1. Basic Information
- Article Title: Drupal core - Critical - Remote code execution - SA-CORE-2026-017
- Publisher: Drupal Security Team
- Publication Date: November 18, 2026
- Source: Drupal SA-CORE-2026-017
- Related Resources: Securing the installer in Drupal, BleepingComputer: Drupal Vulnerability Report, Drupal security advisories, OSV
- Associated CVE: CVE-2026-132165
- Affected Products: Drupal 10, Drupal 11
- Severity: Critical (Author's response priority)
- Reason for Severity: Warnings indicate that this flaw can lead to pre-authentication site takeover or remote code execution, and exploit code could be developed quickly. Active exploitation in the wild has not been confirmed at the time of publication.
2. Executive Summary
A vulnerability in Drupal allows an unauthenticated attacker to re-execute core/install.php under specific conditions and attempt to reinstall Drupal, potentially leading to site takeover or remote code execution (RCE).
3. Attack Flow
Path from Installer Re-Execution to Site Takeover or RCE
- An attacker sends a request to an externally accessible /core/install.php.
- The attacker uses the installer under specific conditions to attempt a Drupal reinstallation.
- Depending on the applicable path and configuration, this leads to site takeover or remote code execution (RCE).
4. Attacker Position and Execution Location
An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the Drupal installer.
5. Visibility for Victims and Administrators
This may appear as service disruption, authentication anomalies, configuration tampering, or data access. Administrators should review requests, processes, files, and account changes along the same timeline.
6. Success and Failure Conditions
Success Conditions
- Running an affected version of Drupal
- The installer is reachable from the web
- Site state and permission conditions permit reinstallation
Failure and Mitigation Conditions
- Updated to Drupal 10.6.22 or later for 10.6.x, 11.3.22 or later for 11.3.x, and 11.4.13 or later for 11.4.x. End-of-life versions (10.5.x and earlier, 11.2.x and earlier) require migration to a supported series.
- If the web server can neither write to
settings.phpnor change its permissions, some exploitation paths are mitigated. This alone may not prevent all exploitation paths. - /core/install.php is blocked
7. What Happens Upon Success
- Site takeover
- Tampering with content, accounts, and configurations
- Code execution with web server process privileges
8. Observable Logs
- External access to /core/install.php
- Installer-related POST requests and rapid configuration changes
- Changes to the mtime (modification time) or permissions of settings.php
- New administrator accounts, modules, themes, or suspicious PHP files
Installer access is confirmed via web server request logs, configuration changes via file auditing, and new administrators via authentication records.
9. Attack Success Determination
- Attempt: Crafted requests to vulnerable endpoints or protocols.
- Execution: Generation of unexpected processes, accounts, files, or commands.
- Impact: Data access, privilege acquisition, persistence, service disruption.
- Request attempts alone do not confirm a successful compromise.
- Observing requests targeting the installer does not automatically indicate that reinstallation, site takeover, or code execution succeeded.
10. Investigation Playbook
- Verify the version, configuration, patch status, and external reachability.
- Preserve raw logs, process trees, file metadata, and changes to accounts or credentials.
- Build a timeline linking crafted requests to code execution and privilege acquisition.
- Search all assets for lateral movement, data access, and outbound communication.
- Isolate and update the target, and rotate associated credentials and tokens.
11. Defense and Detection Ideas
- Single Event: External access to /core/install.php
- Timeline: Correlate anomalous requests with subsequent process or account changes.
- Hunting: Search across environments for identical IOCs, source IPs, accounts, and file hashes.
- Priority Action: Update to Drupal 10.6.22, 11.3.22, or 11.4.13. If immediate updating is not possible, block /core/install.php and review settings.php permissions.
12. Facts / Inference / Hypothesis
Facts
- The official "Security risk" rating by the Drupal Security Team is "Critical, 18/25". This is a Drupal-specific risk rating scale, while the severity in this article reflects the author's response priority.
- The official affected ranges are
<10.6.22 || >=11.0.0 <11.3.22 || >=11.4.0 <11.4.13. Update to version 10.6.22, 11.3.22, or 11.4.13 corresponding to the active series. End-of-life series require migration to a supported series. - If the web server can neither write to
settings.phpnor change its permissions, some exploitation paths are mitigated. This alone may not prevent all exploitation paths.
Inference
- Blocking the installer is an urgent mitigation rather than a complete fix, so an upgrade is still required.
Hypothesis
- None. Attack scope or victim counts beyond publicly disclosed information are not assumed.
13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| ID | Technique | Confidence | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | high | Addressing the attack path established by exploiting a publicly exposed installer. This does not indicate confirmed active exploitation. |
14. Unknowns and Further Investigation
- All configuration conditions required for a successful attack
- Public PoCs and the timing of initial active exploitation in the wild
15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations
Verify access to install.php, modifications to settings.php, the addition of new administrators, new modules or themes, and indicators of web shells along the same timeline.
16. Summary by Role
- SOC: Verify access to install.php, modifications to settings.php, the addition of new administrators, new modules or themes, and indicators of web shells along the same timeline.
- Administrators: Update to Drupal 10.6.22, 11.3.22, or 11.4.13. If immediate updating is not possible, block /core/install.php and review settings.php permissions.
- Users: End users have no workarounds available; administrators must apply updates and check for compromises.
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