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Egor Sivchik for MEIKUIO

Posted on Edited on Originally published at meikuio.com

What Is a Passkey? How It Works and What If You Lose It

By Marcus Hale.

A passkey is a sign-in key stored on your phone, computer, password manager or security key instead of in your memory. The website keeps only the public half of the key. Your device keeps the private half, unlocks it with your face, fingerprint or screen lock, and refuses to use it on a fake site.

That's the standard answer to what is a passkey, and the "Create a passkey" prompt stops there. The part it leaves out is on Apple's own support page. To get your passkeys back after losing every device, you sign in with your Apple Account password, answer a text message sent to your registered phone number, then enter the passcode you used on your old Apple devices. After the tenth wrong try, that backup is destroyed.

I read the recovery documents for Apple, Google, Microsoft, five password managers and a hardware key, and I checked the 51 pages that ranked in US Google for five passkey searches on October 10, 2026. Not one of those pages names the steps above. The steps are all below, each with what the company's own documentation says.

What is a passkey, exactly?

A passkey is a login credential built on open standards from the FIDO Alliance, an industry group whose members include Google and Microsoft, and the W3C, the body that writes web standards. The FIDO Alliance defines it as "an authentication credential based on FIDO standards, that can be stored on your phone or computer, or in a hardware security key allowing a user to sign in to apps and websites with the same process that they use to unlock their device (biometrics, PIN, or pattern)."

Strip the jargon and a passkey is a pair of keys. When you create one for a site, your device makes two keys that work only as a pair. The site stores the public key, which proves nothing on its own and is useless to a thief. Your device or password manager stores the private key and never sends it anywhere. Signing in means proving you hold the private key, and your device does that only after you unlock it.

A passkey is a pair of keys: the website keeps the public one, and your device keeps the private one. There's no password to remember and nothing to type at sign-in. That's the whole idea.

Where the private key lives decides almost everything that follows: who can copy it to your other devices, how you get it back, and whether you can ever move it. It can sit in your phone's built-in password manager, in a separate password manager such as 1Password or Bitwarden, or on a physical security key such as a YubiKey. Most people never choose. They tap Continue, and the phone saves the passkey wherever it saves passwords.

How does a passkey work?

When you sign in, the website sends your device a random challenge. Your device asks you to unlock it, signs the challenge with the private key it holds for that website, and sends back the signature. The site checks the signature against the public key it saved when you created the passkey. No secret crosses the internet, so a fake page has nothing to copy.

The key pair and the challenge

  1. You create a passkey. Your device makes a key pair for that one website and gives the site the public key.
  2. You come back to sign in. The site sends a fresh random challenge, different every time.
  3. Your device asks for your face, fingerprint or screen lock, then signs the challenge with the private key.
  4. The site checks the signature with the public key. If it matches, you're in.

Why a passkey only works on the real website

Each passkey is tied to the address of the site that created it. The US government's digital identity guidelines, NIST Special Publication 800-63B-4, put it this way: properly configured synced passkeys "create a unique public or private key pair whose use is constrained to the domain in which it was created (i.e., the key can only be used with a specific website or RP)." RP means relying party, the website you sign in to.

I wanted to see that refusal happen, so on October 10, 2026 I ran a test on my own machine. I built two small test pages, a "bank" at one address and a lookalike at a second, and used the virtual authenticator Chrome provides for developers in place of a phone. The test touched no real account and no outside website. I created a passkey on the bank page, and the page kept only a public key. I signed in with it there. Then I opened the lookalike and asked for the bank's passkey.

Test page showing a passkey created for a demo bank address, with only the public key kept by the site

The test bank page after the passkey was created: the site keeps only the public key.

The browser refused. The error read: "SecurityError: The relying party ID is not a registrable domain suffix of, nor equal to the current domain." When the lookalike asked for a passkey for its own address instead, it got nothing, because none existed. A copied login page can look perfect. It still sits at the wrong address, and the passkey checks the address.

Lookalike test page at a different address showing the browser error that refuses to use the demo bank passkey

The lookalike address asks for the bank's passkey and the browser refuses.

There's one deliberate exception. The Web Authentication Level 3 standard, which the W3C published as a Recommendation on August 25, 2026, lets a site list its other addresses in a file on its own server, at /.well-known/webauthn, and browsers that support the feature accept those addresses. A scammer can't write a file onto your bank's server, so the exception doesn't help a phisher.

