The rug pull vector is the one that keeps me up at night. I run multiple MCP-connected agents against my own infrastructure daily — monitoring dashboards, auditing pages, filing tickets. The initial tool approval feels safe, but the idea that definitions can silently mutate after that first handshake is a real blind spot.
SHA-256 hash pinning on tool definitions is such an obvious solution in hindsight. It's basically the same principle as lock files in package managers — pin what you approved, alert on drift. Surprised this isn't baked into the protocol spec yet.
Curious: does Aegis handle the case where a server adds new tools after initial connection (not just modifying existing ones)? That feels like another surface area — you approve 3 tools on day 1, then a 4th appears silently on day 30 with a poisoned description.
Good catch. New tools added after initial connection are
a real attack vector — a server could pass the first
handshake cleanly, then inject a malicious tool later.
Aegis pins tool definitions at first discovery and flags
any additions or modifications after that point. So yes,
a newly introduced tool would trigger a policy violation
before the LLM can interact with it.
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The rug pull vector is the one that keeps me up at night. I run multiple MCP-connected agents against my own infrastructure daily — monitoring dashboards, auditing pages, filing tickets. The initial tool approval feels safe, but the idea that definitions can silently mutate after that first handshake is a real blind spot.
SHA-256 hash pinning on tool definitions is such an obvious solution in hindsight. It's basically the same principle as lock files in package managers — pin what you approved, alert on drift. Surprised this isn't baked into the protocol spec yet.
Curious: does Aegis handle the case where a server adds new tools after initial connection (not just modifying existing ones)? That feels like another surface area — you approve 3 tools on day 1, then a 4th appears silently on day 30 with a poisoned description.
Good catch. New tools added after initial connection are
a real attack vector — a server could pass the first
handshake cleanly, then inject a malicious tool later.
Aegis pins tool definitions at first discovery and flags
any additions or modifications after that point. So yes,
a newly introduced tool would trigger a policy violation
before the LLM can interact with it.