instead of a vague "bank-level encryption" claim. If a vendor won't name its algorithms and key sizes on request, treat that as the answer.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Turn on MFA everywhere it isn't already mandatory. It doesn't touch the quantum question directly, but it closes exposure while migration runs.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Plan this year:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Get hybrid key exchange (classical plus ML-KEM) onto your vendor roadmap conversations, especially for anything facing a 2030 deadline.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Prioritize passkey rollout for user-facing authentication. FIDO2's algorithm agility means the migration path already exists, even though today's passkeys still use ECDSA, and rollout itself reduces how much of your estate still depends on a password hash at all.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Close out any lingering TLS 1.2 endpoints. Update TLS 1.3 is a prerequisite for post-quantum key exchange, not a separate project.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Watch:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;IBM's and Google's quantum hardware roadmaps. A jump past the milestones in the NIST timeline above would move deadlines up rather than simply confirm them.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;NIST guidance on hybrid and pure post-quantum modes as FIPS 203, 204, and 205 implementations mature in mainstream TLS and SSH libraries.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of this requires replacing an existing password manager. If it already publishes an AES-256/RSA-2048 stack like the one above, the platform is doing its part; the inventory work above is yours.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Quantum computers are not coming for your password hash. They're coming for the RSA and ECC key exchange that carries it, and NIST has already put dates on the calendar: 2030 to deprecate, 2035 to disallow. The 3-Layer Quantum Exposure Audit turns that abstract risk into three concrete checks a team can run this quarter, one of which is probably closeable this afternoon.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start with Layer 2. Pull the list of everywhere RSA, ECDH, or ECDSA handles a handshake in your environment, and you'll know within a day which vendors need a migration conversation and which ones already have one started.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>encryption</category>
      <category>cryptography</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Symmetric algorithms: Pros, cons and 2026 key risks</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 21 Sep 2026 08:46:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/symmetric-algorithms-pros-cons-and-2026-key-risks-34io</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/symmetric-algorithms-pros-cons-and-2026-key-risks-34io</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F2krqwikiomo9jqa2wirt.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F2krqwikiomo9jqa2wirt.png" alt="Symmetric algorithms: Pros, cons and 2026 key risks" width="800" height="414"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Symmetric algorithms encrypt and decrypt data with a single shared key. That single-key design is what makes them fast enough to protect a database in real time, and durable enough that the &lt;a href="https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/Post-Quantum-Cybersecurity-Resources/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NSA's post-quantum guidance&lt;/a&gt; requires no algorithm change to keep trusting them. What actually breaks at enterprise scale is getting that one key to everyone who needs it, and taking it away cleanly from everyone who doesn't, not the underlying math.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That trade-off, speed and simplicity against key distribution, is the whole story of symmetric cryptography. Everything else, block versus stream ciphers, AES against ChaCha20, what changes once quantum computing is real, is detail underneath it.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Key takeaways&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Symmetric encryption uses one key for both encryption and decryption, which is why it's fast enough for bulk data and real-time traffic.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Its two real strengths are raw speed and quantum durability. AES-256 needs no algorithmic change to remain secure against a quantum adversary.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Its two real limits are the key distribution problem and the lack of non-repudiation, since both parties hold an identical key.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Under the &lt;a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/1/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NSA's CNSA 2.0 guidance&lt;/a&gt;, AES-256 stays as-is. The 2027-2035 migration mandate targets RSA and ECC, not symmetric ciphers.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Enterprises solve the distribution problem with hybrid encryption and structured key hierarchies, not by abandoning symmetric algorithms.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What is symmetric encryption?&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Symmetric encryption uses one secret key to scramble data into ciphertext and unscramble it back into plaintext. The sender and every authorized recipient hold an identical copy of that key. Whoever has it can read the data. Whoever doesn't, can't, regardless of how much ciphertext they intercept.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Symmetric algorithms fall into two families. A block cipher, like &lt;strong&gt;AES&lt;/strong&gt; , encrypts data in fixed-size chunks (128 bits at a time for AES), padding or chaining blocks together for anything larger. A stream cipher, like &lt;strong&gt;ChaCha20&lt;/strong&gt; or the now-retired &lt;strong&gt;RC4&lt;/strong&gt; , encrypts a continuous stream of data one bit or byte at a time, which suits low-latency or resource-constrained contexts better than padding data into blocks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Key length is what sets the actual security margin. AES supports 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys, and 256-bit has become the practical default for anything sensitive, since the cost difference in performance is small and the security margin is larger.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Asymmetric encryption solves the key-sharing problem differently: a public key encrypts, a mathematically linked private key decrypts, and the two never need to meet in the same place. Symmetric algorithms skip that math entirely. The cost is that both sides need the same secret before they can talk, which is where the real trade-off lives.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Criterion&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Symmetric encryption&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Asymmetric encryption&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Keys used&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;One shared secret key for both encryption and decryption&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;A linked key pair: a public key that encrypts, a private key that decrypts&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Speed&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Fast enough for bulk data and real-time traffic&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Orders of magnitude slower for the same volume&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Typical use&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Encrypting data at rest, database and disk encryption, session traffic&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Key exchange, digital signatures, initial handshakes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Key distribution&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Needs a secure channel to share the key before use&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;The public key can be shared openly; only the private key stays secret&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Non-repudiation&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Not provided, since both parties hold an identical key&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Provided, through digital signatures tied to one private key&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Common algorithms&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AES, ChaCha20&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;RSA, ECC (ECDSA, ECDHE)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Quantum posture&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AES-256 needs no algorithm change under CNSA 2.0&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;RSA and ECC face a mandated replacement with ML-KEM and ML-DSA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;The pros of symmetric algorithms&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Speed and efficiency&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Symmetric algorithms are orders of magnitude faster than asymmetric ones for the same volume of data. AES-256-GCM can encrypt a full database, a disk volume, or a live TLS session without the computational overhead that public-key math carries at that scale, which is why every major protocol uses symmetric ciphers for the actual data transfer and reserves asymmetric cryptography for the handshake. That gap is also why &lt;a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9846/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;TLS 1.3&lt;/a&gt; runs an asymmetric exchange exactly once per session and then hands everything else to AES or ChaCha20.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Built for bulk data&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Encrypting gigabytes of records, log files, or backups with an asymmetric algorithm turns impractical well before it turns merely slow. Symmetric ciphers scale linearly with data volume and, on modern hardware, run close to the memory bus speed. That's the property that makes full-disk encryption tools like &lt;a href="https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/operating-system-security/data-protection/bitlocker/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;BitLocker&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_Unified_Key_Setup?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;LUKS&lt;/a&gt;, and per-record encryption inside applications, viable in production instead of a batch job someone runs overnight.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Simple to implement and audit&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One key, one algorithm, no key pair to generate, exchange, or validate. Fewer moving parts means fewer places for an implementation to go wrong, and it's a large part of why AES has survived over two decades of public cryptanalysis as a NIST standard without a practical break. AES implementations are also widely validated against &lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-program?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST's Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program&lt;/a&gt;, so a team adopting it isn't relying on a homegrown or unaudited library.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Quantum durability&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Symmetric algorithms are the one part of the cryptographic stack that doesn't need to change for the post-quantum era. Grover's algorithm gives a quantum computer a theoretical quadratic speedup against brute-force key search, but a quadratic speedup against a 2²⁵⁶ keyspace still only halves &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/aes-256-encryption-unbreakable-2026/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AES-256's quantum resistance&lt;/a&gt; to a 128-bit effective margin, which stays computationally infeasible to break with any hardware on a realistic roadmap. The quantum computing section below covers what CNSA 2.0 actually says about this, and why the migration pressure sits entirely on asymmetric algorithms instead.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;The cons of symmetric algorithms&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;The key distribution problem&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every symmetric scheme runs into the same wall: how do you get the secret key to the other party without an eavesdropper getting it too? Sending the key over the same channel as the data defeats the purpose, mailing it separately doesn't scale past a handful of people, and a key shared over chat or email sits in plaintext in someone's inbox indefinitely. This single problem is why hybrid encryption exists at all, and it's covered in detail later in this article.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Scalability breaks down fast&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A network where every pair of users needs a unique shared key grows at n(n-1)/2. Ten users need 45 distinct keys. A hundred users need 4,950. A mid-sized engineering org that starts with 20 people sharing database credentials and grows to 200 goes from 190 pairwise keys to nearly 20,000, without anyone deciding to make key management harder on purpose. Managing, rotating, and revoking that many pairwise keys by hand demands automated key management or, more practically, a shared architecture where users don't each need a direct pairwise key at all.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The usual workaround, a single shared key per team or department instead of per pair, trades the scalability problem for a worse blast-radius problem: one leaked key now exposes every credential the whole group shares, and rotating it means touching everything at once rather than one relationship.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;No non-repudiation&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Because sender and recipient hold an identical key, nothing about the ciphertext proves who actually created it. Either party could have generated the same message with the same key, so symmetric encryption alone can't provide the kind of proof-of-origin that a digital signature does. That matters more than it sounds: if a shared database credential leaks and two people had access to the key that encrypted it, symmetric encryption alone gives you no cryptographic way to establish which one used it. Systems that need non-repudiation layer asymmetric signatures on top, or rely on access logging to establish who did what and when.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;AES vs. ChaCha20: which one should you actually use?&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Use AES-256-GCM when your hardware has AES-NI acceleration, which covers most modern server and desktop CPUs. Use ChaCha20-Poly1305 when it doesn't, on mobile chips, embedded devices, or software-only environments where AES runs without hardware support. This is the AES-NI rule of thumb, and it settles the choice for the overwhelming majority of deployments.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Property&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;AES-256-GCM&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;ChaCha20-Poly1305&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hardware dependency&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Needs AES-NI for full speed&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Fast in pure software, no special hardware&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Typical use case&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Servers, desktops, database encryption&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Mobile, embedded, WireGuard, parts of TLS 1.3&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Key / nonce size&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;256-bit key, 96-bit nonce&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;256-bit key, 96-bit nonce&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Both are authenticated encryption modes, meaning they detect tampering as well as hide content, in a single pass rather than needing a bolted-on authentication step. Both are approved for use in TLS 1.3, and WireGuard, the VPN protocol built into the Linux kernel, uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 as its only cipher for exactly that hardware-independence reason.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;AES-NI isn't new or rare: Intel added it to server and desktop CPUs starting with the Westmere generation in 2010, and AMD followed shortly after. The practical question for most teams is whether their software stack actually uses that acceleration instead of falling back to a slow, unaccelerated implementation. Skip the legacy list entirely: DES and 3DES are deprecated under NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2, and RC4 and Blowfish have known practical weaknesses that rule them out for anything handling live traffic in 2026.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Quantum computing and symmetric algorithms: What changes&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Grover's algorithm halves &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/aes-256-encryption-unbreakable-2026/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AES-256&lt;/a&gt;'s effective security margin to roughly 128 bits of quantum resistance, which remains computationally infeasible to brute-force with any foreseeable quantum hardware. The algorithm itself doesn't need to change. Compare that to what Grover's algorithm does to a 128-bit key: it drops the effective margin to 64 bits, well within brute-force range, which is the actual reason 256-bit keys are now the practical floor for anything long-lived rather than a conservative preference.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;CNSA 2.0 forces a hard cutover for RSA and ECC. It does not touch AES-256. &lt;a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Sep/07/2003071836/-1/-1/0/CSI_CNSA_2.0_FAQ_.PDF?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;The NSA&lt;/a&gt;'s Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 FAQ states that its symmetric requirements are "essentially the same" as CNSA 1.0's, provided key sizes stay at 256 bits. The mandated migration runs on a fixed clock: new National Security Systems acquisitions must be CNSA 2.0-compliant by January 1, 2027, non-compliant equipment phases out by December 31, 2030, CNSA 2.0 becomes mandatory by December 31, 2031, and full quantum resistance is targeted for 2035. Every one of those deadlines applies to replacing RSA and ECC key exchange and signatures with ML-KEM and ML-DSA, the post-quantum standards &lt;a href="https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2024/08/nist-releases-first-3-finalized-post-quantum-encryption-standards?