What your face or fingerprint actually does

The scan stays on your device. It only unlocks the private key so your device can sign, and the website receives the signature, never your face. PayPal's help page says it plainly: "Your biometric data is not shared with PayPal and never leaves your device." The flip side matters more. Whoever can unlock your phone can use your passkeys, including anyone who knows your screen PIN.

Signing in on a computer with your phone

If the passkey is on your phone and you're at a laptop, the laptop shows a QR code. You scan it with the phone and approve the sign-in there. Google's security team describes the check that stops a remote attacker from abusing this: the computer "verifies that your phone is in proximity using a small anonymous Bluetooth message and sets up an end-to-end encrypted connection to the phone through the internet." No Bluetooth, no sign-in. As one user in the r/Passkeys forum put it, "older computers without Bluetooth won't work."

Passkey vs password (and the codes you already use)

A passkey beats a password on the two attacks that empty most accounts: fake login pages and stolen password databases. A password is a shared secret. The site stores a copy and you type it in, so a fake page can collect it and a breach at the site can leak it. A passkey gives the site nothing worth stealing and won't sign for the wrong address.

Illustration, a metaphor: a painted stage-set copy of a townhouse front propped up by wooden struts stands beside the real house on a sunny street, and only the real door has a keyhole

The codes you already use sit in between. A six-digit code from a text message or an authenticator app is still something you read and type, so a convincing fake page can ask for it just as it asks for the password. NIST's guidelines count text-message codes among the "less secure authentication options that are vulnerable to phishing (e.g., PSTN-based out-of-band authentication)." PSTN means the phone network, which is how text-message codes travel. A hardware security key resists phishing too, because a passkey stored on one is the same technology on separate hardware.

Passwords leak in bulk. If you've reused one, check whether your password has already leaked before you decide it's safe to keep around as a backup.

Passkey vs password and the codes you already use

Method Phish-proof No secret No typing Lost phone
Password no. You type it, so a convincing copy of the login page can collect it. no. The website keeps a stored copy of your password. no yes. Nothing changes. You can type it on any device.
SMS code no. NIST: methods over the phone network are "vulnerable to phishing (e.g., PSTN-based out-of-band authentication)." partial. The website keeps your phone number, not a password. no partial. You need your number working on a new phone.
App code no. A six-digit code is typed like a password, so a fake page can ask for it too. no. The website keeps the secret that generates the codes. no partial. You need the app's backup or the site's recovery codes.
Security key yes. A passkey stored on a security key is tied to the website's address, like any passkey. yes. The website keeps a public key. yes yes. Losing the phone has no effect, but losing the key itself needs a spare registered in advance.
Passkey yes. NIST: use is "constrained to the domain in which it was created." yes. The website keeps a public key. yes. You unlock it with your device's screen lock. partial. Synced copies stay on your other devices. Losing all of them means account recovery.

Source: NIST SP 800-63B-4. FIDO Alliance. Apple, Google, Yubico

A password still wins in a few places. It works on any device, including one you've never touched. You can write it down and hand it to someone you trust. It doesn't belong to Apple, Google or Microsoft. Those are real advantages, and they're why most sites keep your password after you add a passkey. That matters later.

What happens to your passkeys if you lose your phone?

If you lose one device, nothing much happens. Synced passkeys are already waiting on your other devices, and you sign in there. If you lose every device, you have to get through two doors. The first is the account that stores the passkeys: your Apple Account, Google Account, Microsoft account or password manager. The second is the encryption on the passkeys themselves, which needs a secret that only you hold. Apple, Google and Microsoft each ask for something different at that second door, and each limits how many times you can get it wrong.

Illustration, a metaphor: a small boat waits between two canal lock gates, the first gate open behind it and the second still shut ahead

This is the part the search results skip. Of the 51 pages that ranked in US Google for five passkey searches on October 10, 2026, 20 mention losing a device and two mention losing every device. None names what Apple, Google or Microsoft actually asks for. Thirty-one of those pages come from companies that sell password managers, passkey storage, security keys or sign-in services.

In our October 10, 2026 audit of 51 US Google results for five passkey searches, none spelled out the recovery steps Apple, Google or Microsoft asks for. Twenty mentioned losing a device and two mentioned losing every device.

