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    <title>DEV Community: Vitalii Balint</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Vitalii Balint (@vitaliibalint).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Vitalii Balint</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint</link>
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    <item>
      <title>From Azure SSH Detection to Local AI Incident Analysis</title>
      <dc:creator>Vitalii Balint</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 20:50:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/from-azure-ssh-detection-to-local-ai-incident-analysis-3915</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/from-azure-ssh-detection-to-local-ai-incident-analysis-3915</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Collecting security alerts is one challenge. Turning an alert into a useful incident note—&lt;strong&gt;without giving an AI model control over infrastructure&lt;/strong&gt;—is another.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In an earlier lab, I connected an Azure Ubuntu VM to a local Wazuh SIEM over Tailscale and verified one controlled SSH authentication failure. On &lt;strong&gt;November 14, 2026&lt;/strong&gt;, I completed the next step: I retrieved that same historical Azure event from the Wazuh Indexer, passed it through a Python SOC assistant and a local Qwen model, and saved a validated incident report for human review.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The result is a &lt;strong&gt;manually operated laboratory proof of concept&lt;/strong&gt;, not autonomous incident response or a production SOC.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  What changed since the earlier Azure-to-Wazuh test?
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href="https://ta551.info/blog/azure-to-on-premises-wazuh-ssh-detection/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;previous Azure-to-on-premises Wazuh experiment&lt;/a&gt; verified the transport and detection path: &lt;strong&gt;OpenSSH → journald → Wazuh Agent → Tailscale → local Wazuh Manager → rule 5710 → Dashboard&lt;/strong&gt;. It did not claim AI analysis of that specific Azure alert.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This follow-up adds the missing downstream path: &lt;strong&gt;Wazuh Indexer / OpenSearch → restricted read-only retrieval → Python → local Qwen → validated Markdown report → human analyst&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Azure VM remained &lt;strong&gt;deallocated&lt;/strong&gt; during the November 14 analysis. I used the indexed historical event rather than restarting cloud compute just to repeat a known test.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Architecture and trust boundaries
&lt;/h2&gt;



&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;Azure Ubuntu 24.04 (historical SSH event)
        |
        v
Wazuh Agent -- Tailscale private network
        |
        v
Local Wazuh Manager
        |
        v
Filebeat / Wazuh Indexer (OpenSearch)
        |
        | TLS verification + read-only soc_reader
        | SSH port-forward to local loopback
        v
Python SOC Assistant (Windows)
        |              |
        |              +--&amp;gt; SQLite event ledger
        v
LM Studio / Qwen 3.5 4B Instruct
        |
        v
Schema-validated incident report
        |
        v
Human analyst review
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The Python program cannot automatically change Azure resources, block IP addresses, alter firewall rules, or execute model-recommended remediation. The model's role is limited to producing structured investigation notes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. A traceable, controlled Azure alert
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The historical event originated from &lt;strong&gt;one intentionally invalid SSH username against the Azure VM's own loopback interface&lt;/strong&gt;. It was an authorized test, not an external intrusion.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Evidence field&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Verified result&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Wazuh agent&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;code&gt;azure-devops-lab&lt;/code&gt; (ID 002)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Detection rule&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;code&gt;5710&lt;/code&gt; — login attempt using a non-existent user&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Alert level&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;5&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Alert timestamp&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;2026-11-08T00:30:25.167+0000&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Source context&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;code&gt;127.0.0.1&lt;/code&gt; (laboratory loopback)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The alert was retained in the Wazuh archive and the Indexer. I confirmed that the Indexer returned &lt;strong&gt;one matching document&lt;/strong&gt; for this agent and rule. A single intentionally failed login does not demonstrate brute force, lateral movement, or compromise.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. Effective read-only access matters
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The assistant accessed OpenSearch through a local SSH tunnel and validated the Indexer's TLS certificate against a trusted CA. It authenticated with a restricted Indexer account, &lt;code&gt;soc_reader&lt;/code&gt;, rather than administrator credentials.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;During the check, the query initially returned &lt;strong&gt;HTTP 403&lt;/strong&gt;. The intended role already had search permissions for Wazuh alert indices, but the user had not been mapped to it. Correcting that mapping restored the expected read-only search.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The lesson is practical: &lt;strong&gt;role definitions are not enough; effective user-to-role mapping must also be tested.&lt;/strong&gt; No broad administrative rights were needed for alert retrieval.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. Model output failed closed, then passed
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The first end-to-end analysis fetched the event but did &lt;strong&gt;not&lt;/strong&gt; produce an accepted report. Qwen reached its generation limit, yielding an incomplete response:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;finish_reason=length
completed=0
failed=1
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The assistant rejected that output instead of treating partial JSON as a completed security assessment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;After changing the local model configuration, a manual retry succeeded:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;status=success
fetched=1
selected=1
completed=1
failed=0
duration=11.172s
