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F5 BIG-IP: Six Data-Plane Stack Overflows May Allow Pre-Authentication RCE

1. Basic Information

  • Article Name: Out-of-band Security Notification (November 18, 2026)
  • Publisher: F5
  • Publication Date: 2026-11-18
  • Collection Date: 2026-11-21T07:45:23+09:00
  • Source: Primary Source
  • Related Sources: BleepingComputer, CVE-2026-121805, CVE-2026-120292, CVE-2026-120285, CVE-2026-116953, CVE-2026-123637, CVE-2026-120722
  • Technical Condition Primary Sources: F5 CNA CVE-2026-121805, F5 CNA CVE-2026-120722
  • Related CVEs: CVE-2026-121805, CVE-2026-120292, CVE-2026-120285, CVE-2026-116953, CVE-2026-120722, CVE-2026-123637
  • Affected Products: F5 BIG-IP APM, F5 BIG-IP iRules, F5 BIG-IP DNS, BIG-IP CNF, BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes
  • Severity: Critical (Analyst response priority)
  • Reason for Severity: Unauthenticated access to network-perimeter BIG-IP devices can lead to TMM Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution under specific configurations. Active exploitation is unconfirmed at the time of publication.

2. Quick Summary

Six stack-based buffer overflows have been disclosed that could allow specially crafted requests to crash the Traffic Management Microkernel (TMM) and lead to unauthenticated Remote Code Execution on BIG-IP devices with specific APM policies or iRule configurations.

3. Attack Flow

This article covers six vulnerabilities: the five reported by media outlets plus CVE-2026-120722 (DNS::scrape, K000163945, CVSS v3.1 9.8), which was published by F5 on the same day.

These six attack vectors are independent and do not represent a single sequential multi-step attack chain. All represent vulnerability exploitation feasibility conditions described by the vendor, not observed real-world attack steps.

CVE Required Configuration / Feature
CVE-2026-121805 Virtual server configured with an iRule that processes client traffic using PEM::subscriber
CVE-2026-120292 Virtual server configured with an iRule that uses an HTTP profile and MR::message route
CVE-2026-120285 Virtual server configured with an iRule that uses an HTTP profile and PSC::ip_address
CVE-2026-116953 Virtual server configured with an iRule that processes client traffic using GENERICMESSAGE::route
CVE-2026-120722 Virtual server configured with an iRule that processes client traffic using DNS::scrape
CVE-2026-123637 Virtual server with APM provisioned and a per-request policy containing Client Information and Endpoint Security agents

The configuration details for CVE-2026-121805 are based on the description in the F5 CNA record. In the same record, the affected modules for BIG-IP include PEM::subscriber, whereas the affected modules for BIG-IP Next for Kubernetes and BIG-IP Next CNF are listed as DNS::scrape, creating a discrepancy with the description text. Verification from F5 is required regarding the application of this configuration to the latter two products.

  1. An attacker sends a crafted request to a virtual server with one of the vulnerable configurations listed in the table above.
  2. A stack-based buffer overflow causes TMM to crash and triggers a Denial of Service, with the potential to lead to Remote Code Execution.

4. Attacker Location and Execution Context

  • An unauthenticated remote attacker with network reachability to the target virtual server.

5. Impact Visibility for Victims and Administrators

Victims

  • May observe traffic disruption or connection failures.

Administrators

  • Check for TMM core files, restarts, preceding client requests, and unexpected process or network activity.

6. Conditions for Success and Failure

Conditions for Success

  • Affected software version
  • Vulnerable APM policy or specific iRule command configured on the virtual server
  • Attacker requests reach the data plane

Conditions for Failure and Mitigation

  • Application of the designated F5 engineering hotfix
  • Removal of unnecessary APM/iRule configurations and reduction of exposure scope
  • Detection and investigation: Immediately investigate TMM crashes (this does not prevent successful exploitation)

7. What Happens Upon Success

  • Denial of Service via TMM crash
  • Potential arbitrary code execution on the BIG-IP data plane

8. Observable Logs

  • Email: None specified
  • Proxy / SWG / DNS: Anomalous requests directed to BIG-IP virtual servers
  • Endpoint / EDR: TMM crashes, core dumps, restarts, and unexpected child processes or file modifications
  • Identity / IdP: None specified
  • SaaS / Cloud: None specified
  • Network: Client requests and outbound traffic immediately before and after TMM restarts

9. Criteria for Determining Successful Attack

Public Information

  • There is no evidence in the reviewed materials confirming exploitation attempts or successful RCE for any of the six vulnerabilities.