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST&lt;/a&gt; finalized as FIPS 203 and FIPS 204 in August 2024.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There's a real quantum risk that does touch symmetric-protected data, though: harvest-now-decrypt-later. An attacker who records encrypted traffic today, betting on a future quantum computer to break the asymmetric key exchange that protected it, is targeting the RSA or ECC handshake, not the AES session key itself. A short-lived TLS session key, discarded the moment the connection closes, is a poor harvesting target. The actual exposure is data whose long-term confidentiality still depends on an asymmetric key exchange performed years ago, government records, long-lived digital signatures, or intellectual property encrypted under an RSA-wrapped key that was never rotated to a post-quantum scheme.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of this changes the guidance for symmetric ciphers specifically. Organizations planning a post-quantum migration should spend that effort on replacing RSA and ECC key exchange and signatures, not on re-keying AES-256 deployments that already meet the 256-bit requirement.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Overcoming the cons: How enterprises manage symmetric keys&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The industry-standard answer to the key distribution problem is hybrid encryption, and it's already running under nearly every secure connection you make. TLS 1.3 uses asymmetric key exchange (typically &lt;a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic-curve_Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ECDHE&lt;/a&gt;) to agree on a shared secret over an untrusted network without ever transmitting that secret directly, then switches to a symmetric cipher, AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305, for the actual session traffic. Asymmetric cryptography solves the "how do we agree on a secret without anyone overhearing it" problem once, at connection start; symmetric cryptography does the heavy lifting for everything after, because by then both sides already share the key they need.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That pattern solves distribution for a one-off session. It doesn't solve key management for data at rest or for long-lived enterprise secrets that outlive any single connection, credentials sitting in a vault for months or years, shared across a whole team. That takes deliberate, ongoing controls:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Rotate keys on a defined schedule and immediately after any suspected compromise, not on an ad hoc basis driven by whoever remembers to do it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Separate duties so no single administrator can access, export, and use a key unilaterally, which limits how much damage one compromised account can do.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Log every key access and export action, and route those logs to a security team that actually reviews them on a schedule, rather than a retention bucket nobody opens.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Store keys in a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or an equivalent hardware-backed vault rather than in configuration files, environment variables, or a shared spreadsheet, none of which were built to keep a secret secret.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Automate rotation and revocation instead of relying on someone remembering to do it during offboarding, since that's exactly the step that gets skipped under time pressure.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Each of these is a process fix layered on top of the algorithm, and together they treat key management as its own discipline with a defined owner, rather than something that happens by default when someone remembers.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;How Passwork applies this: A key hierarchy that isolates every record&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Passwork's own &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/what-is-zero-knowledge-encryption/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;zero-knowledge architecture&lt;/a&gt; is a concrete answer to the distribution and scalability problems above. The client-side chain runs like this:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A master password, never transmitted to the server, derives a master key through PBKDF2 with roughly 300,000 client-side iterations. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;That master key decrypts the user's RSA-2048 private key, which decrypts the keys for each vault the user has access to. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Each vault key, in turn, unlocks the individual AES-256 key for every record inside it, and only that key decrypts the actual password or secret. &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every step in that chain happens on the client. The server only ever stores ciphertext and encrypted keys it has no way to read on its own.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The point of building it this way is blast radius. A compromised or rotated key affects one record or one vault, not the entire organization's credential estate, because there's no single master key that unlocks everything at once, no equivalent of the n(n-1)/2 pairwise-key problem described earlier.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Changing a master password only re-wraps the user's private key. It doesn't require re-encrypting every record that key can eventually reach, which is the operational difference between a rotation that takes seconds and one that takes a maintenance window. &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Passwork&lt;/a&gt; also runs an independent server-side AES-256 layer on top of this client-side chain, so compromising one encryption layer doesn't hand an attacker the other, a pattern related to but distinct from &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/what-is-end-to-end-encryption/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;end-to-end encryption&lt;/a&gt; in messaging systems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Access to a shared credential can still be revoked instantly and logged, which is what turns "who can technically decrypt this" into "who is actually still authorized to." Full implementation details live in Passwork's &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/tech-guides/cryptography/intro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;cryptography architecture&lt;/a&gt; documentation.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Symmetric encryption and compliance requirements&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most frameworks that mention encryption describe what it must accomplish, not which algorithm to use, and getting that distinction wrong leads to compliance claims that don't hold up under audit.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://gdpr-info.eu/art-32-gdpr/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;GDPR&lt;/a&gt; Article 32(1)(a) names "the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data" as an example of an appropriate technical security measure, one option among several rather than a mandate for a specific cipher. The article leaves the implementation, including which algorithm to use, to the organization's own risk assessment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;PCI DSS v4.0 Requirement 3.5.1 requires rendering stored cardholder data unreadable through &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/hash-and-salt/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;one-way hashes&lt;/a&gt;, truncation, index tokens, or strong cryptography with documented key-management processes, and knowing the difference between hashing and encryption matters here, since only one of those four options is reversible. It does not name AES or specify a minimum key length, so treating PCI DSS as an "AES-256 mandate", a claim that shows up in more than a few security blog posts, overstates what the standard actually says. An organization that can document its cryptography and key-management process meets the requirement regardless of which approved algorithm it runs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The NIS2 Directive &lt;a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;(EU) 2022/2555&lt;/a&gt;, Article 21, requires essential and important entities to implement risk-management measures covering their network and information systems, again without prescribing a specific algorithm. It does require that organizations be able to show what measures they took and why, which is where documented key rotation, access logging, and a defined key hierarchy stop being nice-to-haves and start being audit evidence.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The pattern across all three is consistent: regulators require strong, documented cryptography and key management, and leave the algorithm choice to the organization. That's a reason to pick AES-256 or ChaCha20-Poly1305 on their technical merits, not because a specific regulation names them.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of this changes the basic verdict: the algorithm was never where symmetric encryption failed, and quantum computing doesn't move that goalpost. AES-256 still does its job at the speed enterprises need. The work that actually determines whether an organization's credentials are safe is who holds which key, how it's rotated, and how fast access disappears when someone leaves. &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Passwork&lt;/a&gt;'s per-record key hierarchy, covered above, is one concrete way to keep that work from becoming unmanageable at scale.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start by auditing which systems still manage symmetric keys manually, then move those into a structure where a single compromised key can't reach more than it has to.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>encryption</category>
      <category>cryptography</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>AI agent credentials: 7 rules for secure access control</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Sep 2026 10:00:21 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/ai-agent-credentials-7-rules-for-secure-access-control-5167</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/ai-agent-credentials-7-rules-for-secure-access-control-5167</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F9p48o3ieh0hb3qe3g2kk.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F9p48o3ieh0hb3qe3g2kk.png" alt="AI-powered robotic arm handling documents in a secure folder, with lock and key icons symbolizing AI agent security and access control." width="800" height="414"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;AI agents now hold API keys and database credentials that used to belong only to people or pipelines. They carry service tokens too, often with fewer restrictions than a human user would ever get. A 2026 &lt;a href="https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/idira/identity-security-landscape-report?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;u&gt;Palo Alto Networks&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/a&gt; survey of 2,930 cybersecurity decision-makers across 20 countries found an average of 109 machine identities for every human identity in the organizations surveyed, and 79 of those 109 were AI agents. The survey shows how fast non-human identity has turned into an access-management problem.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most organizations issue agent credentials the same way they issue a laptop to a new hire: create an account, grant broad access so nothing breaks, move on. That approach holds up for people, because a human employee will typically pause and check before taking an action that could cause damage. It holds up less well for a system that acts on whatever instruction looks most convincing in the text it just read.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This article covers the credential side of agent security: how to issue, scope, and audit the secrets an autonomous agent or LLM-based tool needs, without handing it a standing master key. It leans on &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/secrets-management-passwork/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Passwork's DevOps secrets model&lt;/a&gt;, which already answers most of this question for CI/CD pipelines. An agent's credential footprint sits much closer to a pipeline's than to a person's.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Key takeaways
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Agents already outnumber employees&lt;/strong&gt;. 109 machine identities per human, 79 of them AI agents (Palo Alto Networks, 2026).&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Every agent gets its own service account&lt;/strong&gt;. Shared accounts erase attribution the moment something goes wrong.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Scope permissions to the task&lt;/strong&gt;. A single API permission plus the narrowest vault access decides whether a compromise costs one credential or the whole fleet.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Match token lifetime to runtime&lt;/strong&gt;. 15-60 minutes for task-based agents, up to 4 hours for always-on ones.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Static config files leak most often&lt;/strong&gt;. GitGuardian found 24,008 secrets exposed in public MCP config files in 2025 alone.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Keep raw credentials in an isolated tool-execution layer&lt;/strong&gt;. A credential broker can implement this boundary, provided the model-facing agent never receives the secret.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Filtering and scanning add friction rather than authorization&lt;/strong&gt;. Comment and Control bypassed Copilot Agent's filtering, secret scanning, and network allowlist, while CamoLeak used GitHub's Camo proxy as a separate exfiltration channel. These cases support a brokered authorization boundary, but don't prove it can stop prompt injection on its own.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;One identity per agent makes revocation surgical&lt;/strong&gt;. Disable one compromised account while every other agent keeps running.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Rotation still takes a process you run yourself&lt;/strong&gt;. Passwork covers accounts, access, tokens, and audit logs as the foundation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Why AI agent credentials need different controls&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A script follows the same code path every time, so you can scope its access before it ever runs. An AI agent picks which tool to call based on text it reads at runtime, and some of that text can come from an attacker. OWASP (Open Worldwide Application Security Project) names this failure mode &lt;a href="https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;LLM06:2025, Excessive Agency&lt;/a&gt;: unexpected, ambiguous, or manipulated model output can trigger harmful actions when an agent has excessive functionality, permissions, or autonomy.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Prompt injection is text crafted to override an agent's instructions. It's one way this manipulation happens, not the only one. &lt;strong&gt;Two disclosures&lt;/strong&gt; from the past year show what it looks like in practice: &lt;a href="https://oddguan.com/blog/comment-and-control-prompt-injection-credential-theft-claude-code-gemini-cli-github-copilot/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Comment and Control&lt;/a&gt; (April 2026) exfiltrated live tokens from three coding agents through a hidden GitHub comment, and &lt;a href="https://www.legitsecurity.com/blog/camoleak-critical-github-copilot-vulnerability-leaks-private-source-code?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;CamoLeak&lt;/a&gt; (October 2025) used a hidden pull request to make GitHub Copilot Chat leak private repository data through an image-proxy channel. In both cases an agent held tool access, a live credential sat within reach, and untrusted text made the agent treat it as an instruction. Rule 6 covers the mechanics of both. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;The 7 rules for securing AI agent credentials&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;These rules apply the access discipline DevOps teams already use for pipeline secrets to an actor that decides its own next move. Most of them run on controls that mature secrets and identity platforms already offer. What changes is where to draw the boundary between what the agent can request and what it's allowed to hold.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Rule 1: Give every agent its own service account&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;strong&gt;service account&lt;/strong&gt; is a login created for an automated system rather than a person, with its own role and its own token pair, independent of any employee. Every production agent needs one. Sharing a single account across multiple agents erases attribution. When something goes wrong, the log says "the agent" instead of telling you which run, which task, or which deployment caused it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Passwork's &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/onboarding/devops-onboarding/service-accounts-and-tokens/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;guide to service accounts and API tokens&lt;/a&gt; makes this the first rule for any automation, agents included: never authenticate a script or agent with a personal account. A personal account's permissions are usually broader than the job needs. Its actions log under an employee's name instead of the automation's, and revoking access means editing someone's personal profile instead of deleting a dedicated account.