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;The program wrote a validated Markdown incident report locally and recorded processing state in SQLite. No private report, password, raw production log, SSH private key, or local database was committed to the public project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. AI classification is not the analyst's conclusion
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The generated incident note assessed the event as:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Field&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Model output&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Disposition&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;SUSPICIOUS&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Severity&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;LOW&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Self-reported confidence&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;0.7&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Suggested actions&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Read-only investigation and verification&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;My final human disposition was &lt;code&gt;BENIGN&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; because I had deliberately generated this test on an authorized host. The model saw a failed SSH authentication and could describe reasons to investigate it; it lacked the operational context that explains &lt;em&gt;why&lt;/em&gt; it occurred.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is precisely why I did not allow the model to decide firewall actions or declare a confirmed attack. An alert can be technically correct while an AI interpretation remains incomplete.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Repeatability, state, and automated tests
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The assistant stores processed event identities in SQLite and uses a bounded, manually triggered run. After the successful report, I repeated the invocation; the follow-up did not select the already processed Azure event for a duplicate report.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Relevant evidence from this implementation:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;35 Python offline tests passed&lt;/strong&gt;, including validation and state-handling scenarios.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;GitHub Actions checks passed on Python &lt;strong&gt;3.10 and 3.12&lt;/strong&gt; for the SOC project.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Truncated model output was rejected and then retried successfully.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;One matching Azure event produced one validated report.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Human review corrected the AI's suspicious classification to &lt;strong&gt;benign authorized activity&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;These results establish behavior within the tested scenarios only. They do not prove general model accuracy, complete prompt-injection resistance, or production availability.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  6. A separate Terraform CI milestone
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On November 15, I also finalized a &lt;strong&gt;private Terraform infrastructure repository&lt;/strong&gt; for the Azure lab and added a validation-only GitHub Actions workflow.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That workflow checks Terraform formatting, initializes required providers without a remote backend, and runs &lt;code&gt;terraform validate&lt;/code&gt;. It succeeded in GitHub Actions after addressing a Windows-versus-Linux provider checksum issue.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It has &lt;strong&gt;no Azure credentials and no &lt;code&gt;plan&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;apply&lt;/code&gt;, or &lt;code&gt;destroy&lt;/code&gt; stage&lt;/strong&gt;. Validation of source configuration is deliberately separate from deployment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Engineering takeaway
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The important result is not simply that a language model generated a report. It is that I verified a traceable chain, identified real failure modes, and constrained what the model could do:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Azure security telemetry → private SIEM ingestion → indexed event retrieval → local LLM analysis → validated report → human decision.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This experiment exercised Linux log collection, private networking, Wazuh detection, OpenSearch permissions, TLS, SSH forwarding, Python state management, local AI integration, test automation, and incident-review discipline.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The most useful lesson was straightforward: &lt;strong&gt;reliable AI-assisted security workflows need conventional engineering safeguards before they need more autonomy.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Code and earlier work
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/vitaliibalint39-oss/ai-powered-soc-lab" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AI-Powered SOC Lab — source code and tests&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://github.com/vitaliibalint39-oss/ai-powered-soc-lab/blob/main/docs/AZURE_QWEN_END_TO_END_RUNBOOK.md" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Verified Azure-to-Qwen end-to-end runbook&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://ta551.info/blog/azure-to-on-premises-wazuh-ssh-detection/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Azure-to-on-premises Wazuh over Tailscale&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://ta551.info/blog/azure-terraform-ubuntu-docker-nginx/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Azure Terraform, Ubuntu and Docker&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://ta551.info/blog/azure-ansible-tomcat-security-monitor/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Azure Ansible, Tomcat and security monitoring&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://ta551.info/blog/wazuh-ai-security-lab/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Building a local Wazuh and Qwen SOC lab&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Validated November 14–15, 2026 (Michigan). All security events were created in an authorized lab. No real-world compromise or autonomous remediation is claimed.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>azure</category>
      <category>wazuh</category>
      <category>cybersecurity</category>
      <category>ai</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Azure Ubuntu to an On-Prem Wazuh SIEM over Tailscale: Verified SSH Detection</title>
