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    <title>DEV Community: WinstonRedGuard</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by WinstonRedGuard (@wrg11).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/wrg11</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: WinstonRedGuard</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/wrg11</link>
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      <title>A client-side secret scanner that physically can't exfiltrate your code (and why you shouldn't trust mine either)</title>
      <dc:creator>WinstonRedGuard</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Sat, 30 May 2026 18:49:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/wrg11/a-client-side-secret-scanner-that-physically-cant-exfiltrate-your-code-and-why-you-shouldnt-1252</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/wrg11/a-client-side-secret-scanner-that-physically-cant-exfiltrate-your-code-and-why-you-shouldnt-1252</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;There's an irony in most "paste your config to check for leaked secrets" web tools: pasting a secret into a random website &lt;em&gt;is&lt;/em&gt; the leak. You're trusting a server you can't see.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;So I built &lt;a href="https://wrg-11.github.io/devguard-scan/" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;devguard-scan&lt;/a&gt; the other way around — it runs 100% in your browser, zero dependencies, and makes &lt;strong&gt;no network calls at all&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Don't take my word for it.&lt;/strong&gt; Open DevTools → Network, scan a file, and watch zero requests fire. The source has no &lt;code&gt;fetch&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;XMLHttpRequest&lt;/code&gt;, &lt;code&gt;WebSocket&lt;/code&gt;, or &lt;code&gt;sendBeacon&lt;/code&gt; — grep it yourself. It can't exfiltrate what it never calls.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;The 10 detection rules&lt;/strong&gt; (OpenAI, AWS, GitHub classic + fine-grained PAT, Stripe, Google API, Slack token + webhook, private-key blocks, generic assignments) aren't a weaker JS port — they're the exact regex set from a canonical Python scanner, parity-checked byte-for-byte so the convenience of "in-browser" doesn't cost you detection coverage.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It's a POC, MIT-licensed, and open to rule-requests: &lt;a href="https://github.com/WRG-11/devguard-scan" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;github.com/WRG-11/devguard-scan&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The broader point: for a security tool, "trust me" isn't good enough. The design should make the safety property &lt;em&gt;verifiable by the user&lt;/em&gt; — here, an empty Network tab. What other dev tools should be provable rather than promised?&lt;/p&gt;

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      <category>security</category>
      <category>javascript</category>
      <category>opensource</category>
      <category>webdev</category>
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