Microsoft shipped a mitigation in October 2025 to shut down a wave of authentication attacks against the Common Log File System (CLFS) driver. Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri, who goes by Nightmare Eclipse, says that mitigation is now the vulnerability. His exploit, SignDrop, turns the defense into a local privilege escalation to SYSTEM.
Naceri credits the mitigation with working: he says attacks exploiting CLFS vulnerabilities dropped sharply after it landed. The problem is in the mechanism itself. The mitigation creates an authentication file (.cnpf) whenever CLFS creates a new log file. According to Naceri, CLFS enforces the access checks correctly at the start, but the logic can be abused when a different, privileged process later opens the log file. CLFS creates the authentication file with the original file's access permissions, and when a SYSTEM-level process does the opening, the file is created in that context.
The part that lifts this above a routine privilege escalation is what it does to endpoint security. Naceri says privileged processes such as Windows Defender can be forced to open the files. From the perspective of an antimalware engine's kernel drivers, the file-creation request comes from the engine's own legitimate process, so it passes tamper protection.
"What makes it funnier is the fact that it can be used against any antimalware engine to bypass their self defense (or tamper protection) mechanism, as you can trigger arbitrary file creation in the context of their own antimalware process so from the perspective of their kernel drivers, the file creation request is coming from their own legit process so it passes," Naceri said. "This makes this vulnerability unique as it can be used to turn off any antivirus/EDR."
He is clear that Microsoft did the work correctly. "Everything is done properly by Microsoft here but the logic allows abuse," he said. The chain uses a legitimate security mitigation against itself.
Checking whether you're exposed
Naceri gives two ways to test a machine. Run the proof-of-concept exploit: if it spawns a SYSTEM shell, the machine is vulnerable. Or read the CLFS authentication mode at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication\Mode. A value of 0 (learning mode) or 1 (enforcement mode) means the box is vulnerable.
Scope is wide but not universal. SignDrop can't be used against every Windows machine. Naceri tested it on Windows 11 26H2, Windows 11 26H2 Experimental, and Windows Server 2025 Experimental, and estimates 80% of Windows installations are vulnerable.
There is no fix to apply yet. Naceri says the only option is waiting for a patch from Microsoft. Disabling the CLFS mitigation would reopen the door to the memory corruption vulnerabilities it was built to stop, so turning it off trades one exposure for another. Teams that depend on EDR tamper protection as a control should treat it as unreliable on affected hosts until a patch ships, and lean harder on controls that don't sit on the endpoint: network segmentation, privileged-access monitoring, and alerting on unexpected SYSTEM shells.
The disclosure context
Naceri, who says he is a former Microsoft employee, has published SignDrop as a zero-day with no patch available. It joins a long run of flaws he has disclosed in Microsoft Defender, BitLocker, and other Windows components since April: BigDiskBuster, ShieldCrash, ShieldBreak, LegacyHive, RoguePlanet, BlueHammer, RedSun, YellowKey, GreenPlasma, MiniPlasma, and UnDefend. Five years ago he released several privilege-escalation zero-days for various Windows versions.
His pattern of disclosing publicly without first reporting privately has history with Microsoft. After an earlier round, the company warned of legal action against anyone engaging in "malicious activity causing real harm" to its customers, which much of the infosec community read as aimed at Naceri. Microsoft has since fixed some of this year's disclosures, including ShieldBreak, RoguePlanet, YellowKey, GreenPlasma, and MiniPlasma. The rest, SignDrop included, are still waiting on an official patch.
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