      <dc:creator>Vitalii Balint</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 21:59:06 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/azure-ubuntu-to-an-on-prem-wazuh-siem-over-tailscale-verified-ssh-detection-4h5m</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/azure-ubuntu-to-an-on-prem-wazuh-siem-over-tailscale-verified-ssh-detection-4h5m</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Can an Ubuntu virtual machine running in Microsoft Azure send SSH security events to a Wazuh Manager hosted on a local VMware environment without exposing the SIEM to the public internet?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I wanted to validate this with a real end-to-end test, rather than relying only on service status or network connectivity checks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The result:&lt;/strong&gt; I successfully connected an Azure Ubuntu 24.04 VM to my on-premises Wazuh 4.14.8 Manager using Tailscale, generated a controlled SSH authentication failure, and verified that the corresponding alert reached Wazuh Dashboard.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This was an isolated, authorized laboratory experiment, not production security monitoring.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. Lab Architecture
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The environment consisted of:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Cloud:&lt;/strong&gt; Microsoft Azure, Ubuntu 24.04 LTS&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;SIEM:&lt;/strong&gt; Wazuh Manager 4.14.8 running locally on VMware&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Endpoint:&lt;/strong&gt; Wazuh Agent 4.14.8&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Networking:&lt;/strong&gt; Tailscale private VPN&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Log source:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenSSH authentication events through systemd-journald&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Verification:&lt;/strong&gt; Wazuh Dashboard / Threat Hunting&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The event pipeline was:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Azure Ubuntu → OpenSSH → journald → Wazuh Agent → Tailscale → Local Wazuh Manager → SSH Decoder → Dashboard&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Agent communication used TCP port 1514, while TCP 1515 was used for enrollment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Wazuh Manager was not exposed through public inbound SIEM rules.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. Establishing Private Connectivity
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I installed Tailscale on both the local Wazuh Manager and the Azure VM and connected them to the same private tailnet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One interesting observation was that Tailscale traffic used a &lt;strong&gt;DERP relay instead of a direct peer-to-peer path&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This was sufficient for my low-volume test. It is not evidence of production-scale throughput or latency performance.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For initial Azure administration, I temporarily permitted SSH access from one specific public administrator IP through an Azure Network Security Group rule.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;After validating private access, I removed that temporary rule.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. Registering the Azure Wazuh Agent
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I installed Wazuh Agent 4.14.8-1 on the Azure VM and configured it to communicate with the Manager through its Tailscale address.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Manager confirmed:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Property&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Verified result&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Agent name&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;azure-devops-lab&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Agent ID&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Agent version&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4.14.8&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Status during testing&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Active&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Log collection&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;journald&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Checking the service status alone was not enough. I also verified agent enrollment and communication from the Manager side.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Before connecting Azure, I had repaired a local Wazuh database socket issue and confirmed SSH detection using an existing local endpoint. This gave me a known-good detection baseline.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. Generating a Controlled SSH Security Event
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To validate the complete pipeline, I generated one intentionally invalid SSH login against the Azure VM's own loopback interface.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The test used a nonexistent username, rather than real credentials or external targets.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The resulting OpenSSH journal entry reached the on-premises Wazuh Manager.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Observed alert:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Field&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Value&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Wazuh Rule ID&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5710&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Rule level&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Description&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;sshd: Attempt to login using a non-existent user&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Agent ID&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;002&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Log source&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;journald&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Source IP&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;127.0.0.1&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Test account&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;wazuh-azure-test-2026&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I verified the corresponding event in Wazuh Dashboard → Threat Hunting using:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;agent.id: "002" AND rule.id: "5710"&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The filtered results showed one matching alert and one authentication failure, with no successful authentication in that filtered sample.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Wazuh associated the event with MITRE ATT&amp;amp;CK classifications T1110.001 and T1021.004.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;However, one controlled invalid-user event does &lt;strong&gt;not&lt;/strong&gt; establish brute-force activity, lateral movement, or a real compromise.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That distinction matters when reporting security findings.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Validating the Security Boundaries
