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    <title>DEV Community: Thilo Barth</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Thilo Barth (@scanara).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/scanara</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Thilo Barth</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/scanara</link>
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    <item>
      <title>Article 14 of the EU AI Act wants a human who can stop the system. Can your repo show one?</title>
      <dc:creator>Thilo Barth</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 20:37:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/scanara/article-14-of-the-eu-ai-act-wants-a-human-who-can-stop-the-system-can-your-repo-show-one-379e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/scanara/article-14-of-the-eu-ai-act-wants-a-human-who-can-stop-the-system-can-your-repo-show-one-379e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Article 14 of the EU AI Act requires providers of high-risk AI systems to design them so that people can effectively oversee them. It applies to providers that place such a system on the EU market or put it into service, wherever the provider is based. Systems that are not high-risk are not bound by it. Annex III systems (the Act's list of high-risk uses, such as credit scoring and hiring tools) must comply from 2 December 2027. Annex I systems (AI inside regulated products) must comply from 2 August 2028, with exceptions below. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 set both dates (Article 113). Breaking Article 14 can cost up to EUR 15 000 000 or 3% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher (Article 99(4)). SMEs, including start-ups, and small mid-cap companies (a size class the Omnibus added) pay whichever amount is lower. First, find the place in your product where a person can reject or stop a model output.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Three rules narrow who must comply with Article 14, and when
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 2(2), Article 2(13) and Article 111(2) each limit Article 14, and all three were replaced or added by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Annex I Section B is a list of Union product laws. For systems tied to those products, Article 2(2) says: "only Article 6(1), Article 60a and Articles 102 to 112 shall apply". Article 14 is not on that list.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Annex I Section A is a separate list of Union product laws. For those systems, Article 2(13) says the application of Articles 9 to 15 "may be limited". That holds only "where and to the extent that" a product law gives "an equivalent or higher level of protection". The limit must not reduce the overall level of protection. The Commission is to specify the details in delegated acts by 2 August 2027.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 111(2) covers a system placed on the market before its date of application. The Act then applies "only if, as from that date, those systems are subject to significant changes in their designs". Systems intended for use by public authorities must comply "by 2 August 2030". Systems named in Article 111(1) are excluded from that rule.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  A repository can show the stop and override paths, not the person
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 14 asks for design, so a repository can show the technical measures but not that someone used them well. Article 14(1) says the system must be designed so that natural persons can effectively oversee it while it is in use. Article 14(3) says the measures must fit the risks, the level of autonomy and the context of use. They are ensured through "either one or both" of two kinds of measure. The provider builds one kind in before market placement or putting into service, where technically feasible. The provider identifies the other kind for the deployer to implement. A deployer is the organisation that uses the system.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 14(4) lists what the overseer must be enabled to do, as appropriate and proportionate. Understand the system's capacities and limits and monitor its operation. Stay aware of automation bias, the tendency to over-rely on the output. Interpret the output correctly. Decide not to use the system, or disregard, override or reverse its output. Intervene or interrupt it through a "stop" button or similar procedure, so that it halts in a safe state.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 14(5) adds a rule for remote biometric identification systems, which identify people without their active involvement, typically at a distance. For those systems under Annex III point 1(a), no action may follow from an identification unless two natural persons have separately verified it. That rule does not apply where Union or national law finds it disproportionate for law enforcement, migration, border control or asylum.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Act prescribes no tool or file format. The Act's own text is on EUR-Lex: &lt;a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R1689" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R1689&lt;/a&gt; (Article 14 is in Chapter III, Section 2). Our reference page for the article: &lt;a href="https://scanara.io/en/learn/eu-ai-act/article-14-human-oversight/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://scanara.io/en/learn/eu-ai-act/article-14-human-oversight/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  A repository can carry four traces of Article 14(4)
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;These four traces are my engineering judgement, not a list from the Act. Each one ties to a paragraph of Article 14(4).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. An override path that records who decided and why.&lt;/strong&gt; Article 14(4)(d) asks that a person can disregard, override or reverse an output. A function that writes one record per human decision shows the path exists and was used. Requiring a reason even for a confirmation makes a blind click-through visible.