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Account&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Purpose&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Access&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;agent-support-triage-ro&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reads CRM tickets, drafts replies&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read only, helpdesk vault&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;agent-deploy-approval&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reviews and approves deployments&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read only, infrastructure vault&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;agent-cred-rotator&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Rotates secrets on schedule&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read and edit, both environments&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Name accounts by function, not by number. &lt;code&gt;agent-support-triage-ro&lt;/code&gt; tells an on-call engineer what the account does six months from now. &lt;code&gt;agent-3&lt;/code&gt; tells them nothing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Passwork's service-account model issues a separate login, role, and token pair for each agent, with no personal account attached. &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/onboarding/devops-onboarding/service-accounts-and-tokens/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;See how DevOps service accounts work in Passwork&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Rule 2: Scope permissions to the task&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk2023-24/llm08-excessive-agency/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;OWASP's guidance on Excessive Agency&lt;/a&gt; reduces to two movesreduces to two moves:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;enforce least privilege by limiting the agent to the minimum tools and permissions required and independently enforcing authorization in downstream systems; &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;require human approval before high-impact actions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Read more: &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/enterprise-rbac-access-control-policy/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Access сontrol policy: How to design enterprise RBAC&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In Passwork, build the agent's role around a single permission called Use API, with user management, LDAP integration, and SSO administration switched off — the same &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/how-to-manage-devops-secrets-and-credentials/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;API-driven access model DevOps teams already use for secrets&lt;/a&gt;. Grant vault and folder access separately, at the narrowest level the task requires: read only unless the agent's job is to write, folder-level rather than vault-level when it only needs a subset.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A support bot that reads one helpdesk credential has no reason to share a role with a deploy agent that touches production database credentials, even if one shared role is easier to set up. If an agent is compromised, that scoping decision separates a one-credential incident from a fleet-wide one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Rule 3: Match token lifetime to how long the agent runs&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An agent that fires once per task, to answer a ticket or review a pull request, behaves like a short CI (continuous integration) job. It doesn't behave like a person logging in for the day, so its credentials shouldn't last as long as a person's session.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Passwork issues a token pair: an &lt;code&gt;accessToken&lt;/code&gt; used on every API request, and a &lt;code&gt;refreshToken&lt;/code&gt; that requests a new pair once the access token expires. Recommended lifetimes scale with the job:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Use case&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Access token&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Refresh token&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Task-based agent (fires once per job)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;15-60 minutes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1 day&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Always-on agent&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1-4 hours&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;30 days&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Scheduled or manually triggered script&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1 hour&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;7 days&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;These are Passwork's own recommended ranges, not a universal standard. Check your platform's default token lifetime before assuming it matches these numbers. Defaults are usually set for convenience, not for a short-lived agent task, so shortening them is a deliberate step you take, not one you inherit.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In Passwork 7.6.0 and later, you can rotate the full token pair, the access token alone, or the refresh token alone. Rotating the full pair invalidates both previous tokens. Rotating only the refresh token invalidates the previous refresh token but leaves the current access token valid until it expires on its own. Build your revocation testing around whichever mode you use. Store refresh tokens as high-value, long-lived secrets, using a secure secret store or platform-provided secure storage; RFC 9700 provides useful protection principles, even though Passwork documents these as API session tokens rather than OAuth tokens.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Rule 4: Keep credentials out of repositories and MCP configuration files&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agent credentials often leak from plaintext files sitting in the agent's own working directory. GitGuardian's &lt;a href="https://blog.gitguardian.com/the-state-of-secrets-sprawl-2026/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;State of Secrets Sprawl 2026&lt;/a&gt; report found 24,008 unique secrets exposed in MCP (Model Context Protocol) configuration files on public GitHub during 2025. GitGuardian's scanners confirmed 2,117 of them still worked at the moment of detection. Across public GitHub as a whole, 28.6 million hardcoded secrets appeared in commits during 2025, a 34% jump over 2024. Secrets tied to AI services grew 81% to over 1.27 million, including more than 113,000 leaked DeepSeek API keys.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;MCP is &lt;a href="https://modelcontextprotocol.io/introduction?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;an open-source standard&lt;/a&gt; that lets AI applications connect to external tools and data sources. &lt;a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/vulnerabilities-and-exploits/beware-of-mcp-hardcoded-credentials-a-perfect-target-for-threat-actors?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Trend Micro's research&lt;/a&gt; on MCP server configurations found that roughly 48% of the servers it reviewed recommend passing credentials through a &lt;code&gt;.env&lt;/code&gt; file. Hardcoding into a plaintext JSON config is the common alternative. Both approaches put several secrets in one file the agent's own process can open.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Reference the variable name in config, and get the actual value from a secrets platform at process start instead of from a file the agent can read directly:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight json"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"mcpServers"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"internal-api"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"command"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"node"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"args"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"./server.js"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;],&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
      &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"env"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nl"&gt;"API_TOKEN"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"${API_TOKEN}"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
    &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="w"&gt;

&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;This fixes the static-file problem but doesn't decide who fetches the actual value or where that value goes once fetched. Rule 5 covers that part.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  *&lt;em&gt;Rule 5: Route every credential through an isolated tool-execution layer *&lt;/em&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Removing a secret from a repository or MCP config file matters, but it isn't the whole fix if that value then lands straight in the agent's own runtime. A developer knows not to paste an API key into a chat window. An agent has no equivalent instinct. Once a secret enters a tool response, a debug line, or a reasoning trace the model produces, it can resurface anywhere that text gets logged, cached, or replayed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The safest approach is to keep secrets in the tool-execution layer, implemented here as a credential broker or tool-execution service, where the model cannot see them. The agent asks a dedicated tool to perform a specific task, such as checking deployment status or fetching a record. The tool uses the secret to complete the task and returns only the result to the agent.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To provide secrets when a process starts, without storing them in plaintext files such as mcp.json or .env, use passwork-cli exec.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;passwork-cli &lt;span class="nb"&gt;exec&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nt"&gt;--folder-id&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nv"&gt;$PROD_SECRETS_FOLDER_ID&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&lt;/span&gt; – ./start-agent.sh 

&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;&lt;code&gt;passwork-cli exec&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; utility loads secrets into a child process only while that process is running. It does not write them to disk or include them in the command output. The key principle is to keep credentials at the tool level, where they stay outside the model’s context and any text the LLM can read. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Keeping the secret out of model context closes one disclosure path. A prompt-injected agent can still ask the broker to perform an operation it's technically authorized to make, just at the wrong time or on the wrong record. The broker needs its own policy checks in front of the secret store, and Rule 6 covers what happens when an injection still gets that far.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This also limits damage from filesystem access on its own. An agent process that can read a .env file pulls the credential straight into its working memory, and no file permission stops that once the agent itself is doing the reading. Routing through a broker the agent can call but not inspect enforces the boundary that Rule 4 starts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Rule 6: Treat output filtering as a backstop, not your main defense&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On 15 April 2026, researcher Aonan Guan and Johns Hopkins researchers Zhengyu Liu and Gavin Zhong published &lt;a href="https://oddguan.com/blog/comment-and-control-prompt-injection-credential-theft-claude-code-gemini-cli-github-copilot/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Comment and Control&lt;/a&gt;: three proof-of-concept demonstrations against Claude Code Security Review, Gemini CLI Action, and GitHub Copilot Agent. Each used a different injection surface, a pull request title, an issue comment, a hidden HTML comment, to expose runner secrets like &lt;code&gt;ANTHROPIC_API_KEY&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;GITHUB_TOKEN&lt;/code&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Anthropic rated its own finding 9.4 CVSS, above the critical threshold. None of the three vendors assigned a CVE or published a security advisory. Don’t rely on a CVE feed to catch the next one: it returned nothing for a confirmed, critical, remotely triggerable credential leak in three widely deployed agents.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Copilot Agent case shows why filtering alone doesn't hold. Guan's report describes three defenses in front of Copilot Agent: variable filtering, diff-based secret scanning, and a network allowlist. The demonstrated chain got past all three, reading secrets through a route the filter missed, encoding values past the scanner, and exfiltrating through a GitHub endpoint the allowlist already permitted.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CamoLeak,&lt;/strong&gt; an earlier Copilot Chat vulnerability, shows that this risk is not limited to agent runners or CI secrets. Researcher Omer Mayraz found it in Copilot Chat in June 2025 and published &lt;a href="https://www.legitsecurity.com/blog/camoleak-critical-github-copilot-vulnerability-leaks-private-source-code?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;details&lt;/a&gt; on 8 October 2025: hidden pull request content caused Chat to encode private repository data into image requests routed through GitHub's Camo proxy. Mayraz rated it CVSS 9.6. GitHub mitigated the issue, tracked as CVE-2025-59145, by 14 August 2025.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Output filters, scanning, and egress allowlists reduce the chance a leak succeeds, but none of them can authorize or block a tool request on their own. Treat them as backstops. Pair them with independent downstream authorization, argument validation, narrow single-purpose tools, and human approval for high-impact actions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Rule 7: Log every action and keep revocation isolated to one identity&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Passwork's activity log records events in CEF (Common Event Format), suitable for forwarding to a SIEM (security information and event management platform) over syslog. Documented fields include the event code (for example, &lt;code&gt;item_created&lt;/code&gt;), a severity rating, a description, the acting user's ID and login, and the client IP. Passwork's &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/tech-guides/administration/action-history/syslog-and-eventviewer/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;event forwarding documentation&lt;/a&gt; covers the full field list for both Linux syslog and Windows Event Viewer.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A dedicated service account attributes every logged operation to a single automation identity. That's one reliable piece of the picture on a bad day. Reconstructing what one specific agent run actually did still means correlating your broker logs, downstream service logs, and egress logs across the same time window.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The value shows up regardless. When an agent does something nobody planned, whether it followed an injected instruction or misread a task, a per-agent service account tells you which identity, which session, and which secrets it touched, without cross-referencing a shared token against timestamps. &lt;strong&gt;Revocation stays isolated too&lt;/strong&gt; : disable that one account's tokens, and every other agent keeps running. That's a stronger argument for separate accounts than any dashboard.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;AI agent credential checklist&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Run through this eight-check gate before an agent touches a real credential in production.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Dedicated identity.&lt;/strong&gt; Does this agent have its own service account or workload identity, separate from every other agent and every human?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Least privilege.&lt;/strong&gt; Have you limited its role, vault or folder access, and resource scope to what the task actually needs?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Read-only default.&lt;/strong&gt; Have you disabled write, deletion, and external communication unless the task specifically requires them?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Token lifecycle.&lt;/strong&gt; Have you matched the access-token lifetime to the length of a run, with refresh tokens protected and revocable?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;No static exposure.&lt;/strong&gt; Have you confirmed the credential is absent from repositories, &lt;code&gt;.env&lt;/code&gt; files, MCP config, and every other file in the agent's working tree?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Broker boundary.&lt;/strong&gt; Does a separate, isolated broker hold the secret while the model-facing agent receives only a minimized result?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Tested safety controls.&lt;/strong&gt; Have you tested output handling, argument validation, and egress restrictions against adversarial input, rather than assuming they work?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Verifiable containment.&lt;/strong&gt; Can you correlate agent, broker, and downstream logs, and revoke the affected identity without disrupting any other agent?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What this means for your team&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scoping an agent's role to Use API and minimum vault access is a config change. Most secrets platforms already support it. The engineering work sits in the layer around it: a broker between the agent and the secret store, output filtering as a backstop against leaks, and audit logs that let you revoke one identity without touching the rest.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start with the agent that has the broadest access in your environment today, and cut its role down to what the job requires.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>secretsmanagement</category>
      <category>aiagents</category>