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;After the detection test, I performed additional checks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;First, I verified that private SSH access to the Azure VM continued to work through Tailscale.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then I removed the temporary public SSH rule from the Azure NSG.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In the subsequent test, public TCP/22 was unreachable, while private SSH access remained available.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Finally, I deallocated the Azure VM and verified its power state.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Important cost consideration:&lt;/strong&gt; Azure VM deallocation stops VM compute billing, but managed disks, public IP resources, and other retained services may still generate charges.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Azure Wazuh Agent also stops sending events while the VM is deallocated.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  6. The Next Challenge: Agent Disconnections
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I shared this experiment in the r/Wazuh community and received useful technical feedback about agent connectivity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A Wazuh Manager can identify when an agent stops sending keepalives, but that notification alone does not establish the cause.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For a cloud-to-on-premises deployment, several failures can produce a similar symptom:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Azure VM is stopped or deallocated.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Tailscale connection is unavailable.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;The Wazuh Agent service has stopped.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Network communication between the agent and Manager is interrupted.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In a follow-up experiment, I plan to combine Wazuh's agent-disconnection events with external checks of VPN connectivity, service state, and Azure VM power state.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That investigation has &lt;strong&gt;not yet been completed&lt;/strong&gt; and should not be confused with the SSH detection test documented here.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  7. Engineering Lessons
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This exercise reinforced several practical lessons.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Verify the complete event path.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An active service does not prove that security events are reaching the intended destination.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. Keep monitoring infrastructure private.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A private overlay network allowed the Azure endpoint to communicate with the local SIEM without exposing the Manager to the public internet.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. Separate evidence from interpretation.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A Wazuh rule classification is not automatically proof of a real attack.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;4. Test recovery and disconnection scenarios separately.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Successful detection under normal conditions does not prove fault tolerance.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;5. Treat cloud cost management as part of the runbook.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Temporary access rules and running cloud resources should be reviewed and cleaned up after testing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Conclusion
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I verified a complete security-event pipeline from Azure Ubuntu to an on-premises Wazuh Manager through Tailscale.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The experiment demonstrates agent enrollment, SSH telemetry collection, private networking, deterministic detection, dashboard verification, and responsible cloud cleanup.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It does not demonstrate continuous monitoring, automated remediation, production scalability, or root-cause diagnosis of agent disconnections.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Original technical article:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href="https://ta551.info/blog/azure-to-on-premises-wazuh-ssh-detection/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Azure to On-Premises SIEM: SSH Detection with Wazuh and Tailscale&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Community discussion:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/Wazuh/comments/1xqmlg1/azure_ubuntu_onprem_wazuh_4148_over_tailscale/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Azure Ubuntu → On-Prem Wazuh 4.14.8 over Tailscale on Reddit&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h3&gt;
  
  
  Question for the community
&lt;/h3&gt;

&lt;p&gt;If you're operating Wazuh agents across cloud and on-premises networks, how do you differentiate VPN outages, stopped instances, and Wazuh Agent failures?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Do you rely on Wazuh's built-in disconnection alerts, or have you implemented independent health checks?&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Editorial disclosure: This DEV.to adaptation was prepared with AI writing assistance based on my original engineering article and documented laboratory observations. The technical claims reflect the recorded test results.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>devops</category>
      <category>azure</category>
      <category>wazuh</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title># HTTPS Isn't Enough: 5 Security Header Mistakes</title>
      <dc:creator>Vitalii Balint</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 00:10:19 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/-https-isnt-enough-5-security-header-mistakes-52il</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/-https-isnt-enough-5-security-header-mistakes-52il</guid>
      <description>&lt;h1&gt;
  
  
  HTTPS Isn't Enough: 5 Security Header Mistakes
&lt;/h1&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Having an SSL certificate is an important first step toward securing a website. But HTTPS alone doesn't guarantee that a web application is configured securely.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;While working with Linux servers, Nginx, reverse proxies, and my website security audit project, &lt;strong&gt;SiteProbeLab&lt;/strong&gt;, I've been focusing on practical HTTP security configuration issues.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here are five mistakes worth checking.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. HSTS Is Present but Effectively Disabled