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight python"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="k"&gt;def&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nf"&gt;review_decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;reviewer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;action&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;reason&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="c1"&gt;# action is "confirm", "override" or "reverse" (illustrative)&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="k"&gt;if&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="ow"&gt;not&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;reason&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="k"&gt;raise&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nc"&gt;ValueError&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"A review needs a recorded reason"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="n"&gt;audit_log&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;append&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;{&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"decision_id"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nb"&gt;id&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"model_version"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;model_version&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"model_output"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;output&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"reviewer"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;reviewer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"action"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;action&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"reason"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;reason&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="p"&gt;}&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. A stop path with a test.&lt;/strong&gt; Article 14(4)(e) asks for a stop button or similar procedure. A flag that every inference path checks, plus a test that fails when a new output appears after the stop, is a trace a reviewer can run.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight python"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="k"&gt;def&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nf"&gt;infer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;request&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="k"&gt;if&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;stop_switch&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;is_set&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="k"&gt;raise&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nc"&gt;SystemStopped&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"Stopped by operator"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="k"&gt;return&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;predict&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;request&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;

&lt;span class="k"&gt;def&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nf"&gt;test_stop_blocks_new_outputs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="n"&gt;stop_switch&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="kt"&gt;set&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="k"&gt;with&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;pytest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;raises&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nc"&gt;SystemStopped&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="nf"&gt;infer&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;sample_request&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. An output contract for the overseer.&lt;/strong&gt; Articles 14(4)(a) to (c) ask that the overseer can monitor, interpret and not over-rely on the output. A schema test can require every response to carry the model version, a confidence value and a low-confidence flag. The test proves the fields exist. It does not prove anyone reads them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;4. A release gate that fails closed.&lt;/strong&gt; The gate blocks the release when the override test or the stop test is missing or failing. As in the logging and risk posts, a warning leaves nothing that anyone must act on.&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight python"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="no"&gt;REQUIRED&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"test_override_is_recorded"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;,&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"test_stop_blocks_new_outputs"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;

&lt;span class="k"&gt;def&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nf"&gt;gate&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;passed_tests&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="n"&gt;missing&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="p"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;t&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;for&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;t&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;in&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="no"&gt;REQUIRED&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;if&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;t&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="ow"&gt;not&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="k"&gt;in&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;passed_tests&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="k"&gt;if&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;missing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
        &lt;span class="k"&gt;raise&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nc"&gt;SystemExit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;f&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s2"&gt;"Oversight tests missing or failing: {missing}"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;None of this proves that a person oversaw the system well. It proves that the paths exist, were exercised and are checked at release. For a system that takes actions, the Act's phrase "safe state" is not defined further, and a stop test on new outputs says nothing about actions already in flight.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What Scanara checks for Article 14, and what it does not
