The logic of genocide and N. Finkelstein's analysis

The text analyzes the rigorous legal construction of the crime of genocide, focusing on the concept of dolus specialis—the specific intent to destroy a group. The author contrasts the colloquial understanding of genocide with the definition provided by the 1948 Convention, pointing out that the scale of casualties alone does not determine the classification of the act without evidence of intent. Using case law from the International Court of Justice (Srebrenica, Bosnia, Croatia), the text discusses the high evidentiary threshold and the possibility of inferring intent from a pattern of conduct. In the context of Gaza, the argumentation of Norman Finkelstein is cited, who views the material destruction of infrastructure and blockades as a coherent systemic project. The article emphasizes the difficulty in distinguishing mass war crimes from genocide, where genocidal intent must be the only reasonable inference drawn from the analysis of the facts.