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Consider this HTTP response header:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=0&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;At first glance, HSTS is present. But &lt;code&gt;max-age=0&lt;/code&gt; actually tells the browser to remove the stored HSTS policy for that host after receiving the header over HTTPS.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A commonly used configuration is:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A longer policy, with &lt;code&gt;includeSubDomains&lt;/code&gt;, should only be enabled after verifying that every affected subdomain supports HTTPS properly.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Lesson:&lt;/strong&gt; Check security header values, not just their presence.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. Content Security Policy Is Too Permissive
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Content Security Policy (CSP) helps reduce the impact of certain client-side attacks by controlling which resources the browser can load.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;However, a policy that broadly permits external sources and unsafe inline scripts can weaken this protection.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For example, using &lt;code&gt;script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'&lt;/code&gt; may allow inline script execution that a stricter policy would block.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A stronger approach is to design a policy around the application's actual dependencies, using nonces or hashes where appropriate.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;CSP should be treated as defense in depth, not a replacement for secure application code.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. Enforcing CSP Without Testing
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A strict CSP can accidentally block legitimate JavaScript, fonts, analytics, or third-party integrations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Before enforcing a new policy, test it with:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This example lets you evaluate the restrictions without enforcing them.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Review browser console violations, configure reporting if needed, and adjust the policy before switching to enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. Missing Security Headers on Nginx Error Responses
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is an easy detail to overlook in Nginx configurations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Consider:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff";&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Without the &lt;code&gt;always&lt;/code&gt; parameter, Nginx adds this header only for certain HTTP response codes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A more consistent configuration is:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Also check how &lt;code&gt;add_header&lt;/code&gt; directives are inherited between &lt;code&gt;http&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;server&lt;/code&gt;, and &lt;code&gt;location&lt;/code&gt; blocks. A header defined at one level can disappear when additional headers are configured at a more specific level.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Recent Nginx versions provide additional inheritance controls, but you should verify the behavior of the version you're actually running.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Testing Only the Homepage
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A website may return the expected security headers on &lt;code&gt;/&lt;/code&gt;, but behave differently on:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;API endpoints&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Redirect responses&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Error pages&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Static resources&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Responses delivered through a CDN&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A simple starting point:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;curl -sSI https://example.com/&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Then test actual GET responses:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null https://example.com/api/health&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;curl -sS -D - -o /dev/null https://example.com/nonexistent-page&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When using Cloudflare or another reverse proxy, inspect what the client actually receives, not only the origin server's configuration.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Remember that different resource types require different security controls. The absence of a browser-oriented header on a JSON API isn't automatically a vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  My Current Project: SiteProbeLab
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've recently released a dedicated &lt;strong&gt;Security Headers Checker&lt;/strong&gt; as part of &lt;strong&gt;SiteProbeLab&lt;/strong&gt;, my independent website security diagnostics project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The tool helps website owners and system administrators identify common HTTP security header issues, including:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)&lt;/strong&gt; — identifying missing HSTS policies.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Content Security Policy (CSP)&lt;/strong&gt; — detecting missing CSP configurations.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;X-Content-Type-Options&lt;/strong&gt; — checking for missing MIME-sniffing protection.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Referrer-Policy&lt;/strong&gt; — identifying missing referrer disclosure policies.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The tool provides explanations and suggested remediation steps, while keeping broader website audit findings separate from security header results.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It uses the existing SiteProbeLab audit API and supports downloading findings in JSON format.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Try the free Security Headers Checker:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://siteprobelab.com/tools/security-headers-checker/?utm_source=devto&amp;amp;utm_medium=article&amp;amp;utm_campaign=security_headers" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Run a Website Security Headers Check&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;No registration required. Enter a domain to review the findings.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The checker is designed as a practical first-pass diagnostic tool, not a replacement for a comprehensive penetration test or security assessment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I also document my Linux infrastructure, cloud, DevOps, and security engineering projects at:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Technical portfolio:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="https://ta551.info/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;https://ta551.info/&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Final Thoughts