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scanara's code scan checks Article 14 narrowly. Take a file that calls a model, such as &lt;code&gt;.predict()&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;.generate()&lt;/code&gt;. Three separate rules apply to it, and each is satisfied only by its own function name: &lt;code&gt;flag_low_confidence_output&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;apply_with_override&lt;/code&gt; and &lt;code&gt;install_abort_handler&lt;/code&gt;. The scan merges the rules still open for that file into one Article 14 finding, so the finding clears only when all three names are present.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Each rule is a presence check on a function name. It cannot tell whether the call reflects a real oversight process. Only the stop rule has a guard: it does not count a call whose reason is empty, "none" or "n/a". A clear result is a prompt for a person to look, not proof of oversight.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A second set of keyword rules looks for oversight vocabulary in identifiers, such as human-in-the-loop, manual approval, stop function and override. It also has vocabulary for Article 14(4)(a), (b) and (d). Who oversees the system, with what training and authority, is not something a code scan can see. Passing a scan does not mean an organisation is compliant.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Scanara has a free plan, and no credit card is needed
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scan your repository on the free plan: &lt;a href="https://scanara.io/en/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://scanara.io/en/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  I may be wrong about safe states, reasons and stub checks
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Is a stop test on new outputs enough? Does "safe state" in Article 14(4)(e) mean more for an agent that has already sent an email or changed a record?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Requiring a reason on every confirmation may produce one-word reasons typed to clear the form. Is the record then evidence of oversight, or evidence of friction?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A check that looks for a named helper may teach teams to add a stub call to clear it. Is that signal worth having at all? I have no data on this and would like to hear from people who run similar gates.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>compliance</category>
      <category>programming</category>
      <category>euaiact</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Article 9 of the EU AI Act asks for a process. Your repo can show its traces.</title>
      <dc:creator>Thilo Barth</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 18:33:32 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/scanara/article-9-of-the-eu-ai-act-asks-for-a-process-your-repo-can-show-its-traces-4lco</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/scanara/article-9-of-the-eu-ai-act-asks-for-a-process-your-repo-can-show-its-traces-4lco</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Article 9 of the EU AI Act requires providers of high-risk AI systems to run a risk management system. This applies to providers anywhere that place such systems on the EU market. Annex III systems (the Act's list of high-risk uses, such as credit scoring and hiring tools) must meet it from 2 December 2027. Annex I systems (AI inside regulated products) must meet it from 2 August 2028. A provider who breaks it faces a fine of up to EUR 15,000,000 or 3% of total worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. SMEs pay the lower of the two. First, list which of your systems fall under Annex III or Annex I.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Article 9 describes a process, so no file can prove it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A repository cannot prove that a risk management system exists, because Article 9 describes work that people do over time. Article 9(1) says the system must be established, implemented, documented and maintained. Article 9(2) calls it a continuous iterative process, planned and run throughout the lifecycle, with regular systematic review and updating.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 9(2) names four steps. Identify the known and reasonably foreseeable risks to health, safety or fundamental rights. Estimate and evaluate risks, including under reasonably foreseeable misuse. Evaluate further risks using post-market monitoring data. Adopt targeted risk management measures.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 9(5) adds that the residual risk must be judged acceptable. Articles 9(6) to 9(8) require testing before market placement, against metrics and probabilistic thresholds defined in advance. Article 9(9) asks providers to consider adverse impact on people under 18 and other vulnerable groups.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Act prescribes no file format or tool. It does make the documentation concrete. Annex IV point 5 requires a detailed description of the risk management system in the technical documentation. Article 17(1)(g) lists the system as an element of the quality management system.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The practical question is narrower than "are we compliant". Which of these steps leave a trace in the repository that a reviewer can inspect?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Four traces a repository can carry
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;These four traces are my engineering judgement, not a list from the Act. Each one ties to a specific paragraph.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. A risk register in version control.&lt;/strong&gt; Keep one entry per hazard, with likelihood, severity, measure, residual risk and the model version it was assessed against. This covers Article 9(2)(a) and (b). The commit history then shows the regular review and updating that Article 9(2) asks for. Feed post-market monitoring findings into the same register, which is the loop in Article 9(2)(c).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;\&lt;/code&gt;`yaml&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  risk_register/R-014.yaml (illustrative)
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;p&gt;id: R-014&lt;br&gt;
hazard: Applicants with short employment history score lower for reasons unrelated to job fit&lt;br&gt;
affects: fundamental rights (non-discrimination)&lt;br&gt;
foreseeable_misuse: Recruiter uses the score as the only screening criterion&lt;br&gt;
likelihood: medium&lt;br&gt;
severity: high&lt;br&gt;
measure: Score is advisory; recruiter records a reason when confirming or overriding&lt;br&gt;
residual_risk: acceptable        # Article 9(5), signed off by the risk owner&lt;br&gt;
assessed_model_version: 2.3.0&lt;br&gt;
reviewed_by: risk-owner&lt;br&gt;
reviewed_on: 2027-03-02&lt;br&gt;