Internal Assessment Criteria (Not Based on Confirmed Observations)

  • CVE-2026-121805: Correlate requests matching the PEM::subscriber vector with the target configuration.
  • CVE-2026-120292: Correlate requests matching the HTTP profile and MR::message route vector with the target configuration.
  • CVE-2026-120285: Correlate requests matching the HTTP profile and PSC::ip_address vector with the target configuration.
  • CVE-2026-116953: Correlate requests matching the GENERICMESSAGE::route vector with the target configuration.
  • CVE-2026-120722: Correlate requests matching the DNS::scrape vector with the target configuration.
  • CVE-2026-123637: Correlate requests matching the APM per-request policy vector with the target configuration.

In all cases, receipt of a request or a TMM crash alone does not confirm successful RCE.

Distinguish between scanning attempts, execution, privilege escalation, data access, and follow-on compromise; do not infer a successful breach based solely on a single IOC or request.

10. Investigation Playbook

  • Trigger: TMM crashes, restarts, or identification of vulnerable configurations
  • Initial Checks: Verify versions, modules, policies, iRules, and hotfix status; preserve core dumps, request logs, and packet captures
  • Endpoint: Check for TMM core files, child processes, and file modifications
  • Identity / Cloud: Verify BIG-IP administrative accounts and configuration changes
  • Follow-on: Trace internal scanning, credential access, and outbound communications
  • Containment: Restrict access to affected virtual servers and apply engineering hotfixes
  • Classification: Separate Denial of Service, code execution, and control-plane impacts

11. Defense and Detection Ideas

  • Single Event: TMM abnormal termination and automatic restart
  • Timeline: Correlate preceding requests -> TMM crash -> unexpected process activity or egress traffic
  • Threat Hunting: Search all BIG-IP instances for identical request patterns
  • Log Gaps: Verify retention status for virtual server requests, TMM core dumps, and egress logs
  • Priority Actions: Review configurations and apply designated engineering hotfixes

12. Facts / Inference / Hypothesis

Facts

  • All six issues are stack-based buffer overflows that can cause TMM crashes and potential RCE via unauthenticated requests to vulnerable configurations.
  • The issues are limited to the data plane, and F5 states there is no control-plane exposure.
  • Impact is restricted to instances where APM policies or specific iRule commands are configured on virtual servers.
  • F5 is providing engineering hotfixes rather than standard releases, and states there are no workarounds.
  • BleepingComputer reported that F5 had provided no indication of active exploitation of the five vulnerabilities covered in the article. The presence of active exploitation for CVE-2026-120722 remains unconfirmed.

Inference

  • None specified

Hypothesis

  • None. We do not assume broader impact or successful exploitation beyond published information.

13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

ID Technique Confidence Basis
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application medium Can be triggered via crafted requests to public-facing virtual servers. Active exploitation has not been observed.

14. Open Questions and Further Investigation

  • Conditions for successful RCE and detailed request structures
  • Emergence of active exploitation
  • Discrepancy between description text and affected modules for CVE-2026-121805 in Next products

15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations

Review APM and iRule configurations on internet-facing BIG-IP devices immediately, and perform urgent checks for TMM restarts and preceding requests.

16. Summary by Role

  • SOC: Correlate requests immediately preceding TMM crashes and restarts with subsequent processes and egress traffic.
  • Administrators: Verify vulnerable module and iRule configurations and apply designated F5 engineering hotfixes.
  • Users: Updates must be applied by network appliance administrators; there is no end-user workaround.

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