<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">
  <channel>
    <title>DEV Community: Mukund</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Mukund (@retro-raven).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/retro-raven</link>
    
    <atom:link rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" href="https://dev.to/feed/retro-raven"/>
    <language>en</language>
    <item>
      <title>GitHub as a command server: what Kaspersky's GitDoor shows about domain allow-lists</title>
      <dc:creator>Mukund</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Wed, 18 Nov 2026 08:11:29 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/vxsure/github-as-a-command-server-what-kasperskys-gitdoor-shows-about-domain-allow-lists-a6b</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/vxsure/github-as-a-command-server-what-kasperskys-gitdoor-shows-about-domain-allow-lists-a6b</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The attacker's account name and the HTTP method sat in every request. A log that keeps only the domain kept neither.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On 17 November 2026, Kaspersky's GReAT team published a two-part report on Operation ShadowCloud, an intrusion campaign against mainly government networks in Asia and Africa. The report opens: "In early 2026, we identified a new, active intrusion campaign that we have named Operation ShadowCloud."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Two backdoors carry the campaign. GitDoor runs its command channel through the GitHub API. GraphDoor runs its channel through Microsoft Graph and a SharePoint document library. Both lean on services most companies already allow.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The problem: the allowed domain carried the channel
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most egress policies are written as domain lists. &lt;code&gt;api.github.com&lt;/code&gt; is on the list because developers, CI jobs and package managers need it. &lt;code&gt;login.microsoftonline.com&lt;/code&gt; and SharePoint are on the list because the whole office signs in through them. Kaspersky describes the effect in Part 1: the design lets the implants "blend in with normal traffic, effectively evading network-based detections".&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  How GitDoor uses the GitHub API
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The requests GitDoor sends to &lt;code&gt;api.github.com&lt;/code&gt;, as listed in Part 1. Every path starts with &lt;code&gt;/repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/&lt;/code&gt; (GitHub has since taken the account's repositories down):&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Register:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;POST Trix/issues&lt;/code&gt; opens an issue for the new victim.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Check:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;GET Trix/contents/main.&amp;lt;code&amp;gt;.js.map&lt;/code&gt; checks whether the victim's information file already exists.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Store:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;PUT Trix/contents/main.&amp;lt;code&amp;gt;.js.map&lt;/code&gt; creates the file that holds the victim's information.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Fetch commands:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;GET Havo/contents/&amp;lt;file&amp;gt;&lt;/code&gt; downloads commands and plug-ins.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Loop:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;POST&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;DELETE&lt;/code&gt; on &lt;code&gt;Trix/issues/&amp;lt;n&amp;gt;/labels&lt;/code&gt; adds the "bug" label, or removes it if it's already there, and repeats with the Havo fetch until an exit command.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The two repositories split the work. In Kaspersky's words, "the command input is retrieved from the public Havo repository," while "the command result is uploaded to the private Trix repository". Results are encrypted (AES-256, then XOR) and Base64-encoded before the upload. Writing to Trix needs a GitHub personal access token, which the backdoor decrypts at run time along with everything else it needs to reach GitHub.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Across the samples, Kaspersky lists GitHub repositories created between 3 September 2024 and 5 December 2025, and reads the dates as a threat actor "preparing the infrastructure of this operation since at least the end of 2024".&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  GraphDoor: the same idea through SharePoint
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;GraphDoor requests a token from &lt;code&gt;login.microsoftonline.com&lt;/code&gt; with a client-credentials flow, using an application ID and secret hard-coded in the implant. The token authenticates the malicious application, not a person, so no user sign-in sits behind the traffic. The backdoor then sends Graph PUT requests that write encrypted victim data into a SharePoint document library, in a file named like a JavaScript source map (&lt;code&gt;main.&amp;lt;victim code&amp;gt;.js.map&lt;/code&gt;). Graph GET requests fetch its plug-ins for screenshots, process lists and keystrokes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Why a domain allow-list can't separate the two
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A domain decision answers one question: is this destination trusted? For &lt;code&gt;api.github.com&lt;/code&gt; the answer is yes, and the answer stays yes whether the request is a developer reading a public library or a backdoor writing a keylog into an attacker's private repository. Without decryption, a gateway usually sees the hostname and the byte count, and nothing in the path.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What looks like routine developer traffic is, in reality, a two-way command channel.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What the request shows
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Once the HTTPS request is opened, three fields separate the two cases:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;The account in the path.&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;code&gt;/repos/&amp;lt;owner&amp;gt;/&amp;lt;repo&amp;gt;/...&lt;/code&gt; names the owner. Your company has a short list of GitHub organisations; a write to any other owner deserves its own rule. A SharePoint hostname names the tenant in the same way.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;The method.&lt;/strong&gt; GET and PUT to the same host carry opposite risk. Reading a public project is everyday work. A PUT or POST into a private repository you don't own is data leaving.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;The client.&lt;/strong&gt; A developer workstation or a CI runner talking to &lt;code&gt;api.github.com&lt;/code&gt; is expected. An accounts PC, a file server or a domain controller is not.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of the three is exotic. All three disappear in a policy that stops at the hostname.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Checks you can run this week
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Write down the GitHub organisations and SharePoint tenants your company owns. Everything else is "not ours" by default.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Check what your web logs keep for &lt;code&gt;api.github.com&lt;/code&gt;: the hostname only, or the method and the full path.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;List every internal machine that reached &lt;code&gt;api.github.com&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;graph.microsoft.com&lt;/code&gt; in the last 30 days, and match each one to a reason.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Look for MeshCentral agents nobody installed. Kaspersky's closing advice in Part 2 is to treat the arrival of a legitimate remote-management tool such as MeshCentral as a suspicious event.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Make sure servers can't reach the internet directly. When outbound HTTPS works only through your proxy, a backdoor that ignores proxy settings fails instead of slipping past.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Limits worth stating
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Reading the path needs HTTPS inspection, which needs devices that trust a certificate you own, plus a bypass list for apps that refuse inspection.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;An attacker holding a stolen token for your own GitHub organisation passes the account check. The method, the time and the client still apply.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Kaspersky's sample used the account and file names above; other builds will use other names. Rules should key on "not ours", not on a list of indicators.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where VxSure fits
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Rather than allowing or blocking github.com as a whole, VxSure opens every web request that passes through it and can tag each one by host, URL and method. A read from a public project and a write into a stranger's repository become separate rules and separate log lines, kept on your own server.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Can your team say today which machines wrote to GitHub last week?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Sources
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Kaspersky Securelist, "Operation ShadowCloud", Part 1 (GitDoor), 17 Nov 2026: &lt;a href="https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-gitdoor/122004/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-gitdoor/122004/&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Kaspersky Securelist, "Operation ShadowCloud", Part 2 (GraphDoor), 17 Nov 2026: &lt;a href="https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-graphdoor/122005/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://securelist.com/operation-shadowcloud-graphdoor/122005/&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Hacker News, "New GitDoor and GraphDoor Backdoors Turn GitHub and SharePoint Into Covert C2 Channels", 17 Nov 2026: &lt;a href="https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/new-gitdoor-and-graphdoor-backdoors.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/new-gitdoor-and-graphdoor-backdoors.html&lt;/a&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>github</category>
      <category>networking</category>
      <category>devops</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
