Helpdesk: "The System log on every server and every Windows 11 laptop is full of DistributedCOM 10016 errors: 'The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission for the COM Server application with CLSID ... to the user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM'. Security wants them gone, a vendor says to give Everyone full control on the DCOM app, and monitoring has them as a critical alert. Can we fix them?"
Usually not by changing permissions. Event 10016 is the DistributedCOM component telling you that one caller was refused one COM activation, and Microsoft's own article says that for the common Microsoft-component cases the behavior is expected and by design. Microsoft's Learn article says these events "can be safely ignored because they don't adversely affect functionality and are by design," and that this is the recommended action. The cause it gives is a coding pattern: the code first tries to reach the DCOM component with one set of parameters, and if that fails it tries again with another, because there are scenarios where the first attempt succeeds and is preferable.
That doesn't mean every 10016 is noise. A 10016 that repeats at the exact moment a named application fails is a different problem from the same event firing at logon on a healthy laptop. This post is a read-first order: pull the fields out of the event, decide which of the two situations you are in, and only change DCOM security (or the alert) for the one that needs it.
TL;DR
- Read the event fields before anything else. The three that matter are the CLSID, the APPID, and the user SID with its source (LocalHost over LRPC, or a remote address).
- Check whether anything is actually broken at the same minute. If no application or service failed, Microsoft's recommended action is to ignore the event.
- If you only want a quieter log or alert, suppress the exact CLSID, APPID, and SID combination in an Event Viewer filter or in your monitoring rule. Don't suppress all of 10016.
- If an application really fails, look up the AppID in Component Services, read its Launch and Activation Permissions, and add only the account named in the event, only for the permission named in the event.
- Never fix this with Everyone / Full Control or by lowering machine-wide limits. Microsoft says modifying the permissions can have unintended side effects.
Step 1: Read the event, not just the ID (read-only)
Pull recent 10016 events from the System log and keep the structured fields, not only the rendered message:
$ev = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName = 'System'
ProviderName = 'Microsoft-Windows-DistributedCOM'
Id = 10016
StartTime = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
$ev | Select-Object -First 5 TimeCreated, Message | Format-List
Each event carries its values in numbered data fields. Microsoft's suppression example uses param4 for the COM Server application CLSID, param5 for the APPID, and param8 for the security context SID. Group by those so you see how many distinct combinations you really have, rather than thousands of lines:
$ev | ForEach-Object {
$x = [xml]$_.ToXml()
$d = @{}
foreach ($n in $x.Event.EventData.Data) { $d[$n.Name] = $n.'#text' }
[pscustomobject]@{
Time = $_.TimeCreated
CLSID = $d['param4']
APPID = $d['param5']
SID = $d['param8']
}
} | Group-Object CLSID, APPID, SID |
Sort-Object Count -Descending |
Select-Object Count, Name -First 15
Field positions can differ between Windows builds, so confirm against one event's XML before trusting a script. The point is the grouping: most machines show a handful of repeating combinations, usually SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, or the signed-in user.
Step 2: Read the sentence (read-only)
The message wording is the first triage split:
| Message starts with | It means |
|---|---|
| "The application-specific permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission..." | The AppID has its own launch/activation ACL, and the caller isn't in it. |
| "The machine-default permission settings do not grant Local Activation permission..." | The AppID has no ACL of its own, so the machine-wide default was used, and the caller isn't in it. |
| "...from address LocalHost (using LRPC)" | The request came from this computer. |
"...running in the application container <name>" |
The caller was a packaged (app container) app, such as Shell Experience Host in Microsoft's own sample. |
Both wordings appear in the Microsoft article's sample events, for SYSTEM (S-1-5-18), LOCAL SERVICE (S-1-5-19), and a user running inside a Shell Experience Host app container. This post covers Local Activation events from LocalHost. A remote address in the event, or a Launch or Access permission wording instead, means you're in a remote DCOM scenario (a management tool, a vendor agent, or a firewall between hosts), which needs a different triage and is not "by design" noise.
Step 3: Decide which situation you are in (read-only)
Ask one question: did something fail at that same minute?
- Pick one repeating combination from Step 1 and note its timestamps.
