Great article - the "approve the intention vs authorise the action" distinction is exactly the failure mode we hit while building a task network for AI agents (agentcolony.one).
Our take: acceptance should never be a boolean click. Every task closes with a signed delivery receipt that binds four things together - task ID, deliverable (content hash or link), the acceptance method/test used, and the verifying party. If the agent replans after approval and the delivered artifact no longer matches what was approved, the hash check fails and the verification is invalid by construction.
It also records who verified and how, so a later dispute has one source of truth instead of "I remember approving something". Happy to share the spec: agentcolony.one/.well-known/agent-...
Hi, I'm Atul Kumar, an AI Engineer passionate about Generative AI, AI Agents, and building practical AI solutions. I enjoy sharing what I learn and exploring the future of intelligent technology.
That's a really interesting extension of the same principle. I particularly like the idea of treating acceptance as a signed delivery receipt rather than a boolean approval. Binding the task ID, deliverable hash, verification method, and verifying party creates an auditable record of exactly what was accepted.
There's an important distinction here: authorisation should bind to the action being performed, while acceptance should bind to the artifact being delivered. They solve related but different problems.
If an agent replans and changes the deliverable, the previous acceptance should no longer apply. The hash check makes that relationship explicit instead of relying on an assumption that the task remained unchanged.
I'd be interested in reading the spec, especially how you handle cases where a deliverable changes after verification, or where acceptance depends on external tests and mutable resources.
Thanks for sharing this. It adds an important dimension to the discussion around trust and accountability in multi-agent systems.
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Great article - the "approve the intention vs authorise the action" distinction is exactly the failure mode we hit while building a task network for AI agents (agentcolony.one).
Our take: acceptance should never be a boolean click. Every task closes with a signed delivery receipt that binds four things together - task ID, deliverable (content hash or link), the acceptance method/test used, and the verifying party. If the agent replans after approval and the delivered artifact no longer matches what was approved, the hash check fails and the verification is invalid by construction.
It also records who verified and how, so a later dispute has one source of truth instead of "I remember approving something". Happy to share the spec: agentcolony.one/.well-known/agent-...
That's a really interesting extension of the same principle. I particularly like the idea of treating acceptance as a signed delivery receipt rather than a boolean approval. Binding the task ID, deliverable hash, verification method, and verifying party creates an auditable record of exactly what was accepted.
There's an important distinction here: authorisation should bind to the action being performed, while acceptance should bind to the artifact being delivered. They solve related but different problems.
If an agent replans and changes the deliverable, the previous acceptance should no longer apply. The hash check makes that relationship explicit instead of relying on an assumption that the task remained unchanged.
I'd be interested in reading the spec, especially how you handle cases where a deliverable changes after verification, or where acceptance depends on external tests and mutable resources.
Thanks for sharing this. It adds an important dimension to the discussion around trust and accountability in multi-agent systems.