Apple: your password, a text message and your old passcode

Apple's support page on passkey security, dated September 16, 2024, promises that iCloud Keychain passkeys "are recoverable even if the user loses all their devices." The conditions come a few lines later: "To recover a keychain, a user must authenticate with their iCloud account and password and respond to an SMS sent to their registered phone number. After they authenticate and respond, the user must enter their device passcode."

That passcode is the code you used to unlock your Apple devices. Apple keeps an encrypted copy of your keychain in what it calls escrow, guarded by special hardware in its data centers, and the passcode unlocks that copy. Apple's Platform Security guide calls the same factor your iCloud security code. Get it wrong and the page is blunt: "iOS, iPadOS, and macOS allow only 10 attempts to authenticate. After several failed attempts, the record is locked and the user must call Apple Support to be granted more attempts. After the tenth failed attempt, the escrow record is destroyed." The security guide spells out the result. "The keychain is lost forever."

Two things follow. The text message goes to the number on your Apple Account, so that number has to be one you still control. If it left with your stolen phone, get your carrier to move it to a new SIM first. Apple's recovery waits on that text. And Apple offers a safety net you set up in advance: "Optionally, a user can set up an account recovery contact to make sure that they always have access to their account, even if they forget their Apple Account password or device passcode." Set it up while you still have your devices.

Apple's way back to lost passkeys runs through a text message to your registered phone number .

Google: an old screen lock or your Password Manager PIN

Google encrypts passkeys in Google Password Manager end to end, which its 2024 announcement says means they "can't be accessed by anyone, not even Google." The cost of that design shows up on a new phone. Google's security blog, published in October 2022, says: "To recover the end-to-end encryption key, the user must provide the lock screen PIN, password, or pattern of another existing device that had access to those keys." Since 2024 there's a second option. Google says you'll "need to know either your Google Password Manager PIN, or the screen lock for your Android device." The PIN is six digits by default. In practice: if the stolen phone was your only device, the old-device route is gone and the PIN is what's left.

Google limits the tries too. For an old device's screen lock, Google says the number of attempts "is always 10 or less, but for safety reasons we may block attempts before that number is reached." If you remove the screen lock from one of your devices, Google says that old lock may keep working for recovery "for a period of time up to 64 days." Google doesn't publish a limit for the Password Manager PIN.

The first door, the Google Account itself, is stricter than people expect. When a user in Google's own help forum was locked out after deleting a passkey, a volunteer Product Expert replied on July 22, 2026: "Unfortunately, Google account recovery is self service only. There is no appeal or manual review process for this."

Microsoft: a PIN you can only reset from a device that still has access

Microsoft started saving and syncing passkeys in Microsoft Password Manager, inside the Edge browser, in November 2025. Its announcement says passkeys "are currently available on Windows devices," protected by a Microsoft Password Manager PIN. The same post sets the rules for a new device: "you will have a maximum of 10 attempts to input the correct PIN. If you forget your Microsoft Password Manager PIN, you can reset it from a device that already has passkey access."

A follow-up post from April 22, 2026 confirms the lockout: "Recovery from lockout requires resetting the PIN through a secure flow that is initiated from a trusted device and authenticated via the user's Microsoft account." I found no published path for someone who has lost every Windows device and forgotten the PIN.

Samsung Pass syncs passkeys between Galaxy devices signed in to the same Samsung Account. Its US help page doesn't describe recovery after losing all of them.

Password managers: a secret only you hold

Independent password managers put the second door in your hands, so no company can open it for you. 1Password's help page is direct about its Secret Key: "We don't have a copy of your Secret Key or any way to recover or reset it for you." Its fallback is a recovery code, and using it needs "access to the email address associated with your 1Password account." The page adds a trap for the impatient. "Wait at least one hour" after creating a code, or a recovery attempt gets blocked and the code is "unusable for 24 hours."

Dashlane uses a 28-character account recovery key (on a Master Password account it works once, and then you generate a new one), confirmed by an email code or an authenticator-app token. Its help page, updated September 18, 2026, says text-message codes don't count for this step. Without any recovery method set up, the outcome is harsh: "you may need to reset your account, which erases all of your data." Proton uses a 12-word recovery phrase and warns that if you reset your password through email or SMS instead, "some of your account data" may stay locked. Bitwarden offers a recovery code for two-step login and an emergency contact who can take over after a waiting period you set.

