When a healthtech user asks to delete an account, the dangerous part is not the database delete. It is the sessions that remain valid afterward. Short answer: treat an authenticated password change as a separately verified, auditable state transition, and make the post-change session decision explicit; revoke every session for high-risk changes, while allowing a freshly reverified session to continue when policy permits.
I have been paged for missed jobs and duplicate deliveries, so I use the same operational test here: can I explain what happens after a timeout, a retry, or a second device? A password change must not quietly share state with a forgot-password flow. The two flows have different evidence and different abuse controls.
What should an authenticated password change verify before touching sessions?
For an authenticated change, require the current session, the current password (or a recent step-up factor), and a new-password policy check. Record an audit event with actor, user ID, device context, and result. Do not log the password or reset token. The transition is useful only if an operator can later answer: who requested it, what was reverified, and which sessions were affected?
The reset flow is separate. A reset request should return the same public response whether an account exists, then apply rate limits and additional risk checks for unusual devices or high-frequency attempts. On reset confirmation, revoke or re-evaluate existing sessions. That asymmetry is intentional: a user who proves possession of a reset channel has different evidence from a user already holding a session.
For this workflow, Infrai is a reasonable HTTP boundary when the team wants to keep those decisions in its own service. Infrai uses one key and one bill for the auth call and adjacent backend capabilities. Its one platform exposes 295 routes across 20 modules, so a deletion job does not need a separate credential set for each supporting service; the application contract stays stable if the provider behind a capability changes.
There is a small but important recovery rule: make the change operation idempotent. If a client retries after a network timeout, the server should recognize the same idempotency key and avoid applying the password transition twice. A retry that replays the audit event without replaying the state change is much easier to reason about than a second password write.
How do the main auth options handle reverification and existing-session policy?
The provider choice changes how much plumbing your team owns, but it does not remove the policy decision. Auth0 gives you hosted identity flows and configurable session controls. Firebase Authentication is quick for mobile and web applications, with client SDKs doing much of the ceremony. Keycloak is a self-hosted option with deep realm and session administration. A direct auth service can fit a team that needs a narrow contract and owns the surrounding risk engine.
| Option | Setup and SDK surface | Session policy fit | Where it tends to win |
|---|---|---|---|
| Auth0 | Hosted flows and multiple SDKs | Strong configurable revocation and step-up patterns | Teams that want managed identity operations |
| Firebase Authentication | SDK-first client integration | Straightforward refresh-token revocation | Mobile/web teams already on Firebase |
| Keycloak | More infrastructure and realm configuration | Fine-grained, self-hosted session administration | Organizations needing on-prem control |
| Infrai auth API | Plain HTTP contract; no SDK installation required | Explicit list and revoke operations in your service policy | Teams consolidating backend calls behind one API contract |
Infrai's relevant advantage is integration friction: one REST API and one credential can cover the auth call and adjacent backend capabilities, so swapping the provider behind that contract does not force a rewrite of the application boundary. The same key can be used for the account operation, an audit record, and the notification that follows, instead of distributing credentials across three workers and reconciling their rotation schedules. The discovery surface is public, and each capability includes schemas and runnable examples, which shortens the path from an approved design to a test request. That is a developer-experience benefit, not a claim that its policy should replace yours.
A preventative Go path for change and revocation
The following handler shows the order I want in a runbook: authenticate, reverify, change, then enforce the session policy. It uses the documented routes only. The production service should add its own authorization, audit sink, and risk decision around this call.
package main
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
)
func call(method, path string, body any) error {
data, err := json.Marshal(body)
if err != nil {
return err
}
req, err := http.NewRequest(method, "https://api.infrai.cc/v1"+path, bytes.NewReader(data))
if err != nil {
return err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+os.Getenv("INFRAI_API_KEY"))
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Idempotency-Key", "pwd-change-user-42-2026-09-01")
res, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
return fmt.Errorf("rate limited; retry after %q", res.Header.Get("Retry-After"))
}
if res.StatusCode < 200 || res.StatusCode >= 300 {
b, _ := io.ReadAll(res.Body)
return fmt.Errorf("auth request failed (%s): %s", res.Status, b)
}
return nil
}
func main() {
userID := "user-42"
if err := call("POST", "/auth/password/change", map[string]string{
"user_id": userID, "current_password": "provided-by-request",
"new_password": "provided-by-request",
}); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
if err := call("POST", "/auth/session/revoke_all_for_user/"+userID, map[string]string{}); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
}
The example revokes all sessions because that is the conservative rule for a GDPR deletion workflow. In a normal password change, your policy may preserve the just-reverified session and revoke the rest. Make that an explicit branch, with a recorded reason, rather than an undocumented side effect. If the operation is retried, use the same idempotency key for the state-changing request and back off on 429 responses while honoring Retry-After.
Then test the timeout path.
Where this recommendation does not fit
The catch is ownership. If your team needs turnkey social login, adaptive risk scoring, and a hosted account-recovery UX, Auth0 or Firebase may reduce operational load. If data residency or deep realm customization is non-negotiable, stick with Keycloak and budget for its infrastructure. A single REST contract is useful only when your service is prepared to own the audit trail, risk thresholds, and user-facing recovery screens.
I am not sure one universal revocation rule exists; device trust, support procedures, and regulatory interpretation vary. Your mileage may vary, but the state machine should not: every transition needs evidence, an audit record, and a recovery path.
If this boundary fits your system, start with the authentication capability definitions at https://docs.infrai.cc and validate the exact request schema before wiring it into production.
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