The text analyzes the legal and constitutional aspects of the protection of pornography, contrasting Wendy McElroy's liberal vision of autonomy with structural and dignity-based concepts. The author indicates that the Polish legal system does not offer a single, pure doctrine but operates by weighing competing values: freedom of expression (Art. 54), the right to personal life (Art. 47), and the protection of public morality and dignity (Art. 30 and 31). A key point of the analysis is the distinction between private consumption of content and its public imposition, which is reflected in Art. 202 of the Penal Code. The article argues that the liberal model of autonomy allows for the justification of both the right to sexual expression and the protection of those who do not wish to participate in its reception, based on the principle of symmetrical communicative consent.
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