The pattern holds for all four. The company can't open the second door for you, so losing the secret can mean losing the data.

Security keys: no copy, so register a second one

A passkey on a hardware key can't be backed up at all. Yubico's documentation says "passkeys in YubiKeys are not copyable, meaning the passkey is bound to the YubiKey." Its FAQ explains the only real backup: "manually registering a spare key with all services the first YubiKey is registered with." A YubiKey 5 with firmware 5.7 or later holds up to 100 passkeys. Lose the only key and you're back to each website's own recovery process, one account at a time.

Illustration: two identical small hardware security keys, one on a keyring by the front door and the spare hanging alone in a wall key cabinet

What you need when every device is gone

Where the passkeys live What gets you back in Text message Limit on tries If you have none of it
Apple (iCloud Keychain) Apple Account password, a text message to your registered number, then your device passcode Required. Apple: the user must "respond to an SMS sent to their registered phone number." 10. After the tenth, the escrow record is destroyed Not documented. A recovery contact helps with a forgotten password or passcode
Google Password Manager The screen lock of another device that already had your passkeys, or your Google Password Manager PIN Not in this step. The Google Account itself has its own recovery, which Google recommends backing with a recovery phone and email. 10 or fewer per old screen lock. No published limit for the PIN Not documented
Microsoft Password Manager (Edge) Your Password Manager PIN, reset only from a device that already has passkey access Not documented. Microsoft's posts describe the PIN and a trusted device, nothing else. Maximum of 10 PIN attempts No published path without a trusted device
Samsung Pass Signing in to your Samsung Account on the new Galaxy device Not documented. The US help page covers creating and deleting passkeys, not recovery after losing every device. Not documented Not documented
1Password Account password plus Secret Key, or a recovery code plus a code sent to your email Email, not text. 1Password: "We don't have a copy of your Secret Key or any way to recover or reset it for you." A recovery attempt right after a recent sign-in is blocked, and the code is unusable for 24 hours Without the Secret Key or a recovery code, no recovery
Dashlane A 28-character recovery key plus an email code or authenticator token Not accepted. Dashlane: you can't use 2FA recovery codes sent by text message to verify your identity with the recovery key. On a Master Password account the key works once. Then you generate a new one "you may need to reset your account, which erases all of your data"
Proton A 12-word recovery phrase Fallback only. Proton: if you reset through email or SMS recovery instead, some of your account data may stay locked. The phrase is a one-time backup password Email or SMS reset, with some data left locked
Bitwarden A two-step login recovery code, or a trusted emergency contact Not documented. Bitwarden's help page names the recovery code and the emergency contact. It doesn't say whether a text message is involved. Not documented Not documented
YubiKey (security key) A second key you registered on every site in advance None. Yubico: "passkeys in YubiKeys are not copyable." Not applicable Each website's own account recovery, one by one

Source: Apple Support 'About the security of passkeys' (Sept. 16, 2024) and Apple Platform Security. Google Online Security Blog (Oct. 2022) and Google blog (Sept. 2024). Microsoft Edge Blog (Nov. 3, 2025. Apr. 22, 2026). Samsung, 1Password, Dashlane, Proton, Bitwarden and Yubico help pages. Read Oct. 10, 2026

Note

These are the recovery paths each company documents, read on October 10, 2026. Support staff can sometimes do more than a help page says, and the steps change with new phone and browser releases. Check your own account settings before you rely on any of them.

Where your passkey actually lives

Your passkey lives wherever your device offered to save it, which is usually its built-in password manager. On an iPhone that's the Passwords app, on Android it's Google Password Manager, and on Windows it's either Windows Hello on that one computer or Microsoft Password Manager in Edge. A separate password manager or a hardware key is the other option, and you get one only if you pick it when the site asks. Most people never pick. The phone picks for them.

Apple syncs passkeys through iCloud Keychain, which its support page says "is end-to-end encrypted with strong cryptographic keys not known to Apple." Apple also says passkeys work across your Apple devices "and even non-Apple devices within physical proximity," which is the QR-code sign-in described above. Google lets you save passkeys to Google Password Manager "from Windows, macOS, Linux and Android," and they sync to every device signed in to your Google Account. Microsoft's Windows Hello keeps passkeys on that single PC unless you save them to Microsoft Password Manager.