`&lt;code&gt;\&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. Thresholds committed before the test run.&lt;/strong&gt; Article 9(8) requires testing against metrics and thresholds that were defined in advance. A thresholds file whose commit predates the test results is a timestamped record that the thresholds came first. Squashing or rewriting history destroys that record, so protect the branch.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. Tests that name the risk they cover.&lt;/strong&gt; A reviewer can then follow R-014 from hazard to measure to test. Add one test for each foreseeable misuse listed in the register.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;\&lt;/code&gt;&lt;code&gt;python&lt;br&gt;
@pytest.mark.risk("R-014")&lt;br&gt;
def test_short_history_not_penalised(model, thresholds):&lt;br&gt;
    gap = score_gap(model, group="short_history")&lt;br&gt;
    assert gap &amp;lt;= thresholds["R-014"]["max_score_gap"]&lt;br&gt;
\&lt;/code&gt;&lt;code&gt;\&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;4. A release gate that reads the register.&lt;/strong&gt; The gate fails the build when a risk has no review for the model version being released, or no residual-risk sign-off. This makes the iteration in Article 9(2) a condition of shipping. As in the logging post, the gate has to block the release. A warning leaves nothing that anyone must act on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;\&lt;/code&gt;&lt;code&gt;python&lt;br&gt;
def gate(register, version):&lt;br&gt;
    open_items = [r.id for r in register&lt;br&gt;
                  if r.assessed_model_version != version or not r.signed_off]&lt;br&gt;
    if open_items:&lt;br&gt;
        raise SystemExit(f"Risk review missing for {version}: {open_items}")&lt;br&gt;
\&lt;/code&gt;&lt;code&gt;\&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of this proves the review was good. It proves a review was recorded, in an order and at a time that someone can check. Whether the review was adequate is a judgement for the provider, and later for whoever assesses the system.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What Scanara checks for Article 9, and what it does not
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scanara's code scan checks Article 9 narrowly. Take a file that calls a model, such as &lt;code&gt;.predict()&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;.generate()&lt;/code&gt;. The scan reports one Article 9 finding for that file. It stays silent only if the file also calls a function with a recognised name, such as &lt;code&gt;log_hazard_review&lt;/code&gt; or &lt;code&gt;record_lifecycle_risk_review&lt;/code&gt;. That is a presence check on a function name. It cannot tell whether the call reflects a real review. A clear result is a prompt for a person to look, not proof that the process exists.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A second set of keyword rules looks for risk management vocabulary, such as predefined metrics or vulnerable groups, in identifiers. When none matches, the scan reports that it found no signal for that paragraph. Four paragraphs have no code check at all: 9(3), 9(4), 9(7) and 9(10). They set scope, interpretation or options rather than a duty.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The process itself, meaning who reviewed which risk and why, is covered by a guided assessment. The customer answers the questions and Scanara stores the answers as evidence. Passing a scan does not mean an organisation is compliant.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Try it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Free tier, self-serve, no sales call: &lt;a href="https://scanara.io/en/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://scanara.io/en/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Act's own text is on EUR-Lex: &lt;a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R1689" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32024R1689&lt;/a&gt; (Article 9 is in Chapter III, Section 2). Our reference page for the article: &lt;a href="https://scanara.io/en/learn/eu-ai-act/article-9-risk-management/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://scanara.io/en/learn/eu-ai-act/article-9-risk-management/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where I might be wrong
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I would like pushback on three points.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;First, the Act does not say what format a reviewer accepts as evidence of the Article 9 process. Does a versioned register plus tests count, or will assessors only look at the Annex IV description? I do not know.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Second, "thresholds committed before results" depends on honest history. Is a commit timestamp strong enough, or does it need signed commits or an external log?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Third, a check that looks for a named helper function may teach teams to add a stub call to clear it. Is that signal worth having at all, or does it do more harm than good? I have no data on this and would like to hear from people who run similar gates.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>programming</category>
      <category>automation</category>
      <category>startup</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Your AI System Already Has Logging. The EU AI Act Wants Something More Specific Than That.</title>
      <dc:creator>Thilo Barth</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Mon, 07 Sep 2026 14:23:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/scanara/your-ai-system-already-has-logging-the-eu-ai-act-wants-something-more-specific-than-that-3m80</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/scanara/your-ai-system-already-has-logging-the-eu-ai-act-wants-something-more-specific-than-that-3m80</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Your AI system almost certainly has logging. Structured logs, maybe a request ID, maybe already shipped to a log aggregator. If someone asked "do you log what your model does," most engineering teams would say yes without thinking twice.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 12 of the EU AI Act asks a narrower, more specific question than "do you have logs" — and a lot of systems that would confidently answer yes to the first question fail the second one anyway.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What Article 12 actually requires&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The text: a high-risk AI system must technically support automatic logging of events over its lifetime, to a degree that supports traceability, incident investigation, and post-market monitoring. (Remote biometric identification systems under Annex III point 1(a) have their own additional minimum logging content, which this post doesn't cover.)