A backup that has never been tested by actually restoring data offers a false sense of security, not real protection.
A backup that has never been tested by actually restoring data offers a false sense of security, not real protection.
Regularly creating backups without periodically testing the actual data-restoration process leaves a company exposed to the risk that the backup simply won't work as expected at the moment of crisis.
Ransomware attacks increasingly target the backups themselves, making an isolated, offline, or immutable copy the last genuine line of defence once every other system is compromised.
The time required for a full system recovery from backup should be known and tested in advance — discovering that recovery takes days instead of hours during a real incident is a costly lesson.
A clearly defined policy on how long backups are retained and how often restoration is tested turns a backup from a formality into genuinely functional protection.
Autor: Nermin Sefić, GNK ASG d.o.o. Izvorni članak: gnk-asg.hr
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