Independent password managers sit outside the three phone and computer makers. Dashlane's own explainer makes the case for them: "Dashlane passkeys are not tied to iCloud Keychain or Windows Hello. For example, if you switch from Android to iPhone, your Dashlane passkeys remain with you." The company can't recover the account for you, so the recovery secret becomes your job. That's the trade.

Where your passkey lives and who holds the way back

Where it's saved Type Syncs to your other devices Who holds the way back From the company's own pages
Apple Passwords (iCloud Keychain) Built into iPhone, iPad and Mac Apple devices. Apple: end-to-end encrypted "with strong cryptographic keys not known to Apple." Apple's escrow, unlocked by your password, a text message and your device passcode Apple says passkeys can be imported and exported between password managers
Google Password Manager Built into Android and Chrome Android and Chrome. Google: save passkeys "from Windows, macOS, Linux and Android". They sync across your devices. You: the screen lock of another device that had your passkeys, or your Password Manager PIN "can't be accessed by anyone, not even Google"
Microsoft Password Manager Built into Edge Windows only. Microsoft: "currently available on Windows devices," with other platforms planned. You: your Password Manager PIN, reset from a device with access Synced since November 2025
Windows Hello Built into Windows That PC only. Microsoft calls these device-bound passkeys stored on your Windows device. The PC itself Delete in Settings, then Accounts, then Passkeys
Samsung Pass Built into Galaxy phones and tablets Galaxy devices. Samsung: available on each device signed in to the same Samsung Account. Your Samsung Account Recovery after losing every device not described
1Password Separate password manager Any device. A new device needs your account password and Secret Key. You: Secret Key or recovery code "We don't have a copy of your Secret Key"
Dashlane Separate password manager Any device. Dashlane: passkeys "remain available in your vault, which you can access on any device." You: a 28-character recovery key Not tied to iCloud Keychain or Windows Hello, per Dashlane
NordPass Separate password manager Its own apps. NordPass: "There is no option to import or export passkeys to password managers." Not covered here No passkey import or export
YubiKey Hardware security key No copies. Yubico: "passkeys in YubiKeys are not copyable." Up to 100 passkeys on firmware 5.7 and later. Nobody. Only a spare key registered in advance Backup means registering a second key everywhere

Source: Apple, Google, Microsoft, Samsung, 1Password, Dashlane, NordPass and Yubico help pages and blogs. Read Oct. 10, 2026

Pick the place by how you'd get the passkey back, not by how easy it is to save. If you already keep everything in one password manager and have its recovery code printed, keep passkeys there. If you live on an iPhone and keep your Apple Account phone number current, the Passwords app is fine. If you switch between brands, a built-in manager will fight you. Decide before you need it.

Does a passkey replace your password?

Usually not. Adding a passkey leaves your password on the account, and the sign-in page keeps accepting it. Google's help page states it in a box marked Important: "If you add a passkey to your Google Account, it doesn't change or remove any authentication or recovery factors currently on your account." Google turns on "Skip password when possible" by default, but the password still works. Apple's iPhone guide says you can keep "a passkey and password for the same website or app." PayPal's page on lost phones says you "can still log in to PayPal with your password or a one-time passcode."

Microsoft goes furthest. You can switch a Microsoft account to passwordless and delete the password. Google's help page describes no such switch for the Google Account password. Its setting only changes which method comes first. Even then, its help page lists the ways back in: "the Microsoft Authenticator app, Outlook for Android, Windows Hello, physical security keys, or SMS codes." A text-message code is still on that list.

That matters because a fake login page can't use your passkey, so it doesn't try. It offers a password box instead, or a "Try another way" link, and asks for whatever still works. The passkey adds a strong new door. The old one stays open until you close it.

Illustration: a modern front door with a new lock at the top of the steps while a garden side gate beside the house stands ajar at dusk

Where a passkey doesn't protect you

A passkey protects the moment you sign in. It doesn't protect your unlocked phone, the session after you sign in, the recovery path, or a sign-in you approve because someone talked you into it. The companies that make passkeys document every one of those gaps.

Start with your phone. Google warns: "Even if you sign out of your Google Account, once you create a passkey, anyone who can unlock your device can access your Google Account." A shoulder-surfed screen PIN now unlocks every passkey on that phone.