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security configuration isn't a one-time checkbox.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;A reliable workflow should include:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ol&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Reviewing HTTP response headers.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Validating their actual values.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Checking different application routes and response codes.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Testing changes before enforcing restrictive policies.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Rechecking configurations after deployments.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ol&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Security headers are valuable, but they are only one layer in a broader application security strategy.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;How do you validate security headers in your deployment workflow?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'd be interested in hearing about tools and approaches other developers and system administrators use.&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Technical references&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTTP_Headers_Cheat_Sheet.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;OWASP HTTP Headers Cheat Sheet&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;MDN — Strict-Transport-Security&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;MDN — Content Security Policy&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_headers_module.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Official Nginx Headers Module Documentation&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

</description>
      <category>webdev</category>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>nginx</category>
      <category>devops</category>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Building a Local AI SOC Lab with Wazuh and Qwen: Lessons from a Real Implementation</title>
      <dc:creator>Vitalii Balint</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 04:02:35 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/building-a-local-ai-soc-lab-with-wazuh-and-qwen-lessons-from-a-real-implementation-215e</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/vitaliibalint/building-a-local-ai-soc-lab-with-wazuh-and-qwen-lessons-from-a-real-implementation-215e</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security monitoring generates a lot of data. But collecting alerts is only the beginning. The real challenge is retrieving the right events, understanding what happened, and making decisions based on evidence.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I wanted to explore a practical question:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Can a locally hosted AI model help a security analyst investigate Wazuh alerts without giving the AI control over the infrastructure?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;To explore this, I built an isolated AI-assisted Security Operations Center (SOC) lab using Wazuh, OpenSearch, Python, SQLite, and a local Qwen model.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is a manually operated proof of concept, not a production SOC or an autonomous security platform.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  1. My Lab Architecture
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The environment includes Ubuntu 24.04 virtual machines for security telemetry and Wazuh services, together with a Windows workstation running the Python assistant and LM Studio.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The main components are:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Wazuh Agent:&lt;/strong&gt; collects security events from an Ubuntu endpoint.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Wazuh Manager and OpenSearch Indexer:&lt;/strong&gt; process and store security alerts.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Python SOC Assistant:&lt;/strong&gt; retrieves alerts and prepares them for analysis.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;SQLite:&lt;/strong&gt; tracks processed events and stores generated reports.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;LM Studio + Qwen 3.5 4B Instruct:&lt;/strong&gt; generates structured incident analysis proposals.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;
&lt;strong&gt;Human analyst:&lt;/strong&gt; reviews findings and determines the next steps.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The assistant uses a restricted reader account. Access to the Indexer is protected through SSH port forwarding and TLS verification.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Important security boundary:&lt;/strong&gt; The AI cannot execute firewall commands, modify server configurations, or automatically block IP addresses.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Its purpose is investigation support, not autonomous remediation.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  2. The First Problem: Missing Alerts
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;My initial implementation retrieved only the 20 newest alerts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This worked for a small demonstration, but it was not reliable when more events were present.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I improved the Python client using OpenSearch Scroll pagination to retrieve a bounded snapshot of matching alerts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In one documented integration test:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;152 matching alerts were reported by OpenSearch.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;152 alerts were successfully retrieved.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;152 unique event IDs were verified.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That confirmed the pagination logic worked correctly for that query snapshot.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It did not prove continuous monitoring or complete historical coverage.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I also encountered an Indexer permission issue affecting Scroll cleanup. Fixing the reader permissions was part of making the workflow reliable without giving it unnecessary access.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  3. Why I Added SQLite
