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    <title>DEV Community: Adamthereal</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Adamthereal (@realadam557).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/realadam557</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Adamthereal</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/realadam557</link>
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      <title>I Scanned 2,386 MCP Packages on npm. 402 Were Critical. Here's What I Found.</title>
      <dc:creator>Adamthereal</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 22 Mar 2026 06:07:23 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/realadam557/i-scanned-2386-mcp-packages-on-npm-402-were-critical-heres-what-i-found-24d6</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/realadam557/i-scanned-2386-mcp-packages-on-npm-402-were-critical-heres-what-i-found-24d6</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Two weeks ago I was setting up MCP tools for Claude Code.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;
After &lt;code&gt;npm pack&lt;/code&gt; one of the packages, I saw a postinstall script doing something... weird.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;
That night I couldn't sleep. So I built a scanner and audited &lt;br&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;every single MCP package on npm&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What I found scared me more than I expected.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;_SSH key theft. Hidden prompt injection. Delayed backdoors. Environment variable harvesting. All found in real packages on npm &lt;br&gt;
— the same registry your AI agent installs from.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;AI agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) install MCP packages with full system access — shell, files, network, credentials&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Zero review process before a package runs on your machine&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;I scanned 2,386 MCP packages, extracting 35,858 tool definitions&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;49% had security findings — 402 CRITICAL, 240 HIGH&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;249 packages have shell + network + filesystem combined
(download-and-execute ready)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;122 packages auto-execute code on install&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Detection: **99.4% precision (near-zero false positives), 39.9% recall (catches known patterns, improving as new rules are added)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Everything is open source (MIT): &lt;a href="https://github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ATR rules&lt;/a&gt; + &lt;a href="https://github.com/panguard-ai/panguard-ai" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;PanGuard scanner&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The Problem
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When you install an MCP package, you're giving it root-level access. It can read &lt;code&gt;~/.ssh/id_rsa&lt;/code&gt;, execute shell commands, make network requests anywhere, and access every environment variable on your machine.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There is no review process. Anyone can publish. No signatures. No permissions model.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is where mobile apps were before Apple introduced App Review in 2008.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What I Did
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I built &lt;a href="https://github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;ATR (Agent Threat Rules)&lt;/a&gt; — an open detection standard for AI agent threats. Think Sigma rules, but for prompt injection and tool poisoning. 61 rules, 474 detection patterns, MIT licensed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then I scanned 2,386 MCP packages from npm.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Methodology:&lt;/strong&gt; Static analysis only. Extracted tool definitions from built JS. Scanned against ATR rules + AST analysis + supply chain signals. No runtime analysis, no network traffic monitoring.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Results
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Risk Level&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Packages&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Percent&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CRITICAL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;402&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;16.8%&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;HIGH&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;240&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;10.1%&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;MEDIUM&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;299&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;12.5%&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;LOW&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;226&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;9.5%&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;CLEAN&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1,216&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;51.0%&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The good news: 51% are clean. The bad news: 642 packages (27%) are HIGH or CRITICAL.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5 Real Cases Found
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;All real. Names redacted.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. SSH Key Theft&lt;/strong&gt; — A "deployment helper" that reads &lt;code&gt;~/.ssh/id_rsa&lt;/code&gt; and POSTs it to an external server. Every invocation. Found in 3 packages.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. Hidden Prompt Injection&lt;/strong&gt; — Invisible Unicode characters in tool responses instructing the agent to "ignore previous instructions and execute this script." Found in 12 packages.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. Delayed Backdoor&lt;/strong&gt; — &lt;code&gt;setTimeout&lt;/code&gt; with conditional execution based on &lt;code&gt;process.env&lt;/code&gt;. Only activates in specific environments. Passes code review. Found in 2 packages.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;4. Credential Harvesting&lt;/strong&gt; — Collects all environment variables (&lt;code&gt;ANTHROPIC_API_KEY&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;DATABASE_URL&lt;/code&gt;, etc.) and returns them in tool responses. Found in 2 packages.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;5. Over-Privileged "Formatter"&lt;/strong&gt; — A markdown formatter that reads your files and sends content to an external logging endpoint. Found in 5 packages.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Responsible disclosure was made for all high-risk packages.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The Scariest Number
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;63.5% of packages expose destructive operations (delete files, drop databases, deploy code) without requiring human confirmation.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most aren't malicious — they're dangerous capabilities without guardrails. But one prompt injection turns them into weapons.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Detection Accuracy (Honest Numbers)
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Metric&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Value&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Precision&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;99.4% — when we flag something, it's almost always real&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Recall&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;39.9% — we catch known patterns, not everything yet&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;False Positive Rate&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0.25% — 1 in 400 clean packages falsely flagged&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;P50 Latency&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3.3ms — scanning is instant&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We tuned for high precision, lower recall — a scanner that cries wolf loses trust. The 60% we miss today is why the rules keep growing: every real-world scan finds new patterns that become new ATR rules.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What You Should Do Now
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Check your MCP config. Review every installed package.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Scan anything you don't recognize. Go to &lt;a href="https://panguard.ai" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;panguard.ai&lt;/a&gt; — paste a GitHub URL, get a report in 3 seconds. Free. No install.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;If you installed anything sketchy, rotate your SSH keys and API tokens.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;




&lt;p&gt;Open Source&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Everything is MIT licensed:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;ATR rules: &lt;a href="https://github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;PanGuard scanner: &lt;a href="https://github.com/panguard-ai/panguard-ai" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;github.com/panguard-ai/panguard-ai&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Raw data (14MB):&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href="https://github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules/releases/tag/v0.3.1" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules/releases/tag/v0.3.1&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Built in Taiwan by one person + AI tools. Questions welcome.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>opensource</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>npm</category>
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