Then the session. After you sign in, the site gives your browser a token, usually a cookie, and that token is what keeps you signed in. A FIDO Alliance white paper from May 20, 2025 explains the problem: "If you have the token (the session cookie or the access token), then you can continue to transact for the lifetime of that token as the user who authenticated and owned it." Malware that steals the cookie skips the passkey entirely.

Then the way back in. Apple's recovery path runs through a text message to your registered number, and most accounts keep a phone number or email for recovery. If someone takes over that number, that step becomes theirs to answer. Your phone number isn't private, either. Data brokers list it alongside your name and address, which makes it easier for a stranger to pose as you with your carrier. Talking a person into handing over access works the same way it does in AI voice scams, and a faked video call is the next step up. free deepfake detectors catch fewer of those than you would hope.

Then the lure. Microsoft's security researchers published a report on September 9, 2026 about attacks that used passkeys as bait. Their finding: "passkey enrollment is often not the actor's true objective. Instead, the passkey narrative serves as a convincing pretext to guide victims through adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing or device-code authentication flows." In plain terms, the victim either signs in through a relay page that passes everything to the attacker, or types in a code that quietly approves the attacker's own device. An email that pushes you to set up a passkey right now is a reason to go to the site yourself, not to click. Microsoft's advice to companies applies at home too: review newly registered sign-in methods and remove any you don't recognize.

Malware already on your computer is the last gap. The Hacker News reported on August 10, 2026 that three separate research teams had defeated passkey protections "without breaking the cryptography they rest on." One of them, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42, showed how malware already running on the victim's machine can recover the private keys for synced passkeys stored in Google Password Manager in Chrome. The math held. The computer didn't.

None of this makes a passkey weaker than a password. It means an account takeover can still happen, and when it reaches your money or your credit, you need the other layers. Know what identity theft protection actually covers, what a free credit freeze already does, and what a credit monitoring service actually watches before you pay for anything.

Moving, sharing and deleting passkeys

Moving passkeys between companies is only partly solved. The FIDO Alliance has two specifications for it. On its download page, the Credential Exchange Format 1.0 is listed as a Proposed Standard and the Credential Exchange Protocol as a Working Draft, while a line on the same page still calls both "currently in early review draft." Apple's developer page says "users can securely import and export passkeys between password managers." NordPass's help page says the opposite about its own app: "There is no option to import or export passkeys to password managers."

Before you change phone brands, check whether your password manager can export passkeys. If it can't, sign in to your important accounts on the new phone while the old one still works, and create new passkeys there. The same logic applies to browsers. See what actually moves with you when you switch browsers before you count on an import.

Sharing is simpler and riskier than it sounds. Anyone who can unlock the device that holds your passkeys can use them. NIST's guidelines tell government agencies to "assume that all syncable authenticators may be subject to sharing." If you need a relative to have access in an emergency, use the company's recovery or emergency feature rather than sharing your screen PIN.

Deleting is where people get stuck. Deleting a passkey on your phone leaves the public key on the website until you remove it there too. PayPal says that to stop a passkey working, "you should remove it from" both your PayPal account and your password manager. Google covers the mirror case: if you've removed a passkey from your Google Account but are "still prompted to use it when you sign in," you should check any third-party password manager and remove it there. The newest web standard adds a fix. Under Web Authentication Level 3, a site can tell your password manager that a passkey is gone, a signal the standard describes as used when a credential was not recognized, "e.g. because it was deleted by the user." Until every site and manager supports it, delete in both places.

How to create (and remove) a passkey

Creating a passkey takes a minute or two on your end, though Google may hold a new one back for a few days. The site starts it, and your device does the rest. Removing one takes two steps, because the passkey lives in two places.

On an iPhone

  1. Go to the sign-in screen of a website or app that supports passkeys. For an existing account, sign in with your password and open the account or security settings.
  2. When the option to save a passkey appears, tap Continue. The passkey is saved in the Passwords app.
  3. To save it to a security key instead, tap Other options or Save on another device, then follow the prompts.
  4. To delete it, open the Passwords app, tap Passkeys, tap the account, tap Edit, then Delete and Delete Passkey. Then remove it in the website's own security settings.