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Read that again slowly, because the specific words are doing real work. Not "logging exists somewhere." Automatic — it has to happen without a human remembering to trigger it. Over its lifetime — not just at request time, but across the system's whole operational history. Supports traceability — someone has to be able to reconstruct, after the fact, what the system saw and what it decided. Supports incident investigation — when something goes wrong, the logs need to be the thing that explains why, not a dead end. Supports post-market monitoring — the same logs are supposed to feed the ongoing obligation to watch for problems after deployment, not just exist for debugging.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Most application logging was built to answer a different question: "is the service healthy, and can I debug a crash." That's a legitimate, useful thing to log for. It is not the same question as "can I reconstruct, six months from now, exactly what this system decided about a specific person and why." A log line that says INFO: scored applicant, result=0.82 answers the first question fine. It's close to useless for the second one — there's no record of what inputs produced that score, no reference to which model version ran, no way to tie it back to a specific decision that got acted on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Where this actually shows up in code&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The pattern isn't "no logging." It's logging that exists but doesn't capture the right thing, at the right durability, next to the decision that actually matters. A few shapes this takes in practice:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A model call wrapped in generic app-level logging (logger.info(f"prediction: {result}")) with no persisted record of the input, the model version, or which downstream action the result triggered.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Logs that exist but live only in ephemeral container stdout with a short retention window — technically "automatic," but not "over its lifetime" if they age out in a week and the system runs for years.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;A decision-making function that logs that it ran, but not the specific record needed to reconstruct why it produced the output it did for a specific case under investigation.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here's a simplified rule (real Semgrep syntax, not the literal production rule) that looks for the first shape — a high-risk inference call whose output flows into application logic with no accompanying structured, persisted audit record nearby:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;`rules:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;id: eu-ai-act-example.article-12-missing-audit-log
languages: [python]
severity: WARNING
message: &amp;gt;
  High-risk AI inference result is used without a structured audit-log
  call nearby. EU AI Act Article 12 requires automatic logging that
  supports traceability, incident investigation, and post-market
  monitoring -- not just generic application logging.
metadata:
  article: "12"
  category: record-keeping
patterns:

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;pattern-either:

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;pattern: $RESULT = $MODEL.predict(...)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;pattern: $RESULT = $CLIENT.chat.completions.create(...)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;pattern-not-inside: |
  $RESULT = $MODEL.predict(...)
  ...
  audit_log(...)&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;pattern-not-inside: |
  $RESULT = $MODEL.predict(...)
  ...
  persist_decision_record(...)`&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The rule isn't looking for the absence of any log call — most of this code already has one, which is exactly the trap. It's looking for the absence of a call that persists a structured decision record: something that could actually answer "what did this system decide, about what input, using which model version, and what happened next" if someone asked that question a year later.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The passing version doesn't require ripping anything out — usually one additional call next to logic that's already there:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;result = model.predict(applicant_data)&lt;br&gt;
persist_decision_record(&lt;br&gt;
    input_ref=applicant_data.id,&lt;br&gt;
    model_version=model.version,&lt;br&gt;
    output=result,&lt;br&gt;
    timestamp=now(),&lt;br&gt;
)&lt;br&gt;
logger.info(f"prediction: {result}")  # the old logging can stay -- it just isn't sufficient alone&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The generic logger.info line isn't wrong. It's just answering a different question than Article 12 is asking, and a team that only has the first line has reasonable-looking logs and an actual compliance gap at the same time — which is exactly why this one gets missed more than a system with genuinely zero logging would.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This isn't hypothetical. We've already published one real scan result: a public résumé-screening repo came back with three findings and a 91% score (see our Sept 1 post on this). Gaps shaped like the one above — logging that exists but doesn't persist a reconstructable decision record — are a common contributor to scores landing short of 100, even on codebases that already take logging seriously.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Why fail-closed matters here specifically&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There's a second trap worth naming: a compliance check that silently passes when it can't actually verify the logging exists (a timeout, a missing permission, a check that errors out and defaults to "OK"). That produces an audit trail claiming something was verified when nothing was. For a requirement whose entire point is "can you reconstruct what happened," a check that fails open is actively worse than no check — it's a false record layered on top of a real gap. Any tooling built against Article 12 specifically needs to fail closed: if the check can't run, that's a finding, not a pass.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Try it&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Free tier, self-serve, no sales call: &lt;a href="https://scanara.io/en/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://scanara.io/en/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Where I might be wrong&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'd like actual pushback on this one. Is "persist a structured decision record next to the inference call" really what auditors will look for under Article 12, or is that my own engineering intuition about what should satisfy traceability, filling in a gap the regulation itself leaves genuinely open? How much retention is actually "over its lifetime" in practice — is there real guidance on this anywhere, or is everyone guessing at a number right now? And for teams already shipping to observability platforms with long retention (Datadog, a data warehouse) — does that already satisfy this, or does the structure of what's captured matter more than where it's stored? Genuinely don't know the answer to that last one myself.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>programming</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>We scanned public AI repos for EU AI Act compliance. Nearly every one failed.</title>
