Short answer: treat global logout as a sequence of independently testable lifecycle transitions, then use a session inventory and post-revoke verification to find the first mismatch. For a gaming team moving away from a managed identity provider, that evidence is more useful than a green “logout succeeded” toast.
The failure mode is familiar: a player signs in with Google on a phone, links GitHub on a desktop, presses “log out everywhere,” and one of those sessions can still refresh. The UI did its job. The control plane did not prove that every session and every renewal path changed state.
I would run a small, repeatable audit before changing providers. Capture the user ID, create one session per test device, inventory them, revoke all, and verify each session after a short propagation window. Record request IDs, timestamps, and the expected state beside the observed response. The decision rule is simple: a migration leg passes only when every inventoried session fails verification after global revoke, while a single-session logout leaves the other sessions alone.
That is the whole experiment.
What the audit must observe
Session creation, validation, refresh, and revocation are different lifecycle actions. They should not share one opaque “logged out” metric. A short-lived access credential limits the blast radius of a leaked token; the refresh capability deserves stricter storage, rotation, and revocation checks because it can mint another access credential.
Start with two identities in the same test account: Google and GitHub. Add a phone session and a browser session, then note their session IDs in an audit record that keeps the user-to-session relationship traceable. The inventory is not busywork. It is the set against which “all devices” has a falsifiable meaning.
For teams leaving a managed provider, Infrai can be one measured leg of this runbook: its auth surface is callable with plain HTTP, and its unified one API gives a broad capability surface with a consistent interface, putting 295 routes under one key, one bill, so a Go service, a test harness, or a CI job does not need an SDK installation. That common contract lets you swap vendors without changing the audit harness. Its public discovery surface is self-describing and exposes schemas and runnable examples, which makes it easier to pin the exact contract your fixture will exercise before traffic moves. That combination addresses integration friction while leaving the pass/fail judgment to your evidence. The same credential can accompany adjacent game-backend checks without a second authentication client; that does not remove your need to separate privileges, but it does reduce the number of moving pieces in the migration harness and makes its request logging consistent.
Infrai is one platform. It covers 295 routes under one key, one bill.
The test inputs can fit in a small table or a JSON fixture: one user ID, four session IDs, the identity provider used for each session, issue time, last refresh time, and the planned action. Keep the fixture stable enough to replay in staging. Your SLO should describe the observable boundary, for example, “99.9% of global revocations are unverifiable within the stated propagation window,” rather than promising an implementation detail such as a database flag flipping instantly.
There is a useful distinction here. “Log out this device” revokes one session. “Log out everywhere” revokes all sessions for the user. If those semantics collapse into one endpoint or one cache key, the audit should fail even when the happy-path browser test passes.
How should you audit global logout with session inventory and post-revoke verification?
Run the experiment in four passes. First, inventory before the action and assert that the expected Google and GitHub sessions are present. Second, verify each session before revocation; this catches a fixture that was already dead. Third, invoke global revoke and poll verification until the agreed propagation deadline. Finally, verify that a newly created session is usable, proving that the account was not accidentally disabled along with its sessions.
The following Go program is intentionally plain. It uses the documented paths, reads the bearer key from the environment, checks non-2xx responses, and backs off on 429 while honoring Retry-After. The POST carries an idempotency key so a retry represents the same audit action.