On Android or with a Google Account

  1. Open the security settings of your Google Account, or go to g.co/passkeys, and choose to create a passkey on the phone or computer you're using.
  2. Confirm with your screen lock. If you're asked to create a Google Password Manager PIN, write it down somewhere safe.
  3. Expect a delay. Google says you may need to wait 7 days before a new passkey is available at sign-in.
  4. To remove one, use the same passkeys page in your Google Account, then delete it from any other password manager that also holds it.

On Windows

  1. Create the passkey when a website offers it. Windows saves it with Windows Hello on that PC, or in Microsoft Password Manager if you're using Edge and choose it there.
  2. To see or delete passkeys saved on the PC, open Settings, then Accounts, then Passkeys, and select Delete passkey next to the one you want gone.
  3. To reset a forgotten Microsoft Password Manager PIN, use a device that already has access: Edge Settings, then Passwords and autofill, then Microsoft Password Manager, then Settings.

Who passkeys work badly for

Passkeys assume one person, one phone and a working recovery setup. Real households don't always look like that. Google's help page is explicit: "Only create passkeys on devices you personally own and use," and "do not create a passkey on a shared device." A family that shares one laptop has no clean way to follow that advice. Many homes are that family. The workable setup is a separate user account on the computer for each person, with each person's passkeys on their own phone, or a password manager with its own login per person. If neither is realistic, a strong password in a password manager is better than a passkey everyone can unlock.

People without a smartphone, or with an old computer that has no Bluetooth, lose the easy cross-device sign-in. People who manage accounts for an aging parent face the hardest version. Parents who set up a child's first accounts on their own phone hold those passkeys until the child has a device. For a child, though, the bigger long-term risk sits elsewhere: child identity theft usually surfaces only after the damage is done. In one Apple Support Community thread, a parent described a son who had forgotten both his Apple Account password and his phone passcode, with no recovery email or phone number linked, and an email passkey "that can ONLY be accessed via his locked iPhone 17." Every door was shut at once.

If you look after someone else's accounts, set up the company's own access tools while they can still approve them. Don't wait for the lockout. Apple's recovery contact exists for this: "If you forgot your Apple Account password or device passcode, a recovery contact can help you regain access to your account." Families who also pay for identity protection should check what a family plan actually covers, because several exclude anyone living at a different address.

Should you create a passkey when a site asks?

Yes, for most accounts, once the way back in is set up. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre says it outright: "The NCSC recommends users opt for passkeys over passwords wherever they are available." A passkey shuts out fake login pages and gives a breached website nothing to leak. The catch is recovery. Do these first:

  1. Set up the recovery secret for wherever the passkey will live: a recovery contact and a current phone number on Apple, the Password Manager PIN on Google, the PIN on Microsoft, or a printed recovery code for a password manager.
  2. For your email and your bank, add a second passkey on another device or a security key, so losing one device doesn't lock you out.
  3. Don't create passkeys on a shared or borrowed device.
  4. When you retire a phone, delete its passkeys on the phone and on each website.
  5. Treat any email that pushes you to set up a passkey as a lure. Go to the site yourself.

What "15 billion accounts" actually counts

The number you'll see quoted most comes from a FIDO Alliance press release dated December 12, 2024: "More than 15 billion online accounts can use passkeys" for faster sign-ins. The verb is "can." That counts accounts where the option exists, not people who turned it on.

The alliance's own Passkey Index from October 2025 measured actual use. It's based on "a confidential survey of nine FIDO Alliance member organizations": Amazon, Google, LY Corporation, Mercari, Microsoft, NTT DOCOMO, PayPal, Target and TikTok, all with one to three years of passkeys behind them. At those nine companies, 93% of accounts were eligible, 36% had a passkey enrolled and 26% of sign-ins used one. When people did use them, passkey sign-ins succeeded 93% of the time, against 63% for other methods. Fifteen billion accounts can use passkeys, but at nine large companies only about a quarter of sign-ins actually do. Those are different numbers. Quote the right one.

Passkey sign-ins accounted for 26 percent at nine companies in October 2025

At nine companies, 26% of sign-ins used a passkey in October 2025. This is a share of sign-ins, not a share of enrolled accounts. Source: FIDO Passkey Index. Made with Meiku Charts.

