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Posted on Originally published at botlab.org.uk

Optimizely Hack: Wallet Address Swap Checklist for Holders

If you sent crypto on 16 November 2026 using an address you copied or read from an affected website, or any address you copied while an affected page was open in a tab, check that transaction's destination address on a public block explorer against the address you meant to use. Based on current reports, transfers outside this pattern were not affected by the address swap.

This guide was written on 2026-11-18. The situation may change, so check official channels.

BOTLAB is not affiliated with Optimizely, Ledger, or any other company named in this guide.

Check the timing first

There is no deadline or block height in the reports. Based on current reports, the risk window is a past window, so you have nothing to act on "before it is too late."

  • Decrypt reports that the injected code first appeared early on 16 November 2026 (UTC). Report URI found it had been removed from all the scripts it could find by late that evening.
  • Cointelegraph reports that the BBC was among the first sites seen serving it, at 4:21 am UTC on Monday 16 November. Ledger's snippet was cleaned at about 8:41 pm UTC. By 9:52 pm UTC, only one of the 188 infected snippets still contained malicious code.

The key question for you is simple: on 16 November, did you copy, paste or read a wallet address from an affected website, or copy any address while an affected page was open in a tab? If you did not, then based on current reports the address-swap part of this attack did not affect your transfers.

What is confirmed so far

What happened

  • An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely's Experimentation account signup flow and added malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Optimizely says it blocked the vulnerable path, deployed a fix, removed the injected code, revoked tokens and reset access for affected accounts (Cointelegraph).
  • The malware hit scripts belonging to 178 organizations. These include Ledger, OANDA / Coinpass, IG, Interactive Investor and TMS Brokers, as well as IKEA, Salesforce, Zoom, the BBC and CNN (Cointelegraph). Decrypt adds GitLab and HSBC to the list and says Report URI found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely scripts it examined (Decrypt).
  • Optimizely has not said how the attacker gained access to other customers' projects (Decrypt). Researchers have yet to establish this either (Cointelegraph).

How the address swap worked

The script scanned pages for wallet addresses on networks including Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tron, Solana and TON and replaced them with attacker-controlled addresses. It also swapped addresses copied to the clipboard, so anyone who copied an address while an affected page was open could have pasted the attacker's instead (Decrypt).

How much was taken: the sources differ

  • Cointelegraph checked blockchain records and found that the linked addresses received around $7,100 on Monday. In the same article:
  • StepSecurity put the total at roughly $6,600 and noted that some addresses had activity from before the attack.
  • Galaxy Digital's Alex Thorn estimated that victims sent only around $2,300. He said most Bitcoin receipts appeared to be the attacker's own funds.
  • Decrypt, citing Report URI, gives about $7,150, mostly in Bitcoin, Litecoin and USDT. It says the attacker emptied the wallets early on Tuesday 17 November.

What the sources do not say

Neither source says that Ledger hardware devices, the Ledger Live app, or anyone's private keys were compromised. Both describe website scripts only. Ledger's own position is not in these sources: Cointelegraph says it reached out to Ledger but publishes no reply. For any statement about Ledger products, check Ledger's official channels.

Who is not affected, and the wider impact

Who is not affected

  • The affected websites loaded the code from Optimizely's servers without their own systems being breached (Decrypt).
  • OANDA, speaking for Coinpass and TMS Brokers, said its internal systems and infrastructure were not breached. It added that it has seen no indication of impact on client funds or account data (Cointelegraph).
  • The card skimmer could not read payment fields inside third-party payment providers' cross-origin frames (Cointelegraph). Decrypt names Stripe's hosted fields as an example (Decrypt).

Wider than crypto

  • Card details: The script also captured card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into some sites' own forms. Researchers could not say how many card details or cookies reached the attacker (Cointelegraph).
  • iPhones and iPads: The script tried to load code linked to the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which target older iOS versions (Decrypt). Report URI said it could not see how many devices were compromised.

How to check your own position

1. Recall what you did on 16 November

Did you visit any affected site that day? If so, did you copy an address from the page, or copy any address while that page was open in a tab? Report URI's founder advised visitors to affected sites on 16 November to check any crypto transfers they made (Decrypt).