- Look at what the user or service reported at those times: a failed login to an app, a service that didn't start, a failed scheduled task, a management console that couldn't connect.
- Look at the Application log and the System log around those times for the application's own errors.
If the answer is "no, the machine and the apps are healthy," you're in the case Microsoft describes: a first attempt that is refused and a retry that works. The recommended action is to ignore the event. If the answer is "yes, and the application name matches the AppID," continue to Step 4.
A useful test is correlation over time: does the event fire at logon, at boot, or on a schedule regardless of anyone using an application? Constant background repetition with no failing app points to the by-design pattern. A burst that appears only when one named product breaks points to a real permission gap.
Step 4: Find what the AppID is (read-only)
The CLSID and AppID in the event are GUIDs. The AppID key groups the configuration options for DCOM objects hosted by the same executable, and lives at HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\{AppID_GUID}. Microsoft's AppID documentation lists LaunchPermission (the ACL of principals that can start new servers for the class) and AccessPermission (the ACL of principals that can access instances) among its values.
$appid = '{9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276}' # from param5 of one event
$clsid = '{D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160}' # from param4
Get-ItemProperty "Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\AppID\$appid" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object PSChildName, '(default)', LocalService, RunAs, @{n='HasLaunchPermission';e={ $null -ne $_.LaunchPermission }}
Get-ItemProperty "Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\$clsid" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Select-Object PSChildName, '(default)', AppID
The friendly name in (default) is what you will look for in Component Services. If the AppID key has no name or no LaunchPermission value, the machine-default launch permission applies. Microsoft's LaunchPermission page says that if the value does not exist, the DefaultLaunchPermission value is checked in the same way. That's the case behind the "machine-default permission settings" wording.
Step 5: Look at the permission as configured (read-only)
Open dcomcnfg, then Component Services, Computers, My Computer, DCOM Config, and find the application by the name you found in Step 4. Right-click it, choose Properties, then the Security tab, and look at Launch and Activation Permissions. The question is whether the account named in the event is listed there with Local Activation allowed.
For machine-default wording, the place to look is My Computer's own Properties, COM Security tab, Launch and Activation Permissions, Edit Default. Reading is safe. Be careful with the Edit Limits buttons, since those are machine-wide limits that apply to every COM server on the computer.
Some of these entries are owned by TrustedInstaller or are protected, and Microsoft's Q&A answers for the Windows 11 variants describe first taking ownership of the registry keys for the CLSID and AppID and granting Administrators full control before the Security tab becomes editable. That is a deliberate change to system registry permissions, which is a good reason not to do it for events that Microsoft says to ignore.
Step 6: Choose the least risky action
| Situation | Action |
|---|---|
| Healthy machine, SYSTEM / LOCAL SERVICE / user caller, Microsoft component, LocalHost | Ignore (Microsoft's recommendation). |
| Healthy, but the alert or log noise is a problem | Suppress the exact combination in the view or monitoring rule (Step 7). |
| A named application breaks at the same time, caller is its service or user account | Grant that account the permission named in the event on that AppID only (Step 8). |
| Remote address in the event, or a different permission wording | Treat as remote DCOM: firewall, authentication level, and the vendor's documentation. Not covered here. |
Step 7: Quiet the log without touching security (view-only)
Microsoft documents a custom view with a Suppress element. You can build the query for your own combinations from Step 1. Here is the structure from Microsoft's article, with one combination:
<QueryList>
<Query Id="0" Path="System">
<Select Path="System">*</Select>
<Suppress Path="System">
*[System[(EventID=10016)]]
and
*[EventData[
(
Data[@Name='param4'] and Data='{D63B10C5-BB46-4990-A94F-E40B9D520160}' and
Data[@Name='param5'] and Data='{9CA88EE3-ACB7-47C8-AFC4-AB702511C276}' and
Data[@Name='param8'] and Data='S-1-5-18'
)
]]
</Suppress>
</Query>
</QueryList>
This only changes what Event Viewer displays; the events are still written. Add one parenthesised block per combination, joined with or. For alerting, do the same in your monitoring tool: match on the CLSID, AppID, and SID rather than on event ID 10016 alone, so a new, unexpected 10016 still gets noticed. Review the suppression list after major Windows feature updates, since new combinations can appear.