      <dc:creator>Thilo Barth</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2026 20:10:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/scanara/we-scanned-public-ai-repos-for-eu-ai-act-compliance-nearly-every-one-failed-4nme</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/scanara/we-scanned-public-ai-repos-for-eu-ai-act-compliance-nearly-every-one-failed-4nme</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In March 2026, the author of the open-source scanner AIR Blackbox ran it against 5,754 Python files in 11 open-source AI projects, including AutoGPT, AutoGen and LlamaIndex, and &lt;a href="https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47247314" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;posted the results on Hacker News&lt;/a&gt;. Only 23 files (0.4%) passed all six of its checks, which cover Articles 9, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the EU AI Act. We did not run that scan. It is static analysis of Python files, one file at a time, with a lenient pass rule: an article passes if one sub-check is detected. Its author calls it a linter, not legal compliance. We cite it because the author says the full report, the raw data (JSON) and the scanning scripts are in the project's repository, so the results can be checked. We have not re-run it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The scan's author reads this as an awareness gap, not a capability gap. In his comment on the post he says most of the six areas "come down to things developers already know how to do", naming structured logging, input validation, error handling and access control, and that "nobody's connecting those practices to the regulatory requirements". That is the author's interpretation, not something the scan measured.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The gap
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The EU AI Act's high-risk obligations have not started yet. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, in force since 27 July 2026, moved the start date for Annex III high-risk systems from 2 August 2026 to 2 December 2027, and for Annex I products from 2 August 2027 to 2 August 2028. If your AI system falls under Annex III, you will need a risk classification and a technical documentation file by 2 December 2027: Annex IV, 9 sections, mapping what your system actually does to what the regulation requires. The Article 5 bans (since 2 February 2025), the general-purpose AI model duties (since 2 August 2025) and the Article 50 transparency duties (2 August 2026) were not moved. Systems placed on the market before 2 August 2026 have until 2 December 2026 for Article 50(2) marking. Annex III covers more ground than most teams expect, including credit scoring, CV screening and hiring tools, biometric categorization by sensitive or protected attributes, life and health insurance risk assessment and pricing, and exam scoring.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Annex III scope is a judgement call that depends on the system's intended use, and a documentation package has to be checked against what the system actually does, not just written.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The scan reported three failure rates: 97% of files failed the Article 9 (Risk Management) check, 89% the Article 12 (Record-Keeping) check and 84% the Article 14 (Human Oversight) check. The author also reported that 98% of files passed the Article 11 (Technical Documentation) check, which he puts down to developers already writing docstrings and type hints. Treat that figure with care: the Article 11 check looks for logging, documentation and type hints, and a file passes on one detected sub-check, so a high rate says little about whether the technical documentation the Act requires exists. The author's reading is that code passes where good engineering practice already overlaps with a requirement and fails where nobody has made that connection. That is plausible, and this post does not prove it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Why the tools you already have miss this
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If your company runs a GRC platform (OneTrust, Vanta, Credo AI), you might assume this is already covered.&lt;br&gt;
It isn't the same thing. Scanara starts from your code, not from a questionnaire.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Say the risk in your AI system lives in application logic: a scoring function, a ranking model, an inference call that feeds a hiring or lending decision. A cloud-config scan can't see any of that. The evidence the EU AI Act actually asks for, what the system does, what oversight exists, what happens when it's wrong, lives&lt;br&gt;
in the code and the documentation next to it. Not in an IAM policy.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;None of this means you should rip out your GRC platform. Evidence from code and attestations from a questionnaire are different kinds of proof, and most teams only have the second kind.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What Scanara actually checks
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Compliance content usually stays abstract. Here's something concrete instead: one real detection pattern, simplified for this post but built on real Semgrep rule syntax.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Article 14 requires that high-risk AI systems be designed so a human can effectively oversee their operation. That includes the ability to intervene or override an output before it gets acted on. Here's a simplified version of the kind of rule that checks for it:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight yaml"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="na"&gt;rules&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