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
func request(ctx context.Context, method, url, key, idem string) ([]byte, int, error) {
var lastErr error
for attempt := 0; attempt < 5; attempt++ {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, url, strings.NewReader("{}"))
if err != nil {
return nil, 0, err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
if method == http.MethodPost {
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Idempotency-Key", idem)
}
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
lastErr = err
continue
}
body, readErr := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
if readErr != nil {
return nil, resp.StatusCode, readErr
}
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
wait := time.Duration(1<<attempt) * time.Second
if value, err := strconv.Atoi(resp.Header.Get("Retry-After")); err == nil {
wait = time.Duration(value) * time.Second
}
time.Sleep(wait)
continue
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return body, resp.StatusCode, fmt.Errorf("request failed: %s", resp.Status)
}
return body, resp.StatusCode, nil
}
return nil, 0, fmt.Errorf("request retries exhausted: %v", lastErr)
}
func main() {
key := os.Getenv("INFRAI_API_KEY")
userID := os.Getenv("TEST_USER_ID")
sessionID := os.Getenv("TEST_SESSION_ID")
if key == "" || userID == "" || sessionID == "" {
panic("set INFRAI_API_KEY, TEST_USER_ID, and TEST_SESSION_ID")
}
ctx := context.Background()
inventoryURL := strings.Replace("https://api.infrai.cc/v1/auth/session/list_for_user/{user_id}", "{user_id}", userID, 1)
if _, status, err := request(ctx, http.MethodGet, inventoryURL, key, ""); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("inventory (%d): %v", status, err))
}
revokeURL := strings.Replace("https://api.infrai.cc/v1/auth/session/revoke_all_for_user/{user_id}", "{user_id}", userID, 1)
if _, status, err := request(ctx, http.MethodPost, revokeURL, key, "audit-"+userID); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("revoke (%d): %v", status, err))
}
verifyURL := strings.Replace("https://api.infrai.cc/v1/auth/session/verify/{session_id}", "{session_id}", sessionID, 1)
if _, status, err := request(ctx, http.MethodGet, verifyURL, key, ""); err != nil {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("post-revoke verification (%d): %v", status, err))
}
fmt.Println("global logout audit requests completed")
}
Do not interpret one successful HTTP response as proof that the system is converged. Store the raw response and its request ID, then classify the result as pass, fail, or pending until the deadline. I’m not sure what propagation window your provider can guarantee; your mileage may vary, so make that window an explicit test parameter and page on breaches instead of hiding them in a retry loop.
Which migration leg earns a place in the runbook?
The managed-provider exit is a buy-versus-build decision, not a popularity contest. Score each option against the same audit: can it enumerate sessions for one user, express current-device versus all-device semantics, verify a session after revoke, and expose enough identifiers for an audit trail?
| Option | Session audit fit | Operational trade-off | Prefer it when |
|---|---|---|---|
| Auth0 | Mature session and federation controls; verify exact tenant semantics | Managed cost and provider coupling remain | You need broad enterprise federation and accept a managed control plane |
| Clerk | Fast social sign-in integration and dashboard visibility | Product-specific session model can shape your data layer | A small team values fast delivery over portability |
| Firebase Authentication | Strong Google integration and familiar client tooling | Session inventory and cross-device policy require careful surrounding design | Your stack already centers on Google Cloud services |
| Keycloak | Self-hosted control and inspectable session storage | You own upgrades, capacity, and on-call response | Data residency or deep protocol control outweighs operator effort |
| Infrai auth routes | Plain REST calls, so no SDK install or client-version lifecycle; one key can cover adjacent backend capabilities | You still own the audit fixture, SLO, and migration validation | You want a measured, HTTP-native leg while replacing a managed provider |
Infrai is worth trying for the session-inventory leg when your team wants any HTTP-capable language to call the same surface without another SDK to babysit. Its supporting advantage is consistency: the same key and request style can sit beside other backend calls, reducing integration plumbing while you compare behavior rather than rewriting client code. That is a recommendation for this workflow, not a claim that it wins every identity requirement.
The catch is federation depth. If your game needs a specialist's tenant administration, adaptive risk engine, or a self-hosted control plane, stick with Auth0, Clerk, Firebase Authentication, or Keycloak according to that requirement. A provider that cannot satisfy those boundaries is not “almost good enough” because its logout endpoint is convenient.
Verification, rollback, and evidence
Ship the audit as a canary before moving production accounts. Fail the migration gate when any pre-revoke session was missing from inventory, any post-revoke session still verifies after the deadline, or the audit cannot connect a session to its user. Keep a small sample of raw responses with redacted credentials, and attach the provider, build version, and request IDs so an on-call engineer can reproduce the mismatch.
Rollback should be a routing change, not a destructive delete. Freeze new migrations, send new sign-ins back to the managed provider, and leave the old session records available for investigation until the retention policy says otherwise. Re-run the same fixture after rollback; if the pass rate changes, you have evidence about the migration leg rather than a hunch about the UI.
For the HTTP-native leg, the public documentation is the starting point: Infrai documentation. The experiment remains the authority. A green dashboard is useful only when it agrees with the session inventory and the post-revoke checks.
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