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    <title>DEV Community: Sunil Gentyala</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Sunil Gentyala (@sunilgentyala).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/sunilgentyala</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Sunil Gentyala</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/sunilgentyala</link>
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      <title>A 10-minute security gate for any MCP server you plan to connect to an agent</title>
      <dc:creator>Sunil Gentyala</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 17:16:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/sunilgentyala/a-10-minute-security-gate-for-any-mcp-server-you-plan-to-connect-to-an-agent-2l3o</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/sunilgentyala/a-10-minute-security-gate-for-any-mcp-server-you-plan-to-connect-to-an-agent-2l3o</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Before I connect an agent to an MCP server, I now run through the same short list. I turned it into a repo so anyone can copy it into a pull request or a review ticket.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The problem in one paragraph. An MCP client calls &lt;code&gt;tools/list&lt;/code&gt;, and whatever text the server returns, tool descriptions included, goes into the model's context. So a server can hide instructions in a description (tool poisoning), or change a tool after you approved it (a rug pull). The protocol does not require that call to be authenticated, so you have to check it yourself.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What the checklist covers, in six sections:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Tool descriptions: read the raw &lt;code&gt;tools/list&lt;/code&gt; output, look for instructions aimed at the model and for hidden Unicode.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Changes after approval: hash each approved tool definition and re-check it on every session and on &lt;code&gt;notifications/tools/list_changed&lt;/code&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Authentication: the spec makes authorization optional, so if a server uses HTTP authorization, check audience validation, no token passthrough and exact redirect matching. Unauthenticated listing is still a finding for me.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Client-side safety: reject odd URL schemes in authorization endpoints, show the full install command, keep Inspector tooling patched.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Server-side tool safety: validate inputs, contain file paths, block flag injection, treat tool output as untrusted input.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Supply chain and logging: exact package name, locked dependencies, read install scripts, log every call, be able to switch one server off quickly.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Every item is a yes/no question with a quick way to test it, and each says whether it is a spec MUST or beyond the spec (the spec has no rug-pull control at all). Sections 1 to 3 are blockers, so you end up with a pass or fail instead of a pile of advice. Where a MITRE ATLAS technique exists (tool poisoning, rug pull, supply chain), the item is mapped to it.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Real cases show why patch level matters: CVE-2025-6514 (OS command injection in mcp-remote through an untrusted server, CVSS 9.6) and CVE-2025-32711 (EchoLeak in M365 Copilot, CVSS 9.3).&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It is not the first MCP checklist. SlowMist has a good one, and I link it in the README. Mine is built as a review gate rather than a reference guide. If you find an item that is untestable, wrong, or missing, a pull request is welcome.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Repo: &lt;a href="https://github.com/sunilgentyala/mcp-security-checklist" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://github.com/sunilgentyala/mcp-security-checklist&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

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      <category>security</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>mcp</category>
      <category>devops</category>
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