Field notes

The search results: 51 pages ranking in US Google for five passkey searches on October 10, 2026. 20 mention losing a device. 2 mention losing every device. 0 name what Apple, Google or Microsoft asks for. 31 come from companies that sell password managers, passkey storage, security keys or sign-in services.

Recovery rules: Apple asks for your Apple Account password, a text message to your registered number and your device passcode, with 10 attempts. Google asks for an old device's screen lock (10 or fewer attempts) or your Password Manager PIN. Microsoft asks for its Password Manager PIN, with a maximum of 10 attempts, reset only from a device with passkey access.

Standards: NIST SP 800-63-4 final, July 2025 (synced passkeys allowed at AAL2, NIST's middle assurance level, but not at AAL3, its highest). W3C Web Authentication Level 3 Recommendation, August 25, 2026. FIDO Credential Exchange Format 1.0 Proposed Standard, Credential Exchange Protocol Working Draft.

Adoption: more than 15 billion accounts can use passkeys (FIDO Alliance, December 12, 2024). At nine member companies, 36% of accounts have a passkey and 26% of sign-ins use one (Passkey Index, October 2025).

The test: two pages on my own machine with Chrome's virtual authenticator for developers, October 10, 2026. A passkey made for one address was refused by the browser at a lookalike address.

What I didn't do: buy anything, or lock and recover a real account. Every recovery rule above comes from the company's own documentation, read on October 10, 2026.

Sources: Apple Support and Apple Platform Security. Google Online Security Blog and Google Account Help. Microsoft Edge Blog and Microsoft Support. NIST SP 800-63B-4. W3C Web Authentication Level 3. FIDO Alliance. UK National Cyber Security Centre. Help centers of 1Password, Dashlane, Proton, NordPass, Bitwarden, Yubico and PayPal. Microsoft Security Blog. The Hacker News.

Frequently Asked Questions

Where is my passkey stored on an iPhone?

In the Passwords app. Apple's iPhone guide says passkeys you create are stored there and sync to your other Apple devices through iCloud Keychain. You can save one to a hardware security key instead by tapping Other options when the website asks.

How do I find the passkeys on my Google Account?

Open the security settings of your Google Account or go to g.co/passkeys. The passkeys page lists the ones you've created and lets you remove them. If a removed passkey still appears at sign-in, Google says to delete it from your other password manager too.

What are the main downsides of using passkeys?

Recovery and lock-in. Getting synced passkeys back after losing every device takes a separate secret, such as an old screen lock or a PIN, and the tries are limited. Moving passkeys between companies is only partly possible, and your old password usually stays active.

Can a passkey be hacked or stolen like a password?

Not in the same way. The website stores only a public key, so a breach leaks nothing useful, and the passkey won't sign in at a fake address. Malware on your device, a stolen session cookie or anyone who knows your screen PIN can still get around it.

Do passkeys work without an internet connection?

Unlocking happens on your device, but signing in to a website needs the internet anyway. Signing in on a computer with your phone also needs Bluetooth on both, because the computer checks that the phone is physically nearby before it accepts the sign-in.

Can I use a passkey on someone else's computer?

Yes. Choose to sign in with a passkey from another device, scan the QR code with your phone and approve there. The passkey stays on your phone and nothing is saved on the borrowed computer. The computer needs Bluetooth for the proximity check.

Can I share a passkey with a family member?

Google warns that anyone who can unlock the device holding it can use it. A safer way to give a relative emergency access is the company's own feature, such as Apple's recovery contact or Bitwarden's emergency access, which you set up in advance.

Do passkeys expire or need to be renewed?

A passkey lasts until you or the site deletes it. None of the documents I read gives one an expiry date. One exception: Google says passkeys an Android device creates automatically can expire after you sign out, and the device makes a new one next time.

My Take

A passkey is the best lock most people can put on an account today. It shuts the fake-page trick that empties password accounts, and it gives a breached website nothing to leak. It doesn't fix the way back in. That still runs on text messages, old screen locks and PINs you won't remember the day you need them, and the tries are limited. Here's what I'd do. Create passkeys for email, banking and shopping, but only after setting up the way back: a recovery contact on Apple, the Password Manager PIN on Google, a printed recovery code for any password manager, and a second passkey or security key for your email. Then keep your phone number current. It's still one of your keys.

Selected sources

Originally published on Meikuio — What Is a Passkey? How It Works and What If You Lose It.

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