SparkyFitness concentrates health data behind provider and passkey settings
SparkyFitness is a self-hosted fitness, nutrition, water, and health tracker built for families. Its data model combines personal measurements with provider tokens and AI-assisted features. The important internet exposure question is not only who can open the dashboard, but which external services the server can reach and which credentials it can decrypt.
The ZoomEye count-only observation on 2026-11-16 found 0 app matches, 256 title matches, and 2,103 http.body matches for SparkyFitness. The probes used sub_type=all, page 1, and pagesize 1. The body result is a broad mention signal. The title count is the better starting set, but each candidate still needs product and ownership validation.
The official environment reference describes a 64-character hexadecimal SPARKY_FITNESS_API_ENCRYPTION_KEY used to encrypt stored external provider API keys and tokens in PostgreSQL. It also documents OIDC settings, passkey login controls, and a private-network provider switch. A deployment that changes the encryption key without a migration plan may lose access to provider credentials. A deployment that exposes the database but not the web UI still exposes the encrypted material and the rest of the health records.
Separate sign-in from provider authority
The web login authenticates a person to SparkyFitness. An external provider token authorizes SparkyFitness to read or write data at another service. Those are different rights. Inventory every enabled provider, its owner, its scopes, the encryption key version, and the API-key rate-limit configuration. Review whether a family member can connect a provider for another user.
Passkey registration needs an existing session. The environment guide warns that a fresh instance with neither OIDC nor SMTP-backed magic links can leave no way to sign in, because passkey registration depends on an authenticated user. Plan the bootstrap account and recovery path before disabling local login. Keep administrator recovery separate from normal family access.
Treat health records as sensitive production data
Back up the PostgreSQL database and the encryption key under separate controls. A backup without the key is unreadable, and a key backup with the database defeats encryption. Test restoration in an isolated environment. Restrict database network access and remove public object-storage or provider callback routes that are no longer needed.
Private-network provider access deserves particular caution. A feature that lets the server reach a self-hosted recipe or food provider can also become a server-side request path. Allow only configured providers and networks, block link-local and metadata addresses, and log the destination without storing returned health data. The same review applies to AI providers and any integration that receives family records.
Build an ownership record
For each title match, verify the application assets, login page, registration state, OIDC provider, API version, and version evidence. Ask the owner whether the instance is personal, shared with a household, or intended for public access. Record the result and observation time.
SparkyFitness can hold enough information to reveal routines, location, diet, and health conditions. The 256-title result should be treated as a candidate list for owner review. A dashboard behind a password is a good start. The provider tokens, database, encryption key, backups, and recovery paths determine whether the data stays inside that boundary.
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