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Originally, processed event IDs were tracked using a JSON file.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That approach was simple, but I wanted more reliable event state, recovery, and retry behavior.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I introduced SQLite to preserve processed identifiers and incident reports.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;During verification, I successfully migrated 20 existing event IDs and confirmed database integrity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I also tested restoring a synthetic incident report from the database after its Markdown export was missing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This taught me an important engineering lesson:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;AI analysis is only one part of the system. Reliable event state and recovery matter just as much.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  4. Connecting a Local Qwen Model
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The Python assistant connects to Qwen through LM Studio's local API-compatible endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The workflow sends selected security events to the model and requests structured JSON output.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The application validates required fields before saving a report.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In one test, I used a synthetic failed SSH authentication event.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Qwen proposed:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Disposition:&lt;/strong&gt; SUSPICIOUS&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Severity:&lt;/strong&gt; LOW&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Recommended action:&lt;/strong&gt; Investigate and review related logs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This was useful, but I also noticed how easily a language model could misinterpret technical context.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For example, a client source port can be confused with a destination service port. A single failed login also does not automatically indicate brute-force activity.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That is why I separate observed evidence from AI-generated hypotheses.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  5. Prompt Injection in Security Logs
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One of the most interesting experiments involved an untrusted SSH log message.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I tested synthetic log content containing text designed to manipulate the model into treating failed authentication as successful authentication.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In a documented retest, the model preserved the failed-login finding.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;An earlier test also exposed an unsafe recommendation to block an IP address. I introduced conservative recommendation filtering and regression tests to help keep responses within the lab's read-only investigation scope.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;These were limited experiments.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;They do not demonstrate complete resistance to prompt injection or guarantee that every AI-generated recommendation is safe.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Security logs are evidence, not instructions.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Human review remains essential.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  6. Testing and Verification
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I wanted the project to demonstrate more than a working screenshot.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The repository includes 31 mocked and offline Python tests, exercised through GitHub Actions using Python 3.10 and 3.12.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The implementation also includes validation of event identity, persistent processing state, structured model responses, and read-only operational boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;However, automated tests alone do not prove production security or detection accuracy.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The lab still has important limitations: manual execution, no continuous alert monitoring, and network restrictions around the local model service that require further verification before broader deployment.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  7. What I Learned
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Three lessons stand out from this project.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;First, reliable data retrieval comes before AI analysis.&lt;/strong&gt; Missing alerts can undermine even a well-written incident report.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Second, local AI can assist security investigations, but its output must be validated.&lt;/strong&gt; A structured response is not necessarily a correct response.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Third, automation needs clear security boundaries.&lt;/strong&gt; I prefer a system that helps an analyst understand an event over one that performs potentially harmful actions without approval.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;My next areas of work include more realistic alert replay tests, better performance measurements, and stronger local-model network restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Project Resources
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The public repository includes the Python implementation, tests, documentation, and sanitized verification examples.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;GitHub:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href="https://github.com/vitaliibalint39-oss/ai-powered-soc-lab" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;AI-Powered SOC Lab&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Original engineering article:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a href="https://ta551.info/blog/wazuh-ai-security-lab/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;Building a Local AI SOC Lab with Wazuh and Qwen&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'm interested in how other engineers approach local AI for security operations.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Would you trust a local LLM to prepare incident triage reports if every recommendation required human approval?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;




&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Editorial disclosure: This DEV.to adaptation was prepared with AI writing assistance using my original engineering article and documented project results as source material.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>ai</category>
      <category>python</category>
      <category>devops</category>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
