Non-Human Identity Governance in Advanced Manufacturing

RAJAT SHEORAN — Sat, 21 Mar 2026 21:33:12 +0000

In most identity programs, the focus is still on users. Access reviews, lifecycle management, role-based access, all of it is built around people.

But in manufacturing environments, a large portion of activity does not come from users. It comes from systems.

Machines, controllers, applications, and automation pipelines interact with each other constantly. Each of these interactions relies on some form of identity, even if it is not always labeled that way.

The challenge is that these identities are not governed with the same discipline as human users.

What Counts as a Non-Human Identity Here

In a manufacturing setup, non-human identities show up in different forms:

service accounts used by applications
credentials used by PLCs and industrial systems
API keys between MES, ERP, and cloud platforms
certificates used for machine communication
identities used by automation and monitoring tools

They are often created as part of system setup and then left unchanged for long periods.

Why Traditional Governance Does Not Fit Well

Identity governance models assume structure. In manufacturing environments, things are usually more practical than structured.

Ownership is not always clear

A system may be set up by one team, supported by another, and used by a third. The identities tied to that system do not always have a clearly defined owner.

Identities last longer than expected

Machines and systems stay in place for years. Their credentials often stay the same. Even when systems are replaced, the identities are not always cleaned up properly.

Stability is prioritized

If something works, teams prefer not to change it. Updating credentials or tightening permissions can introduce risk, so it is often delayed.

Not everything supports modern controls

Some systems do not integrate easily with centralized identity platforms. They rely on static credentials or local configurations.

Common Issues That Show Up

Across different environments, similar patterns tend to appear:

credentials shared across multiple systems
service accounts with more access than needed
secrets stored in configuration files or scripts
identities that are no longer used but still active

These issues build up over time. Individually they may not seem critical, but together they increase risk.

Static Credentials Are Still Common

A lot of systems rely on credentials that do not change often.

They are set once and reused:

passwords
API keys
certificates

This makes systems predictable, which is important for operations. But it also means that if a credential is exposed, it can be used for a long time.

Moving away from this model is not always straightforward. Some systems simply do not support more dynamic approaches.

What can be done?

There is no single solution that fixes everything. But a few practical steps can improve the situation.

Get a basic inventory

Start by understanding what exists.

Look at:

cloud IAM systems
secrets management tools
application configurations
integration points between systems

The goal is not perfection. It is visibility.

Assign ownership at a system level

Instead of trying to track ownership for every identity, assign ownership for systems.

For example, a production line or application stack should have a responsible team. That team is then accountable for the identities used within it.

Reduce obvious over-permission

Trying to implement perfect least privilege all at once usually fails.

Start with:

identities that have very broad access
permissions that are clearly not needed

Make incremental improvements.

Improve how secrets are handled

Where possible:

move credentials out of code and into secure storage
use centralized secrets management
introduce rotation for higher-risk credentials

This does not have to happen everywhere at once.

Monitor usage patterns

In environments where configurations do not change often, behavior becomes a useful signal.

Look for:

unexpected connections between systems
unusual access patterns
identities being used in ways they were not intended for

This can help detect issues that static reviews miss.

Align with existing workflows

Any governance control that slows down operations will be resisted.

Instead of adding separate processes, integrate identity management into:

deployment workflows
system provisioning
automation pipelines

This makes controls easier to apply consistently.

Where Things Usually Get Stuck

Most organizations recognize the problem, but progress is uneven.

Security teams want stronger controls.
Operations teams want stability.

Both are valid concerns.

If controls are too strict, they can impact production. If they are too relaxed, risk increases over time.

Finding the balance is an ongoing process.

Looking Ahead

Manufacturing environments are becoming more automated. Systems are making more decisions without human involvement.

This will increase the number of non-human identities and the level of access they require.

Governance will need to adapt, but it does not need to be overly complex.

Clear ownership, better visibility, and gradual improvements in how identities are managed can go a long way.

Final Thoughts

Non-human identities in manufacturing are not new, but they are becoming more important.

The goal is not to apply enterprise IAM models directly, but to adapt the principles in a way that fits how these environments operate.

Small, consistent improvements tend to work better than large, disruptive changes.

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