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CVE-2026-77382: CVE-2026-77382: Cryptographic Precision Loss in falcon-rust Discrete-Gaussian Sampler

CVE-2026-77382: Cryptographic Precision Loss in falcon-rust Discrete-Gaussian Sampler

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-77382
CVSS Score: 5.9
Published: 2026-11-20

A cryptographic soundness defect in the discrete-Gaussian sampler of falcon-rust prior to version 0.2.0 degrades acceptance-probability precision to approximately 2^-33. By evaluating exponential approximations using 32-bit fractional fixed-point arithmetic (FixedPoint64) and left-shifting polynomial inputs by 31 bits, the implementation violates Falcon's required precision bound of 2^-40 to 2^-46, invalidating the theoretical security reduction against statistical private key leakage.

TL;DR

falcon-rust versions prior to 0.2.0 use 32-bit fractional fixed-point arithmetic in the discrete-Gaussian rejection sampler, truncating exponential polynomial evaluation precision to 2^-33. This violates the 2^-40 minimum precision requirement mandated by the Falcon specification, causes standard Known Answer Tests (KATs) to diverge, and invalidates the Rényi divergence bounds protecting the secret signing key. Upgrading to falcon-rust 0.2.0 restores precision to 2^-50.80 by migrating sampler arithmetic to FixedPoint128.


Technical Details

  • CVE / Advisory ID: CVE-2026-77382 / GHSA-25rm-9wvm-m38v
  • Weakness Class: CWE-1240: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation
  • CVSS v3.1 Score: 5.9 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N)
  • Affected Component: src/samplerz.rs (approx_exp, ber_exp, sampler_z)
  • Precision Degradation: 2^-33 relative error (vs. Falcon mandated 2^-40 to 2^-46)
  • Patched Precision: 2^-50.80 maximum relative error via FixedPoint128 (Q63.64)
  • Exploit Status: None (Cryptographic security proof invalidation)
  • Fixed Version: falcon-rust 0.2.0

Affected Systems

  • falcon-rust (< 0.2.0)
  • falcon-rust: < 0.2.0 (v0.1.0, v0.1.1, v0.1.2) (Fixed in: 0.2.0)

Code Analysis

Commit: 930d766

fix(samplerz): evaluate the Gaussian acceptance probability at 64-bit precision (GHSA-25rm-9wvm-m38v)

File: src/fixed_point.rs
@@ -224,6 +224,15 @@ impl From<FixedPoint128> for FixedPoint64 {
     }
 }

+/// Widen FixedPoint64 (scale 2³²) to FixedPoint128 (scale 2⁶⁴). Lossless: the extra
+/// 32 fractional bits are zero. Used by the discrete-Gaussian sampler to evaluate the
+/// acceptance probability at full (64-bit) precision.
+impl From<FixedPoint64> for FixedPoint128 {
+    fn from(v: FixedPoint64) -> FixedPoint128 {
+        FixedPoint((v.0 as i128) << 32)
+    }
+}
+
File: src/samplerz.rs
@@ -54,24 +59,25 @@ fn approx_exp(x: FixedPoint128, ccs: FixedPoint128) -> u64 {
     let mut y: u64 = C[0];
-    let z: u64 = if x.0 < 0 { 0 } else { (x.0 as u64) << 31 };
+    let z: u64 = if x.0 < 0 { 0 } else { (x.0 >> 1) as u64 };
     for cu in C.iter().skip(1) {
         let zy = (z as u128) * (y as u128);
         y = cu - ((zy >> 63) as u64);
     }
-    let z2: u64 = if ccs.0 < 0 { 0 } else { (ccs.0 as u64) << 31 };
+    let z2: u64 = if ccs.0 < 0 { 0 } else { (ccs.0 >> 1) as u64 };
     (((z2 as u128) * (y as u128)) >> 63) as u64
 }
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Commit: bf2cf00

feat: Eliminate f64 from key generation via generic FixedPoint

Mitigation Strategies

  • Upgrade falcon-rust to version 0.2.0 or later to restore 64-bit fractional fixed-point precision in the discrete-Gaussian sampler.
  • Rotate Falcon signing keys that have generated large public transcripts of signatures using vulnerable versions (< 0.2.0).
  • Cap the maximum number of signatures generated per key pair if operating on legacy versions temporarily.

Remediation Steps:

  1. Update the dependency declaration in Cargo.toml to falcon-rust = "^0.2.0".
  2. Execute cargo update -p falcon-rust and rebuild all dependent binaries.
  3. Run cargo test to verify that samplerz::tests::approx_exp_meets_falcon_precision and samplerz::tests::test_approx_exp pass with the tightened 2^23 ULP tolerance.
  4. Revoke and re-generate long-lived Falcon key pairs that were heavily utilized for signing under versions 0.1.0 through 0.1.2.

References


Read the full report for CVE-2026-77382 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.

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