Much talk has gone around after recent TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) attacks tested by Battering Ram and Wiretap took the cryptocurrency world by storm. While several TEE-based projects like Phala, Secret, Crust, and IntegriTEE, using Intel SGX and AMD SEV-SNP protections got compromised, Oasis remains unaffected.
A technical analysis of how Oasis withstands TEE attacks and mitigates TEE vulnerabilities has been discussed at length by now. Without going into those details, it is sufficient to point out that the security design of Oasis is not solely dependent on TEEs. Multi-layered cryptographic and protocol-level protective layers in addition to TEEs make the network resilient amid hardware exploits. As a result, any lingering concern that the TEE's claim of being tamper-proof falls short of ground reality should be laid to rest as far as Oasis is concerned.
However, critics, from armchair detractors to champions of alternative privacy-preserving techniques, are not so easily convinced. The Oasis TEE break challenge has already gone a long way to silence them.
Proof in Practice
The first thing to note about the recent "successful" attacks on TEEs is that the target exposed the limitations of SGX and SEV-SNP. Oasis Sapphire uses SGX v1 to safeguard its secrets, which is fundamentally different from the vulnerabilities of the specific Intel and AMD encrypted enclaves that were exploited.
Moreover, the chipmakers admitted their threat models excluded physical attacks but Oasis has long armed itself for such eventualities. Its defense-in-depth strategy is, therefore, well-equipped to answer the core question of viability of TEEs for confidential computing in blockchain environments.
The challenge to hackers to break Oasis TEE security and steal 1 Bitcoin (wBTC) from a Sapphire smart contract is thus not a gimmick on a dare but stems from supreme confidence that Oasis has in its TEE security.
Technical Details
As part of the challenge, the Sapphire smart contract has been deployed at 0xc1303edbFf5C7B9d2cb61e00Ff3a8899fAA762B8. It generates a cryptographic keypair entirely within the enclave using Sapphire's secure randomness.
In effect, it means that the private key never leaves the TEE, there is no function to extract it, no off-chain generation. The contract derives an Ethereum address from this key and exposes only the public address: 0xCEAf9abFdCabb04410E33B63B942b188B16dd497. This is where the wBTC is stored at the moment.
As Sapphire contract acts as a custodial wallet, any and all transaction signings occur inside the TEE when the authorized owner requests a withdrawal. So, design eliminates traditional attack vectors. Withdrawal destinations are hardcoded which signifies that even a compromised owner account can only return funds to Oasis's multi-sig vault.
In addition, there must be authentication involving sign-in with Ethereum (SIWE) verification with all transaction signing using Sapphire's cryptographic primitives inside the enclave.
As a result, if the wBTC goes missing through any unauthorized means, it would prove that a hacker has hijacked the TEE and extracted the private key. That would be the evidence of a TEE compromise rather than a smart contract exploit.
Rules & Parameters
The bounty shared on its official X account by Oasis has already garnered over 1 million views, catching the attention of Ethereum security researchers, hardware hacking communities, and more. The full contract source code is publicly verified and viewable directly through the Oasis Explorer.
What makes it unique is that the bounty is not a controlled experiment - it tests real security with real economic value at risk. It is also unlike traditional bug bounties with reporting and triage processes, making it an open challenge.
It goes without saying that all standard security protections for Sapphire are active, including: ephemeral key rotation, restricted compute committee membership, enhanced key manager node safeguards, and ongoing CPU controls. The challenge is time-bound as it gives anyone who believes they can break Sapphire's confidential computing guarantees, the chance to prove it until the end of 2025.
TL;DR: Hack It, Keep It
- One wBTC is locked in a Sapphire smart contract; anyone who hacks it can keep the funds
- The only way to win is to break the TEE and extract the key; smart contract exploits are blocked
- This is a security test on a live network, running until the end of 2025, with all standard defenses active
Who is game?
Top comments (7)
This is how you silence the "TEE is broken" crowd. Putting up 1 BTC and saying 'come and get it' is a masterclass in proving security not just talking about it.
Great read — fascinating challenge and a clever exploration of TEE security! Love seeing deep technical dives like this that push understanding of trusted execution environments.
I heard somewhere it being said that this challenge has more meaning than just trying to win the lucrative prize, and I absolutely agree. So, even when hackers try and fail to crack Oasis' security, all the efforts get documented as testing grounds for how the TEEs withstand stress and threats. This will help improve the future security matrix and can also serve as a model for adoption by other TEE-based projects.
Exactly — every attempt, win or lose, strengthens the ecosystem. Testing Oasis’ TEEs under real stress reveals invaluable insights that push secure computing forward for everyone building on trusted hardware.
couldn't have said better!
This post highlights Oasis Sapphire’s proactive approach to TEE security, showing how real-world challenges like the Battering Ram and Wiretap exploits are used to test and strengthen the network great insight for anyone interested in secure blockchain systems.
Great write-up! this really captures why the Oasis TEE Break Challenge stands out from typical bug bounties. It’s not theoretical security talk; it’s live, verifiable proof under real conditions. The “hack it, keep it” model perfectly reflects Oasis’s confidence in Sapphire’s enclave design and layered defense approach. Whether someone cracks it or not, this is the kind of bold, transparent testing that pushes blockchain security forward.