      <category>devops</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>What is segregation of duties (SoD)? Definition and examples</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 17 Sep 2026 14:47:09 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/what-is-segregation-of-duties-sod-definition-and-examples-4m8i</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/what-is-segregation-of-duties-sod-definition-and-examples-4m8i</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fidlfh3c1acvb9moyedjn.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fidlfh3c1acvb9moyedjn.png" alt="What is segregation of duties (SoD)? Definition and examples" width="799" height="413"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A single employee who can create a vendor record and then approve that vendor's invoice doesn't need anyone else's help to push an improper payment through. No collusion is required, and nothing has to be forged: one login with too much reach is enough on its own. &lt;strong&gt;Segregation of duties (SoD)&lt;/strong&gt; is the control that closes that gap. It splits a sensitive process into steps that different people must complete, so no one person can execute a transaction from start to finish unchecked.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The principle sits underneath most internal-control frameworks in finance, IT, and security operations. Auditors ask about it by name. Regulators cite it in specific clauses. And the cost of skipping it keeps climbing: the median case of occupational fraud cost &lt;strong&gt;$104,000&lt;/strong&gt; in 2026, and the average case ran for about 12 months before anyone caught it, according to the &lt;a href="https://www.acfe.com/fraud-resources/report-to-the-nations?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ACFE&lt;/a&gt;'s Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;What is segregation of duties (SoD)?&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Segregation of duties (SoD)&lt;/strong&gt; is an internal control that divides a sensitive process into stages, typically authorization, custody or execution, and recordkeeping or reconciliation, and assigns each stage to a different person. No single individual initiates and approves the same transaction, or handles an asset and records its own movement. The goal is to make fraud or error require collusion instead of opportunity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;SoD is not the same as an org chart.&lt;/strong&gt; A reporting line shows who manages whom, but it says nothing about who can create a vendor, approve its payment, and reconcile the ledger without a second person ever reviewing the transaction. Two people can report to the same manager and still satisfy SoD, as long as neither can complete the full process alone. The four-eyes principle, requiring at least two people to sign off on a sensitive action, is the simplest expression of the idea.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Segregation of duties vs. least privilege vs. RBAC&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;SoD is not least privilege, and least privilege is not RBAC. Least privilege limits how much access one person has. SoD limits whether one person can complete an entire sensitive process alone, even within their allowed access. RBAC (role-based access control) is the mechanism that usually enforces both, by attaching permissions to roles instead of individuals.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The three ideas fail differently when applied alone. Least privilege without SoD still lets one narrowly scoped account both create and approve the same type of record, because narrow doesn't mean isolated. RBAC without SoD can quietly hand one person two roles that were never meant to overlap, like an accounts-payable clerk covering for an approver during a vacation week. The role definitions look clean, the combination defeats the control.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of this makes RBAC unnecessary. It's the tool that makes SoD enforceable at scale. See &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/what-is-rbac-access-control/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;how RBAC assigns access by role&lt;/a&gt; for the underlying model: instead of tracking individual permissions, an administrator defines roles, and SoD rules decide which roles a single account can hold at once.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Principle&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it controls&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Fails without it&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Least privilege&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;How much access one account has&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Accounts accumulate unused, high-risk permissions over time&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;RBAC&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;How access maps to job function&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Permissions get assigned ad hoc, inconsistently, per person&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Segregation of duties&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Whether one account can finish a sensitive process alone&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;A single compromised or careless account can complete fraud or cause damage with no second party involved&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Common segregation of duties conflicts (with examples)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A segregation of duties conflict exists whenever one account or one person holds two roles that, combined, let them complete a sensitive process without a second party involved. The clearest examples sit in finance and procurement, but the same failure pattern shows up in DevOps pipelines, HR systems, and credential vaults.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Formalized SoD requirements trace back to the accounting scandals at Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s, which led directly to the &lt;a href="https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/office-hours-gary-gensler-sarbanes-oxley?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Sarbanes-Oxley Act&lt;/a&gt; and its &lt;a href="https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/404guide.pdf?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Section 404 internal-controls mandate&lt;/a&gt;. That history still shapes how auditors approach the control today: SoD exists because informal trust stops scaling once a company passes a certain size.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When one person can both create a vendor and approve its payment, fraud requires no collusion at all.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Domain&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Conflicting duties&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it enables if combined&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Finance&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Create a vendor + approve its invoice&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Fictitious vendor payments with no second reviewer&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Procurement&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Request a purchase + approve the purchase order&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Unauthorized spending routed around budget controls&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;IT / DevOps&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Deploy code + approve the deployment&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Unreviewed code reaches production, including backdoors&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;HR&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Set an employee's pay rate + process payroll&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Unauthorized pay changes that no one else verifies&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Credential management&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Create a vault + grant its own admin rights&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;One account that stores secrets and controls who can see them, with no independent oversight&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;IT administration&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Provision user accounts + approve access requests&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Accounts created and approved by the same person, bypassing review&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If one row in that table describes how your vault works today, that gap is fixable. &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Try Passwork free&lt;/a&gt; and see how vault policies close it.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;How to build a segregation of duties matrix&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A segregation of duties matrix maps roles against the actions those roles can take, so conflicts become visible before they cause a problem. Building one takes five steps.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Identify the critical processes.&lt;/strong&gt; Start with anything that moves money, changes access, or touches production: vendor payments, payroll changes, code deployment, credential and vault administration.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;List every role involved.&lt;/strong&gt; Include job-title roles (accounts-payable clerk, DevOps engineer) and system roles (vault administrator, approver) side by side.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Map roles against actions.&lt;/strong&gt; Build a grid with roles on one axis and actions, such as create, approve, execute, and record, on the other. Mark every action each role can currently perform.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Flag the overlaps.&lt;/strong&gt; Any role that can both initiate and approve the same process, or both execute and record it, is a conflict.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Resolve each conflict.&lt;/strong&gt; Reassign the role, split the process across two roles, or, where reassignment isn't practical, document a compensating control.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A small worked example, three roles against three actions in an accounts-payable process:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Role&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Create vendor&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Approve payment&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Reconcile ledger&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;AP clerk&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Finance manager&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Auditor&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;No&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Yes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;No single row can check every column. That's the matrix working as intended.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Preventive vs. detective SoD controls (and compensating controls for lean teams)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Preventive SoD controls&lt;/strong&gt; stop a conflicting assignment before it happens, usually by blocking a role combination in the access system itself. Detective controls catch conflicts after the fact, through audit trails and periodic access review. Compensating controls substitute for either when a team is too small to fully separate a process.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Preventive controls are the strongest, because they remove the opportunity entirely. A role system that refuses to let one account hold both "approver" and "requester" for the same workflow never lets the conflict form in the first place.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Detective controls&lt;/strong&gt; accept that some overlap is unavoidable and catch it instead. An audit trail that logs who created a record, who approved it, and who accessed it afterward lets a reviewer spot a conflict during an access certification, even if the system allowed it to happen.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most SoD guidance assumes a dedicated identity governance and administration (IGA) or GRC platform running continuous conflict checks. Small IT teams rarely have that budget, and most guidance skips what to do instead.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Four compensating controls cover most of the gap. Call it the four-control SoD baseline:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Separate roles wherever headcount allows&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Route anything that can't be separated through a second approver&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Log every privileged action to an exportable audit trail&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Review access on a fixed schedule instead of never&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of the four requires a GRC platform. All four require someone to own the schedule.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Segregation of duties and compliance frameworks&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Segregation of duties shows up by name or by requirement in most major compliance frameworks, though the legal weight varies by sector and jurisdiction. SOX ties it to financial reporting controls, NIST and ISO frame it as a general security control, and NIS2 folds it into access control policy requirements for essential and important entities in the EU.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of these frameworks hand over a ready-made SoD matrix. They require that the organization has one and can show how conflicts get resolved.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Framework&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it requires&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Citation&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;SOX&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Documented internal controls over financial reporting, including access controls that keep one person from completing certain transactions alone&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;a href="https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/404guide.pdf?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;SOX Section 404&lt;/a&gt;, SEC small-business guide&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Organizations define and document individual duties, then configure system access so no combination of duties lets one account complete a sensitive process alone&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/53/r5/upd1/final?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST AC-5&lt;/a&gt;, control AC-5&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;ISO/IEC 27001:2022&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Segregation of duties as a named control area, covering how conflicting duties and responsibilities are separated&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/27001?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ISO/IEC 27001:2022&lt;/a&gt;, Annex A control 5.3&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;NIS2 Directive&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Essential and important entities implement measures covering human resources security, access control policies, and asset management&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIS2 Directive, Article 21&lt;/a&gt;, Art. 21(2)(i)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;SOX's Section 404 mandate is the one most compliance-driven SoD programs cite by reflex, though it applies specifically to public companies' financial reporting controls, not to every framework in this table. Whether SoD is legally required for a given organization depends on sector, jurisdiction, and which frameworks apply. A compliance or legal team is the right source for that determination. This table is a map, not a legal opinion.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Segregation of duties checklist&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Use this checklist to move from an ad hoc access setup to a documented segregation of duties program, with or without a dedicated GRC platform.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Map every critical process that moves money, changes access, or touches production.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Build a segregation of duties matrix and flag every role that can both initiate and approve the same action.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Assign non-removable administrators per vault or policy type, so oversight doesn't depend on who created the resource.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Enable AD/LDAP group sync so access changes follow directory updates instead of manual tickets.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Turn on exportable audit logging for every privileged action.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Schedule periodic access review, more often for high-risk roles than for standard ones.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Document compensating controls wherever strict separation isn't feasible, and record who owns each one.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

</description>
