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OPTIMJACK: One Trusted Script Put Malware on 178 Websites

OPTIMJACK: One Trusted Script Put Malware on 178 Websites

On November 16, 2026, visitors to the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce and GitLab were served malicious JavaScript. None of those organisations had been breached. The code came from a service they all trusted: Optimizely Web Experimentation.

An attacker wrote their own code into the custom Project JavaScript field of Optimizely customer projects. Optimizely's CDN then delivered it with a valid certificate, from a domain every affected site already trusted. As Report URI's Scott Helme put it, the CDN served exactly what it was given. This was not a cache poisoning attack.

Report URI checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found the injected code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. That count is a floor. Report URI could only check the snippets it could find in time, and Optimizely has not published its own number.

How it got in

Optimizely Web Experimentation lets sites run A/B tests by loading a JavaScript snippet from Optimizely's CDN. Each snippet holds Optimizely's code, the customer's experiments, and an optional Project JavaScript field: custom code the customer writes in their Optimizely dashboard, which runs on every page. The attacker edited that one field and left the rest of each snippet untouched.

There were three loader versions. Most snippets got a plain script tag pointing at 1688360.cc/track.js. Some hid the same URL in base64 with atob(), so a search for the domain would not find it. A third version embedded a full inline copy of the payload that runs through eval() if the domain is blocked. Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned at one point and then reinfected with the base64 version, which means the attacker still had write access during the cleanup.

The scope was not limited to customer sites. The snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com carried the code too. Some customers serve their snippet from their own domain, such as opt.scheels.com or www.vodafone.com.au, and those were affected as well, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.

How the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects is not established in the public reporting. An Optimizely spokesperson told reporters the flaw was in the Experimentation account signup flow, but that does not explain the mechanism that enabled cross-project modification. That question is still open.

The timeline, in UTC on November 16

The BBC's snippet was clean in a urlscan capture at 02:21. The first Optimizely injection was seen at 04:21, in that same BBC snippet. The 1688360.cc domain was registered at 05:23. The first build of track.js appeared at 08:10, and it was first seen loading on bbc.com at 08:28. Zoom's snippet was modified at 11:20. The attacker swept stolen crypto to exchanges at 13:03. A card skimmer was added to the payload at 13:43. By 21:52 only one of the 188 infected snippets still carried the code, TalkTalk's, and every file Report URI monitored was clean by 23:11. Most sites were exposed for about 16 hours.

What the payload did

Every visitor received the same script, track.js, rebuilt 26 times in a single day, with every part active at once. It swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, in page text, form fields, links, images, the clipboard, and outgoing requests. It re-scanned the page whenever it changed, so copying an address from anywhere while that tab was open could paste the attacker's address instead.

The skimmer, added at 13:43, watched form submissions and POST requests for a card number, expiry date and CVV, and sent them to 1688360.cc/card.php. It did not collect the cardholder name or billing address, and it could not read card fields inside cross-origin hosted payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen. Cards typed into a site's own form fields were not protected by that.

It also collected non-HttpOnly cookies and page screenshots, and on iPhones and iPads it routed visitors to the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. iOS 13 to 17 got Coruna, 18.x got DarkSword, and iOS 26 got a separate chain that only fingerprints the device. The kit's own comments say iOS 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, are patched. Pages on iOS 18.6 or earlier reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit.

As of 19:25 UTC on November 16, the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040, all within roughly nine hours. The funds were swept out at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC. One wallet, on TRON, has been in use since March 2026, so this actor was active long before this campaign. Report URI is clear about the limit of that figure: it cannot see how many cards or cookies reached 1688360.cc.

What Optimizely confirmed, and what is still unknown

Optimizely posted a status notice at 01:02 UTC on November 17: an unauthorised party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation, the flaw was fixed, the injected code was removed, affected accounts were secured, and additional protections were added. Its initial incident report says Mandiant is investigating and a final root-cause report will follow. Optimizely says no passwords were stolen and no Optimizely admin account was breached. No CVE has been assigned.

Do not conflate this with the earlier wave from November 13. That one used webshell.lol/get.js delivered through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts. The two waves are related in the researchers' reporting, but their timelines and delivery paths are separate. The name OPTIMJACK comes from independent researcher Amirul Cyber.

The DFIR lesson

The lesson is about trust boundaries, not about Optimizely alone. A third-party script is code you run but do not review, loaded outside your release process, and able to change without a deploy on your side. If you run Optimizely or any tag manager, check the Project JavaScript and tag history for changes made on November 16, look for loads from 1688360.cc or unexpected track.js files, and review what your Content Security Policy actually allows from third-party domains.

Report URI crawled 256 of the affected organisations' hosts and tested their CSPs against what the payload needs. Sixty-eight had no CSP at all. Fifty had a policy that allowed the payload and the data theft. Seventeen let the payload run but blocked the theft through connect-src, although the address swapping still worked. Only 24 blocked the payload outright. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com was never going to help, because the malicious code arrived from the trusted host itself. What separated the 24 was a restrictive script-src.

One case shows the trap. HSBC's CSP blocked track.js and the data theft, but the inline copy still ran, because the policy allowed unsafe-eval, which Optimizely's own documentation tells customers to allow.

For hunting, the indicators Report URI published include 1688360.cc, the iOS routers 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu and eil786npto9u5bq.icu, and two SHA-256 hashes for track.js builds, 814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f for the 17:13 build and f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40 for the latest build at 17:57. A search limited to one hash or to the literal string cdn.optimizely.com will miss coverage, because the loader had several forms and some snippets were customer-hosted. Preserve script responses, response headers, CSP reports, browser telemetry, proxy records and DNS logs from November 16. A clean script retrieved today does not establish what visitors received during the incident.

If you visited one of the affected sites on November 16, update your iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, check any crypto transfer you made against the address you meant to pay, and watch your card statements if you paid by card on an affected site. Exposure to the script does not by itself prove theft, but the skimmer and the wallet swapper were live that day.

One trusted script. 178 sites. No breach required.

Sources: Report URI, "World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely" (Scott Helme); Optimizely status page, "Web Experimentation Security Incident", November 17, 01:02 UTC; Malwarebytes; ReversingLabs; TechTarget; Breachnews.

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