In the current age of digital privacy and decentralized technologies, tools like Tor and Snowflake have provided significant value to people living under restrictive regimes. They enable secure access to the web, anonymized communication, and freedom from surveillance. These technologies have contributed positively in many parts of the world, and in some cases, saved lives. However, alongside this, there exists an overlooked issue: the increasing reliance on casual, unaware volunteers to maintain the infrastructure behind these systems.
For instance, many internet users — especially those using privacy-focused browsers or browser extensions — unknowingly participate in distributed proxy systems like Snowflake, which is part of the Tor ecosystem. Their IP addresses are used as entry points or relay channels for anonymized traffic. While the idea of empowering users to support privacy by default may seem noble, most participants are unaware of their role, or of the potential consequences their network presence might create for themselves.
Here, I propose a new, non-invasive model that shifts the focus away from traditional censorship and permanent bans. Instead of trying to destroy or outlaw systems like Tor, this strategy uses awareness and behavioral psychology to reduce misuse, improve digital hygiene, and identify serious cases of misuse without affecting the general population.
The model is simple: at the national level, Snowflake proxy discovery systems can be run to passively log active relay IPs. Once a significant sample is collected, those IPs are temporarily blocked for a short duration — for example, 24 to 48 hours — just long enough to create a mild disruption in connectivity. At the same time, an informational SMS or message is sent to the associated ISP or phone number (based on legal and ethical telecom access), stating something like: “Be careful. Your IP was recently used to route privacy traffic via Tor’s Snowflake system. This may expose your IP publicly.” The message is neutral, free from accusation, and focused entirely on privacy awareness.
This creates a soft, recurring loop: temporary disruption, followed by education. It does not enforce compliance or threaten legal action. Instead, it allows users to make informed choices. Many who had no idea they were participating will quietly uninstall or disable the tool. Volunteers will step back. Participation will decline — not because they were forced, but because they were informed. And most importantly, those who persist after multiple cycles of disruption and awareness naturally self-identify as advanced users or high-risk actors. This creates a filtered environment where general public usage declines, and focused, technical actors remain identifiable for further analysis or engagement, if necessary.
This approach avoids direct confrontation. It doesn’t create the backlash seen with firewalls, DPI-based bans, or full censorship. It also avoids collateral damage to legitimate services. Most people tend to resist when faced with hard restrictions, but tend to withdraw voluntarily when made aware of unseen risks. This awareness-based method, repeated in cycles, creates long-term behavioral change without pressuring anyone into submission. It respects user choice, while still reducing the misuse of privacy tools inside the country.
Eventually, this soft deterrence mechanism would leave only a narrow base of highly technical users continuing to operate private bridges, obfuscated tunnels, or VPNs. These users, by nature, are more traceable and containable than a large, noisy network of accidental volunteers. And since nothing is permanently blocked, it becomes difficult for external observers to classify this as censorship. Instead, it becomes a matter of responsible network management through education and temporary controls.
This is not a call to destroy Tor. Tor has done meaningful work in the privacy space and continues to be used by individuals with good intentions. But at the same time, national networks and governments need better, non-destructive ways to manage misuse and reduce blind participation in complex global infrastructures. This strategy, in its full neutrality, is an attempt to offer one such direction.
— Muhammed Shafin P
GitHub: github.com/hejhdiss
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