      <category>accessmanagement</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Monthly cybersecurity news: Authentication under siege</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 02 Sep 2026 23:43:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/monthly-cybersecurity-news-authentication-under-siege-19b9</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/monthly-cybersecurity-news-authentication-under-siege-19b9</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fh96tq7evg3ky8i827wjn.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fh96tq7evg3ky8i827wjn.png" alt="Monthly cybersecurity news roundup for August 2026 — blue speech bubble icon with lightning bolt graphic" width="799" height="413"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;August's cybersecurity news&lt;/strong&gt; had a common thread: attackers found ways around the login itself instead of attacking it directly. Authentication bypasses, forged tokens, stolen sessions, exposed API keys, and leaked machine credentials repeatedly provided access without requiring attackers to crack a password or defeat MFA.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;More than &lt;strong&gt;9,300&lt;/strong&gt; active AWS access keys were found in public repositories, build logs, and container images. Among the corporate keys were 526 root keys and 242 IAM keys with full AdministratorAccess permissions.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The March LiteLLM supply-chain incident may have exposed more than &lt;strong&gt;2,500&lt;/strong&gt; organizations and 434,000 CI/CD pipelines, according to an impact assessment published in August.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Researchers found &lt;strong&gt;4,576&lt;/strong&gt; n8n API tokens in public GitHub repositories; among reachable instances tested, 36% accepted at least one leaked key.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Mirage2FA targeted &lt;strong&gt;9,426&lt;/strong&gt; Microsoft 365 email addresses and compromised up to 4,532 of them by stealing authenticated sessions after MFA.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The same pattern showed up in &lt;strong&gt;four disclosed vulnerabilities&lt;/strong&gt; : N-able N-central, Citrix NetScaler, Keycloak, and SharePoint all disclosed flaws capable of bypassing authentication or identity controls. Separately, password-spraying activity rose 155-fold as attackers probed for gaps in MFA enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The incidents below show how authentication is expanding beyond passwords and login screens — and where IT and security teams need to adjust their controls.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Active exploitation of a critical authentication bypass in N-able N-central remote management platform (CVE-2026-18577)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The vulnerability CVE-2026-18577 (CVSS 8.1) allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to fully bypass authentication and gain administrative access to N-central servers. The flaw stems from an incomplete fix for a previous vulnerability, CVE-2026-18556. Active in-the-wild exploitation has been recorded since August 1, 2026, with attackers using the legitimate Take Control feature to reach customer endpoints after compromise and deploying a cloudflared tunnel for persistent remote access.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Remote monitoring and management (RMM) platforms hold the highest privilege level across an organization's entire infrastructure and its connected clients. An authentication bypass in such software immediately creates a supply-chain exposure risk across the whole client base.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; IT teams must urgently check their platform version and confirm that N-able hotfix 2026.3.1.10 (2026.3.1 Hotfix 2) is installed. A review of active privileged sessions is also critical.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-18577-n-able-n-central-authentication-bypass-exploited-in-the-wild/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Rapid7&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 4, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Remote, zero-interaction authentication bypass in Citrix NetScaler Gateway (CVE-2026-19490)&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Citrix patched a critical alternate-path authentication vulnerability, CVE-2026-19490 (CVSS score 9.3), in NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the flaw on affected gateway configurations (including SSL VPN, ICA Proxy, CVPN, RDP Proxy, and AAA) without any user interaction. Preconditions vary by version: newer affected builds require a SAML configuration in addition to a Gateway or AAA setup, so not every NetScaler deployment is exposed the same way.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Remote access gateways serve as the primary perimeter defense for corporate networks. A successful authentication bypass at this layer completely negates the value of employee corporate credentials and MFA policies.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Because these appliances are directly exposed to the internet, IT teams should perform an emergency update to the patched builds provided by Citrix (14.1-73.32 or 13.1-63.21 and later).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.securityweek.com/exploitation-expected-for-critical-authentication-bypass-patched-in-citrix-netscaler/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;SecurityWeek&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 20, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Perimeter credentials alone can't be the last line of defense against flaws like this one. Passwork adds a centrally managed, audited layer for the credentials and secrets behind your gateways and RMM tools. &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;See how Passwork's access control works&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Critical Keycloak password-reset vulnerability (CVE-2026-18963) leading to remote account takeover&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; A critical vulnerability, CVE-2026-18963 (CVSS score 9.1 per Red Hat), was found in Keycloak's password recovery (reset-credentials) flow. Due to improper state validation, a remote, unauthenticated attacker can reset any user's password, including administrators'. Fixes have been released in Keycloak 26.7.2, as well as Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.15 and 26.6.6.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Validation flaws in account-recovery flows undermine any strict password-complexity requirements or initial MFA, giving attackers a direct path to compromising the identity provider (IdP).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; IT teams should prioritize patching Keycloak servers and test password-reset and account-recovery flows with the same rigor applied to primary authentication methods.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/critical-keycloak-password-reset-flaw.html?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Hacker News&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 24, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Critical remote code execution vulnerability CVE-2026-69836 (CVSS 10.0) fixed in Microsoft Entra ID's cloud directory&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Microsoft fixed a critical remote code execution vulnerability, CVE-2026-69836, in Entra ID's cloud service, related to deserialization of untrusted data. Unlike the other flaws in this digest, this is a remote code execution issue in cloud infrastructure, not a credential or authentication bypass. Microsoft resolved the issue server-side, requiring no action from customers. The flaw was initially flagged as exploited in real-world attacks, but Microsoft later revised the status to "not exploited."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Entra ID is the central hub for access control and authorization for thousands of companies. Maximum-severity vulnerabilities in identity providers' cloud infrastructure create global risks across the entire trusted ecosystem.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Despite the automatic patch applied by the provider, security teams should monitor for anomalies in cloud identity logs and revisit risk assumptions about access during incidents affecting key service providers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.securityweek.com/microsoft-rolls-out-22-fresh-security-patches/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;SecurityWeek&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;/&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.heise.de/news/Microsoft-stopft-zahlreiche-Cloud-Schwachstellen-11423129.html?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;heise online&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 21-24, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Mass exposure of active AWS keys threatens full takeover of corporate accounts&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Research by Truffle Security identified more than 9,300 AWS access keys leaked into public repositories, build logs, and container images, keys that remained valid and active for years. Of these, 817 belonged to companies, including 526 root keys and 242 IAM keys with full AdministratorAccess permissions, granting complete control over cloud infrastructure.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Leaked long-lived access keys, especially those with administrator rights, give attackers unimpeded access to cloud resources, bypassing standard authorization portals and MFA entirely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; IT teams must prohibit the use of AWS root accounts in routine processes, set up continuous scanning of public sources for exposed secrets, and immediately revoke and rotate any compromised keys, following &lt;a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/root-user-best-practices.html?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AWS's own root user best practices&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://trufflesecurity.com/blog/leaked-corporate-aws-keys-held-full-admin-rights?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Truffle Security&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 19, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;CloudSEK report maps potential exposure from the March LiteLLM supply-chain incident&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; On August 11, CloudSEK published an impact assessment of the March 24 compromise involving malicious LiteLLM releases 1.82.7 and 1.82.8. The report estimates that the short-lived PyPI exposure (the packages were publicly available for roughly 40 minutes) may have affected more than 2,500 organizations and over 434,000 CI/CD pipelines worldwide.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The assessment focuses on the potential exposure of high-value machine credentials available to affected development and build environments. CloudSEK’s figures describe reconstructed exposure risk, not confirmed compromise of every named organization or pipeline.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; AI development and build automation environments now hold the highest concentration of non-human (machine) secrets in an organization. Compromising tooling at the build stage lets attackers strike deep inside the infrastructure, and the delay between the original incident and a full exposure estimate shows how long that risk can go unquantified.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Machine credentials require strict lifecycle control, rotation, and access-rights auditing. IT teams need to implement security monitoring for third-party libraries and protect environment variables in CI/CD pipelines. Passwork's &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/tech-guides/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;technical guides&lt;/a&gt; cover API-based secret rotation patterns that fit directly into this kind of pipeline hardening.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.cloudsek.com/blog/ai-supply-chain-breach-2500-companies-434000-cicd-pipelines?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;CloudSEK&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 11, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Vulnerability in the N-able Passportal browser extension exposes users' password vault master keys&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The Passportal browser extension accepted messages from third-party websites and iframe elements. Attackers could send a request and obtain extension access tokens containing secret keys. This allowed extraction of the entire contents of the password vault, including seeds for generating one-time TOTP codes. N-able released a patch adding origin-checking for requests in July 2026; Dark Reading's August coverage detailed the flaw and its impact.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Password managers concentrate an organization's most critical secrets. Compromising a password manager's browser extension effectively bypasses the entire security architecture, MFA factors included. The risk was compounded by refresh tokens remaining valid for 100 days.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Organizations need to enforce regular automatic updates of browser extensions on employee devices, and when selecting IAM solutions, evaluate whether they support end-to-end encryption of client-side operations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-threats/n-able-bug-password-vault-master-keys?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Dark Reading&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 20, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A browser extension is only as trustworthy as its architecture. Passwork uses client-side AES-256 encryption with a zero-knowledge model, so vault data stays encrypted even in transit through the browser layer. &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Explore Passwork's security architecture&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Mirage2FA phishing campaign bypasses Microsoft 365 multi-factor authentication through session theft&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The Mirage2FA platform uses adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing to intercept legitimate Microsoft 365 session authorization tokens. The campaign compromised up to 4,532 email addresses, roughly 48% of the 9,426 addresses targeted, across 3,518 organization domains in the US and EU.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Session cookies effectively become the equivalent of user credentials once initial MFA verification has passed. Session theft bypasses standard protection factors without requiring a password or code to be re-entered.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Traditional SMS- or app-code-based MFA is no longer sufficient to protect cloud systems on its own. Organizations need to adopt phishing-resistant authentication methods, shorten session token lifetimes, and set up monitoring for anomalous session behavior.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/mirage2fa-surge-hits-4500-us-and-eu.html?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Hacker News&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 25, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;JWT authentication bypass in Microsoft SharePoint (CVE-2026-55040) allows impersonation of any user&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; A vulnerability, CVE-2026-55040, was discovered in SharePoint Server Subscription Edition that lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker generate a forged JWT token and impersonate any user or portal administrator. Microsoft patched the flaw in July 2026. Rapid7's August technical analysis detailed the chain of defects behind it, including a disabled token signature requirement and weak validation of token elements, and confirmed active exploitation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; JWT validation errors let attackers fully bypass authentication without needing to steal user passwords.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Service-to-service trust relationships and token validation must be checked and controlled by IT teams with the same rigor applied to user passwords and MFA sessions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/ra-microsoft-sharepoint-jwt-token-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-55040/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Rapid7 blog&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 11, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Exploitation of an SSRF vulnerability in MLflow (CVE-2026-64849) for covert credential exfiltration from cloud environments&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.3, CVE-2026-64849, was found in the model registry of the MLflow Tracking Server. It lets an unauthenticated attacker bypass webhook safeguards and reach internal cloud metadata services to exfiltrate short-lived credentials. The issue affects all MLflow versions prior to 3.15.0.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Cloud metadata services often issue short-lived access keys that, once compromised, can be used by attackers for rapid lateral movement inside a company's cloud environment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Teams running machine learning platforms need to patch MLflow to version 3.15.0 and restrict network access to metadata services from containers and AI tooling, following the pattern in &lt;a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/configuring-instance-metadata-service.html?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AWS's IMDSv2 configuration guidance&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.securityweek.com/mlflow-vulnerability-exploited-for-cloud-credential-theft/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;SecurityWeek&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 20, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Thousands of leaked n8n API tokens found in GitHub repositories, threatening compromise of connected IT services&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Researchers found 4,576 unique n8n API tokens in public GitHub repositories, linked to 1,255 hosts. Testing against accessible instances found that 36% of them (321 of 896 reachable hosts) accepted at least one leaked key. With a privileged token, attackers could view automation workflow structures, execution logs, and extract credentials stored in n8n for third-party database and service integrations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Automation and integration platforms act as hubs where passwords, API keys, and access rights to numerous corporate IT systems accumulate. A single leaked API token to such a hub creates massive risk of cascading compromise across the entire IT infrastructure, even though the exposure itself is not tracked as a CVE.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; IT departments need to extend secret-scanning policies beyond core application code, covering configuration files of automation and integration tools as well.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://thehackernews.com/2026/08/leaked-n8n-api-tokens-exposed-live.html?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Hacker News&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 5, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;155-fold surge in password-spraying attacks exploiting MFA misconfigurations and exceptions&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Analysts recorded a &lt;a href="https://www.huntress.com/blog/twist-the-nozzle-on-password-spraying-a-tradecraft-tuesday-recap?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;155-fold increase&lt;/a&gt; in the scale of password-spraying attacks in the first half of 2026. Analysis of 23 affected companies found that 8 of them had no multi-factor authentication (MFA) at all. In the remaining 15 cases, MFA was enabled but failed to work, because IT departments had configured exceptions for "trusted locations," limited policy enforcement to a subset of applications or user groups, or left MFA running in report-only (audit) mode.