2. Compare destination addresses on a public block explorer

For each outgoing transfer from that day, look up the transaction on the chain's public explorer. Use your wallet's transaction history, or your exchange's withdrawal history if you sent from an exchange. Then compare the full destination address, not just the first and last few characters, with the address you intended.

The address you intended should come from a source you trust. Good options are your own wallet's receive screen, or a saved contact you verified earlier. Do not use the same web page again.

3. Check what is in your wallet now

Your wallet app shows your balances. A public block explorer gives an independent view of the address itself.

If you hold assets on several chains, Scan a wallet free. StuckScan is read-only: paste a public address and it shows what is in the wallet, staked, locked, pending or ready to claim, with on-chain proof. It needs no wallet connection or signing, and it never asks for a seed phrase. It does not yet check bridges, most DeFi other than Aave v3, or Solana stake accounts on the web page. Note that it cannot tell you whether a past transfer went to the address you intended; only Step 2 can.

4. If a transfer went to an unknown address

On-chain transfers generally cannot be reversed by a website or a third party. Contact the official support of the wallet or exchange you sent from, using the address you already know, not a link from a message. Keep the transaction ID, and consider reporting to your local authorities.

5. Cover the non-crypto risks

  • Update iPhones and iPads to the latest iOS.
  • Watch your card statements, as Report URI's founder advised (Decrypt).
  • If you entered card details into a site's own form that day, ask your card issuer whether to replace the card.

Habits that help from now on

  • Copy receiving addresses from your own wallet app, not from web pages.
  • On a hardware wallet, confirm the address on the device screen before approving.
  • Send a small test transaction first for large transfers.

Watch out for follow-up scams

Big headlines attract fake "recovery" services, fake support accounts and phishing emails that pretend to be from Ledger or other named brands. Keep these rules in mind:

  • Nobody legitimate will ever ask for your seed phrase. Not Ledger, not an exchange, not a "security researcher."
  • Nobody legitimate charges a fee to unlock, verify or recover funds.
  • Ignore messages saying your wallet "must be migrated" or "re-verified" because of this incident.
  • Reach companies only through addresses you already know or type yourself.
  • Treat unsolicited direct messages offering help as suspicious, especially ones that promise to get money back.

FAQ

I visited Ledger's website but didn't send any crypto. Should I worry?

Based on current reports, the swap only redirected transfers that used an address taken from an affected page or copied while it was open. The sources do not describe any way for this script to move funds out of your wallet on its own. If you use an iPhone or iPad, update iOS anyway.

Was my Ledger device or seed phrase compromised?

Neither source says so; both describe malicious website scripts. Ledger's statement is not included in the sources, so check Ledger's official channels.

Is the malicious code still running?

Optimizely says it removed the injected code and deployed a fix (Cointelegraph). Report URI reported removal from all the scripts it could find by late 16 November (Decrypt). Optimizely says it is continuing to investigate (Cointelegraph).

Can someone get my crypto back if I sent it to the attacker?

Be wary of anyone who promises that, especially for a fee. Contact your wallet or exchange through official channels, keep the transaction ID, and report it to authorities.

Key takeaways

  • Based on current reports, the risk window was 16 November 2026 (UTC). There is no deadline to act on.
  • The attack swapped wallet addresses shown on pages or copied to the clipboard while an affected page was open, and it skimmed some card forms.
  • Check each 16 November transfer's full destination address on a public block explorer.
  • Update iOS devices and watch your card statements.
  • Never share your seed phrase or pay a "recovery" fee.
  • BOTLAB is not affiliated with Optimizely, Ledger or the other companies named.

General information, not financial advice. Crypto trading can lose money, including all capital. Check the official docs before you move funds.

Want these checks run on your own strategy? See the strategy and backtest audit.

Paper trading results are simulated. Past results don't predict future results. Crypto trading can lose money, including all capital. Not financial advice.


Originally published on BOTLAB. Score your own bot's trade log free: Check your bot.

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