CVE-2026-102945: Unrecovered Goroutine Panic via Malformed NGAP PathSwitchRequest in Aether Project AMF
Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-102945
CVSS Score: 4.9
Published: 2026-11-20
CVE-2026-102945 is a denial-of-service vulnerability affecting the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) of the Aether Project (omec-project/amf) prior to version 3.1.6. When processing an NGAP PathSwitchRequest message over the 3GPP N2 interface, the HandlePathSwitchRequest function fails to verify the byte slice lengths of extensible APER bit strings inside the UESecurityCapabilities Information Element before accessing index zero. Because the NGAP receive goroutine lacks a panic recovery handler, supplying a zero-length bit string triggers an out-of-bounds slice read panic that terminates the entire AMF daemon.
TL;DR
An unchecked slice index read in Aether Project AMF's NGAP PathSwitchRequest handler allows a connected gNodeB with a valid AMF-UE-NGAP-ID to crash the AMF daemon via an empty extensible ASN.1 APER bit string in the UESecurityCapabilities Information Element.
Technical Details
- CWE Classification: CWE-125 (Out-of-bounds Read) / CWE-248 (Uncaught Exception)
- CVSS v3.1 Score: 4.9 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
- Attack Vector: 3GPP N2 Interface (NGAP over SCTP from rogue/compromised gNodeB)
- Affected Function: HandlePathSwitchRequest in ngap/handler.go
- Security Impact: Denial of Service (Unrecovered Go runtime panic terminating AMF process)
- Patched Version: omec-project/amf v3.1.6
- Exploit & KEV Status: No public PoC; Not listed in CISA KEV
Affected Systems
- Aether Project AMF (omec-project/amf)
-
omec-project/amf: < 3.1.6 (Fixed in:
3.1.6)
Code Analysis
Commit: d28042a
Guard against short UESecurityCapabilities bit strings in PathSwitchRequest to avoid index out of range panic
diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index b508c2fe..9cec7165 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-3.1.6-dev
+3.1.6
diff --git a/ngap/handler.go b/ngap/handler.go
index 332086b6..8a1011f6 100644
--- a/ngap/handler.go
+++ b/ngap/handler.go
@@ -3265,13 +3265,22 @@ func HandlePathSwitchRequest(ctx ctxt.Context, ran *context.AmfRan, message *nga
}
if uESecurityCapabilities != nil {
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
- amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
- // not support any E-UTRA algorithms
+ // UESecurityCapabilities has CRITICALITY ignore in PathSwitchRequest
+ // (TS 38.413, PathSwitchRequestIEs). BIT STRING (SIZE(16,...)) must be
+ // at least 2 bytes; when the APER extension bit is set the decoder may
+ // return fewer bytes. Guard against that to avoid an index panic.
+ if len(uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes) < 2 ||
+ len(uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes) < 2 {
+ ran.Log.Warnln("UESecurityCapabilities bit string too short in PathSwitchRequest; ignoring IE per TS 38.413 PathSwitchRequestIEs criticality IGNORE")
+ } else {
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetEA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRencryptionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA1_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x80) >> 7)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA2_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x40) >> 6)
+ amfUe.UESecurityCapability.SetIA3_128_5G((uESecurityCapabilities.NRintegrityProtectionAlgorithms.Value.Bytes[0] & 0x20) >> 5)
+ // not support any E-UTRA algorithms
+ }
}
if rANUENGAPID != nil {
Mitigation Strategies
- Upgrade omec-project/amf to version v3.1.6 or later to enforce minimum byte-slice length validation on UESecurityCapabilities bit strings.
- Enforce strict network segmentation and firewall ACLs on the N2 reference point (SCTP port 38412) so only authenticated gNodeB IP addresses can communicate with the AMF.
- Deploy 3GPP Network Domain Security (NDS/IP) using mutual IPsec authentication (3GPP TS 33.501) between RAN nodes and the 5G Core control plane.
- Implement deferred recover() handlers in NGAP worker goroutines to prevent isolated message-parsing panics from terminating the entire AMF daemon.
Remediation Steps:
- Identify all deployed instances and container images of omec-project/amf running versions prior to v3.1.6.
- Update the AMF deployment manifest or Helm chart to pull omec-project/amf release v3.1.6 (or rebuild from source incorporating commit d28042aaaea0221c5ea93c3e069a1dd5e7436f4c).
- Perform a rolling restart of the AMF pods/services and verify that connected gNodeBs re-establish NGAP associations cleanly.
- Monitor AMF warning logs for 'UESecurityCapabilities bit string too short in PathSwitchRequest' to detect anomalous or malformed handover requests from connected RAN nodes.
References
- GitHub Security Advisory: GHSA-v6w5-38cf-pcv8
- Fix Commit d28042aaaea0221c5ea93c3e069a1dd5e7436f4c in omec-project/amf
- Pull Request #767: Guard against short UESecurityCapabilities bit strings
- Aether Project AMF Release v3.1.6
- NVD Entry for CVE-2026-102945
- CVE.org Record for CVE-2026-102945
- CVEListV5 JSON Record for CVE-2026-102945
Read the full report for CVE-2026-102945 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.
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