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Deploying MFA does not guarantee protection if blind spots remain in security policies. Attackers actively search for loopholes and applications left unprotected by MFA to gain initial network access.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; IT teams need to eliminate "trusted IP address" exceptions, implement comprehensive MFA coverage across all external entry points, and regularly audit how security policies are actually enforced.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/password-spraying-attacks-surge-155x-as-hackers-exploit-mfa-gaps/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;BleepingComputer&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 19, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Unverified claims by hacker "TheHatman" of mass credential theft from Microsoft Entra corporate customers&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; Between August 1 and 17, 2026, a hacker forum user going by "TheHatman" posted offers to sell employee data from large enterprises, allegedly obtained from Microsoft Entra cloud environments through compromised credentials. Unit 42 researchers were unable to confirm a specific entry vector or an actual breach of the Entra service itself, leaving the threat classified as an "unverified breach via account credential theft."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Even though the hacker's claims of breaching the provider's infrastructure remain unconfirmed, the incident drew wide attention and illustrated how attackers use compromised passwords to compromise cloud tenants. Unverified claims of this kind should be treated by IT teams as a signal to check their own systems, not as proof that the platform itself was breached.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; IT and security teams need to set up regular monitoring for leaked employee credentials and watch for signs of MFA fatigue and password-spraying attempts against cloud identity directories. Unverified threats should be used to build threat-hunting hypotheses, not to trigger panic responses.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/large-scale-credential-attacks/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Unit 42 report&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 18, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;Comparative analysis of SOC response effectiveness based on CISA red team tests&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What happened:&lt;/strong&gt; The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) evaluated the defenses of two organizations through red team penetration testing. One organization completely missed and failed to contain the attackers' actions, while the other quickly detected initial compromise attempts and isolated the affected hosts. CISA's recommendations include maintaining baseline detection profiles, using Conditional Access policies for workload identities, and promptly rotating and revoking tokens.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Why it matters:&lt;/strong&gt; Monitoring tools are useless without well-honed incident-response processes. Protecting cloud and hybrid environments depends directly on integrating identity and access management (IAM) systems with security team on-call playbooks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The defensive takeaway:&lt;/strong&gt; Privilege inventory processes, Conditional Access verification, and emergency session-token revocation need to be practiced regularly through drills and attack simulations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Source:&lt;/em&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa26-237a?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;em&gt;CISA Advisory&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;em&gt;– August 25, 2026&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  &lt;strong&gt;August 2026 recap&lt;/strong&gt;
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In August, attackers went around authentication using forged tokens, stolen sessions, leaked keys and much of this activity doesn't trip the alerts most organizations rely on. In practice, that means password policy alone no longer covers most of your attack surface: sessions, tokens, and machine credentials need the same lifecycle controls that passwords already have.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Three priorities for September:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Patch the four disclosed authentication bypasses.&lt;/strong&gt;  N-central and SharePoint had confirmed in-the-wild exploitation this review period. NetScaler and Keycloak warrant urgent patching given their severity, even without confirmed exploitation to date.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Audit authentication end to end, not just the login screen.&lt;/strong&gt;  MFA at sign-in provides limited protection if account recovery, JWT validation, session lifetimes, or Conditional Access coverage have gaps. Mirage2FA and CaptiveCrunch both bypassed MFA by stealing a session or token after authentication, not by defeating it.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Scan repositories and CI/CD pipelines for exposed keys&lt;/strong&gt; , the way GitGuardian and Truffle Security did in August, and build revocation and rotation into routine operations rather than incident response.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>passwordsecurity</category>
      <category>security</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>How to teach children about password security: Tips for parents</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:17:54 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/how-to-teach-children-about-password-security-tips-for-parents-4lb3</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/how-to-teach-children-about-password-security-tips-for-parents-4lb3</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fq5rg5euyiargwb4wa7vc.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fq5rg5euyiargwb4wa7vc.png" alt="An illustration of a shield made from colorful building blocks with a keyhole and padlock icons, symbolizing password security and protecting children online." width="800" height="414"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;As the new school year begins, children start logging into more apps, school platforms, email accounts, and games on their own. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Many families only think about password security after something goes wrong. For example, a Roblox account taken over by a stranger, or a fake message pretending to come from the school asking a student to “confirm” their login. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We'd rather you start before that happens.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;Create, Protect, Recover routine&lt;/strong&gt; below takes about ten minutes to teach and continues to work as children move from their first gaming account to managing school and email logins more independently.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Create a password and motivation to protect important things
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A password protects the things your child cares about online, including schoolwork, game progress, messages, photos, and personal information. Describe it as a key to a digital room: someone who gets the key may enter the room, change what is inside, or lock its owner out.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This analogy gives children a reason to care without frightening them. Start by showing your child what each account holds.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it protects&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Why it matters&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;School account&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;It may contain assignments, messages, and personal details.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Gaming account&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;It may hold saved progress, purchases, and conversations.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Social account&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;It can contain photos, contacts, and private messages.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Email account&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;It may provide the reset route for other accounts.&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Give the email password special attention. Email services often receive password-reset links for other accounts, so access to email may lead to access elsewhere. &lt;a href="https://www.ceopeducation.co.uk/parents/articles/parents-guide-to-cyber-security/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;CEOP Education&lt;/a&gt; (the UK National Crime Agency's child safety programme) advises families to use a separate, strong password for email.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Ask what your child wants to keep safe in each account. Their answer might be a drawing, a message from a friend, or saved game progress. Password safety for kids makes more sense when the password protects something they value.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Teach children password security in a way that is age-appropriate
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Teach children password security by matching responsibility to their age, confidence, and account type. Give every account its own long &lt;strong&gt;passphrase&lt;/strong&gt; , then increase independence gradually. Keep a clear route for asking for help with forgotten passwords, suspicious messages, lost devices, and account recovery.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;strong&gt;passphrase&lt;/strong&gt; is a longer password made from several words. Choose words the child can remember but other people cannot connect to them. Leave out names, birthdays, school names, addresses, pets, favourite teams, and details posted online.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Each account needs a different passphrase. If a reused password appears in a data breach, someone can try it on the child's other accounts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://www.nist.gov/cybersecurity-and-privacy/how-do-i-create-good-password?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST&lt;/a&gt;'s 2025 consumer guidance recommends at least 15 characters when a password is required and treats length as the main priority. Use that figure as guidance for parents rather than a test the child must pass. A password manager can store long passwords that are difficult to remember.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Avoid forcing children to add symbols and numbers unless the website requires them. Substituting a number for a letter often creates an easy-to-predict pattern. Follow the website's rules while prioritising length and uniqueness.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Ages 5–8: Learn the privacy rule&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Children in this age range can learn that a password stays secret from friends, classmates, other players, and strangers. A parent or guardian may help them create, enter, store, or recover it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Keep the lesson short. Say: "This password opens your account. We keep it private, and you can always ask me for help."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Ages 9–12: Create a passphrase together&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Let the child choose several unrelated words. Check that the words contain no personal facts, then explain that the finished passphrase belongs to one account.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Ask the child to explain the rule back to you. If they can describe why password reuse is risky, they have understood the reason behind the rule.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Teens: Hand over responsibility gradually&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Teens can create and store their own passwords, review recovery options, and manage a second sign-in check. Agree in advance on what they should do if they lose access or respond to a suspicious message.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Respect their growing privacy while keeping a no-shame help rule. Reporting a mistake early should lead to calm action. &lt;a href="https://www.unicef.org/parenting/child-care/online-privacy?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;UNICEF&lt;/a&gt;'s online privacy checklist for parents recommends giving older children age-appropriate responsibility for their privacy and security.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Try this tonight: The five-minute passphrase check
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Choose&lt;/strong&gt; one low-risk account your child already uses.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Ask&lt;/strong&gt; what information or activity the account protects.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Check&lt;/strong&gt; that its password is unique and contains no personal facts.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Decide&lt;/strong&gt; where the family will store it safely.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Practice&lt;/strong&gt; this sentence: "Something looks wrong with my account, so I need help."&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Protect the password after it is made
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A good passphrase works only when the family can keep it private, store it safely, and recover the account if something goes wrong. Start with email, school, gaming, shopping, and social accounts. They may contain personal information, saved purchases, private messages, or payment details.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Use the Create, Store, Add a Second Check plan:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Create a unique password for each account. Use a long passphrase when the child needs to type or remember it. Let a password manager generate a random password when memorisation is unnecessary.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Store it securely. A &lt;strong&gt;password manager&lt;/strong&gt; is a tool that creates and stores different passwords so the family does not need to remember them all. Its &lt;strong&gt;master password&lt;/strong&gt; opens the password vault, so the responsible parent should create and protect it carefully.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Add a second check. &lt;strong&gt;Two-factor authentication (2FA)&lt;/strong&gt; adds another check after the password. This might be an approval on a device or a code from an app. You may also see this called 2-step verification, 2SV, or MFA.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Turn on 2FA for important accounts when the service offers it. Keep recovery codes private and store them separately from the password. Anyone with a working recovery code may be able to enter the account.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A &lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/what-is-passkey-how-does-it-work/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;passkey&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt; lets someone approve a sign-in with a device PIN, fingerprint, or face scan instead of typing a password. If you see this option, check how the account can be recovered if the device is lost or replaced.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The UK's &lt;a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blogs/passkeys-are-more-secure-than-traditional-ways-to-log-in?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;National Cyber Security Centre&lt;/a&gt; recommends passkeys where supported and 2-step verification where passkeys are unavailable. Recovery options still differ by service and the child's age.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Recognize phishing and keep the password private
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Give children one exact boundary: "Never share a password with a friend, classmate, other player, or stranger." Younger children may need help from a parent or guardian. As children become more independent, agree on recovery and reporting rules instead of demanding access to every account.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A request for a password can sound friendly or urgent. Another player might offer free game items. A message that seems to come from school might claim the child's account will close unless they sign in immediately.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/social-engineering-vs-phishing-expert-guide/?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Phishing&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt; is a fake message or website that tries to steal a password, verification code, or personal information. Children do not need to judge every message alone. Teach them to pause and ask for help.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Pause before you sign in
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Stop&lt;/strong&gt;. Do not reply or enter a password.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Do not click the link&lt;/strong&gt;. Show the message to a trusted adult.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Open the official app&lt;/strong&gt; , use an existing bookmark, or type a known address.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href="https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/how-recognize-avoid-phishing-scams?ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;FTC&lt;/a&gt; gives the same advice. Contact an organisation through an app, phone number, or website you already know is genuine, rather than using details in the suspicious message.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A game message might say, "Confirm your account now to keep your items." Tell your child to stop. If appropriate, take a screenshot and ask an adult to check the account through the normal app.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Never blame a child for clicking. Shame delays reporting. A quick report gives the family more time to change the password, review activity, and stop further changes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Recover an account without panic
