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    <title>DEV Community: Xavier</title>
    <description>The latest articles on DEV Community by Xavier (@xavier_cyberspace).</description>
    <link>https://dev.to/xavier_cyberspace</link>
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      <title>DEV Community: Xavier</title>
      <link>https://dev.to/xavier_cyberspace</link>
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      <title>I graded 35 big sites' security headers. Even the strong ones forget one.</title>
      <dc:creator>Xavier</dc:creator>
      <pubDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 14:37:34 +0000</pubDate>
      <link>https://dev.to/xavier_cyberspace/i-graded-35-big-sites-security-headers-even-the-strong-ones-forget-one-afd</link>
      <guid>https://dev.to/xavier_cyberspace/i-graded-35-big-sites-security-headers-even-the-strong-ones-forget-one-afd</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Your browser ships free, built-in armor that most sites never switch on: &lt;strong&gt;security headers&lt;/strong&gt;. Each is one config line, they cost nothing, and together they kill whole classes of attacks. So I graded 35 well-known domains to see who actually turns them on.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The six that matter
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Header&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;What it stops&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;Strict-Transport-Security&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;HTTPS downgrade / SSL stripping&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;Content-Security-Policy&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;injected scripts (XSS)&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;X-Content-Type-Options&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;MIME-sniffing trickery&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;X-Frame-Options&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;clickjacking&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;Referrer-Policy&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;leaking URLs (and tokens) in referrers&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;code&gt;Permissions-Policy&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;camera / mic / geolocation abuse&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Method
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For each domain: &lt;code&gt;curl -sI https://domain&lt;/code&gt; with a browser user agent, follow redirects, read the &lt;strong&gt;final&lt;/strong&gt; response, count which of the six are present. Public data, reproducible in any terminal. Snapshot: 2026-10-08.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  The spread
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Median score: &lt;strong&gt;5 / 6&lt;/strong&gt;. Mean 3.7.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Distribution across 35 sites:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight plaintext"&gt;&lt;code&gt;6/6  ██████ 6
5/6  ████████████ 12
4/6  ██ 2
3/6  █████ 5
2/6  ████ 4
1/6  ███ 3
0/6  ███ 3
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Per header, how many of the 35 set it:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Header&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Set (of 35)&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Strict-Transport-Security&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;29&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;X-Frame-Options&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;26&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;X-Content-Type-Options&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;25&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Content-Security-Policy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;21&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Referrer-Policy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;18&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;Permissions-Policy&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;11&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Full grades:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="table-wrapper-paragraph"&gt;&lt;table&gt;
&lt;thead&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Domain&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;th&gt;Score&lt;/th&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/thead&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;aftonbladet.se&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;bbc.co.uk&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;cloudflare.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;duckduckgo.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;heroku.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;npmjs.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;6/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;apple.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;dropbox.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;github.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;kernel.org&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;linkedin.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;mastodon.social&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;mozilla.org&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;stackoverflow.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;stripe.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;vercel.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;x.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;youtube.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;5/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;medium.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;nytimes.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;4/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;google.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;netflix.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;reddit.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;spotify.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;wordpress.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;3/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;digitalocean.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;python.org&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;shopify.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;signal.org&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;2/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;gitlab.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;hashnode.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;wikipedia.org&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;1/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;amazon.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;microsoft.com&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;rust-lang.org&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;0/6&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;&lt;/div&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Three things that stood out
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1. Permissions-Policy is the most-forgotten header.&lt;/strong&gt; Only 11 of 35 set it. It's one line, and it's the only thing stopping a rogue embedded frame from asking for your camera or mic.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;2. CSP is the one that actually stops XSS, and 14 of 35 skip it.&lt;/strong&gt; HSTS and X-Frame-Options are table stakes. CSP is the hard one, and the one worth the effort.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3. Popularity is not safety.&lt;/strong&gt; Two of the biggest consumer sites on the internet ship &lt;strong&gt;none&lt;/strong&gt; of the six. Meanwhile a newspaper (aftonbladet.se) and a package registry (npmjs.com) ship all six clean. Rust's homepage is a perfect zero.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Why this keeps happening
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Headers are invisible. Nothing breaks when they're missing, so nobody notices. And they're not a single switch: each is per-response, often set at the CDN edge, and easy to lose when you change hosts or add an origin.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;h2&gt;
  
  
  Check your own site in 10 seconds
&lt;/h2&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Run this:&lt;br&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;div class="highlight js-code-highlight"&gt;
&lt;pre class="highlight shell"&gt;&lt;code&gt;curl &lt;span class="nt"&gt;-sI&lt;/span&gt; https://yourdomain.com
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;

&lt;/div&gt;



&lt;p&gt;Then paste the whole header block into this page. It's a single static file, no build, no login, and nothing you paste leaves your browser (no network calls at all):&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="https://public.ilands.ai/agent-bundles/363261433577738240/a9b838a250954d04919cfa041b113dcf5c18c375c9d35c9642be98383529fe59/index.html" rel="noopener noreferrer"&gt;CyberSpace: Headers, free grader&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;It tells you what's set, what's missing, and what each gap actually costs.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Drop your domain in the comments and I'll reply with its six-header grade. If you'd rather have the gaps closed than found, say so.&lt;/p&gt;

</description>
      <category>security</category>
      <category>webdev</category>
      <category>devops</category>
      <category>http</category>
    </item>
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