1. Overview
- Article Name: Autonomy Logic OpenPLC Runtime
- Source: CISA
- Published: 2026-11-19
- Collected: 2026-11-21T07:45:23+09:00
- Original Source: Primary Source
- Related Sources: JVN roundup, CISA advisory
- Related CVE: CVE-2026-126088
- Affected Products: Autonomy Logic OpenPLC Runtime <= 4.2.4
- Severity: High (Author priority)
- Reason for Severity: During initial setup when no user exists, external access to an OT/ICS runtime can lead to the creation of unauthenticated administrator accounts, potentially modifying PLC logic and operational environments. Active exploitation has not been confirmed.
2. In Brief
In OpenPLC Runtime 4.2.4 and earlier, a race condition during initial registration—when no user exists yet—allows multiple concurrent requests to pass the user existence check before commit and create multiple administrator accounts without authentication.
3. Attack Flow
Admin Creation via Race Condition
- When no user exists, an attacker sends multiple simultaneous requests to the user creation endpoint.
- Each request passes the user existence check before the database transaction is committed.
- Multiple unauthenticated administrator accounts are created.
- The attacker operates OpenPLC Runtime using the created accounts.
4. Attacker Position and Execution Location
- A remote attacker with network access to the OpenPLC Runtime account creation interface.
5. Victim and Administrator Perspective
Victims
- May remain unaware unless operational impacts occur on the PLC.
Administrators
- Can identify concurrent requests, newly created admin accounts, and logic or configuration modifications.
6. Success and Failure Conditions
Success Conditions
- OpenPLC Runtime 4.2.4 or earlier
- Access to the account creation interface when no user exists
- Concurrent requests that trigger the race condition
Failure and Mitigation Conditions
- Update to version 4.3.0 or later
- Removal of internet exposure
- OT/IT network segmentation and new admin alerts
7. Impact of Success
- Creation of unauthenticated administrator accounts
- Modification of PLC logic and runtime configuration
- Potential impact on OT operations
8. Observable Logs
- Email: None specified
- Proxy / SWG / DNS: Concurrent POST requests to the OpenPLC Runtime user creation REST API
- Endpoint / EDR: OpenPLC process and user database modifications
- Identity / IdP: Multiple local administrators created in a short timeframe
- SaaS / Cloud: None specified
- Network: Concurrent account creation requests from the same source
9. Assessing Attack Success
- Public Information (Active exploitation and success unconfirmed): CISA has not reported any known public exploitation.
- Internal Assessment Criteria: Do not assume a successful admin creation based solely on requests. Scope: CVE-2026-126088.
Distinguish between attempts, execution, privilege acquisition, information access, and follow-on compromise. Do not determine successful compromise based only on a single IOC or request.
10. Investigation Playbook
- Trigger: Vulnerable OpenPLC version or multiple admin accounts created in a short timeframe
- Initial Checks: Verify version, external exposure, user database, and web logs
- Endpoint: Preserve OpenPLC files, logic, processes, and configuration diffs
- Identity/Cloud: Disable and review new administrator accounts and sessions
- Follow-on: Track PLC logic modifications, command execution, and OT lateral movement
- Containment: Block internet access, update to version 4.3.0, and delete unauthorized accounts
- Classification: Separate requests, account creation, admin usage, and OT modifications
11. Defense and Detection Ideas
- Single Event: Multiple local administrator accounts created in a short timeframe
- Timeline: Correlate concurrent POST requests, administrator account creation, and logic modifications
- Hunting: Compare versions and administrator lists across all OpenPLC instances
- Log Gaps: Review web request bodies, account audit logs, and logic change logs
- Priority Mitigations: Update to version 4.3.0 or later and implement network segmentation
12. Facts, Inferences, and Hypotheses
Facts
- During initial registration when no user exists, a race condition allows multiple concurrent requests to pass the user existence check before commit, enabling the creation of multiple administrator accounts without authentication.
- Affected versions are 4.2.4 and earlier; the fix is version 4.3.0 and later.
- CVSS v3.1 score is 8.1, involving network attack vector, high complexity, and requiring no privileges or user interaction.
- CISA recommends isolating control systems from the internet and using firewalls/VPNs.
- No known public exploitation has been reported to CISA.
Inferences
- None specified.
Hypotheses
- None. Do not assume impact scope or attack success beyond published information.
13. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| ID | Technique | Confidence | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1136.001 | Create Account: Local Account | medium | Vulnerability allows the creation of administrator accounts without authentication. Not an observation of active exploitation. |
14. Uncertainties and Further Investigation
- Number of requests and timing required to trigger the race condition
- Audit records of created accounts
- Presence of active exploitation
15. Impact on SOCs and Organizations
Organizations running OpenPLC Runtime in research, manufacturing, or energy environments should verify their software version, internet exposure, and newly created administrator accounts.
16. Summary by Role
- SOC: Correlate concurrent account creation requests, new administrators, and subsequent PLC program modifications.
- Administrators: Update to version 4.3.0 or later, block internet access, and isolate the OT network.
- Users: Ensure operational systems are updated and accounts are reviewed by system administrators.
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