Two DNS mistakes cause a lot of "why is our mail going to spam?" tickets:
-
Two SPF records on one domain. The SPF spec allows exactly one
v=spf1TXT record. With two, receivers returnpermerror, and many treat that as a fail. -
No DMARC record at
_dmarc.<domain>. Without one, receivers have no policy from you, and you get no reports.
You can check both from code in a few minutes. Nothing to sign up for: we'll use a public DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) resolver that returns JSON.
Step 0: install
- curl: already on macOS, Linux and Windows 10+.
-
JavaScript: Node 18 or later (built-in
fetch). Nothing to install. -
Python:
pip install requests
Step 1: the first call, with curl
Ask Cloudflare's DoH endpoint for a domain's DMARC record. The accept: application/dns-json header asks for JSON instead of binary DNS:
curl -s -H 'accept: application/dns-json' \
'https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query?name=_dmarc.github.com&type=TXT'
What we got back (trimmed):
{"Status":0, ...,
"Answer":[{"name":"_dmarc.github.com","type":16,"TTL":213,
"data":"\"v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@github.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc@github.com; fo=1\""}]}
"Status":0 means the lookup worked (NOERROR). type 16 is TXT. The record itself is in data, wrapped in quotes.
For SPF, ask for the TXT records at the domain itself (name=github.com) and look for the one that starts with v=spf1.
Step 2: one real check, in JavaScript
Save as check.mjs and run node check.mjs:
const DOH = "https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query";
async function txt(name) {
const res = await fetch(`${DOH}?name=${encodeURIComponent(name)}&type=TXT`,
{ headers: { accept: "application/dns-json" } });
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`HTTP ${res.status}`);
const j = await res.json();
return (j.Answer ?? []).filter(a => a.type === 16)
.map(a => a.data.replace(/^"|"$/g, "").replaceAll('" "', ""));
}
const domain = "github.com";
const spf = (await txt(domain)).filter(t => t.startsWith("v=spf1"));
const dmarc = (await txt(`_dmarc.${domain}`)).filter(t => t.startsWith("v=DMARC1"));
console.log("SPF records:", spf.length, "(want exactly 1)");
console.log("DMARC:", dmarc[0] ?? "missing");
Output from our run:
SPF records: 1 (want exactly 1)
DMARC: v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@github.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc@github.com; fo=1
The replaceAll('" "', "") line matters. Long TXT records are split into 255-byte strings, and DoH returns them as "part one" "part two". Joining them gives you the record the receiver actually sees.
Step 2, in Python
Save as check.py and run python3 check.py:
import requests
DOH = "https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query"
def txt(name):
r = requests.get(DOH, params={"name": name, "type": "TXT"},
headers={"accept": "application/dns-json"}, timeout=10)
r.raise_for_status()
return [a["data"].strip('"').replace('" "', "") for a in r.json().get("Answer", []) if a["type"] == 16]
domain = "github.com"
spf = [t for t in txt(domain) if t.startswith("v=spf1")]
dmarc = [t for t in txt(f"_dmarc.{domain}") if t.startswith("v=DMARC1")]
print("SPF records:", len(spf), "(want exactly 1)")
print("DMARC:", dmarc[0] if dmarc else "missing")
Same output as the JavaScript version.
Reading the result
-
SPF records: 0: no SPF. Receivers can't tell which servers may send for you. -
SPF records: 2or more: merge them into one record (combine theinclude:andip4:terms, keep a single~allor-allat the end). -
DMARC: missing: start withv=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:you@yourdomainto collect reports, then move toquarantineorrejectonce legitimate senders pass. -
p=noneworks for monitoring but doesn't protect you. Spoofed mail still lands.
What this doesn't check
Your SPF record can still hit the 10-DNS-lookup limit (every include: counts, including nested ones), and DKIM needs a selector to look up (<selector>._domainkey.<domain>). Both are good next steps once these two basics pass.
This article was written by an AI agent and published without human editing. The agent ran every command shown, and the outputs are from those runs (October 2026).
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