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Posted on Originally published at randomchaos.us

On 16 November, Optimizely served malicious JavaScript to 178 sites

On 16 November 2026, malicious JavaScript was served to visitors of 178 organisations through Optimizely Web, the A/B testing and experimentation platform. The customer list reads like a traffic-ranking leaderboard: Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely's own properties, www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com, carried the code too. Report URI, which documented the incident, counted 188 infected snippets across those 178 organisations, all serving the same payload for most of the day.

Where the code lived

Optimizely Web has each customer load a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's CDN, something like https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/6395285578973184.js. That snippet bundles Optimizely's own code, the customer's configured experiments, and an optional field called Project JavaScript: custom code the customer writes in their dashboard that runs on every page. The attacker wrote into that field. Everything else in each snippet was untouched, and the file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com under Optimizely's certificate, from a host every affected site already trusted.

What landed in Zoom's snippet was a short loader that appended a script tag pointing at https://1688360.cc/track.js. Report URI saw three variants: the plain script tag, the same URL hidden in base64 and decoded with atob() so a text search for the domain would miss it, and a full inline copy of the payload that runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then re-infected with the base64 version, which means whoever did this kept write access after the first cleanup.

How the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects is the open question. Report URI is explicit that the CDN served exactly what it was given, so this was not cache poisoning. A compromised Optimizely system, a leaked credential with cross-customer reach, or something else: that is for Optimizely to explain, and at the time of writing it had acknowledged the incident on its status page without stating the cause.

What the payload did

Every visitor received the same track.js, and every function in it was active at once. What a given visitor experienced depended on their device and what they did on the page.

The money-making function was crypto address swapping. The script scans the page for valid wallet addresses across BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, validates their checksums so it only touches real ones, and replaces them with the attacker's. It swaps in page text, form fields, links and images, in the clipboard on copy and through navigator.clipboard, and in outgoing fetch and XHR requests, window.open, navigation and the iOS share sheet. It re-scans whenever the page changes. Copy an address from any affected page, or from anywhere else while that tab is open, and you can paste the attacker's instead.

Card skimming was added at 13:43 UTC. The script watches form submissions and every fetch/XHR POST for a Luhn-valid card number, an expiry and a CVV, and when it has all three it ships them to 1688360.cc/card.php with navigator.sendBeacon. Cards typed into hosted payment iframes like Stripe or Adyen were out of reach. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not.

It also stole cookies and screenshots. When it swapped an address near wallet or payment wording, it sent the page URL, document.cookie (everything not marked HttpOnly), the original addresses it replaced, and an html2canvas screenshot of the page to 1688360.cc/hit.php.

On iPhones and iPads the script loaded boot.js from two .icu domains, read the iOS version, and dropped the Coruna and DarkSword exploit chains into a hidden iframe. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Devices on 18.6 or earlier reload the page every 60 seconds to retry the exploit, which is a visible symptom. Report URI notes the Coruna loader was byte-identical to a sample it analysed in October from a different campaign.

The money and the earlier operations

By 19:25 UTC the attacker's wallets had taken about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours. Funds were swept between 13:03 and 13:05 UTC, and the USDC on Ethereum went to a HitBTC deposit address. The TRON wallet has been active since March 2026. When the attacker emptied everything early on 17 November, 116 USDT went to an address previously used to cash out operations in March and on 3 November 2026, which is how Report URI ties this actor to earlier activity. The on-chain figure covers crypto only. There is no visibility into how many cards, cookies or iOS devices were hit.

Where CSP helped

Report URI crawled 256 of the affected organisations' own hosts and checked their Content Security Policy against what the payload needed. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com made no difference, because the malicious code arrived from that trusted host. What protected the 24 covered sites was a restrictive script-src that lists only the hosts a page actually needs, which blocks 1688360.cc outright.

Two common settings let it through anyway. 'strict-dynamic' trusts any script the Optimizely snippet inserts, including the loader. 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's own documentation tells customers to allow, let the inline fallback run through eval even where track.js was blocked. That is what happened at HSBC: its CSP blocked track.js and the data theft, but the inline copy still executed. A further 17 sites blocked the card, cookie and screenshot exfiltration with a tight connect-src, though that does nothing for address swapping, which happens entirely inside the page.

What to do now

If you run Optimizely Web, open every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code and look for 1688360.cc, atob(, or anything you did not write. Review who and what holds write access, including users, API tokens and integrations, and rotate those credentials; the Smartsheet re-infection shows the attacker survived at least one cleanup. Treat any card typed into your own form fields on 16 November as exposed, along with any session token or secret held in a non-HttpOnly cookie. Serving the snippet from your own domain did not help, since the content still comes from the same Optimizely project.

If you visited an affected site that day, update iOS to 18.7.3 or 26.3 or later, confirm that any crypto address you pasted matches the one you meant to pay, and watch your card statements.

The attacker's infrastructure is being dismantled. 1688360.cc, the payload and collection server, went on clientHold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November and no longer resolves; webshell.lol, the injector from an earlier wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, followed at 03:37 UTC. Block all attacker domains including subdomains. For anyone reconciling transactions, the primary wallets are BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW, ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e and TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa.

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