$100K+ Returned — Wallet Access Restored (Adverting Case)

A polished “ad deal” led to a wallet compromise. Funds had already moved. We restored access and reassigned control of the attacker’s receiving wallet to the victim team. A reward was offered later; we didn’t keep it — the surplus was directed to @_SEAL_Org. We stay independent.

What you need to know

• The wallet was already compromised; funds had already been moved.
• We restored access and ensured $100K+ didn’t remain with the attacker.
• The project offered a reward; we didn’t keep it. The surplus was sent to @_SEAL_Org.
• We do this independently. This isn’t our job — it’s our hobby. **

How the scam looked (simple and real)

**

• The victim was approached with a partnership/advertising proposal for a crypto game.
• It looked credible: a plausible website, a fairly large X (Twitter) profile, and professional video calls.
• During a call, they asked to install a “workplace viewer” to access materials.
• That “viewer” was stealer malware.
• The attackers withdrew funds, swapped tokens on one chain, and moved
• assets to another chain into their own receiving wallet.

What we did (facts only)

1. Confirmed the compromise and halted further movement.
2. Restored wallet access for the rightful owner.
3. Secured and reassigned control of the attacker’s receiving wallet to the victim team.
4. Coordinated follow-up steps to reduce residual risk

Outcome: access back • control back • attacker locked out.

Post-incident hardening (what we actually delivered)

• Stop re-compromise. We gave step-by-step guidance to safely handle the infected device so it can’t steal funds again (network isolation, session revocation, credential/key rotation, and a clean rebuild plan).
• Clean operational setup. We helped configure a new, clean workstation dedicated to wallet operations (fresh OS, vendor-only downloads, hardware wallet, minimal extensions, separate browser profile, 2FA).
• Forensics-ready. We explained how to snapshot disks and collect system/app logs so the team can hand proper evidence to investigators if they pursue legal action.

More critical steps: full, actionable checklist → https://phishdestroy.io/critical-action

The method: “Adverting”

Adverting is business-style social engineering. Criminals imitate normal workflows (ad buys, partnerships, PR) to make you install a “required client/viewer.” That “client” is the payload.

Adverting stealer method
Common telltales

• “Install our ad manager/helper to sync creatives.”
• “Use our custom Zoom/Telegram client for the call.”
• “Open our media kit/NDA via a secure viewer.”

Rule of thumb

If a workflow from strangers requires a special client/viewer/updater, treat it as hostile by default. Use only official vendor downloads.

Money, the offered reward, and why we declined

• After recovery, the project offered a reward because the total recovery exceeded the initial loss.
• We didn’t keep it.
• We directed the entire surplus to a team we trust and collaborate with: @_SEAL_Org.
• We do not turn this into a funding stream. Independence stays non-negotiable.

Our principles

• Independence only. No budgets, no strings. This isn’t our job; it’s our hobby.
• Results > talk. Access restored, funds back. Everything else is noise.
• No “special clients.” If someone pushes a custom viewer/updater, assume hostility.
• Share smart. We disclose what helps victims — never what helps the actor.
• Make scammers feel it. Lawful, efficient pressure on their infra. With measured sarcasm.

Practical advice (start today)

For projects & teams

• Never install any “workplace viewer/client/updater” from unverified third parties — even if the call looks professional.
• Get Zoom/Telegram only from official vendor sites.
• Avoid sponsored links for wallets/bridges/airdrops — navigate directly.
• Prefer hardware wallets; keep seeds offline; rotate keys on any suspicion.
• If compromised: revoke sessions, move funds, rotate keys, re-issue secrets, and ask for help quickly — hours matter. For the community

Report suspicious activity: https://t.me/PhishDestroy_bot
Join us: https://phishdestroy.io/ •
IF YOU'VE BEEN HACKED - https://phishdestroy.io/critical-action

Closing

The money had already moved. We brought access back and made sure $100K+ didn’t stay with the attacker. A reward was offered; we declined to keep it and directed the surplus where it helps others. We’ll keep doing it this way — independent, fast, and effective.