  &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;id&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;eu-ai-act-example.article-14-missing-human-oversight-hook&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;languages&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="pi"&gt;[&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nv"&gt;python&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;]&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;severity&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;WARNING&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;message&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="pi"&gt;&amp;gt;&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="s"&gt;High-risk AI inference call has no human-oversight hook (approval, override, or review checkpoint) nearby. EU AI Act Article 14 requires human oversight measures for high-risk AI systems before their output is acted on.&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;metadata&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="na"&gt;article&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s2"&gt;"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="s"&gt;14"&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="na"&gt;category&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;human-oversight&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="na"&gt;patterns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;pattern-either&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;pattern&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;$RESULT = $MODEL.predict(...)&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;pattern&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="s"&gt;$RESULT = $CLIENT.chat.completions.create(...)&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;pattern-not-inside&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="pi"&gt;|&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="s"&gt;if $APPROVED:&lt;/span&gt;
              &lt;span class="s"&gt;...&lt;/span&gt;
      &lt;span class="pi"&gt;-&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="na"&gt;pattern-not-inside&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="pi"&gt;:&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="pi"&gt;|&lt;/span&gt;
          &lt;span class="s"&gt;$RESULT = require_human_approval(...)&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The rule looks for a high-risk inference call, a model prediction or an LLM completion, whose result flows straight into downstream logic with no oversight checkpoint anywhere nearby. No conditional gate. No approval or override call in scope. The code works fine. There's just nothing in it that gives a human the chance to catch a bad output before it gets acted on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Flip it around and the passing version of the same code just adds one checkpoint:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight python"&gt;&lt;code&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;result&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="o"&gt;=&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="n"&gt;model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="nf"&gt;predict&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;applicant_data&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;span class="k"&gt;if&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span class="nf"&gt;require_human_approval&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;result&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;):&lt;/span&gt;
    &lt;span class="nf"&gt;finalize_decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="n"&gt;result&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class="p"&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Same model, same prediction. One line of difference, and that line is exactly what Article 14 is asking for.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is a simplified example, not the literal production rule. The real ruleset covers more languages, more oversight-hook idioms, and confidence handling not shown here. It's still real Semgrep syntax, checking for a real pattern, mapped to a specific article and paragraph. Every finding traces back to something specific&lt;br&gt;
in the regulation, not a vague "AI governance" checkbox.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Fail-closed, on purpose
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One pattern developers described on Hacker News in March 2026 stuck with us: compliance checks bolted on as middleware that silently let a request through when a check times out or errors. That's worse than having no check at all. It produces an audit trail that says "compliant" when nobody actually verified anything.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scanara's merge gate is fail-closed by design. If the check can't run, the PR gets blocked. It doesn't get silently waved through. A compliance check that quietly allows on failure isn't really a check. It's a false audit trail, and that's worse than an honest gap.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Try it
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Free tier, self-serve. Connect a repo and see what it actually finds. No sales call needed:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;a href="https://scanara.io/en/?utm_source=devto&amp;amp;utm_medium=launch&amp;amp;utm_campaign=post-launch-2026-08" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://scanara.io/en/?utm_source=devto&amp;amp;utm_medium=launch&amp;amp;utm_campaign=post-launch-2026-08&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Where I might be wrong
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Genuinely interested in pushback here. What's the real false-positive rate on pattern-based detection like this at scale, once you're past the illustrative example above? Does automated evidence like this actually hold up to an auditor, or is it still compliance theater dressed up in YAML? And with the high-risk start dates now at 2 December 2027 and 2 August 2028, how much of this is worth building into your engineering practice today versus later? I'd rather hear the hard questions in the comments than pretend there aren't any.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>compliance</category>
      <category>programming</category>
      <category>automation</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