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Recover an account through the service's official route, change the exposed password, and check what happened. The child should tell a trusted adult first. Together, they can review recent activity, remove unknown devices, restore the second sign-in check, and store new recovery details safely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Use the Recover part of the &lt;strong&gt;Create, Protect, Recover&lt;/strong&gt; routine:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Tell a trusted adult&lt;/strong&gt;. Explain what happened, including any link opened, password entered, code shared, purchase noticed, or unexpected sign-in reported.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Open the official service&lt;/strong&gt;. Use its known app, a saved bookmark, or an address that the parent types directly. Avoid links and phone numbers from the suspicious message.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Reset the password&lt;/strong&gt;. Follow the service's official account-recovery process on a familiar, updated device. Create a new, unique password. If the old password was reused, change it on every account where it appears.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Review account activity and devices&lt;/strong&gt;. Look for unfamiliar sign-ins, messages, purchases, profile changes, or recovery addresses. Sign out of devices the family does not recognise, if the service offers that option.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Restore account protection&lt;/strong&gt;. Turn 2FA back on, confirm that the passkey still works, and replace any recovery codes that may have been exposed. Treat recovery codes as private credentials and store them securely.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  What to check after a reset
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The new password is unique.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The recovery email address or phone number is correct.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Unknown devices have been signed out where possible.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;2FA or the passkey remains active.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Purchases, messages, and profile changes look familiar.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Saved passwords on shared devices have been updated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Parental controls and privacy settings remain correct.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Recovery steps differ by service. For example, &lt;a href="https://support.google.com/families/answer/7103262?hl=en&amp;amp;ref=blog.passwork.club" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Google&lt;/a&gt; says that changing the password of a supervised child account turns off 2-Step Verification. Families using that account type need to turn it on again after the reset.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Make password security a family habit
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To teach children password security, practise the Create, Protect, Recover routine until asking for help feels normal. Start with one account today: review its passphrase, add a second sign-in check if available, and ask your child who they would tell if a login looked wrong.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>passwordsecurity</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Por qué los hashes SHA-256 de contraseñas siguen siendo vulnerados</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 15:36:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/por-que-los-hashes-sha-256-de-contrasenas-siguen-siendo-vulnerados-1k6o</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/por-que-los-hashes-sha-256-de-contrasenas-siguen-siendo-vulnerados-1k6o</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Uno de los artículos de nuestro blog se ha mantenido consistentemente como el más popular: "Cómo funciona SHA-256: ¿Se puede desencriptar?". Decidimos traer algunas ideas de ese artículo a Dev.to, y esperamos que el tema anime a algunos de ustedes a cuestionar, refinar o ampliar estas ideas en los comentarios. Empecemos.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  SHA-256 solo funciona en una dirección
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;"¿Se puede desencriptar SHA-256?" parece una pregunta razonable, pero mezcla dos operaciones distintas.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;El cifrado está diseñado para ser reversible: los datos se transforman usando una clave, y quien tenga la clave adecuada puede recuperar el texto original. SHA-256 funciona de otra manera. Toma una entrada y produce un resumen (digest) de longitud fija, y el algoritmo solo calcula ese resumen hacia adelante.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Los hashes de contraseñas siguen siendo atacables por otra vía: la adivinación (guessing).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Supongamos que un atacante obtiene una base de datos con valores SHA-256(contraseña). Puede tomar una contraseña probable, aplicarle el hash y comparar el resultado con el valor almacenado. Una coincidencia revela la contraseña que produjo ese verificador.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;El hashing y el cifrado resuelven problemas diferentes. La resistencia a la reversión bloquea un tipo de ataque. La adivinación sigue disponible como otro.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Qué hace SHA-256
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;SHA-256 acepta un mensaje de longitud arbitraria y produce un resumen determinista de 256 bits. Una entrada idéntica produce una salida idéntica, e incluso un pequeño cambio en la entrada modifica radicalmente el resumen resultante.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Internamente, SHA-256 rellena el mensaje, lo procesa en bloques de 512 bits, expande cada bloque en un calendario de mensajes (message schedule) y ejecuta una función de compresión durante 64 rondas. Para las decisiones sobre almacenamiento de contraseñas, una característica de diseño importa más que cualquier otra: SHA-256 está construido para calcular resúmenes de forma eficiente.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Esa eficiencia es útil. SHA-256 aparece en verificaciones de integridad, flujos de firma digital y otros sistemas donde procesar datos rápidamente es exactamente lo que los desarrolladores necesitan. Las contraseñas plantean un problema distinto.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Por qué el hashing rápido también ayuda a los atacantes
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Durante un inicio de sesión normal, calcular un resumen SHA-256 con rapidez parece ideal. Después de una filtración de base de datos, esa misma velocidad beneficia al atacante.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Un atacante que trabaja sin conexión (offline) opera de forma independiente a tu aplicación. Los límites de frecuencia, la limitación de peticiones (throttling) de la API y los bloqueos de cuenta quedan fuera de juego, porque el atacante prueba contraseñas candidatas contra un verificador robado usando su propio hardware.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Para una función de hash de propósito general, hacer que cada cálculo sea económico es buena ingeniería. Para el almacenamiento de contraseñas, queremos que cada intento tenga un costo computacional significativo.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Por eso la &lt;a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Guía de almacenamiento de contraseñas de OWASP&lt;/a&gt; recomienda esquemas de hashing de contraseñas dedicados en lugar de funciones de hash rápidas de propósito general como SHA-256.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;La distinción importante está entre un primitivo criptográfico y el sistema construido a su alrededor. SHA-256 puede seguir siendo una función de hash segura mientras que SHA-256(contraseña) sigue siendo un diseño de almacenamiento de contraseñas deficiente.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  El salting y la derivación de claves resuelven problemas distintos
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Añadir una sal (salt) es una mejora esencial, pero su propósito a veces se malinterpreta.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Una sal es un valor aleatorio único asociado a cada registro de contraseña. Dos usuarios que elijan la misma contraseña producen entonces valores almacenados diferentes. El salting también anula la precomputación reutilizable: un atacante no puede preparar una sola tabla de hashes de contraseñas comunes y aplicarla de forma eficiente en múltiples usuarios o bases de datos.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Una sal convierte cada registro de contraseña almacenado en un objetivo distinto. Hacer que cada intento sea costoso es un trabajo aparte, gestionado por una función de derivación de claves (KDF) para contraseñas.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;La sal normalmente se guarda junto al verificador de la contraseña, así que en cuanto un atacante roba la base de datos, la conoce. Aun así puede tomar una contraseña candidata, combinarla con la sal de ese usuario, calcular el resultado y compararlo con el verificador almacenado.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Una KDF para contraseñas diseñada específicamente se encarga de ese segundo trabajo, incrementando deliberadamente el costo de cada intento. Argon2id y PBKDF2, por ejemplo, permiten a los sistemas ajustar la cantidad de trabajo necesaria para derivar un verificador.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Los controles resuelven problemas distintos:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Control&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Función principal&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Dónde queda corto&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Sal aleatoria única&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Evita la precomputación compartida y hace que contraseñas idénticas generen hashes diferentes&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;La velocidad de adivinación contra un registro conocido no cambia&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Argon2id / PBKDF2&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Hace que cada intento offline sea más costoso&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Una contraseña débil sigue siendo débil&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Limitación de frecuencia + MFA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reduce el riesgo de apropiación de cuenta en línea&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Una base de hashes robada sigue necesitando su propia protección&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Estos mecanismos se complementan entre sí. Cada uno cubre una parte distinta de la amenaza.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Qué usar en un sistema nuevo
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Para una aplicación nueva, una opción por defecto razonable suele ser Argon2id. OWASP recomienda actualmente esta opción como la preferida para el hashing de contraseñas. Cuando aplican requisitos FIPS-140, OWASP recomienda PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 con un factor de trabajo de al menos 600,000.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Trata PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 como una construcción distinta de SHA-256 puro. SHA-256 puede formar parte de la construcción, pero PBKDF2 combina una función pseudoaleatoria con una sal y un factor de trabajo configurable, específicamente para hacer que las adivinaciones repetidas sean más costosas.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST SP 800-63B&lt;/a&gt; describe de forma similar el hashing de contraseñas en torno a sales y factores de costo, incrementando este último a medida que el rendimiento del sistema lo permite.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Trata esos parámetros como configuración: pon a prueba su rendimiento (benchmark) en tu infraestructura, documenta la decisión y revísala conforme evolucionen el hardware y las recomendaciones.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Las aplicaciones también necesitan una vía de actualización. Un framework o una biblioteca criptográfica mantenida activamente facilita esto más que implementar el esquema por cuenta propia. Almacena suficientes metadatos junto a cada verificador, incluyendo la versión del algoritmo, la sal, los parámetros y el verificador, para poder reconocer registros antiguos y migrarlos más adelante.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Más allá del hashing de contraseñas: los controles que aún necesitas
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Una buena KDF para contraseñas cambia principalmente la economía de la adivinación offline después de que se ha robado una base de verificadores. Aborda un modelo de amenaza: la adivinación offline tras una filtración. Otras vías de ataque requieren controles independientes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Los sistemas en producción todavía necesitan controles alrededor del flujo de inicio de sesión. La limitación de frecuencia incrementa el costo de la adivinación en línea. La MFA reduce el valor de una contraseña robada. Las políticas de contraseñas y las verificaciones contra contraseñas filtradas reducen las credenciales predecibles. La autenticación resistente al phishing aborda ataques que el hashing de contraseñas nunca llega a ver.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;La planificación operativa también importa. Parámetros que parecían razonables hace varios años pueden llegar a ser económicos de calcular con el tiempo. Una estrategia de migración práctica consiste en detectar un verificador desactualizado tras un inicio de sesión exitoso y derivar uno nuevo usando el esquema y los parámetros actuales.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Para el almacenamiento de contraseñas, elige un esquema de hashing diseñado para ese propósito, como Argon2id o PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256. Usa bibliotecas mantenidas activamente, diseña pensando en actualizaciones de parámetros y trata la autenticación como un sistema: el hashing de contraseñas es solo uno de varios componentes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;SHA-256(contraseña) crea un problema de seguridad, mientras que SHA-256 en sí mismo sigue siendo criptográficamente sólido. La verdadera pregunta es cuán costoso hacemos cada intento del atacante una vez que la base de datos ya está fuera de nuestro control.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;¿Qué esquema de hashing de contraseñas usa tu stack hoy en día, y cómo planificas y ejecutas las actualizaciones de parámetros o algoritmos como un despliegue gradual en lugar de una migración riesgosa de una sola vez?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Referencias
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/es/how-sha-256-works-can-you-decrypt-it/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Cómo funciona SHA-256: ¿Se puede desencriptar?&lt;/a&gt; — Passwork.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

</description>
      <category>sha256</category>
      <category>cryptography</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>passwordmanagement</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why SHA-256 password hashes still get cracked</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 28 Aug 2026 10:56:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/why-sha-256-password-hashes-still-get-cracked-50gb</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/why-sha-256-password-hashes-still-get-cracked-50gb</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;One article on our blog has consistently remained our most popular: "How SHA-256 works: Can you decrypt it?" We decided to bring a few ideas from it to Dev.to, and we hope the topic prompts some of you to challenge, refine, or expand on these ideas in the comments. Let's get into it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F63fcu6murw0g8pjqpbdc.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F63fcu6murw0g8pjqpbdc.png" alt=" " width="799" height="450"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  SHA-256 only runs one direction
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;"Can SHA-256 be decrypted?" sounds like a reasonable question, but it mixes two different operations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Encryption is designed to be reversible: data is transformed using a key, and someone with the appropriate key can recover the original plaintext. SHA-256 works differently. It takes an input and produces a fixed-length digest, and the algorithm only computes that digest forward.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Password hashes remain attackable through a different route: guessing.&lt;br&gt;
Suppose an attacker obtains a database containing SHA-256(password) values. They can take a likely password, hash it, and compare the result with the stored value. A match reveals the password that produced that verifier.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Hashing and encryption solve different problems. Reversal resistance blocks one type of attack. Guessing remains available as another.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What SHA-256 does
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;SHA-256 accepts a message of arbitrary length and produces a deterministic 256-bit digest. Identical input produces identical output, and even a small change to the input radically changes the resulting digest.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Internally, SHA-256 pads the message, processes it in 512-bit blocks, expands each block into a message schedule, and runs a compression function for 64 rounds. For password-storage decisions, one design characteristic matters most: SHA-256 is built to compute digests efficiently.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That efficiency is useful. SHA-256 appears in integrity checks, digital-signature workflows, and other systems where processing data quickly is exactly what developers want. Passwords create a different problem.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Why fast hashing helps attackers too