Step 8: When it's real, change one thing (deliberate change)
Only after Step 3 shows a failing application:
- Take a copy of the current state. Export the AppID key from the registry (
reg export) and note the existing entries in the Launch and Activation Permissions dialog. - In Component Services, open the Security tab for that application and, under Launch and Activation Permissions, choose Customize and then Edit.
- Add only the account named in the event, and allow only Local Activation (the permission the event names).
- Don't use Everyone, Authenticated Users, or Full Control. Don't edit machine-wide limits to make one application work.
- Retest the failing application, then wait through the same period that produced the failures and re-run the Step 1 grouping.
Microsoft says that modifying permissions on DCOM components to stop the logging is possible but not recommended, because the errors don't affect functionality and changes can have unintended side effects. That cautionary text is about the Microsoft-component noise. For a third-party application that is truly broken, a narrow grant for the specific account is the usual fix, and the vendor's documentation should be consulted first.
Step 9: Prove it (read-only)
$since = Get-Date '2026-01-01 08:00' # set to the time of your change
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
LogName='System'; ProviderName='Microsoft-Windows-DistributedCOM'; Id=10016; StartTime=$since
} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Measure-Object | Select-Object Count
Compare the count for the one combination you changed before and after, and confirm the application works. A drop of that one combination, with other combinations unchanged, is what a correct narrow fix looks like. If every 10016 vanished, you changed more than you meant to.
Common false starts
- "Give Everyone full control on the DCOM app." It stops the event and widens who can launch and use that COM server. Microsoft's article recommends against changing permissions for these events.
- "Edit the machine-wide limits." Those affect every COM server on the computer.
- "Disable DCOM." Many Windows components use it locally, so this can break things that currently work.
- "Alert on every 10016." Without a healthy-baseline filter, the alert is permanently red and gets ignored. Alert on new combinations or on 10016 together with an application failure instead.
- "Same event, same cause." The same ID can come from a Microsoft background component, from a vendor agent, or from a remote call. The CLSID, APPID, SID, and address tell you which.
FAQ
Is DCOM event 10016 a problem?
For the Microsoft-component cases in Microsoft's article, no. They are logged as part of a retry pattern, are expected and by design, and can be ignored.
Why do I see it on every new Windows install?
Because the pattern is built into the components that log it, not caused by your configuration. Microsoft's sample events show SYSTEM, LOCAL SERVICE, and user accounts in app containers.
Can I hide it?
Yes, with an Event Viewer filter that has a Suppress clause for the exact CLSID, APPID, and SID. It hides the display only.
How do I find the app behind a CLSID?
Look up the CLSID under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID for its AppID, then match the AppID to a name in Component Services under DCOM Config.
When should I change DCOM permissions?
Only when a specific application fails at the same time, and then only for the account in the event on that AppID.
Related posts
- Service Control Manager Events 7023, 7031, and 7034 (when the failing thing is a service, not a COM activation)
Free checklist
Granting Everyone full control on a COM server, or raising machine-wide limits, to silence a log line is a change made on every server at once. So is a Conditional Access policy enforced before anyone read the report-only results. The free Conditional Access pre-enforcement checklist keeps break-glass accounts, pilot groups, and report-only review on one page:
If you want the rest of the Intune runway written down for the team (enrollment hygiene, compliance phasing, break/fix cards and read-only PowerShell snapshots), the Intune & M365 Admin Starter Pack pairs with this triage: https://cashflow4375.gumroad.com/l/joonf?utm_source=devto&utm_medium=article&utm_campaign=aps_first_sale&utm_content=dcom-event-10016
Admin Pack Studio; not affiliated with Microsoft. Steps 1-5 and 9 are read-only checks: Get-WinEvent, the event XML through ToXml(), Group-Object, Get-ItemProperty on the AppID and CLSID keys, and viewing the Component Services Security tab. Suppressing events in a view, granting a permission, and exporting or editing registry keys are deliberate changes. Change one link at a time, write down the time, prove it over a full business day, and check current Microsoft Learn for version-specific behavior.
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