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;During a normal login, computing one SHA-256 digest quickly looks ideal. After a database leak, that same speed benefits the attacker.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An offline attacker works independently of your application. Rate limits, API throttling, and account lockouts stay outside the loop, because the attacker tests candidate passwords against a stolen verifier using their own hardware.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For a general-purpose hash function, making each calculation inexpensive is useful engineering. For password storage, we want each guess to carry a meaningful computational cost.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That is why the OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet recommends dedicated password-hashing schemes over fast general-purpose hashes such as SHA-256.&lt;br&gt;
The important distinction sits between a cryptographic primitive and the system built around it. SHA-256 can remain a secure hash function while SHA-256(password) remains a poor password-storage design.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Salting and key derivation solve different problems
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Adding a salt is an essential improvement, but its purpose is sometimes misunderstood.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A salt is a unique random value associated with each password record. Two users choosing the same password therefore produce different stored values. Salting also defeats reusable precomputation: an attacker cannot prepare one table of common password hashes and apply it efficiently across many users or databases.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A salt makes every stored password record a distinct target. Making each guess expensive is a separate job, handled by a password key derivation function (KDF).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The salt normally sits alongside the password verifier, so once an attacker steals the database, they know it. They can still take a candidate password, combine it with that user's salt, calculate the result, and compare it with the stored verifier.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A purpose-built password KDF handles that second job by deliberately increasing the cost of each attempt. Argon2id and PBKDF2, for example, let systems tune the amount of work required to derive a verifier.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The controls solve different problems:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Control&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Main job&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Where it falls short&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Unique random salt&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Prevents shared precomputation and makes identical passwords hash differently&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Guessing speed against one known record stays the same&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Argon2id / PBKDF2&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Makes each offline guess more expensive&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;A weak password stays weak&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Rate limiting + MFA&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Reduces online account-takeover risk&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;A stolen hash database still needs its own protection&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;These mechanisms complement each other. Each covers a different part of the threat.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What to use in a new system
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For a new application, a sensible default is usually Argon2id. OWASP currently recommends it as the preferred password-hashing choice. When FIPS-140 requirements apply, OWASP recommends PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 with a work factor of at least 600,000.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Treat PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 as a distinct construction from plain SHA-256. SHA-256 may be part of the construction, but PBKDF2 combines a pseudorandom function with a salt and configurable work factor specifically to make repeated guesses more expensive.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;NIST SP 800-63B similarly describes password hashing around salts and cost factors, with the cost increased over time as system performance permits.&lt;br&gt;
Treat those parameters as configuration: benchmark them on your infrastructure, document the decision, and revisit it as hardware and recommendations evolve.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Applications also need an upgrade path. A maintained framework or cryptographic library makes that easier than implementing the scheme yourself. Store enough metadata with each verifier, including algorithm version, salt, parameters, and verifier, to recognize older records and migrate them later.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Beyond password hashing: the controls you still need
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A good password KDF mainly changes the economics of offline guessing after a verifier database has been stolen. It addresses one threat model: offline guessing after a leak. Other attack paths need separate controls.&lt;br&gt;
Production systems still need controls around the login flow. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Rate limiting raises the cost of online guessing. MFA reduces the value of a stolen password. Password policies and breached-password checks reduce predictable credentials. Phishing-resistant authentication addresses attacks that password hashing never sees.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Operational planning matters too. Parameters that looked reasonable several years ago may eventually become cheap to compute. One practical migration strategy detects an outdated verifier after a successful login and derives a new one using the current scheme and parameters.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For password storage, choose a purpose-built password-hashing scheme such as Argon2id or PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256. Use maintained libraries, design for parameter upgrades, and treat authentication as a system: password hashing is one component among several.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;SHA-256(password) creates a security problem while SHA-256 itself remains cryptographically sound. The real question is how expensive we make each attacker guess after the database is already outside our control.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What password-hashing scheme does your stack use today, and how do you plan and execute parameter or algorithm upgrades as a gradual rollout instead of a risky big-bang migration?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;References&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br&gt;
&lt;a href="https://passwork.pro/blog/how-sha-256-works-can-you-decrypt-it/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;How SHA-256 works: Can you decrypt it?&lt;/a&gt; — Passwork.pro&lt;br&gt;
&lt;a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br&gt;
&lt;a href="https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-4/sp800-63b.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;NIST SP 800-63B: Digital Identity Guidelines&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cryptography</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>sha256</category>
      <category>passwordmanagement</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Why your password manager shouldn't have a "god mode"</title>
      <dc:creator>Passwork Team</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 Aug 2026 23:53:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/why-your-password-manager-shouldnt-have-a-god-mode-3ln8</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/passwork_team_fd7bbec6480/why-your-password-manager-shouldnt-have-a-god-mode-3ln8</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Your lead DevOps engineer quits on a Friday, no notice, master password included. Or maybe it's simpler: your company's sole founder comes back from a two-week trip and just... can't remember it. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Either way, someone in the room asks the question we hear on almost every technical call about Passwork: "Is there a backdoor for this? A way to just unlock everything?"&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The honest answer is no, and that's on purpose. Any "restore everything" button that can instantly decrypt all data in a password manager is a massive single point of failure (SPOF). If you build a backdoor for emergencies, you've also built a front door for attackers. Compromise one account, get everything. That's not a feature, that's the whole system's threat model collapsing into a single credential.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This post is about how we designed access recovery for a zero-knowledge password manager without that button. Instead of one god-mode admin, we split recovery into three isolated layers, each with a narrow job and a hard boundary on what it can't do. We think the pattern generalizes past our own product, so we're sharing the reasoning, not just the feature list.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The zero-knowledge dilemma
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Zero-knowledge architecture means the server only ever sees ciphertext. Encryption and decryption happen client-side; the server stores encrypted blobs and has no way to read them without a cryptographic grant, a wrapped key handed to a specific user for a specific vault.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is great for security and terrible for anyone who assumes recovery works "somehow." If nobody sets up a recovery path before an incident, the math is unambiguous: the data is gone. Not "hard to get," not "requires a support ticket." Gone, because the server never had the key in the first place.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We treat this as the correct trade-off, not a bug to work around. The alternative, a server that can always decrypt on demand, means every password in the vault is one server compromise away from a breach. But it does mean recovery can't be an afterthought. It has to be architecture, decided and configured before anyone needs it, not improvised during an incident at 2 a.m.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So the design question becomes: how do you let an organization recover from losing an account, a device, or an employee, without ever creating a single credential that can decrypt the whole system?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Deconstructing "god mode": our three-tier recovery model
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We ended up splitting recovery into three tiers, each solving one narrow problem. None of them, alone or combined, produces a master key to everything. That's the point.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Tier 1: Infrastructure level, the emergency console
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The first tier answers a login problem, not a data problem: what if the Owner (the top-level system administrator) can't get into their own account and normal recovery, like an email link, isn't available?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For this we built an emergency console: a set of CLI commands that run on the server itself, not through the web UI. An admin with server access can use it to reset the Owner's password or two-factor authentication when the normal recovery path isn't available.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two things gate this deliberately:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;It requires server-level access, via SSH or console, rather than a button in the interface.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The emergency commands are locked behind a state flag that the server admin has to explicitly enable before they can run.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The emergency commands stay disabled by default and become available only after a server administrator explicitly enables the required state flag. Deliberate activation protects the recovery path from accidental use and keeps it beyond the reach of someone with web application access alone.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The key boundary is that the emergency console restores login access while preserving the existing cryptographic access model. Resetting the Owner's password lets them sign in again with exactly the vault permissions they had before the incident.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Vault decryption still depends on cryptographic grants issued in advance. In other words, the emergency console solves the account-access problem, while access to vault data remains governed by the existing grants.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every use of it gets logged as a distinct event: password reset, 2FA reset, whatever ran. It's traceable, not a quiet backdoor.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Tier 2: Data level, the offline recovery account
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Fixing login solves half the problem. The other half: what if the person who actually had the cryptographic grant to a vault is the one who's gone?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Our approach relies on pre-shared cryptographic grants, set up before anything goes wrong rather than improvised during the incident. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In practice: create a standard user account (not an Owner, not a service account), assign it as administrator for the specific vault types your team cares about, then print the master password and put it in a physical safe, a bank deposit box, or another team's offline vault.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The classic break-glass pattern works because the cryptographic access is already in place before the emergency. There's no way to retroactively grant access to a vault after the fact if nobody set up the grant beforehand. If your recovery account only has access to two vault types today, that's exactly what it'll be able to recover next year, no more.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The scope is deliberately narrow. This account isn't root. It's a targeted key to a defined set of vaults that someone consciously decided were worth this level of insurance. Wider coverage means assigning more vault types to it, and thinking harder about how you're storing that offline password.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Tier 3: Automation level, service accounts aren't a backdoor
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The third tier is less about recovery and more about closing a mistake we've seen teams make: treating a service account as an emergency login.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A service account exists for automation, onboarding scripts, CI/CD pipelines, identity provider sync, anything that needs programmatic access to the API without a human typing a password. It authenticates with API tokens.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Critically, a service account is designed exclusively for programmatic access through API tokens. Interactive login remains unavailable. That separation is a deliberate design decision: allowing interactive access would turn a narrowly scoped automation credential into a quiet backdoor, potentially sitting in a CI secret store with privileges beyond its intended purpose.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If a token leaks, the blast radius is whatever that integration was explicitly granted, and nothing else. It's still bound by the same access-grant rules as any other account. It doesn't become a master key just because it's automated.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The architecture at a glance
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The three recovery tiers solve different problems and deliberately stop at different boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;emergency console&lt;/strong&gt; restores access to the Owner account when normal login recovery is unavailable. It requires server-level access and explicit activation, and it cannot decrypt vaults the Owner was never granted access to.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;offline recovery account&lt;/strong&gt; restores access to selected vault types through cryptographic grants created in advance. Its reach is limited to those pre-assigned vaults: it cannot gain new access retroactively during an incident.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;strong&gt;service account&lt;/strong&gt; handles programmatic access for integrations and automation. Its API token is limited to explicitly granted resources and cannot be turned into an interactive web login.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This separation is the important part. Recovery does not depend on one privileged credential with access to everything. Each mechanism has its own trigger, scope, and boundary, so compromising one recovery path does not automatically compromise the entire system.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Together, the three tiers provide different paths for account recovery, data recovery, and automation without creating a universal master key.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Security is about distributing trust, not concentrating it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The engineering takeaway is simple, even if implementing it took real work: a password manager with a god-mode admin isn't actually zero-knowledge, whatever the marketing says. If one account, one password, or one command can unlock every secret in the system, you've built a single point of failure with extra steps.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The harder, more useful design goal is recovery without concentration: multiple isolated mechanisms, each auditable, each scoped to a narrow job, none of them capable of becoming a universal key on its own.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We're curious how other teams solve this. How does your org handle the bus factor for critical infrastructure secrets? Physical safe, Shamir's Secret Sharing, something homegrown with HashiCorp Vault, or are you still crossing your fingers? Drop it in the comments, we'd like to compare notes.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>devops</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>architecture</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
